


---

This is a reproduction of a library book that was digitized by Google as part of an ongoing effort to preserve the information in books and make it universally accessible.

Google<sup>TM</sup> books

<http://books.google.com>





BRI

AS

OLAFLOKKE  
BOOK BINDING  
BLOOMINGTON







7827

A15







THE  
AMERICAN JOURNAL  
OF  
THEOLOGY

EDITED BY  
THE DIVINITY FACULTY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

VOLUME XV  
1911

**The University of Chicago Press**  
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

83185

BR1  
.A5

Published  
January, April, July, October 1911

Composed and Printed By  
The University of Chicago Press  
Chicago, Illinois, U. S. A.

# TABLE OF CONTENTS

## JANUARY

	PAGE
THEOLOGICAL EDUCATION. Arthur Cushman McGiffert . . . . .	1-19
THE HISTORICITY OF JESUS: AN ESTIMATE OF THE NEGATIVE ARGUMENT Shirley Jackson Case . . . . .	20-42
PRAGMATIC ELEMENTS IN MODERNISM. Errett Gates . . . . .	43-56
THE EVOLUTION OF RELIGION. Shailer Mathews . . . . .	57-82
CRITICAL NOTES: <i>Matthew and the Virgin Birth.</i> Benjamin Wisner Bacon	83
<i>Theological Obscurantism.</i> Frank Hugh Foster . . . . .	96
RECENT THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE . . . . .	107-156
BRIEF MENTION . . . . .	156-165
BOOKS RECEIVED . . . . .	166-168

## APRIL

THE HISTORICAL CHARACTER OF THE GOSPEL OF MARK. F. Crawford Burkitt . . . . .	169-193
THE INFLUENCE OF PSYCHOLOGY UPON RELIGION. Clarence Augustine Beckwith . . . . .	194-204
IS JESUS A HISTORICAL CHARACTER: EVIDENCE FOR AN AFFIRMATIVE OPINION. Shirley Jackson Case . . . . .	205-227
THE CRISIS IN DOCTRINAL CHRISTIANITY. John E. Russell . . . . .	228-237
THOUGHTS ON THE IDEA OF A FIRST CAUSE. Edouard Montet . . . . .	238-249
THE LOGICAL ASPECT OF RELIGIOUS UNITY. Gregory D. Walcott . . . . .	250-258
CRITICAL NOTES: <i>The Pre-Christian Jesus.</i> William Benjamin Smith . . . . .	259
<i>Jesus' Historicity: A Statement of the Problem.</i> Shirley Jackson Case . . . . .	265
<i>The Toronto Gospels.</i> Edgar J. Goodspeed . . . . .	268
RECENT THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE . . . . .	272-313
BRIEF MENTION . . . . .	313-332
BOOKS RECEIVED . . . . .	333-336

## JULY

THE "TWO NATURES" AND RECENT CHRISTOLOGICAL SPECULATION. I, The Christology of the New Testament Writings. Benjamin B. Warfield . . . . .	337-361
---	---------



	PAGE
IS BELIEF IN THE HISTORICITY OF JESUS INDISPENSABLE TO CHRISTIAN FAITH? Douglas C. Mackintosh . . . . .	362-372
THE RESURRECTION IN PRIMITIVE TRADITION AND OBSERVANCE. Benjamin Wisner Bacon . . . . .	373-403
DOSITHEUS, THE SAMARITAN HERESARCH, AND HIS RELATIONS TO JEWISH AND CHRISTIAN DOCTRINES AND SECTS. Kaufmann Kohler . . . . .	404-435
A WORD OF PROTEST: MUST CHRISTIANS ABANDON THEIR HISTORIC FAITH? John Alfred Faulkner . . . . .	436-444
CRITICAL NOTES: <i>The Text of the Toronto Gospels.</i> Edgar J. Goodspeed . . . . .	445
<i>Bardesanes and the Odes of Solomon.</i> Martin Sprengling . . . . .	459
<i>Concerning Palon's Review of König's Dictionary</i> . . . . .	461
RECENT THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE . . . . .	463-484
BRIEF MENTION . . . . .	484-500
BOOKS RECEIVED . . . . .	501-504

---

## OCTOBER

THE MOST IMPORTANT MOTIVES FOR BEHAVIOR IN THE LIFE OF THE EARLY CHRISTIANS. E. von Dobschütz . . . . .	505-524
THE HEBREW VIEW OF SIN. Henry Preserved Smith . . . . .	525-545
THE "TWO NATURES" AND RECENT CHRISTOLOGICAL SPECULATION. II, The New Testament Jesus the Only Real Jesus. Benjamin B. Warfield . . . . .	546-568
THE CLASSIFICATION AND EVOLUTION OF MIRACLE. John Edwards Le Bosquet . . . . .	569-583
THE CHRISTOLOGY OF A MODERN RATIONALIST. Frank Hugh Foster . . . . .	584-598
RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE AND THEOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT. George Galloway . . . . .	599-608
CRITICAL NOTES: <i>A Critique on Professor Warfield's Article "The Christology of the New Testament Writings" in the July Number of This Journal.</i> George Holley Gilbert . . . . .	609
<i>Is Belief in the Historicity of Jesus Indispensable to Christian Faith?</i> Shailer Mathews . . . . .	614
<i>Ignatius and the Odist.</i> J. de Zwaan . . . . .	617
RECENT THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE . . . . .	626-651
BRIEF MENTION . . . . .	651-659
BOOKS RECEIVED . . . . .	660-662

# THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY

Volume XV

JANUARY, 1911

Number 1

## THEOLOGICAL EDUCATION<sup>1</sup>

---

ARTHUR CUSHMAN McGIFFERT  
Union Theological Seminary, New York City

---

The present is a time of widespread confusion in theological education. Until a comparatively recent date there was general agreement among our theological schools as to the kind of course needed to prepare men for the Christian ministry. The curricula of all of them were much the same and were practically what they had been from the beginning. Every student was expected to study the Old and New Testaments in their original tongues, church history, apologetic and dogmatic theology, homiletics, and the pastoral care. Beyond these time-honoured subjects no one thought of going. But within the last few years a great change has taken place. It has come to be widely felt that the traditional course is inadequate and ill-adapted to the needs of the ministry in this modern age. On every hand we are hearing criticism of the old order of things and the demand that theological education be radically reconstructed in order to bring it into closer touch with existing conditions. No one can deny that there is justice in the criticism and that the demand for reconstruction has at least some warrant. In many of our theological institutions change has already come on a larger or smaller scale. New subjects undreamed of by the fathers have been given a place in the curriculum and are engaging a large share of attention. But the immediate result has been serious confusion. It was

<sup>1</sup> Address given at the Meadville Theological School (June, 1909).

difficult enough in the three years of the theological course adequately to master even the five or six subjects which formerly constituted the whole of the curriculum. To add the many new subjects that are clamoring for treatment and still do thorough and satisfactory work is out of the question. Students must either content themselves with a mere smattering of knowledge in a great variety of fields or must select a few out of the many and confine their attention to those few. The former is demoralizing, the latter alone rational. As a consequence the necessity of an elective system has been frankly recognized by many of our theological schools. But the result is the emergence of a serious question. Are all the subjects already taught or to be taught hereafter of equal importance to the prospective minister? Does it make no difference to which he devotes his attention? Is a man adequately prepared for the work of the Christian ministry who has spent three years of graduate study in a more or less theological atmosphere and in the pursuit of any subjects not altogether alien to religion and theology which he may happen to have elected? A system of election carried through consistently and thoroughly undoubtedly implies this. But few theological faculties probably are ready to assent to it. What subjects then are necessary? Which, if any, among the multiplicity of studies now claiming attention should be required of every student? Which may fairly be left to his own choice? This fundamental question has not always been seriously faced and answered on its merits. Like many of our colleges, our theological schools have as a rule drifted into the position in which they find themselves or have reached it simply by way of compromise. The traditional disciplines were provided for by fully endowed professorships. They were already in possession of the field and they seemed the only bulwark against complete educational anarchy. New subjects were gradually given a place as the demand became insistent, sometimes as required studies, oftener in somewhat contemptuous fashion as electives, and the amount of time devoted to the older courses was curtailed only so far as necessary to give standing-room to the newer ones.

This, of course, is not a permanently tolerable situation. The



whole matter must be dealt with in a more radical and thorough-going fashion. The question must be asked by all our theological institutions: What does the Christian minister actually need to fit him for his work in the present age? The importance of the question was never greater than it is today. There have been periods when all was settled and students needed only to receive the Christian system ready made from the hands of their instructors and pass it on unchanged to their people. The appropriation of a definite and circumscribed system, well understood and generally agreed upon, at least within the communion to which the school belonged, was all that was required. Today the situation is wholly changed. The old way of looking at things is out of date and the old landmarks have largely disappeared. This we are feeling both in our liberal and in our conservative churches. Theology is in the making and ethical and religious ideals and aspirations are in flux. The need of the age is not more men in the ministry, as so many are saying, but more strong and thoroughly trained men. There is need, as perhaps never before, of wise and intelligent leaders who shall be able rightly to guide the church and the world in this time of religious confusion and upheaval. In quiet seasons, when all is going on as in the past, when traditional principles and customs are everywhere in control, men of meager gifts and narrow training may be equal to the task of uttering the familiar message to a docile people. But now only strong men can meet the situation. Men of insight, of discrimination, of independence, of initiative, men who can think clearly and to good purpose and can act wisely and efficiently—such men we must have. How to train them is the problem facing our theological institutions today. No school can make little men into great men, but men adequately endowed—and no others ought to, go into the ministry in this age—can be given an equipment which will enable them to minister wisely and helpfully to this restless and changing age, an equipment without which they are likely to be blind leaders of the blind and to impede instead of promote the progress of God's kingdom in this earth.

What kind of a training then should the theological student have to fit him for efficient service in the Christian ministry of

today? What are the ends at which he needs particularly to aim and the lines along which he needs particularly to work? Difficult or even impossible as it may be to reach a satisfactory answer to this question in the present condition of things, or to give the answer, if it were reached, practical effect in theological education, at least the question is worth raising. I am concerned here only with training for the work of the active ministry. Undoubtedly our theological schools should also train theological specialists and should offer opportunities to social and religious workers of various kinds. But the great majority of our students are preparing for the specific work of the Christian ministry, and it is only of them that I shall undertake to speak.

I. First of all I should say it is essential that the Christian minister in this age, as in every other, should understand Christianity, should know what it is he represents, and what he has to offer the world and this age in which he lives. This seems axiomatic and yet strangely enough some modern writers on theological education disregard it altogether. They insist that the one all-important thing for the theological student to know is the world of today, what it is and what it needs, in order to be able to minister wisely to it. Those who take this position seem to assume that the business of the Christian minister is simply to help the world in any way he can quite without regard to Christianity and to what it may have to offer, or that it is so easy to understand Christianity that no special study of it is required. The former assumption is based upon a misconception of the ministerial calling, the latter upon a misunderstanding of the nature of Christianity.

The Christian minister is not a mere philanthropist or social reformer, he is the representative and herald of the Christian religion. It is his business not merely to help the world as any earnest man of any other faith or of no faith might undertake to help it, but to bring to bear upon the world the uplifting power of Christianity. He is a Christian minister just because he believes that in Christianity there is power for the betterment of humanity and of the world, and there rests upon him the responsibility of making that power tell in the largest possible degree. I do not mean to say that a Christian minister should make use of none

but Christian agencies, and should withhold his active support from movements for good carried on under other than Christian auspices. On the contrary, he should promote every good cause he can by every possible means and should co-operate with all the forces of goodness everywhere, whatever their name or sign. But it is his specific duty to marshal all the Christian forces over which he has control and to enlist all the Christian spirit at his command for the accomplishment of God's work in the world. And if he is to do this wisely and efficiently it is necessary that he understand Christianity thoroughly. No mere casual acquaintance with it, no mere general notion that it means kindness and mercy and love, will answer the purpose. There must be an intimate familiarity with it in its inner nature and in its various manifestations if he is to make it a real power and bring it to bear in helpful fashion upon the diverse needs of the community and of the age. There are those, as we all know, who believe that Christianity has no message for the world of today, who think it an outworn system and look elsewhere for their ideals and their inspirations. If this were to become the plight of any Christian minister undoubtedly he ought to substitute for Christian means and Christian agencies others that seemed to him more effective in promoting the common end. For no man should make use of less effective means simply because they are Christian. The one great end is to get the work done, to get builded in this our earth the kingdom of God by whatever means we can. But the only reason men do not believe in the power of Christianity to meet the needs of today as well as of other days is because they do not understand it. If it seem to anybody inappropriate and ineffective in the modern situation it is because it has not been fully comprehended. No one is justified in doubting it or turning from it until he knows it through and through, and certainly of all men the Christian minister is recreant to his task who either distrusts its efficiency or fails to make it as efficient as it might be made because he has not fully mastered its meaning and grasped its innermost significance. And to do this is no easy matter, as the critics referred to above seem to suppose. To understand the genius of any great movement, to see what it means and what it demands, to determine its adaptations, to



measure its limitations, and to uncover the sources of its power is one of the most difficult of tasks, and Christianity is no exception to the rule. The easy-going acceptance of it and the easy going rejection of it are alike mischievous. Either way it is discredited and shorn of its power. The fundamental thing for every Christian minister is thoroughly to understand it that he may bring Christianity itself and not some poor counterfeit of it to bear on the world in which he lives, and that he may draw on its deep wells of power and not upon the broken cisterns of some self-created delusion.

Whatever else then a theological seminary does it must give its students an understanding of Christianity. But how is this to be done? Here there may be many opinions. The main thing is to secure agreement concerning the end to be aimed at. If there be agreement here we shall have at least one clear principle to guide us in the shaping of our theological curricula and the differences in detail will matter relatively little. But let us look at some of the details. Assuming the fundamental aim just stated how may it be reached?

I suppose everyone will admit that an essential to the understanding of Christianity is an understanding of Jesus Christ, of his purposes, of his intentions, of what it was he wished and undertook to do. Some would say this is the whole of Christianity. I do not myself take so narrow a view, but that it is an important part of it I am quite sure. I am not talking here of what is commonly called christology, the origin and nature of Jesus Christ, the constitution of his person, his relation to God. All this is of secondary importance. The essential question is, What it was he undertook to do and what he actually did. This at least one must know if one would understand Christianity.

And yet it is an extraordinary fact that in most of our theological institutions relatively little emphasis is laid in the curriculum upon the study of Jesus. There are courses upon the gospels and also, in some cases, a single course upon the life and teaching of Christ, but as a rule he is subordinated to instruction in the New Testament as such, and so far as most of the curricula go, he might be the least important of all the subjects that demand the students'

attention. This is a lamentable situation. There is no one thing the theological student ought to know more thoroughly than the work and purposes of Jesus. He cannot be treated adequately by the New Testament department alone, nor should he be. He should be made the center, or at any rate be given a place in the work of every department. There should be courses in the ethics of Jesus, his conception of religion, his idea of God, his place in the history of the church or of the world, his use of the Old Testament, his attitude and methods as a teacher, as a preacher, and so on—courses conducted by the departments severally concerned. The New Testament department should see to it that his life and work and teaching as a whole are set forth and the sources for a knowledge of them carefully investigated; but in all the departments the students' thought should be continually brought back to Christ. It should be the aim of instruction, so far as possible, to bring him before the men as he appeared to those who saw him in the flesh and to let him make his own appeal to them. If he be divine, he ought to convince them of his divinity; if he be supreme, he ought to convince them of his supremacy as he did his early disciples. Theological students, of all men, ought not to accept his supremacy on the basis of theological tradition or philosophical speculation. To give them an enthusiasm for Jesus, born of their own vision of him as he really was, this alone can make them at once true and effective ministers of his.

But if Jesus is to be understood he must be studied in the light of his environment, not as a supernatural figure, a second Melchizedek without father or mother, but as a member of the Jewish race and an heir of the great prophets. In other words, the history of Israel, of its aspirations, its ideals, and its ideas, all that inner life of a people which alone explains its great men—this too the student must know who would adequately understand Jesus himself. How far such study should be carried and how much it should involve I cannot attempt to say. It belongs primarily to the biblical department to answer the question. What is demanded at this point is not that a man shall know the Old Testament, but that he shall understand Jesus Christ, and so much of the Old Testament and so much of that which follows it

as may be necessary for this, it should be insisted that every theological student ought to have. Whether this shall involve the study of Hebrew is also not a question for me to answer. I can conceive that such study might immensely forward the end, but I can conceive also that it might hinder it, if it distracted attention from the one important matter. On the old theory that the Bible was the literal word of God, of course the study of it in its original tongues was an absolute necessity for every self-respecting preacher of the word. But now that that theory has passed away, the study of Hebrew and Greek for the Christian minister must justify itself primarily by showing that it gives him a better understanding of Jesus Christ. This, at least, the study of Hebrew properly conducted may doubtless be made to do by imparting a larger knowledge of the forces that made and molded Jesus and a more intimate acquaintance with the atmosphere in which he lived and moved.

✓ And still further, Jesus can be adequately understood only as he is studied in connection with his early followers. The impression which he made upon them is an essential part of our picture of him. It is not simply his words and deeds that bring him before our eyes, but the fascination which he exerted over them and the power with which his personality dominated them. And then, too, the sources upon which we must rely for a knowledge of his life and work come from them. Only when we understand them and make ourselves familiar with their ideals and ideas can we succeed in any degree in detaching him from the circle of his disciples and discover, better in many cases than they were able to do, his real purposes and his inner spirit. The New Testament then should be an object of study, not primarily in order to know it—that is not the point here—but in order the better to understand Jesus Christ. If this were recognized to be the primary end controlling New Testament study, its methods would evidently be different from those that have prevailed in the past. Just what might be involved I do not attempt to say. The determination of it belongs to the New Testament department. But whatever may be involved of New Testament philology, exegesis, history, theology, the Christian minister ought if possible to have.

But Jesus is not the whole of Christianity. It is a complex phenomenon and it has had a long history. No one can fully comprehend it as it now exists, unless he knows how it came to be what it is. No one indeed can fully know what it now is except as he has followed its history and is able to trace in it threads now in some cases almost wholly hidden from sight. The man who would make Christianity count for good in this age must know it in its various phases, past and present, know what it is and what it is not, what it can do and what it cannot do, the latter as important as the former. Nothing is easier for some people than to take Christianity in whatever form it is offered them without question and without discrimination. Nothing is easier for others than to reject the whole Christian system as untrue and ineffective. And nothing is easier perhaps for all of us than to accept an element of it here and there which happens to appeal to us. But in none of these ways can the Christian minister do his duty by the world, for in none of these ways can Christianity be brought effectively to bear upon the needs of the age. To disentangle the elements of which it is composed, to trace them to their origin and study them in their combination, to see how they have been affected by each other and modified by outside influences—all this is necessary if one is to make intelligent and discriminating use of the existing product. To know Christianity means not only to know it as a totality but to distinguish what is controlling and dominant in it from what is only subordinate and secondary. All the parts of a complex system may be made equal objects of faith but they cannot possibly be made equal instruments of power. Only when the dominant principles of Christianity are discovered and actually made controlling can it do the work it is fitted to do.

By the historical study of Christianity, by the study of it in its origin, in its development, and in its existing forms, the permanent and the temporary, the valuable and the worthless may be discriminated one from the other and the vital and controlling principles which give it its essential character and make it what it really is laid bare. It is not so much the history of Christian institutions or of the vicissitudes of the Christian Church that

is important but the history of the Christian idea and of the Christian spirit. What has Christianity been thought and felt to be? What has it actually proved itself to be to men of one and another type in one and another age, from the apostles' day to our own? This is how its significance and inner nature reveal themselves to the eye of the historian. Perhaps one may find by such study that Christianity has been in the main only a development of the principles of Jesus Christ and that it justly calls itself by his name because it has been true to his purposes. Or perhaps one may find that it has been almost from the beginning, even from the apostle Paul, or from the primitive disciples who knew Christ in the flesh, a complete perversion of his spirit, that it has made important what did not interest him and subordinated or forgotten all that he held dear. In either case, if we would understand Christianity we must know both Jesus Christ and the Christian centuries since his day. We may apply to the Christianity of the present age, to that of our own church, or of any other church, any test we please. We may measure it by its agreement with the spirit and purposes of Jesus or by its adaptation to the needs of the men of today. In either case we can estimate it justly only as we know it in its origin and history. We must know it thus if it be only to reject it. We must know it thus if we would reform it and make it conform more nearly to our ideal of it. Much more must we know it thus if we would wisely and effectively employ it as an instrument for the promotion of God's work in the world.

Another discipline rich in fruitfulness for the understanding of Christianity is the history of religion, or the comparative study of the principal religions of the world. It has but recently found its way into our theological institutions and by some its rightful place there is disputed on the ground that it is, strictly speaking, a university not a theological discipline. But this is to misunderstand the principal end of theological study, which is not to gain an acquaintance with various theological disciplines but to reach an adequate understanding of the nature and meaning of Christianity. For this a study of the religions of the world is of the utmost importance. Only when one has placed Christianity beside other great systems is one in a position fully to appreciate

either its significance or its worth. A common error of an earlier day was to deny all likeness between Christianity and other faiths. Christianity was alone true and all others but tissues of falsehood. A common error today is to magnify the oneness and overlook the differences, to put Christianity on a level with the ethnic faiths and lose sight altogether of its distinctive elements. The former attitude meant a misunderstanding of the ethnic faiths, the latter a misunderstanding of Christianity. Christianity has much that is common with other faiths and much that is peculiar to itself. Only as this is recognized and the two elements clearly distinguished can its message to the modern world be fully understood.

The study of Jesus Christ, of Christian history, and of the other great religions of the world, should bring the student to a clear knowledge of what Christianity really is and what it is fitted to do. To summarize what has thus been learned and to set forth the meaning and significance of Christianity in clear form is the province of dogmatic theology. To one who has studied Christianity in the way that has been indicated, dogmatics should be no more than a formulation of results already attained and conclusions already reached. Rightly understood it is simply a comprehensive and consistent statement of the principles of Christianity. Those principles are wholly practical, having to do with religion and ethics, with man's attitude toward God and toward his fellows, not with metaphysics or with science. The notion that it belongs to dogmatic theology to set forth a Christian philosophy of the universe is in my opinion entirely erroneous. This, so far as it is important at all, belongs to apologetics, not dogmatics. It may be necessary to do it in order to show the rationality of Christianity and to commend it to thinking men, but it is not necessary in order to make it understood. Experience shows that Christianity is consistent with the most various and contradictory philosophies, and this is natural for it is itself not a philosophy but a religion and an ethic. It is in other words wholly practical, and to formulate and summarize its practical principles, religious and ethical, is the one and only province of dogmatic theology.

II. The primary and indispensable equipment of every Chris-

tian minister is, as I have said, an understanding of Christianity. Without it he has no adequate message for the world. With it he is ready for all emergencies and can meet all needs. But it is necessary that he shall know the needs to be met, and so a second part of the necessary equipment of a Christian minister is an understanding of men and their needs, particularly the men and the needs of the present age. Two opposite and extreme positions have been taken in this matter. Some maintain that a knowledge of men and their needs is the one thing necessary to the Christian minister and that this should constitute the chief or only subject of study in theological schools. But as already said, to know the needs of men is vain unless one has something with which to meet those needs. Others on the contrary maintain that the only way to know men is to live among them, that the minister learns all he needs to know about them in his active career in the ministry and that the divinity school can give him nothing of value and need not concern itself with the matter. In reply to this it may be said that the very power of seeing depends in considerable degree upon knowing what to look for and how to look for it and for this the training of the schools is needed. It is a notorious fact that many ministers go on year after year endeavoring to meet the needs which their fathers met, quite oblivious to the existence of any new needs peculiar to the present age or of any old needs outside the traditional circle. One of the most important services rendered by modern social science is that it opens men's eyes to conditions to which hitherto they have been for the most part quite blind, though the conditions themselves are in many cases centuries old. If one were to gain nothing from it except an open vision and an inquiring mind its study would be amply justified.

An important preparation for an adequate understanding of the men whose needs we are to meet is a study of psychology, including the psychology of religion, but by no means that alone. The study has not been made enough of in its relation to ministerial efficiency. Metaphysics and ontology have often engrossed the attention of theologians to the exclusion of the far more important branch of psychology.

It is in this connection too that the study of religion in its various manifestations, individual and racial, of our own and other ages again has value. To understand the religious nature of man on a large scale and over a broad area is an indispensable condition of understanding the religious needs of the individual or of the community to which we may be called upon to minister.

Still further, no one is in a position to understand the needs of the particular community in which his lot may be cast and of the particular people with whom he may be thrown unless he knows something of the tendencies of the age in which he lives, and of the forces and influences which have made it what it is. In other words, the study of history, not primarily for the sake of knowing the past, but for the sake of comprehending the present, is indispensable to anyone who would minister wisely to the needs of the world. What shall one think of existing institutions who does not know how they came to be? How shall one decide what attitude to take toward the various social movements of the day, all forcing themselves on our attention and all claiming to be for the benefit of humanity, unless one has followed the world-wide awakening of the social conscience, and has traced its many manifestations, and knows their mutual relations and their bearing upon the common cause? And how shall one judge the ethical ideals of today who fails to understand their genesis and growth? An immense amount of good energy is continually wasted by the best people in endeavoring to change conditions which, if they understood their history, they would see are changing themselves quite without their help, or it may be are unchangeable by any power of man. And meanwhile the age is crying for the help of just such people who have no help left to give where it would really count. Certainly no one needs wisdom in this matter more than the Christian minister, whose very profession marks him as a leader in all moral as well as religious effort. No one can estimate what tremendous progress might be made in building the kingdom of God in this our land if all the moral power that resides in our Christian churches were enlisted for the promotion of wise and practicable and permanently worthwhile ends. No mere daily contact with the world of men, illuminating as it is, can impart that



largeness of view and that breadth of vision which are needed by him who would best serve his day and generation.

And what is true in ethical and social lines is true in every line. Who can understand the existing religious situation—the curious enthusiasms, the astonishing aspirations, and the often disheartening indifference—unless he knows where it has all come from and how? It is not merely that an understanding of modern religious history in its inner development and its controlling forces spares the Christian minister much misplaced confidence and much needless despair, but that it enables him to put effort where effort is needed and where it really counts, and makes it possible for him to appeal effectively to the often latent, always powerful religious impulses of humanity.

Equally important is a knowledge of the history of modern thought that one may understand its currents, may know what they mean for the religious and the moral life, and how they may be utilized for the improvement of both. Many ministers of our liberal as well as of our conservative churches seem to have no conception of the significance of modern trends of thought. They may purposely ignore them as ungodly, as many conservatives do, they may live in them and revel in them, as many liberals do, without understanding whence they came and whither they go, and so without being able to minister effectively and helpfully to an intellectual world dominated by them. It is not enough to know what men are thinking about today. That is easy to find out, at any rate for one's own community. But if one would bring a message to thinking men that has worth and power he must know why they are thinking as they are and what their thinking means for present and for future.

Where shall a man get the knowledge that is necessary along all these lines? If it is the business of the theological school to give him an understanding of Christianity, it would seem to be the business of the college or university to give him an understanding of the world in which he lives. And indeed it would be a great help if students for the ministry were to carry on lines of study with this end in view before coming to the seminary. It would be much better worth while than courses in more specifically

theological subjects which many now take in college by way of preparation for their professional work. But after all, under existing circumstances, a large measure of responsibility rests upon the divinity school itself for instruction along these lines. Course must be offered which are either not given in college or have not been taken there, and no man should be sent out into the ministry who has not at least had his attention called to the immense importance of understanding the age in which he lives and the men among whom he moves and who has not done some work with that end in view.

But in addition to an understanding of the general tendencies of the age—social, ethical, religious, and intellectual—every theological student needs some knowledge of the specific conditions which he will be called upon to face in his ministerial work. Here much may, indeed must, be left to the period of active ministerial service. But even here too some helpful training is possible and much more would be possible if there were a larger degree of specialization in the Christian ministry. Many of the crying problems of the age are peculiar to certain strata of society or to particular kinds of communities. There is the problem of poverty and the problem of wealth, the problem of the city and of the country, the problem of the factory town and of the rural village, the problem of the intellectual classes and of the uneducated masses. One of the unfortunate things about the ministerial profession is that we treat it so commonly as a single homogeneous calling and try to train men for the ministry in general, when we should be training them for particular lines of ministerial service. In modern education for foreign missionary work a great advance has been made in this respect. Students know to which field they are going and are able to prepare themselves to meet the peculiar needs of that particular field. But with the men who remain at home everything is still left largely to chance. All receive practically the same training and take up ministerial work in the country, in the small town, in the large city, in the slums, or on the avenue according as the opening happens to come. It would make immensely for efficiency if the peculiar tastes and abilities of individuals were studied and they were advised to prepare

themselves for some particular kind of ministerial service in some particular sort of environment. Men are already preparing in our theological institutions for service in various positions, such as bible-school teachers, Y.M.C.A. secretaries, and settlement directors. It would be an immense advance if men were to prepare themselves particularly for one or another definite kind of ministerial work, to be preachers or pastors or organizers, or to labor specifically in the country, in the factory community, in the slums of a great city, or in university circles. No man can acquaint himself with all these various fields, their conditions and their needs, and the best methods to be employed in ministering to them. Here if anywhere election and specialization are appropriate and necessary. And even if it should chance that circumstances led a man into some field for which he had not particularly prepared, he would be better fitted for the unfamiliar work for having made a thorough study of some special line of service, even though not his own. Much of our so-called practical training lacks point and fails to grip just because it is training for everything in general and nothing in particular.

III. The third matter in which training is needed by the theological student is how to apply Christianity to the needs of men. Every Christian minister should know how to bring Christianity effectively to bear upon the world. This can be fully discovered only by experience in the field. Men learn how best to do the work by doing it. At the same time, in this line as in the preceding, the theological school can do much. It should not content itself with teaching what Christianity is and what the world is upon which it is to be brought to bear; it should also give instruction in the matter of method, in what is commonly termed practical theology. The study of the age in which we live is, strictly speaking, no more a part of practical theology than the study of Christianity itself. Both are, of course, practical, inasmuch as they constitute part of a man's training for practical ministerial work, but their immediate purpose is different from that of the discipline known more specifically as practical theology. That discipline has to do properly with the application of a Christianity presumed to be already known to an age presumed to be already understood.

Viewed thus practical theology should have not necessarily a large but an essential place in the theological curriculum. The old notion of its scope is much too narrow for the needs of today. It should be viewed in a broader way and handled on a larger scale than commonly in the past and it should include many things which formerly were either not studied at all or were studied in other connections and with another purpose. I can do no more here than enumerate a few of the subjects which legitimately belong within its sphere.

In addition to the familiar topics of homiletics and the pastoral care, there properly belongs to practical theology the whole matter of apologetics which means the presentation of Christianity in such a way as to show its essential rationality, and its fitness to satisfy the needs of men, and also to meet the peculiar objections which have sprung from modern thought and life.

The whole subject of religious education, which is now coming so prominently to the front, also belongs here. We are realizing its importance as never before and are learning that the old haphazard and slipshod methods of training the young are not only ineffective but positively demoralizing.

To practical theology pertains also the study of the great religious classics of the world, not for scientific ends, and not, in this case, for the sake of understanding Christianity and other religions, but for the purpose of comprehending better the spiritual forces which have moved and moulded the lives of multitudes of men in past and present and of enriching one's own stores of religious power. For this purpose, of course, the Bible still remains the most important of all on account both of its inherent character as a great monument of religious experience and of the estimate in which it is held by Christendom. Whatever attitude one may take toward the question of biblical authority the Christian minister who does not steep himself in the Bible robs himself of a tremendous engine of spiritual power, whether his work be cast with the most conservative or most radical of Christian communities. And for this it is not the New Testament that is alone important, but the massive and magnificent revelations of religious experience of various types which crowd the pages of the Old

Testament, the most immediately and broadly and variously human of all the great religious classics of the world.

An enlargement of the scope of practical theology is also necessary because the Christian minister of today is called upon to do so many things of which his predecessors of an earlier day never dreamed. Undoubtedly the multiplication of functions has led to an unfortunate scattering of energy and has meant in many cases a decided loss of efficiency. The situation, indeed, as it now widely exists is not permanently tolerable. Specialization in ministerial work will soon come to be a necessity of existence. And as specialization in function becomes common, of course specialization in seminary preparation will be more and more needful. But of this I have already spoken. I may simply say that as every theological student should undertake to acquaint himself as fully as possible with the peculiar needs of some particular type of community or class of society, he should also prepare himself to become an expert in some special line of ministerial service. Expert in all he cannot possibly be. To be expert in none is to be equally inefficient in all. Every Christian minister may and must know Christianity. He cannot possibly know and minister to the whole world: let him make his choice of field and line of work and let him be a master therein.

✓ I have spoken of three things as essential to the Christian minister—a knowledge of Christianity, a knowledge of men, and a knowledge of the method of bringing Christianity effectively to bear upon them. For training in all these lines our theological schools should provide in such measure as they can, and in all these lines the demands and the opportunities are today greater than they ever were. It is not that the number of courses offered needs necessarily to be greatly multiplied; that may in many cases be impracticable. But if so, some of the old must be displaced by some of the new subjects, so far as that can be done without in any way lessening the emphasis on the fundamental matter of understanding Christianity. At any rate, it is not a time for lowering our standards or shortening our course, as some seem to think in their short-sighted desire to increase the ranks of the ministry. On the contrary, it is a time to require more than

ever before. Under the old system students had perhaps time enough, but now a three-years' course is all too short.

But even if the course were lengthened to four years, as in my opinion it might well be, no one man could do everything, nor should he even if he could. Election on a larger or smaller scale there must be. And moreover, quite independently of the necessities of the case, the elective system has in itself great value in our theological schools, as in other schools. But no elective system is justified which allows a man to enter upon the work of the ministry without a thorough understanding of Christianity and an adequate comprehension of the age in which he lives. This much at least he must have. The elective system has its dangers in permitting men to devote their attention to the unimportant at the expense of the essential matters. But if our theological institutions were to plan all their courses under the dominance of a clear and definite ideal, and were to keep that ideal always before their students, there would be little cause to complain of scattered energies and wasted time.

Throughout this address I have spoken of theological education in a specific and somewhat narrow sense. I have said nothing of that larger training of mind and heart which every Christian minister should have. He who would meet the spiritual needs of men and would lead them in paths of peace or in ways of service, must have a training such as no professional course can give. He must speak out of a burning heart, out of a rich experience, and out of a well-furnished mind. It has been said that successful ministers are born, not made. But the successful minister is always in the making. By intimate human contacts, by communion with the best and greatest souls of all the ages, by vigorous thought and strenuous toil, by all these ways that make true men and true leaders of men the true Christian minister too is trained. The ministry is not merely a profession: it is limitless opportunity for service; and there are no abilities natural or acquired, no endowments, spiritual and intellectual, no gifts of mind and heart, no graces of character, no capacities for devotion, no power of enthusiasm that may not find within it freest scope and largest exercise.

## THE HISTORICITY OF JESUS

### AN ESTIMATE OF THE NEGATIVE ARGUMENT

SHIRLEY JACKSON CASE  
The University of Chicago

Did Jesus actually live, or is he only the pious fiction of a primitive religious imagination? This question is not new, but it has been discussed with renewed energy in Germany during the past year, and some leading New Testament scholars have participated in the discussion.<sup>1</sup>

At first sight the issue seems to be a purely historical one, yet the real point of interest for much of the discussion is not the data of history but the problem of Jesus' significance for the founding of Christianity as well as for the religion of modern times. The present denial of his existence is the extreme swing of the pendulum away from the older orthodoxy's interpretation of his place in

<sup>1</sup> The discussion was given special prominence early in the year when the Berlin division of the Deutscher Monistenbund, on the evenings of January 31 and February 1, debated this subject. Arthur Drews, professor of philosophy in Karlsruhe technical high school, led the debate for the negative and Professor von Soden, of Berlin, for the affirmative. Other speakers were F. Steudel, G. Hollmann, M. Fischer, F. Lipsius, H. Francke, T. Kappstein, and M. Maurenbrecher. The stenographic report of the whole discussion is now published as *Berliner Religionsgespräch: Hat Jesus gelebt?* Berlin and Leipzig (1910). Many other public discussions of the same theme have taken place. Of the most important publications, on the radical side are Drews, *Die Christusmythe* (1900, 1910<sup>3</sup>); the periodical *Das freie Wort*, edited by Max Henning; F. Steudel, *Wir Gelehrten vom Fach! Eine Streitschrift gegen Professor D. von Sodens "Hat Jesus gelebt?"* (1910); S. Lublinski, *Die Entstehung des Christentums aus der antiken Kultur* (1910), and *Falsche Beweise für die Existenz des Menschen Jesus* (1910); W. Schultz, *Dokumente der Gnosis. Mit einer ausführlichen Einleitung* (1910); on the negative, Bornemann, *Jesus als Problem* (1909); H. Windisch, "Der geschichtliche Jesus" in *Theologische Rundschau*, XIII (1910), 163-82, 199-220; P. Wernle, "Wider moderne Skepsis für den Glauben an Jesus," and H. Holtzmann, "Paulus als Zeuge wider die Christusmythe von Arthur Drews" in *Die Christliche Welt* (February 17, 1910), 145-60; von Soden, *Hat Jesus gelebt?* (1910); Beth, *Hat Jesus gelebt?* (1910); Jülicher, *Hat Jesus gelebt?* (1910); Weinle, *Ist das "liberale" Jesusbild widerlegt?* (1910); J. Weiss, *Jesus von Nazareth, Mythos oder Geschichte* (1910). A somewhat more complete citation of the literature may be found in the *Biblische Zeitschrift*, VIII (1910), 415-17. Much of it is of minor importance.

theology. The modern extremists say that not only is the rôle assigned to him by the older theologians untenable, but also the efforts of modern criticism are futile since the present world-view cannot permit any importance to be attached to a historical founder of religion. Drews, in closing the Berlin debate, formulated two questions which in his opinion were fundamental to the whole controversy: What is the secret of Christianity's origin in the light of which it can be revitalized for modern times? and, What can Christ be to us today? The last question is answered simply: "As a purely historical personality, *nothing*"; and regarding the first, not only is the significance of myth central for an explanation of the rise of Christianity but for its modern revitalization as well. Not the historical Jesus but Christ as an idea, as an idea of the divine humanity, is the ground of a new religion. "When we can and will no longer believe on accidental personalities we can and must believe on ideas."<sup>2</sup>

If one would avoid confusion, he must here distinguish three distinct problems: Was Jesus a historical person? In what sense can he be called the historical founder of Christianity? and, What is his significance for modern religion? The present discussion will be confined to the first of these three questions.

The present tendency to deny the historicity of Jesus has its antecedents in the skepticism of Bruno Bauer. In the controversy which followed the appearance of Strauss's *Life of Jesus*, Bauer found himself more in sympathy with Strauss than with the contemporary Christian apologists. Their religious world-view was for him impossible—true religion could not be conditioned upon belief in the special activity of a historical personality, so Bauer began a critical examination of the literature upon which his opponents relied as the authority for their position. His first effort was to show that the picture of Jesus given in the Fourth Gospel was unhistorical.<sup>3</sup> Then he turned to the Synoptic Gospels

<sup>2</sup> *Berlin Religionsgespräch*, 94 f.; also *Christusmythe*, p. xi: "the 'Christusmythe' has been written directly in the interest of religion out of the conviction that the forms hitherto prevailing are no longer sufficient for the present, that especially the 'Jesus-ism' of the modern theology is fundamentally irreligious and itself presents the greatest hindrance to all true religious progress."

<sup>3</sup> *Kritik der evangelischen Geschichte des Johannes* (1840).



where he adopted the conclusions of Weisse and Wilke as to the priority of Mark. But if Mark was the principal source for the first three gospels then their testimony to Jesus was in reality supported by only one witness, and this, upon further examination, proved to be a work of fiction.<sup>4</sup> If Jesus was no such person as the gospels depicted perhaps he was not a historical character at all. Bauer turned to the Pauline letters as the only remaining evidence, and these he decided were also unhistorical.<sup>5</sup> Accordingly all proof of Jesus' actual existence vanished, and the origin of Christianity was not to be traced to any definite personal founder. How, then, did the new movement originate? In answering this question Bauer allowed his fancy free play. The new type of thought which received the name Christianity, after an evolutionary period of about fifty years, came to maturity in the time of Trajan and was a syncretistic product embodying elements from Judaism, Stoicism, and Platonic philosophy.<sup>6</sup>

The distinctive feature of Kalthoff's theory is his emphasis upon the social idea.<sup>7</sup> The starting-point of his thought is a reac-

<sup>4</sup> *Kritik der evangelischen Geschichte der Synoptiker*, 3 vols. (1841-42); 2d ed., *Kritik der Evangelien und Geschichte ihres Ursprungs* (1850-51).

<sup>5</sup> *Kritik der paulinischen Briefe* (1850-52).

<sup>6</sup> *Christus und die Cäsaren. Der Ursprung des Christentums aus dem römischen Griechentum* (1877).

<sup>7</sup> *Das Christus-Problem, Grundlinien zu einer Sozialtheologie* (1902, 1903<sup>2</sup>); *Die Entstehung des Christentums, Neue Beiträge zum Christusproblem* (1904); *Was wissen wir von Jesus? Eine Abrechnung mit Professor Bousset in Göttingen* (1904); cf. Bousset, *Was wissen wir von Jesus? Vorträge im protestanten Verein zu Bremen* (1904). Kalthoff finds a natural following among socialistic writers, though Jesus' historicity is not always denied outright. K. Kautsky, *Der Ursprung des Christentums* (1908), also "Jesus der Rebell" in *Die neue Zeit*, XXVIII (1910), 13-17, 44-52, treats the Christian literature with so free a hand as to make Jesus a political and social revolutionist, a typical "Marxist." M. Maurenbrecher, *Von Nazareth nach Golgatha. Eine Untersuchung über die weltgeschichtlichen Zusammenhänge des Urchristentums* (1909), *Berliner Religionsgespräch* (1910), 89-93, takes the sources more seriously than Kautsky does. He combines historical method—he was formerly a theologian—and the philosophical ideas of Drews with strong socialistic tendencies. As a result, Jesus' life and death are thought to have been the indispensable incentive for the new religion, but the real secret of its origin is the activity of the Son of Man myth which fixed itself upon the person of Jesus after his death and in which the hopes of the common people found expression. Jesus had not put himself forward as Messiah, but he had spoken of the Son of Man in the third person, whose

tion against the individualism of modern religion, a feature, in his opinion, not to be found in primitive Christianity. This was purely a collective movement of the masses, and indeed so free from the individual element that the notion of a personal founder is entirely unhistorical, a later personification of the ideals and experiences of the community itself. On its positive side, Kalthoff's theory of the rise of the new religion is not essentially different from that of Bauer: Rome was the seat of its origin; Jewish messianism, Stoic philosophy, and the communistic clubs of the time supplied its source elements; its literature was a poetic creation projecting into the past the more immediate experiences of the present, as when the picture of a suffering, dying, and rising Christ typified the community's own life of persecution and martyrdom.

W. B. Smith varied the theory by assigning the origin of the Jesus-cult to pre-Christian times.<sup>8</sup> For Smith the whole subject is less a *problem* than it was with his predecessors and more a question of phrases. The two pillars of his argument are (1) τὰ περὶ τοῦ Ἰησοῦ and (2) the word "Nazareth." From the statement of Acts 18:25 to the effect that Apollos was preaching "the things of Jesus" while he as yet knew only the baptism of John, Smith infers that prior to the gospel story there existed a "doctrine" concerning Jesus sufficiently definite and vital to form the background of a widespread propaganda. "Jesus" was in fact a pre-Christian theological idea connected with a cult widely diffused among the Jews and especially among the Hellenists between 100 B.C. and 100 A.D. Similarly the word "Nazareth"—the exact spelling does not greatly matter—was not originally the name of a place but an appellation meaning "guardian," "savior." The word "Jesus" originally had the same meaning, so that the association of the two names was a natural procedure. In the literature of Christianity the Jesus of the gospels was invented to personify the former of these terms, and the city called Nazareth—

coming he had believed near at hand. Jesus was moved mainly by the proletarian instinct, which also dominated the thinking of the disciples. The giving of themselves to this ideal after Jesus' death was the birthday of Christianity.

<sup>8</sup> *Der vorchristliche Jesus* (1906).

otherwise an unknown place—is a geographical fiction prompted by the latter; while “Christ” signifies the deity, especially if one reads *χριστός* as equivalent to *χρηστός* and compares Ps. 34:8, “taste and see that the Lord is good (*χρηστός*).”

Other investigators have drawn more largely upon data gathered from the so-called heathen religions to prove that “Jesus” is a product of mythological fancy. Already before W. B. Smith, J. M. Robertson had supposed that Jesus of the gospels was only a perpetuation of an old Ephraimitish sun-god, Joshua.<sup>9</sup> The representatives of the *religionsgeschichtliche* school are usually content with claiming that the heightened picture of Jesus given in the gospels contains many foreign elements,<sup>10</sup> yet many of their conclusions can readily be made to serve the purposes of those who argue that the so-called historical Jesus is entirely a creation of fancy.

Drews has drawn freely upon much of this earlier work, and the significance of the whole movement against the historicity of Jesus may be estimated from Drews's work as a basis.<sup>11</sup> At the

<sup>9</sup> *Christianity and Mythology* (1900); *A Short History of Christianity* (1902); *Pagan Christs, Studies in Comparative Hierology* (1903).

<sup>10</sup> E.g., Gunkel, *Zum religionsgeschichtlichen Verständnis des Neuen Testaments* (1903); Pfeiderer, *Das Christusbild des urchristlichen Glaubens in religionsgeschichtlicher Beleuchtung* (1903); *Die Entstehung des Christentums* (1905); Jeremias, *Babylonisches im Neuen Testament* (1905); Brückner, *Der sterbende und auferstehende Gottheiland in den orientalischen Religionen und ihr Verhältnis zum Christentum* (1908); Clemen, *Religionsgeschichtliche Erklärung des Neuen Testaments* (1909; a convenient summary of the literature); Zimmern, *Zum Streit um die “Christusmythe”: das Babylonische Material in seinen Hauptpunkten dargestellt* (1910). Vollers, *Die Weltreligionen in ihrem geschichtlichen Zusammenhange* (1907), will go so far as to say that “no decisive argument for the historicity of Jesus can be produced; cf. Steck, “Das Leben Jesu und die vergleichende Religionsgeschichte” in *Protestantische Monatshefte* (1909), 329-37, 412-16, 447-54, who writes with special reference to Vollers and Drews.

<sup>11</sup> *Die Christusmythe*; also *Berliner Religionsgespräch*, 15-34, 66-74, 93-95. Later writers of this school have had practically nothing to add to what Drews and his predecessors have written. For example, Lublinski's *Die Entstehung des Christentums*, although containing 257 closely printed pages, is mainly a composite of ideas from earlier writers, and with no systematic acknowledgment of the obligation. Nor has this material always been taken over accurately. On p. 177 reference is made to “Benjamin W. Smith's” citation from Epiphanius to prove the pre-Christian existence of the Nazarite sect, but Lublinski copies not Smith's “vor Christus” but Drews' “lange vor Christus.” See below note 14.

Berlin conference he presented for discussion five theses, which form a good epitome of his whole position:

1. Before the Jesus of the gospels there existed already among Jewish sects a Jesus god and a cult of this god which in all probability goes back to the Old Testament Joshua; and with this were blended on the one hand Jewish apocalyptic ideas and on the other the heathen notion of a dying and rising divine redeemer.

2. Paul, the oldest witness for Christianity, knows nothing of a "historical" Jesus. His incarnated Son of God is just that Jewish-heathen redeeming divinity, Jesus, whom Paul merely set in the center of his religious world-view and elevated to a higher degree of religio-ethical reflection.

3. The gospels do not contain the history of an actual man but only the myth of the god-man, Jesus, clothed in historical form, so that not only the Israelitish prophets along with the Old Testament types of the Messiah, a Moses, Elijah, Elisha, etc., but also certain mythical notions of the Jews' heathen neighbors concerning belief in the redeeming divinity, made their contribution to the "history" of that Jesus.

4. With this method of explanation an "undiscoverable" remainder which cannot be derived from the sources indicated may still exist, yet this relates only to secondary and unimportant matters which do not affect the religious belief in Jesus, while on the contrary all that is important, religiously significant, and decisive in this faith, as the Baptism, the Lord's Supper, the Crucifixion, and the Resurrection of Jesus, is borrowed from the cult-symbolism of the mythical Jesus and owes its origin not to a historical fact but to the pre-Christian belief in the Jewish-heathen redeeming divinity.

5. The "historical" Jesus as determined by the critical theology is at any rate of so doubtful, intangible, and faded a form that faith in him cannot possibly longer be regarded as the indispensable condition of religious salvation.

The first of these theses contains the positive side of the whole argument, and the remaining points can have but little force if this should be found invalid. What is the evidence for a pre-Christian Jesus?<sup>12</sup> Three pieces of documentary evidence are

<sup>12</sup> The argument is elaborated in *Christusmythe*, 1-119.

produced to show the pre-Christian use of the word "Jesus": a passage in Hippolytus, another in Epiphanius, and another from a Paris papyrus of magical formulae. Hippolytus at the beginning of the third century A.D. mentions a hymn used by the gnostic sect of the Naassenes which represents Jesus asking the Father's permission to visit the earth and relieve the condition of men.<sup>13</sup> Both Smith and Drews use this in proof of their position but without any serious attempt to prove that the passage originated before the Christian era. Smith excuses himself from discussing the date, while Drews says "to all appearances pre-Christian" and cites a Babylonian parallel to the hymn, which, however, may only mean that Babylonian and Christian elements were both used in its composition. Whatever the antiquity of the sect itself may be, as Hippolytus thinks of it, it is a heretical *Christian* sect, and the supposition that this reference to Jesus is a pre-Christian feature lacks support.

Smith lays great stress upon the testimony of Epiphanius, who mentions a sect of heretics called *Naζαπαῖοι* (*Haer.* 18) or *Νασαρπαῖοι* (*Haer.* 29) "who existed before Christ and knew nothing of Christ," and Epiphanius further says, "all men called the Christians *Naζωπαῖοι*."<sup>14</sup> How much worth can be attached to this evidence? Even admitting that the variations of spelling are merely accidental, it must be remembered that Epiphanius was writing at the end of the fourth century A.D., and that his treatment of the subject is very obscure. He cannot himself have thought of this sect as precursors of the Christian community, nor does he give the slightest intimation that they revered a cult-god, Jesus. It is only by liberal etymologizing that any connection with a pre-Christian Jesus can be established; for example, the word "Nazarite" or "Nazorite" signifies "guardian," "watchman" (Syriac *nasarya*, Hebrew *ha-nosri*) so originally it is practically identical in meaning with "Jesus," that is, "deliverer," "savior." Thus it becomes probable that this sect worshiped

<sup>13</sup> Hippolytus, *Philosophumena*, V, 10; cf. *Realencyklopädie*, XIV, art. "Ophiten," 404-13.

<sup>14</sup> These citations follow Smith's own rendering of the passage, *Der vorchristliche Jesus*, 60 and 63. Smith's "vor Christus (Christo)" becomes with Drews "lange vor Christus," *Christusmythe*, 26.

a god Jesus as guardian, savior, deliverer. But Epiphanius is not to be cited in support of such a conclusion. He has no thought of a pre-Christian Jesus; the word "Nazarite" he connects with the town Nazareth, and it is barely possible, in spite of Smith's objections, that the Old Testament name "Nazirite" is responsible for Epiphanius' reference to pre-Christian times.

The case is scarcely more favorable for the argument from the Paris papyrus. The pertinent passages are: *ορκίζω σε κατα του μαρπαρκουριθ' νασααρι* . . . . (l. 1549) and *ορκίζω σε κατα του θεου των Εβραιων Ιησου* . . . . (ll. 3019-20). Whether *νασααρι* in the first formula has any reference to the word Nazarite is doubtful, but in the second Jesus is clearly mentioned: "I adjure thee by Jesus, the god of the Hebrews." If the formula is pre-Christian it is positive evidence for the existence of an earlier Hebrew deity by the name of Jesus. But the manuscript is conceded to belong between 300 and 400 A.D., and although the original composition may have been much earlier there are no good reasons for placing it before the Christian era; it is better interpreted as a heathen composition in which the Jews and the Christians are not distinguished.<sup>15</sup>

The further supposition of secret sects in Judaism where an alleged cult-god, Jesus, could be worshiped is difficult to imagine; yet Drews asserts that not only have the world-views of Babylonians, Persians, and Greeks influenced Judaism polytheistically, but from the beginning, side by side with the priestly and officially accentuated view of the One God, went a faith in other gods, a faith which not only received constantly new nourishment from foreign influences but, above all, which seemed to be fostered in the secret sects.<sup>16</sup> That the main line of Judaism contained syncretistic elements is now generally recognized, but the perpetual and widespread existence of secret polytheistic cults among the Jews is not supported by any substantial evidence. The Jewish literature seems to know nothing of such a situation, and although these sects are supposed to have been "numberless," practically the only ones to be cited as possible examples are the Therapeutae

<sup>15</sup> Cf. Deissmann, *Licht vom Osten* (1908), 186, note 14.

<sup>16</sup> *Christusmythe*, 21 f.

mentioned by Philo, the Essenes described by Josephus, and the Naassenes (Greek "Ophites"). There is some doubt about the antiquity of the last, but they are assumed to have existed as a Jewish sect "if not before at all events contemporaneous with Christianity." Moreover the name of Jesus cannot be connected with these sects except by a doubtful process of word-derivation. The word "Therapeutae" signifies "physicians" (*θεραπευταί*) and with these the Essenes (whose name means "pious," "god-fearing") held many ideas in common. Further the name "Jesus" means in Hebrew "helper" or "deliverer," that is *curator*, *θεραπευτής*. Now "the Therapeutae and the Essenes looked upon themselves as physicians, especially as physicians of souls; it is therefore not at all improbable that they worshiped a cult-god under this name," that is, "Jesus."<sup>17</sup> A similar supposition for the Naassenes is based upon their possible kinship with the Essenes and the presence of Jesus' name in Hippolytus' citation of their hymn which, as already observed,<sup>18</sup> is not free from the suspicion of Christian influence. The supposition of the prevalence of secret religious sects among the Jews as well as the worship of a god bearing the name "Jesus" rests upon only very inadequate evidence.

Continuing the argument from likeness of names, a prototype of the Christian "Jesus" is found in Joshua. His name, like that of Jesus, signifies "deliverer" "savior"; his mother (according to an Arabic tradition!) was Miriam and the mother of Jesus was Mary (Miriam); he leads Israel out of distress in the wilderness into the promised land where milk and honey flow, that is, the land of the Milky Way and the moon, and Jesus also leads his followers into the heavenly kingdom; and all this is traceable to an ancient cult of the sun, the Greek legend of Jason forming the connecting link. Jason=Joshua=Jesus. Jesus with his twelve disciples passing through Galilee came to the Passover feast at Jerusalem; Joshua with his twelve helpers passed through the Jordan and offered the Paschal lamb on the other shore; Jason with his twelve companions went after the golden fleece of the lamb; and all originally was the myth of the sun's wandering through the twelve

<sup>17</sup> *Christusmythe*, 25.

<sup>18</sup> See above, p. 26.

signs of the Zodiac. Thus Joshua (Jesus) was an old Ephraimite god of the sun and of fertility, worshiped among many Jewish sects as the hero-deliverer of ancient Israel and the future messianic savior.<sup>19</sup> But when one asks for the evidences of a Joshua-cult among the Jews, he finds no answer. Again, is there anywhere in Judaism an intimation that Joshua was ever the hero about whom messianic hopes were built? Here also evidence fails; and as for a resemblance between the Jesus of the gospels and this alleged cult-god, Joshua, it lies merely in the identity of name—a feature of no importance when one recalls the frequency of the name among the Jews.<sup>20</sup>

Finally, as an argument for a pre-Christian Jesus, it is urged that the idea of a suffering messiah is not a distinctively Christian product, but it was earlier a Jewish doctrine, having been taken over from the heathen notion of a suffering, dying, and rising God. To be sure, nature myths personifying the death of winter and revival to new life in the spring, and the like, are common in the heathen mythologies of Asia Minor, and acquaintance with these on the part of the Jews is possible, but evidence that these formed an important part in the construction of their messianic hope is scanty. Certainly a mere collection of isolated points suggesting similarities of ideas is not sufficient proof of borrowing, particularly when the Jewish literature shows so little to confirm the supposition. Isaiah, chap. 53, is the most favorable passage, and granting that the thought in this chapter may be of heathen origin and the significance messianic<sup>21</sup>—both doubtful points—it is still true that official Judaism did not interpret the suffering servant of Isaiah messianically nor did early Christianity which, *ex hypothesi*, represents the unofficial side of Jewish thought, make extensive use of the passage. Paul, whom Drews will concede to be a historical personality of primal importance for the new movement, does not use the idea of the "suffering servant" in his

<sup>19</sup> *Christusmythe*, 23, 46–48, 98 f.; *Berliner Religionsgespräch*, 25.

<sup>20</sup> Wienel says an argument based on the likeness of Jesus to Joshua is "simply grotesque." They have nothing in common but the name, which belongs to no less than twenty different men in Josephus' history (*Ist das "liberale" Jesusbild widerlegt?* 91).

<sup>21</sup> So Gressmann, *Der Ursprung der israelitisch-jüdischen Eschatologie*, 302–33.



interpretation of Jesus, but rather the idea of the offered victim in the Jewish sacrificial system; and, further, he testifies that a dying messiah is a stumbling-block for Jews as well as foolishness for the Greeks.<sup>22</sup> Moreover the gospels clearly show that nobody associated with Jesus anticipated for him a career that would end in death. The primitive Christians had too much difficulty in defending their faith in a suffering Messiah to allow us to believe that they found the idea current in Judaism or even that the heathen notion of a dying and rising divinity was recognized as having any essential similarity with their preaching about "Jesus Christ and him crucified."

Drews has yet a few "proofs" of a sporadic sort for the existence of a pre-Christian Jesus. Smith's arguments from the phrase, "the things of Jesus" and from the supposed fictitiousness of the town of Nazareth are repeated. But the first point, as the context in Acts will show, merely implies that Apollos had previously been instructed by followers of Jesus who were not interpreting baptism in exactly the same way as it was being interpreted among the Pauline churches. The argument from "Nazareth" rests chiefly on the absence of the name in Jewish literature, but it cannot be very significant that a small Galilean town is not mentioned and, when we recall the apologetic difficulties it raised, it does not seem probable that it is a mere invention of the Christians. Another point is made from the type of Christology in the Book of Revelation and in the Teaching of the Twelve Apostles. The Jesus in these books is thought to have "nothing in common with the Christian Jesus" and to be "in all probability" taken over from a pre-Christian cult. But we have previously been told that the Christian Jesus also came from this source; then why the variation of form? Not only does the assertion that they have nothing in common seem ill-advised, but the explanation of the differences may easily be accounted for by conditions within the history of Christianity. Again, evidence for a long history of the name Jesus is found in the successful use of that name in magic already "at the beginning of the Christian propaganda," "an entirely inconceivable fact if its bearer had been a mere man." But the an-

<sup>22</sup> I Cor. 1:23.

cients who used magic were not given to critical skepticism in such matters; it would be quite sufficient for them to know that Jesus' followers believed him now to occupy a place of authority in the divine realm. Moreover, the date and extent of the magical use of Jesus' name are more doubtful problems than they are here assumed to be.<sup>23</sup>

Drews's second thesis, dealing with Paul,<sup>24</sup> proceeds upon the assumption that a pre-Christian Jesus is an established fact. Anything in the Pauline writings indicating the historicity of Jesus is explained in some other way or is called a later insertion; and, finally, it is asserted that "the Pauline letters contain no compulsion of any sort for the supposition of a historical Jesus and no man would be likely to find such there if it were not already for him an established assumption." Unlike most critics who deny the historicity of Jesus, Drews would save Paul in so far as the latter can be cited as the exponent of a religion built upon faith in an *idea*—the item which Drews regards central in all religion. As might be expected, the fundamental problems of Pauline study are scarcely touched and no fixed principles of critical investigation are followed. One takes from the literature what he pleases and leaves what he pleases. We are told at the start that no compelling proof for the authenticity of any of the letters can be produced and yet from them an elaborate and confident exposition of Pauline thought is derived.

Two main points are argued: Paul knew no "historical" Jesus, and his "Jesus" was none other than a heathen cult-god. At once several passages in Paul's writings demand explanation; for example, I Cor. 11: 23 ff., describing the last supper on the night of Jesus' betrayal. This seems to point to a specific event in the life of a historical individual, but the difficulty is avoided by assuming that "we have here to do with a clearly later insertion," at least the reference to the betrayal is "certainly inserted." Similarly the implication of a historical Jesus whose death was followed by

<sup>23</sup> Paul gives a hint of this practice in his day (Phil. 2:9 f.), and Acts, chap. 3, shows the early believers defending their right to use Jesus' name in this way; but how extensively they did this at an early date is not known.

<sup>24</sup> See also *Christusmythe*, 120-63.

certain appearances to his followers (I Cor. 15: 5 ff.) is either another interpolation, or else it refers to an ecstatic experience without regard to any definite historical person. It is a convenient elasticity of critical method which can allow these options. Again, the mention of "brothers" of the Lord, as in I Cor. 9: 5 and Gal. 1: 19, is to be understood in the sense of community brotherhood; yet we are not told why Paul in the same context should not have included Peter and Barnabas in this brotherhood. Moreover, brothers *in* the Lord, not brothers *of* the Lord, is Paul's mode of thought for the community relationship. These are fair examples of both the brevity and the method Drews uses in treating the positive side of the Pauline evidence. It is difficult to take such arguments seriously, particularly when they are presented so briefly and with no apparent ground of justification except the presupposition that a historical Jesus must not be recognized.

If Paul's gospel is not to be traced to an actual Jesus, what is its origin? The answer is a fanciful reconstruction of the historical background. In Tarsus the heathen religious movements of the time flourished and here Paul had heard of a Jewish sect-god, Jesus, yet Paul's own sympathies were with official Judaism and he studied to become a teacher of the Law. Now the gospel of "Jesus," which was originally "nothing other than a Judaized and spiritualized Adonis-cult" was first preached by men of Cyprus and Cyrene (Acts 11: 19 f. is the evidence!) but Paul opposed this preaching because the Law pronounced a curse upon everyone who hung on a tree. Then all of a sudden there came over him a great enlightenment; the dying Adonis became a self-sacrificing god, surrendering his life for the world. This was "the moment of Christianity's birth as a religion of Paul."

This entire treatment of Paul is inadequate and unfair as a representation of his testimony to the historicity of Jesus. It ignores the results of the recent "Jesus *versus* Paul" controversy in which the gap between the two has been shown to be less wide than, for example, Brückner and Wrede supposed;<sup>25</sup> it overlooks the seriousness of Paul's struggle with opponents who based their claim to superiority on their personal association with Jesus; and

<sup>25</sup> Cf. Jülicher, *Paulus und Jesus* (1907); J. Weiss, *Paulus und Jesus* (1909).

furthermore, the whole undertone of the Pauline letters with their incidental references to Jesus—the type of evidence which is in some respects the most telling—all passes for nothing. Moreover, to make the Adonis cult the historical background of the Pauline thought is especially open to criticism. On the one hand, many features of Adonis' career do not find a place in Paul's picture of Jesus; for example, the youthful god slain by the wild boar, or the mourning of his goddess sweetheart; nor are many important items in Paul's thought paralleled in the legend of Adonis: Jesus' human ancestry and family connections,<sup>26</sup> his association with disciples,<sup>27</sup> his righteous life<sup>28</sup> lived in worldly poverty<sup>29</sup> and self-sacrificing service,<sup>30</sup> his heavenly exaltation as a reward for obedience,<sup>31</sup> the circumstances of his death,<sup>32</sup> the awakening of faith through his appearances,<sup>33</sup> and finally the stress Paul puts on the Messiah's future coming, and his present significance for the spiritual life of believers.

It is also doubtful whether the idea of the incarnation of the deity, which Drews thinks to be the fundamental item of the Pauline Christology, is really a primal feature in the apostle's thought. For him there is but one God, the activity of whose will is manifest in all things. Although Jesus was a pre-existent being who voluntarily surrendered his heavenly position, still it is God who sent him to earth, God raised him from the dead and delegates to him the conduct of the judgment, and to God at last he submits all things in order that "God may be all in all." It is true that Paul speculates about the activity of Jesus in the angelic realm in subordination to God, but the significance of this activity in man's behalf lies not in the abstract thought of an incarnated redeeming divinity but in an actual human life terminated by a violent death. Not some hypothesis about his *becoming* a man, but the way he lived and the *outcome* of his career as a man, his

<sup>26</sup> Rom. 1:3; I Cor. 9:5; Gal. 1:19; 4:4.

<sup>27</sup> I Cor. 15:5; Gal. 1:17 f., etc.

<sup>28</sup> Rom. 5:18 f.; II Cor. 5:21.

<sup>30</sup> Rom. 15:3; II Cor. 10:1.

<sup>29</sup> II Cor. 8:9; cf. Phil. 2:5 ff.

<sup>31</sup> Rom. 1:4; Phil. 2:9 f.

<sup>32</sup> I Cor. 11:23; and numerous references to his crucifixion.

<sup>33</sup> I Cor. 5:5-8; Gal. 1:12, 16.

success in contrast with the first man's failures, his restoration of the ideal of a perfect man—these are the phases of his activity that make him truly the savior of men. His resurrection, through which he was “declared to be the Son of God,” and his present activity in the spiritual life of the community are the further assurance of his saving power. In all of this the thought of pre-existence is never the stress-point. The heavenly man, the earthly Jesus, the exalted Christ (Messiah), the heavenly Lord are all features of Paul's system; but the point of supreme importance for his gospel, that which he makes the central item of his preaching, is the transition from the second to the third, from “Jesus” to “Christ and him crucified.”

Turning next to the gospels, they are held to contain only the myth of the god-man. Here, again, there is no detailed handling of critical problems. The external testimony to the gospels' origin is unceremoniously set aside on the ground of Eusebius' “notorious unreliability.” Upon the fact, now widely recognized, that the evangelists combined interpretation with their historical narratives is based the broad generalization that all is fiction, and the efforts of critical study to determine more accurately the real historical background are characterized as a “half comic, half sad performance” and a “horrible fiasco.” Yet, apparently without any suspicion of the comic, we are asked to believe that so matter-of-fact a circumstance as Jesus' association with his disciples is merely a variation of the myth about Jason's search for the golden fleece.

The point of departure for the argument against the gospels is a citation from Wrede to the effect that Mark is an apologetic treatise aiming to prove to gentile readers that Jesus was the Son of God. Granting this, it is not the same as saying Mark was interested in showing that the Son of God was Jesus, nor is Drews justified in his conclusion that “in the [synoptic] gospels we have to do not with a deified man but much more with an anthropomorphized God.”<sup>34</sup> This does not truly represent the order or progression in gospel thought. What troubled the early Christian missionaries was not the reluctance of their hearers to believe that

<sup>34</sup> *Christusmythe*, 211.

a god had become a man, but their hesitation about believing that a man, especially an obscure Jew, was really the Son of God. The oldest type of synoptic tradition does not connect either Jesus' activity or his teaching with a deified past; at baptism he first appears as God's Son, and his conduct through life is interpreted with reference to his future; his teachings are not of any angelic world out of which he has come, but of the earthly life to be lived in spiritual fellowship with God. Belief in the resurrection and exaltation of Jesus is the starting-point for the theological elaboration of the gospel tradition, and the interpreter's task was not to read the divine out of Jesus' career, but so to narrate the story of his activity that it might answer to the later faith in him as the exalted Messiah. Only in the later stages, as in the Fourth Gospel and the nativity stories of Matthew and Luke, does the process of elevation reach back as far as the pre-earthly side of Jesus' career. Hence the idea of a pre-Christian cult-god as the starting-point for the gospel literature does not at all answer to this situation; and a similar objection holds against Kalthoff's supposition that Jesus is merely the community's ideal personified to save it from perishing. On the contrary, gospel thought moves in the opposite direction, from the person to his idealization rather than from the ideal to its personification. The extent to which the gospel picture of Jesus is historical is another problem, but it must be admitted that this literary activity moves out from the idea of a historical Jesus who has become the heavenly Christ.

Jensen's explanation of the gospels' origin forms a phase of this skeptical movement not considered by Drews. According to Jensen Jesus is originally neither a personified ideal, nor an anthropomorphized cult-god, but a reproduction of the Babylonian hero (or heroes) whose exploits are narrated in the so-called *Gilgamesh Epic*.<sup>35</sup> The argument rests upon the parallels which are found

<sup>35</sup> P. Jensen *Das Gilgamesch-Epos in der Weltliteratur* (1906), 811-1030; *Moses, Jesus, Paulus: drei Varianten des babylonischen Gottmenschen Gilgamesch* (1909); *Hat der Jesus der Evangelien wirklich gelebt?* (1910). In the last-mentioned treatise (p. 4) the author protests against being classed with those who deny outright the existence of a historical Jesus, yet in effect his position is the same as theirs. He holds that Paul's letters as well as the gospels are wholly imitations of the Babylonian legend:

on comparing the epic and the gospels, much emphasis being placed upon agreements in the succession of events. The force of the argument can be estimated more accurately by citing a section of the most important parallels, preserving the order of incidents as arranged by the author:<sup>36</sup>

1. At the beginning of the Gilgamesh legend Eabani was created by a miracle at the command of the gods.

2. Eabani lived far from men in the steppe (wilderness).

3. Eabani (is hairy and) has long hair on his head. Presumably he is clad with skins.

4. Eabani lives as the beasts of the steppe (wilderness) on grass and herbs and water.

5. Gilgamesh dreams of a star resembling a host of the heavenly Lord who is stronger than he, then of a man (human being), and this star, as well as the man, is symbolic of Eabani who thereupon comes immediately to Gilgamesh.

6. To all appearances Eabani afterward flees into the steppe (wilderness).

7. The sun-god calls from heaven to Eabani in the steppe (wilderness) with kind words and speaks to him of delicious food or loaves and of the kissing of his feet by the kings of the earth.

At the beginning of the Jesus story John was produced by a miracle in accordance with an announcement by an angel.

John lived in the steppe (wilderness) near the Jordan.

John, as a Nazirite, wears his hair uncut and long. He is clad with a garment of camel's hair and girded with a belt of leather or skin.

John lives on what is to be found in the wilderness: on grasshoppers and wild honey, and, like a Nazirite, drinks no wine.

John knows (by revelation) and prophesies of Jesus' coming as the coming of a man who is stronger than he, and soon afterward this Jesus comes to John.

Jesus afterward flees into the wilderness.

Immediately before his flight into the wilderness the spirit of God descends from heaven upon Jesus and a voice from heaven calls him God's beloved Son. In the wilderness, moreover, someone (i.e., the devil) speaks with Jesus about bread (which Jesus should make from stones) and about the fact that Jesus should rule

"Of the career of the alleged founder of Christianity [Jesus] we know nothing or at least as good as nothing"; and "We serve in our cathedrals and houses of prayer, in our churches and schools, in palace and hut, a Babylonian god."

<sup>36</sup> *Moses, Jesus, Paulus*, 27-30.

8. Eabani returns from the steppe (wilderness) to his abode, the home of Gilgamesh.

9. The dominion of [the great serpent and] the great lion is conquered by a god who comes down on a cloud (?) to whom the dominion of the world is to be transferred.

10. [Conquest of the great serpent.]

11. A fever plague, Xisuthros intercedes for plagued humanity and in this way probably the plague was brought to an end.

12. Xisuthros builds himself a ship and keeps it ready.

13. On an evening Xisuthros, with his family and his nearest friends, enters the ship.

14. A storm arises and ceases.

15. Xisuthros lands with his family far from his abode.

16. Sinful humanity and most beasts, among them also the swine, are drowned in the flood.

17. On a seventh day, after an interview with three intimate persons, Xisuthros comes to the top of the high mountain of the deluge and then is deified.

18. The voice of the invisible Xisuthros out of the air to his ship companions says: You are to be pious.

19. Chumbaba adventure.

20. Gilgamesh reproaches Ishtar for her love affairs and the evils she has done her lovers.

21. The bull adventure.

all kingdoms of the earth if he kissed the devil's feet.

Jesus returns from the wilderness to his native place.

The kingdom of heaven and of God is near, which is to be introduced by Jesus' coming on the clouds.

Expulsion of the demon in the synagogue at Capernaum.

Peter's mother-in-law is sick with fever and Jesus makes her well.

A boat is kept ready for Jesus.

On an evening Jesus with his disciples enters the boat.

A storm arises and ceases.

Jesus lands in Perea opposite his native place.

Two thousand or more demons, and two thousand swine, are drowned in the sea over which Jesus went.

After six or eight days, thus certainly originally after a week of seven days, Jesus with three most intimate persons went on to a high mountain and was glorified and called God's Son.

The voice out of the cloud on the mountain of transfiguration says: You are to hear Jesus.

[Apparently omitted but is in a new place.]

John blames Herod for having married his second wife, Herodias, and for his evil deeds.

[Apparently omitted but is in quite a new place.]



22. Eabani dies.

John the Baptist dies (at a corresponding place in the story).

. . . . .

And so on until the end of Jesus' career is reached.

39. [Gilgamesh dies.]

Jesus dies.

It is evident that no importance can be attached to any likeness between individuals. At first John is Eabani, then he becomes Gilgamesh and Jesus is Eabani (No. 5), then Jesus becomes Xisuthros (Nos. 11-17), then Xisuthros is God (No. 18). When John reproves Herod he is Gilgamesh (No. 20), but when he dies in consequence of this boldness he is Eabani (No. 22). In the uncited parallels which follow there is the same confusion: when Jesus starts across the lake with the disciples he is Gilgamesh; when the storm arises he is Xisuthros; again, Gilgamesh represents the rich young ruler, but in the immediately following incident he represents Jesus' disciples; Jesus is Xisuthros when he gives the loaves to the disciples and they are Gilgamesh, but in the very next parallel Jesus is again Gilgamesh; then Jesus is Xisuthros and Peter is Gilgamesh, though immediately afterward the rich man in hell is Gilgamesh and Lazarus in Abraham's bosom is Eabani, notwithstanding the correspondence between Eabani and John the Baptist at the time of the latter's death. It cannot be said that the life-story of any hero in the Babylonian legend parallels that of any New Testament character, and indeed, so far as the support of the argument is concerned, the proper names may as well be struck from the list.

As to the resemblance between individual events, it is insignificant and often trifling in content; for example, two characters are alike in that each is in the wilderness—among orientals a natural place for meditation; one has a hairy body, the other wears a garment made of hair; one eats grass, the other eats grasshoppers; and, finally, both die—hardly a remarkable fact when there is no resemblance in the circumstances attending their deaths. But what of the alleged "essentially similar *succession* of events"? This is not true of persons with whom the action is associated, for, as already observed, first one person and then another is intro-

duced without regard to orderly procedure. Moreover, it is not true that the action, as arranged in these parallels, preserves the order of events in the gospels. The reference to Jesus' coming on the clouds (No. 9) appears in the gospels not at the beginning of Jesus' preaching but toward the close. The connection between holding a boat ready (No. 12) and entering the boat (No. 13) is a misrepresentation of the gospel narrative. Xisuthros enters the ship that he prepares and holds in readiness, but the occasion on which a boat is held ready for Jesus (Mark 3:9) is entirely different from that on which he enters a boat to go across the lake (Mark 4:35), and an important part of his work in Galilee is done in the meantime. It is exceptionally irregular to place the transfiguration in connection with the story of the Gadarene demoniacs (Nos. 16-18). According to the gospel order a wide gap intervenes in which belong several incidents mentioned later in Jensen's series. Again, the order of Mark is violated when Jesus' conversation with the rich young ruler is placed before Jesus' reference to the "loaves"; and the order of Luke suffers when the story of the rich young ruler is put before the parable of the rich man in hades.

The alleged points of likeness are even more insignificant when one views them in their original contexts. It is only by a generous omission of the main features of the narrative that a theory of resemblance can be made even plausible. To take a single illustration, the gospel story of Jesus' baptism and temptation tells of an individual with a new consciousness of his mission in life reflecting in solitude upon the means he will use for its accomplishment. Though he is hungry and has power to turn stones into bread, he will not, for God is more to him than bread; nor will he ask God to show him favoritism either in the display of unusual acts or in the granting of earthly dominion. These are all inferior motives—temptations of Satan—in contrast with the ideal of perfect submission to the will of God. On the other hand, the portion of the Babylonian legend, of which the gospel narrative is supposed to be a reproduction, pictures Eabani as a wild creature sporting with the beasts and protecting them from the hunter. The latter complains to Gilgamesh, the ruler of the city of Erech, who promises to lure Eabani away by means of a prostitute. The plan succeeds

and finally Eabani is persuaded to enter the city and live in friendship with Gilgamesh. Later (lacunae in the records leave the exact connection uncertain) follows the so-called temptation parallel, which, however, is no temptation at all but a speech of comfort and exhortation from Shamash the sun-god. Eabani is evidently restive under the restraints of civilization, and Shamash says, in effect, Why, Eabani, do you long for the harlot, the prostitute? Have you not been supplied with food and clothing at the court of Gilgamesh who will allow you to sit on an easy seat at his right hand and the kings of the earth will kiss your feet? And when the dawn of morning broke "the words of Shamash, the mighty, loosened the bands of Eabani and his furious heart came to rest." These narratives certainly have no essential feature in common, and a theory of the derivation of the gospel story from the Babylonian, when the argument rests wholly on internal resemblance, is nothing less than absurd.

Perhaps the greatest weakness of this whole theory lies in its omissions. Large sections of both the gospel history and the Babylonian epic have to be suppressed in order to establish even the faintest semblance of parallelism. Practically all of Jesus' teaching is overlooked and his career taken as a whole has no counterpart in the epic. There is no character there whose religious ideas, whose inner experiences, whose motives and impulses, whose attitude toward men and God, and whose relations in life have the least resemblance to these traits in the gospel picture of Jesus. In no respect does Jensen's hypothesis, as a theory to explain the origin of the gospels without reference to a historical Jesus, seem to have any validity.

When all the evidence brought against Jesus' historicity is surveyed it is not found to contain any elements of strength. The argument for a pre-Christian Jesus lacks any substantial support and all theories that would explain the origin of the New Testament literature as purely a work of fiction fail. Paul and the gospel-writers are seen to possess the firm conviction that Jesus was a historical personage. Still it may be asked, Were they right in this conviction? Is his historicity an absolutely provable proposition? As a mathematical theorem, perhaps not, but we may

also remark that such a proof that he was not historical is also out of the question. There is no one now living who can say from first-hand knowledge that there was, or that there was not, in the first century of our era, an actual person about whom Christian tradition gathered. In matters of history "proof" can mean only a reasonable certainty based upon the available data. These data, if taken at their face value, are very explicit and the efforts which have thus far been made to explain them as totally spurious seem altogether inadequate. True, no great worth can be attached to any testimony outside of Christianity itself—Tacitus is too late to speak from personal acquaintance with the period in question and the originality of the passage in Josephus is much in doubt;<sup>37</sup> but unless Paul's epistles can be shown to be falsifications throughout, the historicity of Jesus is a compulsory conclusion. If, for example, Paul's controversy with opponents as reported in Galatians or in the Corinthian letters is historical, it inevitably follows that there was a historical Jesus with whom the older apostles had been personally associated. Drews is less consistent than his colleagues when he tries to save Paul's historicity and denies that of Jesus, but they are not more successful in showing reasons for rejecting Paul. Jensen's attempt to derive the Pauline letters from the Gilgamesh legend<sup>38</sup> is even less worthy of consideration than his treatment of the gospels, and although W. B. Smith argues for the spuriousness of Romans he passes the other letters by without consideration. Only belief in Jesus' historicity seems adequate to explain the evidence which now lies before us. Otherwise the origin of the earliest features in the gospel tradition remains unexplained, while the stages of development in this tradition are seen to move away from Jesus, the man of Galilee, toward the heavenly Christ; and Paul not only makes the historical personality of Jesus the corner-stone of his gospel, but the whole situation in which Paul moves shows a historical background in which such a person is the central figure.

The fourth and fifth of Drews's theses are related only indirectly to the present topic and can here be allowed only a few concluding

<sup>37</sup> Tacitus, *Annals*, XV, 44; Josephus, *Ant.*, XVIII, 3, 3; cf. XX, 9, 1.

<sup>38</sup> *Moses, Jesus, Paulus*, 38 ff.

words. Regarding the fifth thesis which raises the question of Jesus' relation to modern religion, Drews does not correctly represent the attitude of the "liberal" theologians, if by "liberal" he means the leading representatives of New Testament study in Germany. They do not hold that "faith" in the historical Jesus is the sole ground of their religion and that it is "only through textual criticism in a philological way"<sup>39</sup> that religion today is to be explained and established. For them "salvation" is not an affair of belief but of life, and Jesus' significance lies not in the doctrines about him formulated by his early interpreters but in his own religious life. To discover with keener appreciation the content of this religious life from which so strong an influence went out into the lives of others is the aim of these scholars.

The fourth thesis is nearer to the historical question in hand, though it really carries us over to the problem of Jesus' historical relation to the founding of Christianity. Is it a fact that what Drews's theory leaves unexplained is only "secondary and unimportant matters"? The answer given to this depends upon one's understanding of what constituted the vital element in primitive Christianity. If this was doctrine and ritual then Drews's claim—had he successfully established his other propositions—might have to be granted; but if the essential item was a new religious impulse which used, among other things, theological notions and outward forms in its efforts at self-expression, then the features Drews leaves unexplained are the primary and all-important. On this interpretation the personal influence of Jesus' own life is not only the key to the origin of the new religion but also the incentive for the literary activity which produced the New Testament.

<sup>39</sup> *Berliner Religionsgespräch*, 93 f.

## PRAGMATIC ELEMENTS IN MODERNISM

ERRETT GATES  
The University of Chicago

A study of the writings of representative Modernists, especially those that have fallen under the ban of the Roman *Curia*, reveals a constant use of pragmatic phrases and ideas.

It is not to be inferred from this that modernism has adopted a thoroughgoing pragmatism, either of the moderate or radical sort; or that it holds its pragmatic elements apart from other philosophies. It uses pragmatism in so far as it serves its purpose, but it does not hesitate to resort to all the philosophies for help.

The Modernist is an eclectic in philosophy. He is a Platonic idealist and mystic when it is to his advantage, as in the formulation of his catholicism; but a pragmatist, when it comes to the elucidation and defense of his modernism. In metaphysics (the nature of reality) he remains, along with the "Prince of Scholastics," the Angelic Doctor, an absolute realist. In epistemology (the theory of knowledge) he is a Kantian empiricist. In logic (the nature and criterion of truth) he is a pragmatist. But none of these systems are carried out consistently in their respective inquiries. His immanentism modifies his metaphysics, while his intuitionism modifies his epistemology; and his pragmatism does duty on all occasions. He does not hesitate to apply his pragmatic criterion to his realist belief in the Absolute, or to his mystical conception of catholicism.<sup>1</sup> This will help to explain the striking diversities among some of his theological ancestors—Kant and Newman—to whom he lays claim.

But what have the Modernists themselves to say of the new philosophy called pragmatism? It ought to be said first of all that there is not entire agreement among them as to any philosophy. Father Tyrrell says:

To judge so diversified and complex a movement as modernism by any one of its representatives, is most unfair to all the rest. I represent myself alone.

<sup>1</sup> TYRRELL, *A Much-Abused Letter*, 78-81, *et passim*; *Through Scylla and Charybdis*, 42-43 ff.; cf. JAMES, *Pragmatism*, 73.

Abbé Loisy is impatient of me as a dreamer and mystic. Père Laberthonnière finds me guilty of an occult scholasticism. One friend complains of my democratic, another of my conservative and aristocratic sympathies. With all due respect to the encyclical *Pascendi*, Modernists wear no uniform, nor are they sworn to the defense of any system, still less of that which His Holiness has fabricated for them.<sup>2</sup>

Modernists do not desire to separate themselves as a party from the Roman church, nor to be set apart as a guild within it. Hence they have avoided all organized efforts or prearranged agreements. Their safety lies in their diffusion throughout the entire body, and their alliance with many different types of thought; in other words, in their complexity rather than their unity. They fear all hard and fast lines either of organization or philosophy. But they are more sensitive to philosophic classification than to any other kind. Nothing in all the papal encyclical *Pascendi* gave them so much concern as the "assumption that there lies at the root of modernism a certain philosophical system." The Modernist never wearies of reminding us that "not philosophy but criticism is the presupposition of modernism." "So far from our philosophy dictating our critical method, it is the critical method that has of its own accord forced us to a very tentative and uncertain formulation of various philosophical conclusions."<sup>3</sup>

When Father Tyrrell was classified with pragmatists, he showed no little irritation and expressed himself as follows: "Because, as is plain from the last chapter, I am in sympathy with 'pragmatism' and use many of its terms and principles, it has pleased certain hard-worked reviewers, with no leisure for microscopy, to dump me down with the pragmatists and have done with me." In an article in the *Annales de philosophie chrétienne* (October, 1905), explaining his attitude, he said:

Life is the test and criterion of truth, as serviceableness is of any instrument. But it does not follow that whatever is immediately or apparently useful to life, is truly so, and therefore true. Nor does truth belong *per prius* to particular propositions, but to the whole mind or world-scheme with which such particulars cohere, and which they involve or imply. Such a scheme is truer just in the degree that it extends our power and control more widely over experience as a

<sup>2</sup> *Mediaevalism*, 106; cf. Sabatier, *Modernism*, 160.

<sup>3</sup> *The Programme of Modernism* (English trans. by George Tyrrell), 13.

whole. And this total experience includes far more than the physical world of our sensations. It embraces the whole world of human life—aesthetic, ethical, social, political, religious—over which the spirit of man broods by reflection, feeling, will, and action; through which it is developed and enlarged in the direction of deity. . . . The pragmatist reasonably protests against the Absolute in the sense of an external Something to be copied by the mind, which Something has no common measure with our experience, or in the sense of a Goodness which is transcendently or infinitely unlike the goodness of human conduct and will, and can in no sense be copied or imitated practically. But truth is none the less an agreement with God as with an eternal or absolute standard; it is an agreement of our mind and reason with the Mind and Reason with which our given experience is saturated, not with a Mind out of all relation to us and our world. For God is the law of our life and being; our being is the expression of God.<sup>4</sup>

There is evident here an effort on the part of Father Tyrrell to combine pragmatism with his well-known mystical immanentism.

The French group of Modernists has openly identified itself with a school of philosophy which passes under the name of "the Philosophy of Action," or in its application to religious problems is known as the "New Apologetic." Its founder was Maurice Blondel, who set forth the central principle of the philosophy in a Sorbonne thesis in 1893, under the title, *L'action*. Blondel makes action rather than thought or feeling primary in the determination of reality. It is of this school that Dr. William Turner wrote in the *New York Review* of 1906-7, under the title: "A Contemporary French School of Pragmatism." Of it he said:

When one considers their method and examines the fundamental principles on which they rely, one will find that both in the destructive and the constructive phase of their activity as thinkers, they have many points of contact with the method and with the principles of philosophical pragmatism. While "the French School of Pragmatism" "has taken no account of recent and American English pragmatism," its members nevertheless agree in (1) "A protest against the attempt to interpret all reality in terms of intellect, and (2) an insistence on action, conduct, or activity crises, as the center of philosophical enquiry."<sup>5</sup>

An enthusiastic and brilliant group of the younger Roman Catholic clergy of France has taken up the philosophy of Blondel and applied

<sup>4</sup> George Tyrrell, *Through Scylla and Charybdis*, 196, 197; Cf. *A Much-Abused Letter*, 94.

<sup>5</sup> *New York Review* (1906-1907), 27, 34; cf. *Philosophic Review* (1908), 312—art. by E. LeRoy, "Philosophy of Religion in France."



it as an apologetic to Catholic dogma. The Abbé Charles Denis, defended it in the pages of the *Annales de philosophie chrétienne*; and le Père L. Laberthonnière elaborated it in *Essais de philosophie religieuse*; while more recently a learned Catholic layman, M. Edouard Le Roy, has applied it to dogma in a volume entitled, *Dogme et critique*, which Paul Sabatier says, "marks a date in religious history." These philosophers of "action" are universally hailed among Modernists as "apologists for the truth and transcendency of Catholic institutions," and their work is regarded as a triumphant defense of their right to remain in the Mother Church, and be treated as dutiful sons.

French modernism, however, stands alone in its commitment to a definite philosophy. Of this school Father Tyrrell says:

There is, I know, a certain school of miscalled Modernists for whom the historic difficulties are altogether secondary or even non-existent; whose reconstructive efforts are inspired by a sense of the inadequacy of scholastic philosophy as a vehicle of Christian thought; who feel the urgent need of a religious philosophy which shall be a faithful, experimentally verifiable analysis of the implications of religious life and action. With this school I am in profound agreement. . . . Gladly as I welcome the more living and flexible synthesis of the Philosophy of Action, yet so far as they ignore or evade any of these inconvenient facts or attempt to dictate to history in the old style, I have no patience with them.<sup>6</sup>

But Modernists are not interested in philosophy, pragmatic, or otherwise, for its own sake. The movement as a whole was at first unconscious of any philosophic bent; scientific and historic facts made modernism what it is. And it would remain utterly oblivious of philosophy if it were compelled to hold these facts subservient to philosophy. Whenever philosophy means anything to it, it is as an instrument in the clearer explication or solution of its practical problem. That problem is how to conceive catholicism so as to make it a term inclusive of all the facts of Christian history and all the manifestations of the religious consciousness. That means the problem of reconciling freedom with authority, criticism with faith, progress with permanence, modern science with ancient dogma, democracy with hierarchy: the form with the spirit, and the present with the past, without throwing away anything of value, or breaking with a catholicism that is worthy of the name. This is the task

<sup>6</sup> George Tyrrell, *Mediaevalism*, 107-8.

that distinguishes modernism from all other movements in modern religious thought. It is an effort within the sphere of the Roman Catholic church to construct a synthesis of modern science and democracy with Catholic dogma and institution without doing violence to either.

And for its pains it has called down upon it the wrath of the Roman hierarchy, and the incredulity of the rest of Christendom. Caught thus between two fires, its principal task has been one of self defense—an *apologia pro sua vita*—by which it hopes to commend itself to the kindly consideration and fellowship of the Mother Church, and to the respect of the Protestant world. An inquiry into the pragmatic elements in modernism must, therefore, be narrowed to its distinctive expression as an apology for modern thought and method in a mediaeval system.

And for this purpose there is general recourse among Modernists to the principles of pragmatism. Not always a conscious recourse to the philosophic principles known as pragmatism, but an instinctive employment of pragmatic tests, which has always been the human way of getting on in the world. Modernists were using pragmatic principles before pragmatism was fully born. They have not adopted the system as such, nor rejected it; and they follow the "temper of mind," the attitude and spirit of pragmatism rather than its technical doctrines.

Modernists very generally adopt the pragmatist view of (1) *experience as the source of all knowledge and the test of all validity*.

Pragmatism refers everything to experience in which all intellectual inquiry and moral idealization begin and end. It is *par excellence* the philosophy of experience, in which there can be no value or truth but such as is realized in human experience, and no theoretical difference worth while which does not make a difference in experience. "Things are what they are experienced as being."

Modernists still further adopt the pragmatist view of (2) *usefulness*, or "*practical consequences*," or "*successful working*," as the *criterion of truth*.

If we look at history candidly, and without prejudice, we have to admit that no religion has ever in the long run established or proved itself in any other way.

<sup>1</sup> Pratt, *What Is Pragmatism*, 21 ff.; cf. Bawden, *The Principles of Pragmatism*, 51-88 ff.

Religions have *approved* themselves; they have ministered to sundry vital needs which they found reigning. When they violated other needs too strongly, or when other faiths came which served the same needs better, the first religions were supplanted.<sup>8</sup> . . . The truth of our beliefs consists in general in their giving satisfaction.<sup>9</sup>

#### I. THE TREATMENT OF EXPERIENCE AS A SOURCE OF RELIGIOUS KNOWLEDGE IN MODERNIST WRITINGS

The *Programme of Modernism* contains a very full and clear exposition of this principle joined with the conception of immanence:

Just as science, by its combination of experiment with the laws of calculus, extends our dominion over the physical world, and as metaphysics corresponds to the necessity of judging our action by a fixed conception of the universe, so the needs of our moral life, and that experience of the divine which we possess in the hidden depths of our consciousness, issue in a special sense of spiritual realities which dominates the whole of our ethical existence.<sup>10</sup> . . . Religious knowledge, in fine, is our actual experience of the divine which marks in ourselves and in the whole world.<sup>11</sup>

In this explicit acceptance of a subjective empirical theory of religious knowledge, the authors of the *Programme* are consciously following the Kantian criticism. Having shown that the "arguments for the existence of God, drawn by scholastic metaphysics, have lost all value nowadays," they affirm the sovereignty of conscience as an organ of religious knowledge:

Hence it was natural to have recourse to the testimony of conscience in order to demonstrate the existence of God, or rather, to justify our faith in the divine. Thus an appeal was made to man's moral impulses, which, for the rest, are the most authorized witnesses in this matter, since the origin of religion is a matter of conscience and should be investigated accordingly.<sup>12</sup>

But they are not satisfied with affirming this as their own view. They defend it as "a mode of procedure not only fully justified in itself," but as "held legitimate by the most illustrious representatives of Catholic teaching." They cite it as the view of Clement of Alexandria, of Tertullian, of Origen, of Augustine, and even of Thomas Aquinas himself, who, "though drawn to metaphysical speculations and full of trust in argumentative reasoning, allows due demonstrative

<sup>8</sup> Quoted from James by Pratt, *What Is Pragmatism*, 183.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, 90.

<sup>10</sup> *Programme of Modernism* (trans. by Tyrrell), 98.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, 96.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, 100-101.

value to the living aspirations of conscience and to the deeper needs of the spirit. He constantly affirms that 'a natural desire can never be a delusion.'"<sup>13</sup>

This experience, however, must not be construed as purely personal and individualistic; it is also an "experience of a divine impulse which reaches us as members of a social organism, through past ages of collective religious life."<sup>14</sup> With this social conception of the content of religious experience Father Tyrrell agrees:

That the religious life of the church is the source and criterion of doctrinal truth; that experiment is the criterion of theory as the fruit is of the tree, is a point that I will not even discuss.<sup>15</sup>

He says still further:

If you had followed my writings at all carefully you would know that I believe firmly in the necessity and utility of theology; but of a living theology that continually proceeds from and returns to that experience of which it is the ever tentative and perfectible analysis.<sup>16</sup>

This experience which is the source of religious knowledge and truth is not merely an experience of the intellect—"an equation of thought to thing (*adequatio rei et intellectus*)."<sup>17</sup> It is "a function of man's whole inward life."<sup>17</sup> "The apprehension of truth—at least of moral and religious truth—is an act of the entire moral personality rather than a function of the speculative intellect alone."<sup>18</sup> It is just here in its antischolastic intellectualism that the Modernists discover their affinity with Newman. He, too, failed to find the merely intellectual or rational proofs of the existence of God satisfying. He says: "Were it not for this voice speaking so clearly in my conscience and my heart, I should be an atheist, or a pantheist, or a polytheist when I looked out into the world."<sup>19</sup> Newman aids and abets the Modernist quite as much because of his indifference to scholastic methods and interests as by his doctrine of development.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, 104-5.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, 108; cf. Bawden, *Principles of Pragmatism*, 64 ff.

<sup>15</sup> *Mediaevalism*, 38.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, 46.

<sup>17</sup> *Programme*, 97; cf. Pratt, *What Is Pragmatism*, 184.

<sup>18</sup> James J. Fox, D.D., *New York Review* (1905-6), 40.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, 37.

It is said that he never quoted from St. Thomas. Bremond says concerning Newman:

In putting conscience, Christian experience, and personal realization of the Divine, at the base of the whole religious structure, he collaborates, without knowing it, in the work of Schleiermacher and his disciples. . . . Newman's psychology of faith is like an introduction to "pragmatism" and "the Philosophy of Action."<sup>20</sup>

Christianity is thus a living experience, in Modernist apologetics; and because living, it is changing from generation to generation, and must ever and anon reclothe itself in a new body suitable to its environment. Dogma and institution are simply the body in which the living Christian experience statedly reclothes itself, and by which it preserves its life.<sup>21</sup>

## II. THE FUNCTIONAL OR RELATIVE NATURE OF RELIGIOUS DOGMA AND INSTITUTION

The point to be safeguarded in the Modernist program is the *break* between the *past* and the *present*, the *old* and the *new*. His principle of catholicism forbids any schism. He must accept the whole, or nothing. His objection to protestantism is that it stands for a schism in the history of the kingdom of God on earth. He is done with all dualism—all antithesis between the past and the present, the church and the world, science and religion, reason and revelation, the inspiration of the first century and that of the fourth, thirteenth, sixteenth, or twentieth centuries. God is one; his spirit is over all and in all times, places, peoples, and periods of Christian history without break or partiality. The Protestant holds a brief in favor of religious history during the first century, and from the sixteenth to the twentieth over a part of Christendom. The Modernist holds a brief for the whole period of Christian history from the first to the twentieth century. And not only so, but for all religious history. His catholicism is a universal Christian term, but more, it is a universal human term. He aspires to reach a final synthesis which shall transcend all historic antitheses between Jew and Gentile, Greek and Roman, Protestant and Catholic. He achieves this pur-

<sup>20</sup> Henry Bremond, *The Mystery of Newman* (English trans. by Corrance), 332.

<sup>21</sup> *The Programme*, 78, 80, 85, 87 ff.; cf. Loisy, *The Gospel and the Church*, 165 ff. (English trans. by Horne).

pose by the application of the principles of divine immanence and of development or evolution to the history of his church and her established order.

Hence he accepts the whole history of his church without wavering—"Christ-worship, saint-worship, miracles, sacraments, dogma, theology, uniformity, ritual, priesthood, sacrifice, papacy, infallibility, nay, mediaevalism itself," because all stand for so many *attempts to satisfy the religious requirements of human nature*.<sup>22</sup> He accepts them not because they are *true*, but because they have been *useful*. And the principle which binds him to the past, at the same time frees him from it.

It is the principle of *development*,<sup>23</sup> which the Modernist explicates pragmatically as a *principle of continuous adaptation* of organism to environment, of belief to experience, and of dogma and institution to religious needs. Each in its time gave satisfaction and hence was true, not absolutely, but relatively. Pragmatism for the Modernist becomes a philosophy of history viewed as a process from within. As a process-philosophy it serves his purpose most admirably. He uses it as an interpretation of the historic process through which the Christian organism has passed. This process justifies itself at every stage and in every expression as something valuable and useful under its own conditions. New conditions beget new needs, and new needs call for new organs.

Modernist writings are so replete with this doctrine that the historian is embarrassed with the riches of his materials. Pragmatic development is pre-eminently the apologetic device of the Modernist. By means of it he frees himself from the past and yet holds all that is valuable in it. As Lilley, one of the most sympathetic Protestant interpreters of modernism, so finely says:

There is no dogma, therefore, which can resist the solvent analysis necessitated by the application to it of the category of growth. But neither is there any which does not in some way witness to truth, and to some degree inhere in truth, by reason of the fact that it has had its origin in some profound experience of the general soul of man, which is the divinely-constituted source of all revelation. So modernism rejects no dogma and transforms all. . . . But modernism

<sup>22</sup> Tyrrell, *Mediaevalism*, 150; cf. *Through Scylla and Charybdis*, 20-84.

<sup>23</sup> *The Programme*, 78 ff.

holds that life may be trusted to slough off its old skin, and that when it does so in obedience to the needs of nature it may find that every expression of the old life needs to repeat itself in some worthier and more developed form in the new.<sup>24</sup>

This is the fundamental thought and apologetic principle of Loisy,<sup>25</sup> and of the New Apologetic of the French Clergy;<sup>26</sup> of Tyrrell,<sup>27</sup> and English modernism; but pre-eminently of *The Programme of Modernism*, which presents itself as an undisguised application of this principle to biblical and Christian history. Its authors protest their "aim not to subvert tradition," "but to show how the honest recognition of such an evolution has led us to justify our faith by the notion of the permanence of something divine in the life of the church, in virtue whereof every new doctrinal formulation, every new juridical institution, can claim a divine origin and a divine maintenance."<sup>28</sup>

According to the *Programme* religious history behaves pragmatically. As expressed by Höffding: "All worth rests on the relation of events and of conditions to life at its different stages, to the existence and evolution of life."<sup>29</sup>

Religious dogmas and institutions have grown up and survived because they answered to a human need, and worked in the satisfaction of that need. The history of dogma shows that there has been a continuous change, a constant growth and decay, and adaptation of outer form to inner meaning. This is the divine method in history, as in nature.

Everything in the history of Christianity has changed—doctrine, hierarchy, worship; but all these changes have been providential means for the preservation of the Gospel-spirit, which has remained unchanged through the ages.<sup>30</sup>

The *Programme* abounds in appeals to this principle of pragmatic and relative value, as applied to the history of dogma.<sup>31</sup> Its authors never weary of reminding Pius X that official scholasticism herself, that bulwark of papal tradition, was an adaptation to the age, and was begotten by its practical needs.

<sup>24</sup> A. T. Lilley, *Modernism. A Record and a Review*, 22-23.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, 55-75; cf. Fogazzaro, *The Saint* (English trans.), 291-92.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, 95-103, 149-62, 174-84.

<sup>28</sup> *Programme*, 20-21.

<sup>27</sup> *Through Scylla and Charybdis*, 20-84.

<sup>29</sup> Höffding, *Problems of Philosophy*, 154.

<sup>30</sup> *Programme of Modernism*, 92; cf. 20.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, 90.

S. Thomas was thus the true Modernist of his time, the man who strove with marvellous perseverance and genius to harmonize his faith with the thought of that day. And we are the true successors of the scholastics in all that was valuable in their work—in the keen sense of the adaptability of the Christian religion to the ever-changing forms of philosophy and general culture. . . . Scholasticism is precisely the intellectual expression of the Christian experience as adapted to the spiritual needs of the early Middle Ages.<sup>32</sup>

The same thing was true of the papacy, of which the *Programme* says:

We quite understand those decisive practical reasons that moved the church in the Middle Ages to take to herself a political power which, however it may at times have hampered her spiritual influence, did nevertheless, further the development of mediaeval Europe in some ways.<sup>33</sup>

But the Modernist has only thus freed his hands with reference to dogmas and institutions in their past development. What of their use in the present, and his attitude toward them, for they survive as a part of the church's living faith and practice.

Here he turns to the apologetic of symbolism and the distinction between faith-values and fact-values. Tyrrell wrote his ill-starred *Much-Abused Letter* for the express purpose of strengthening the attachment of a Roman Catholic professor to the church. He could no longer intellectually justify the official teachings and requirements of Catholicism. Tyrrell did not disguise the force of the professor's objections to Catholicism, which, he says, "taken all together constitute a massive objection against received theological positions which, frankly, I am unable to solve." He abandons "for argument's sake" the "intellectual defence of catholicism," and then asks:

Does it straightway follow you should separate yourself from the communion of the church? Yes, if theological intellectualism be right; if faith mean mental assent to a system of conceptions of the understanding; if catholicism be primarily a theology, or at most a system of practical observances regulated by that theology. No, if catholicism be primarily a life, and the church a spiritual organism in whose life we participate, and if theology be but an attempt of that life to formulate and understand itself—an attempt which may fail wholly or in part without affecting the value and reality of the said life.<sup>34</sup>

He passes from the distinction between theology and revelation, the official and the collective church, the real and ideal catholicism, and

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, 143, 89; cf. 19.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, 126.

<sup>34</sup> *Much-Abused Letter*, 50.



one's privilege to reject the one and hold communion with the other, to the symbolic meaning of the sacraments in whose spiritual values one can still participate, and find unity with the church.

When you hear mass you can still do so with a desire and intention of uniting your life in self-sacrifice with this endless, worldwide self-sacrifice of the mystical Christ for the same ends in the same spirit.<sup>35</sup>

Religious dogmas as well as the sacraments have this representative or symbolic import, according to leading Modernists such as Tyrrell, LeRoy, and Loisy.

The world of experience [says Tyrrell] is simply subordinate and instrumental to the real world of our will and affections in which we live the life of love and hate, and pass from one will-attitude to another in relation to other wills than our own. . . . In this region truth has a practical and teleological sense—it is the trueness of a means to an end, of an instrument to its purpose. . . . Beliefs that have been found to foster and promote the spiritual life of the soul must so far be in accordance with the nature and the laws of that will-world with which it is the aim of religion to bring us into harmony; their practical value results from, and is founded in, their representative value.<sup>36</sup>

If any theology of grace or predestination or of the sacraments would make men pray less, or watch less, or struggle less, then we may be sure that such theology is wrong.<sup>37</sup>

M. LeRoy works out his conception of dogma on the basis of the philosophy of action; and holds that "dogma proclaims, above all, a prescription of practical order; it is the formula of a rule of practical conduct." As illustrations of this he says, to quote Inge:

When we say, "God is personal," we mean, "behave in your relations with God as you do in your relations with a human person." When we say, "Jesus is risen from the dead," we mean, "treat him as if he were your contemporary." Similarly the doctrine of the Real Presence means that we should take, in presence of the consecrated elements, the same attitude as we should in the presence of the actual Jesus.<sup>38</sup>

It is the view of Loisy that the dogmas of the church, put forth as immutable and absolute, are not really so, but relative, "related to the state of general human knowledge in the time and under the circumstances when they were constituted."<sup>39</sup> The fundamental

<sup>35</sup> *Much-Abused Letter*, 85.

<sup>36</sup> Quoted by Inge, *Faith and Its Psychology*, 172.

<sup>37</sup> Tyrrell, *Through Scylla and Charybdis*, 104.

<sup>38</sup> Inge, *op. cit.*, 170-71; cf. Lilley, *Modernism*, 149-62.

<sup>39</sup> *The Gospel and the Church*, 215; cf. Lilley, *Modernism*, 68 ff.

truth of dogma is unchangeable, but its intellectual formulations, since they are presented in external images derived from and suited to the intelligence of the time, "are necessarily inadequate, capable of improvement, consequently of change."

It necessarily follows that considerable change in the state of knowledge might render necessary a new interpretation of old formulas, which, conceived in another intellectual atmosphere, no longer say what is necessary, or no longer say it suitably.<sup>40</sup>

In true pragmatic fashion, following the Ritschlian distinction between fact-judgments and value-judgments, the Modernists distinguish between the truths of fact (fact-values) and the truths of faith (faith-values). They belong to two different orders. On the basis of this separation they achieve freedom for science, both historical and physical, and independence for religious faith. While they are "perfectly certain of the ultimate accord of faith and science," and proclaim themselves "lovers of that true science which is indifferent to all those ultra-phenomenal problems, whose solution concerns the other faculties of man's spirit,"<sup>41</sup> they very jealously guard the independent, autonomous, and sovereign rights of religious faith in its own territory.

Such critical scholars as Loisy among the Modernists find this distinction especially serviceable as a defense of their free, critical labors in the field of New Testament history and literature. As the *Programme of Modernism* states it:

It matters little to faith whether or no criticism can prove the virgin-birth of Christ, his most striking miracles, or even his resurrection; whether or no it sanctions the attribution to Christ of certain dogmas or of direct institution of the Church.<sup>42</sup> . . . Religious facts include mysterious meanings which pure science misses. Faith, with its peculiar power, penetrates to these meanings, and feeds on them. It does not create them; it finds them. But to find them we just need this faculty of faith which, working upon the facts, does undoubtedly transfigure and disfigure them, but only from the knowledge point of view and not ontologically. [Hence] the Christ of Faith, for example, is very different from the Christ of history.<sup>43</sup>

Modernists, therefore, make a sharp distinction in the sacred documents between the historic foundation and the expression of religious faith. And hence they examine them with two

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*, 216.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, 112.

<sup>41</sup> *The Programme*, 111.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, 117.

faculties: the scientific faculty, which, by use of proper historical methods, estimates the value of the scriptural sources as those of any other historical documents; and the faculty of faith, or religious intuition, which strives, by assimilation and sympathetic self-adaptation, to experience in itself that religious experience of which the Bible is the written record.<sup>44</sup> . . . Thereupon the negative results of our criticism vanish before the strong affirmations of religious intuition.<sup>45</sup>

The practical bearing of the Modernist's pragmatic philosophy upon his relation to his church and his work is perfectly apparent. His amazing independence of fact in the realm of faith, and his indifference to faith in the realm of fact, make of Loisy one of the most acute and untrammelled scholars in biblical criticism, and at the same time one of the humblest of believers in the church. His apologetic principle frees him in both his work and worship, whether he lay his hand to a critical investigation of the gospels, or the origin and nature of dogma, or the claims of the papal power, or "to complete the reconciliation of the old Catholic tradition with the new thought and the new social aspirations." In all alike he is equally free, because they belong to the domain of scientific fact or phenomenal expression. Or if he worship, whether in the language of the Lord's Prayer or in that of the Litany; in the memorial Supper of the primitive church or the mass of the mediaeval church; in all he is alike sincere, because they belong to the realm of symbol, whose values depend upon the spiritual preparation and insight of the worshipers, no two of whom are alike. He takes what he can or what he likes, or what has value for him, and leaves the rest. He has not compromised himself.

The Modernist conceives his own work as an expression of this fundamental law of pragmatic development, and sees the present, with all that he has contributed to it, passing as outgrown symbol into disuse to make way for still other formulations of the one abiding religious spirit.

<sup>44</sup> *The Programme*, 125.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*, 111.

## THE EVOLUTION OF RELIGION<sup>1</sup>

SHAILER MATHEWS  
The University of Chicago

The use of the term evolution in connection with religion is subject to at least two objections. On the one side are those who insist that religion is the gift of God and therefore has no historical development. And on the other the biologist may object to the use of the term in any such general sense as a student of social science must adopt.

To the first critic it may be replied that when he asserts or implies that religion has not developed like other elements in human experience the facts are against him. Whatever may have been its origin, religion exhibits phenomena akin to those observable in social institutions to which the term "evolution" may legitimately be applied. The old distinction of the Deists between the natural and a revealed religion has been outgrown, not so much because it did not involve large elements of truth, but because as a final answer to the problems set by the history of Christianity it failed to take into account those psychological and sociological factors with which the modern student is particularly concerned. All religions are phases of religion.

To the other class of critics it must be replied that if biologists ever had a monopoly on the term evolution their exclusive rights have long since expired. The conception given the word by the *Origin of Species* and general biological usage is a particular phase of a view of the world as old as reflective thought. The service which biology has rendered the social sciences at this point has largely been confined to the region of method, vocabularies, and analogies. If these analogies have too often been overemphasized and made to do yeoman service in the name of some non-biological science, they have none the less made it possible to

<sup>1</sup> This paper presents in substance one of a series of addresses given at the University of Chicago in honor of the centenary of the birth of Darwin.

realize that, whatever precise definition may be given the term evolution, there is a large measure of similarity between certain processes in social history and certain others in the building up of cellular organisms. Outside of the strictly biological sciences the word must be used in a large sense, but it is not identical with mere change or growth. It is possible to trace religion as one of the functional expressions of life itself through increasingly complicated and more highly differentiated activities and institutions, as that life both of individuals and societies seeks to adjust itself more effectively to its environment. The result of such vital activity is to produce, as it were, species of religions, between which, as for example Brahmanism and Mohammedanism, there is only a generic likeness.

To justify the legitimacy of the use of the term evolution in a reasonably strict sense, this paper will discuss (1) what religion is; (2) its development into species of religions according as its expression has been conditioned by its environment; (3) the persistence of vestiges of lower religious forms, concepts, and institutions in the more highly developed; and, (4) the struggle for the survival of the socially fittest among religions.

#### I. THE NATURE OF RELIGION

There have been times in which men have endeavored to arrive at the conception of religion by abstracting from Christianity its characteristic elements. Other attempts have been made to extend this process of abstraction to all religions and thus to discover that which is, to so speak, a generic concept. The difficulty with such search after a bit of scholastic realism is evident. Generic religion never existed apart from religions, and religions never existed except as interests and institutions of people. There is imperative need that all students of the subject, and especially theologians, should emancipate themselves from scholastic abstractions, and frankly recognize that religion is not a thing in itself, possessed of independent, abstract, or metaphysical existence, but is a name for one phase of concrete human activity. It is only from a strictly social point of view that either religion or religions will in any measure be properly understood.

We know only people who worship in various ways and with various conceptions of what or whom they worship.

Yet while men possess *religions* and not merely *religion*—religions of all sorts, from the simplest custom of the savage to the profundity of Brahmanism and the redemptive gospels of the Buddhist and the Christian—the comparative study of human activities expressed in these different religions has, however, discovered within them *religion* as a common divisor, as it were; viz., a particular functioning of life itself, as truly and universally human as the impulse of sex and self-preservation.

If we attempt to formulate this common element, or rather to describe this functional expression of life expressed in all religions, we must study comparatively both the highly developed religious systems and the simplest type of religion as it exists among primitive people. That is to say, while not overlooking the more complex systems as a means, so to speak, of determining the direction taken by evolution and thus better fitting ourselves to appreciate religion as never absolutely static, we must study the simplest religious organisms in order to understand the more complicated. To push the biological analogy farther, it might be said that the "cell" of religion is man's conscious attempt to place himself in beneficial relationship with those superhuman forces in his world upon which he realizes his dependence, and which he treats as he would treat persons whom he wished to aid him.

It is obvious that the content of such a formal definition will vary according to the conception of what constitutes this superhuman environment; and that this variety of estimate will affect the methods which a man adopts in making that environment propitious. A study of even the most primitive religion leads one to two convictions apparently paradoxical: religion does not necessarily imply a belief in a supreme person, and yet, in religion, environment is conceived of in the same way that men conceive of persons. Therein the functioning of life in religion differs from the functioning of life in the satisfaction of the impulse of sex and food-seeking. True religion does not, as Monier-Williams would insist, postulate the existence of one living and true God of infinite power, wisdom, and love. That would exclude too many

religious customs and rites. Men have worshiped fetiches or animals or sacred stones. Such objects are regarded as elements in the environment which affect human interests, and therefore, without being of necessity consciously personified, are treated as if they were personal.

There are a number of theories undertaking to show how this attitude of mind was induced; but all are more or less unsatisfactory. Some find the cause in fear, or dreams, or regard for ancestors, or the appetencies of sex. Doubtless there is truth in all of these hypotheses but we are not absolutely sure as to just how religion came into existence any more than we are sure how human life itself arose. We can, however, see clearly that the functional significance of religion is an elemental expression of the second of the two elemental impulses of life itself, namely, to propagate and protect itself. Religion is life functioning in the interest of self-protection. It differs from similar functional expressions of life in that (1) it treats certain elements of its environment personally (though not necessarily as a person), and (2) it seeks to make these friendly and so helpful. One or the other of these two elements has almost invariably been overlooked in studies of religion, but both are indispensable to the concept. Religion utilizes personal experience and uncompromisingly presupposes personalism not, let it be repeated, in a sense of any systematic world-view, but, in a sense doubtless unconsciously at the first but with ever-increasing clearness of conception, it treats the environment as it would treat human beings; and religion is just as uncompromisingly functional, not only in adjusting the individual or the group to its environment, but also in the attempt to adjust the environment personally considered to the person or the community. Thus Schleiermacher's conception of religion as a feeling of dependence is only part of the truth. To it must be added the conscious effort after reconciliation. It is this two-fold modification of the elemental functioning of life in the interest of self-preservation that distinguishes religion from so many activities with which it has been intimately associated, like hunting and grain-planting, marriage and burial.

Obviously the inception of this radically human attitude toward

its world is lost in the unrecorded struggles by which humanity raised itself above other forms of animal life with which it is genetically united. But one's ignorance here does not impugn the fact that such a use of experience was actually made.

Sometime, somewhere—just when and where it matters not—there appeared a man who first of all living creatures, with the new impulses of a genuine person, attempted to adjust himself consciously to the outer world upon which he saw himself dependent, by an attempt to make that outer world favorable to himself. It makes little difference how he conceived that outer world or which one of its particular aspects first impressed him. Any one of the various theories of the origin of religion might here suffice. The essential thing is that, in his passion to protect his life and to insure his continuous existence as a person, he attempted consciously to enjoy or to win the favor of the extra-human environment with which he found himself involved. And that, so far as we know, no animal other than man ever attempted to accomplish.

Nor is it necessary to insist that all religions are genetically related in a sense that one has been derived from another. The historico-religious method at the present time is in danger of mistaking similarities between religions for genealogical relations. Thus in the comparative study, let us say, of Christianity, there is strong temptation to insist that elements of Babylonian myths go to constitute the very content of Christianity. That a certain degree of genealogical relationship in this particular case may have existed may well be admitted, but a too rigorous application of the comparative genealogical method in the study of religion is certain to distort the facts. If there is anything undeniable in the study of society it is that human nature is essentially the same, and that when facing the same social needs it functions in a generic sort of way. A striking illustration of the fact that independent activity of individuals produces similar results is to be seen in a study of inventions. The commonest occurrence is for men subject to the stimulation of similar social need, in absolute independence of each other, to produce instruments and processes practically identical. An even more striking illustration of this general truth is that



all civilizations precipitate practically the same moral codes when they arrive at the same stage of complicated social life. So in the case of religions, the striking similarities which occur between religions belonging to the primitive class and religions belonging to the highly social class are not to be interpreted as necessarily involving imitative, or in fact any, historical relationship. Such similarities both in institution and in process of evolution can often be sufficiently well accounted for by a generic religious impulse in humanity which tends to produce customs, rites, institutions, and creeds in answer to individual and social needs.

The evolution of religion viewed historically is nothing more or less than the organization of religions by the differentiation, through the use of social experience, of the practices, institutions, philosophies, by which men have attempted to justify, rationalize, direct, and give value to this phase of the elemental impulse of personality.

At the risk of excessive repetition, one thing needs particularly to be emphasized, namely, the worshiper not only seeks to appease that in his environment which he regards as conditioning his welfare, but he also undertakes to put himself into proper relationship with that which he appeases. The essence of religion is not a feeling of dependence, but the impulse toward reconciliation with that which engenders such a feeling. The moment a man thinks that the highest power in his environment is unreconcilable, his relations therewith become utterly passive, i.e., impersonal; he ceases to be religious and becomes simply a fatalist. And fatalism is not religion, for it lacks the fundamental attitude of religion which is the effort to establish favorable relations with the super-environment. In other words, the situation which religion would establish is one of personal harmony between the worshiper and that worshiped, no matter how crude or superstitious that relationship may be. The primitive savage who by mysterious rites seeks to induce his corn god to give him a good harvest differs no whit, so far as his psychological attitude is concerned, from the most philosophically religious person who seeks to enter into healthful personal relations with a supreme and infinite God through an intelligent faith that the universe may be con-

ceived of as involving a cosmic personality possessed of purpose and love. How true this is, is apparent in the work of Christian missionaries. They do not need to engender the religious impulse—they need simply to give new content and intellectual control to that impulse. A man could never make a religious convert of a dog. The South Sea cannibal could become a Christian because he was first of all religious.

## II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE PERSONAL INTERPRETATION OF ENVIRONMENT

It will be understood from what has already been said that the term extra- or superhuman environment does not always necessarily involve personality. What the term means is simply some power other and more than human which a man regards as having influence upon his life and fortunes. The fact that such elements of the environment *are treated* as if they were personal, is only to say that religion involves an extension of experience over into environment as a means of interpreting that environment in the interests of a helpful reconciliation. Such an act is not unlike the way in which, to speak figuratively, a living organism makes the assumption, that its environment discovered by experience is capable of forming a part of a dynamic situation. Thus far Ward is correct in saying that religion is in man what instinct is in animals. But only in so far, for did an animal even seek to placate nature?

The essential matter in the evolution of religion as in all evolution is the transformation of the original organism through its relation with its environment and the nucleating about itself—if the figure may be allowed—of the cells of other experiences into species of the same genus. And this is accomplished by the transformation of the mass of experience with which humanity adjusts itself to its environment to which it must submit and from which it must derive assistance.

1. Primitive religions generally deal with environment directly. The primitive gods in the earliest strata of survivals and literature in which we can trace religious concepts were natural forces. The heavens and earth, fire, water, and wind, the sun,

moon, and planets—these natural objects were worshiped but they were not personified. Man found himself face to face with the awfulness of Nature. He saw how dependent he was upon this nature; how the rising of the river would flood and sweep away his hut; how the rain would come from heaven to give him grass for his cattle, how the sun would drive the animals he hunted into the deep forests. He naturally wanted to make the river and the heavens propitious. A little later, he very likely turned animistic and regarded natural forces as the home or the visible expression of personal gods; but at the start he worshiped unpersonified natural objects. But he began to treat them personally—as he treated the other members of his tribe or other tribes when he wanted help.

If we go even farther back than philology can carry us and study religion as we discover it in the most primitive folk, we find corroboration for this view, although with this difference: there seem to be some tribes that have not risen to the conception of the great natural forces as those that are to be appeased and who therefore concern themselves rather with items in their natural environment. In fact, anything unusual is apt to be regarded by primitive men as a good or a malign influence. In either case it needs to be treated with respect and if possible placated. A rock over which someone has fallen, a cave in the darkness of which someone has been lost, a curious root that was discovered when one became ill, a tree that had been struck by lightning—all have been regarded as operative forces in a man's situation which needed in some way to be placated.

Here, too, an early step was to regard these natural objects as the residence of some spirit, good or evil. Thus fetichism arose as a sort of limitation of the lesser nature-worship. Not all natural objects were significant, and even those which were might lose their meaning if the spirit abandoned them.

It is possible to draw a distinction between magic and religion as soon as religion begins to take on its more social form. The witch is different from the priest if for no other reason than that her arts are anti-social. But despite the weighty names to be quoted against such a view, it would seem to me that non-injurious

magic may be treated as the vestige of a rudimentary religion preserved and observed by specially empowered persons. For there is in such magic, e.g., rain-making, that "will to conciliate" as well as to control which, as the complement to the "will to power," is the very sign manual of religion. But this is not to say that religion developed from magic. The fundamental difference between magic and religion lies not in that magic was originally anti-social and so nefarious, but that in the course of social evolution it is seen to be so. As religion develops, certain rites are seen to apply only the impersonal principle that like affects like through the agency of a specially empowered person; but religion seeks to conciliate super-human influences by means implying personal relations and attributes. This distinction between personal and impersonal is gained through the increased social experience. That practice, which once implied a certain personal analogy, is seen to be irrational and so impersonal, and ultimately anti-social. The primitive religion thus outgrown becomes magic, and although socially condemned, continues as a survival. And the reason why it is condemned is in large measure the development of a knowledge of natural processes. A growing science thus relegates certain elements of a religion to superstition.

Similarly, too, in the case of the worship of dead ancestors, a stage in religious development to be found all but universally in simple civilizations. Whatever may have been the origin of such a custom it is sufficiently clear that the dead were regarded as important factors in determining good and evil fortune. To propitiate them is therefore good policy as well as tribal piety.

2. With the emergence of actual tribal organization a new phase in this religious interest appeared. A developing civilization does not always, it is true, immediately react upon the conception of the god, but in so far as the religious concept develops it invariably passes through a stage in which these forces which have been treated *like* persons are treated *as* persons. That is to say, contemporaneously with the development of the clan, religion entered into the stage of naïve anthropomorphic or anthropopathic religions. Such a development was inevitable for people

sufficiently constructive to become a part of the main current of civilization. All others, like the Black Fellows of Australia, preserve the religious ideas in forms as primitive as their civilizations. Such personification, however, does not seem to have proceeded uniformly. In some cases a tribe would have as its own a god who was the personification of some natural force and would worship him by attributing to him those qualities which, thanks to its social development, the tribe as a whole believed to be the most ideal. Without exception these tribal gods are regarded as normally in a state of reconciliation with the tribe. Generally they are regarded as the fathers of their tribes. In other words, they are believed to partake of the same elemental quality as primitive civilization itself. They are, however, subject to paroxysms of anger evidenced by the defeat of the tribe in battle, by the outbreak of disease, and by various other misfortunes. In such cases they must be placated by gifts. In this we see one of the various contributing influences that made sacrifice a social institution, although there are other influences quite as powerful. At other times a god appears to be particularly favorable in that he sends good weather and good fortunes. At such times his kindness needs to be appreciated by gifts. Thus arises the sort of sacrifice which is not intended to appease but to thank the tribal god for his help.

But the most essential element in the tribal religion is the conception of the god as the supreme member of the tribe. It is true he is not believed to appear frequently, but at critical moments some member is likely to see him and get some word of encouragement or warning. Further, there have been few peoples who have attained the tribal form of society in which there is not some particular person or family regarded as in some way the god's special representative. Such persons instruct the tribe as to the will of the god, serve as priests, and, under the god's direction, establish great feasts of which the god partakes. Probably at this point we find the most important contributing source of sacrifice. The social group includes the god and he shares in the experiences of the tribe, be they sad or joyous. And it should be noted that the rites of religions had their origin in the enjoyment of life as

truly as in its misery and fear. Men thought of the gods as their companions as truly as their judges.

This tribal god in some tribes may, so to speak, be assisted by a number of secondary gods; but polytheism is not necessarily an element of tribal religion, and even when a tribe worships several gods it is likely to have one particularly its own. In fact, as the tribal civilization develops, in many cases, particularly among the Semites and the Aryans, it would seem as if there were two classes of gods—those which represent the material forces more or less personified and constitute a sort of super-divine body of deities to whom worship is to be paid as the final sources of good fortune, and, along with these, so to speak, the working class among the gods. Other tribes carry along with their single tribal god a phase of magic which may be said to be the survival of some more primitive religious practice. Similarly, customs, the meaning of which has long been forgotten, may be carried along as essential elements of a developing religion. So important may these customs become as to give almost its full content to the religion.

3. The fact that the tribal god was regarded as, so to speak, the responsible party in tribal history, led to another phase of religion, the monarchical. Such a term is at best unsatisfactory but serves to indicate how the thought of God develops by the extension to him of new political conceptions. The national god must be superior to the tribal chieftain. As a chieftain developed in power by conquest so as to extend the power of the tribe over other tribes, it has been all but uniformly true that the tribal god was regarded as victorious over the gods of the conquered tribes. Thus, as the tribe itself through conquest became the head of a quasi-nation, did the god become a conquering monarch. Only it did not at all follow that the tribe which had been absorbed or conquered would give up its god. It might continue to worship him in the hope that ultimately he would assert himself and give deliverance to his people. Or, on the other hand, as the tribe was incorporated into a new political entity, its god might become a member of the royal court of the supreme God. There is many a nation whose religious history shows the struggle between the worship of the two sets of deities. Thus we find, in the history of

Israel, a long succession of struggles between the worship of Jehovah and that of the Baalim and the Syrian gods of the high places belonging to the conquered Canaanites. This struggle is likely to be particularly violent when the two sets of gods are brought together, not by war or conquest, but by the intermingling of civilizations.

For conquest is not the only source of the development of the king god. Political development as such leads to this more developed conception. It may often be that a number of tribes have the same god. These may federate, as in the tribes of Israel, religion being the sole or at least the chief bond of the political unity. But even such federation is not necessary for the development of the idea of God. The transformation of the tribe from nomadic to agricultural life has been accompanied by a transformation of the conception of God and has given him new attributes, as in Zoroastrianism. Sometimes this addition has been made through the religious teachers or the priests; sometimes it has been unconsciously due to the rise of new economic conceptions born of social evolution. As the agricultural stage of social evolution has passed into the commercial and urban, the new powers of the chieftains have been used as media for shaping new prerogatives for the god. His relations become less those of the father of the family and more those of the king, increasingly political and forensic. It is not too much to say that in the case of all tribes whose development we can trace across the various stages of social evolution, the idea of monarchy, which, however different its social institutions may have been, has characterized some period of every developed society, has also colored religions. The god is not subject to the will of the people; the people and their material environment are to obey him. Obedience to his law becomes thus a condition of his rendering his people aid.

At this point the really great religions have made two important transitions:

1. The superhuman monarch of the tribe has come to be regarded as the superhuman monarch of the world, the king of creation. It has not followed that all the other gods have been regarded as non-existent, for in many cases they have been treated as devils

or saints. But the passage to genuine monotheism cannot infrequently be traced through this monarchical stage.

The divine monarch is supreme over human subjects. He arranges nature. The thunder is his voice, the wind his messenger, the earthquake the creature of his will. Men begin to think of him philosophically, and so transcendental may the thought of him become that the effort to realize the now supreme and increasingly ethical conception of his character gives rise to a genuine if naïve theology.

2. The second transition has been the moral elevation of the idea of God. This change has been the work of the prophet. In primitive religion the prophet in any true sense of the word is unknown. There are only medicine-men, necromancers, witches, and the like. But few peoples ever come to the universal monarchy conception of its god without seeing in him the standard of morality. If such a transition is impossible a new god is adopted as the new conscience needs a more sensitively moral God. If, as in the case of classical mythology, gods are past reformation, they are pensioned off with conventional honors and allowed to pass into innocuous desuetude on some mountain where their example will not injure the morals of young people. In the extent of this moral idealism of its idea of God, the Hebrew religion is unique. It seems to have passed through the earlier stages of religious evolution, but as in no other religion did this eventuate in a monarch of absolute righteousness, hating iniquity. That this was the case was due to the work of the prophets who, from an exceptional religious experience, taught an unwilling nation ideals that were to serve as the basis of the non-monarchical ethical religion of Jesus.

This monarchial conception has given rise to the most precise theologies. It is easy to see why. Political experience is so universal, political institutions are so subject to legal adjustment, and legal analogies are so intelligible, that it has been comparatively easy to systematize religious relations under the general rubrics of statecraft. Thus righteousness has been thought of as the observance of the laws of the god, given through divinely-inspired teachers, and punishment has been attached to the violation of



such laws in precisely the same way as to the violation of laws of the king. The pardoning of sins has been a royal prerogative, although sometimes needing justification in the way of vicarious suffering by some competent sacrificial animal or person, while the rewards of the righteous have been pictured by figures drawn from the triumphs of earthly kings, just as in primitive societies the future was regarded as the "happy hunting-ground."

3. Only a few religions have as yet progressed beyond the monarchical stage. In Brahmanism, religion has been denied content and direction by an impersonal cosmic philosophy, and two of the three great religions of Semitic origin—Judaism and Christianity—have moved over into a quasi-transcendental personal sphere. But the theologies of even these religions have been developed on the monarchical analogy. In Christianity, however, the influence of Jesus has resulted in the retranslation of the divine king into the divine Father. His own experience here furnished the interpretative analogy. Unaffected by philosophy he expressed religion in terms of most generic experience, and thus may fairly be said to have closed the cycle of purely religious anthropomorphic formulas. But the Christian religion has not been content. It has sought rationalizing formulas in which to synthesize itself with such elements of its environment as are contained in a growing world-view. Nor is this synthesis the mere establishment of a static situation. All three elements—the world-view, Christianity, and the situation itself—are in process of evolution. Paternity can never serve as a synthetic theological and philosophical concept. True as it is for experience it has been too obviously an analogy for theology. Historical orthodoxy is built on divine sovereignty, but there have already begun to appear signs that in Christianity the social mind is redescribing that environment upon which men find themselves dependent in terms more consonant with scientific thought than are those derived from monarchy. Here indeed may be said to be the real crisis in which theology finds itself in highly civilized countries. Convinced as are men of scientific temperament that the monarchical conception already anachronistic in a democracy is totally inadequate to express cosmic relations, a rapidly developing scientific thought has not yet reached sufficiently dis-

tinct conclusions to enable one to forecast exactly the next stage in the evolution of those conceptions by which modern men shall make intelligible to themselves the significance of the religious life.

There are those who insist that there is no next stage; that the situation in which religion and science find themselves is capable of no further progress; that the future is to be religionless; that humanity is to replace God, and that ethics is to replace religion as the means by which to regulate the impulse toward reconciliation with a personal environment. But this forecast seems to me untenable. Tendencies have developed so rapidly within the past four or five years looking to the justification, from the point of both psychology and sociology, of religion as a normal attitude, that it is hardly likely that the impulse to adjust oneself to the non-human, cosmic environment, conceived of in some personal way, will disappear. We face, it is true, the question as to what is meant by the term "personality" when applied to that appalling environment which astronomy, biology, and geology have discovered and are discovering. In a certain sense we are back again where religion began its evolution. We can no longer think of God in the way of a naïve anthropomorphism. We no longer think of God as sending plagues; we have fastened that indictment upon bacteria. We no longer believe that eclipses are punishments for our sins or that famines and earthquakes are due to divine displeasure. Like our primitive ancestors we are face to face with the forces of Nature. Indeed, we are not altogether sure that we ought to speak even about forces. We are really face to face with the Whole.

Is religion then to be replaced by natural science, or is it to enter upon a new cycle of development, again starting with nature? Unless all signs fail there is strong probability that this second alternative is to be realized. But modern man will start with a vastly richer experience than that of the primitive man who first endeavored to adjust himself consciously to the same environment. If we cannot think of the Whole in terms of monarchy we can yet think of it with Jesus through the discovery within it of the presence of personality. For the fundamental presupposition of any exploration of the universe is that its phenomena can be restated in terms of human thought. But we ourselves must be included

in the Whole of things, and we as human personalities are just as truly the expression of the forces resident in that environment as are the laws of physics. The Whole must at least include those phenomena to which we give the name of personality. And may we not add that, if development of the organism is determined by its environment, these very phenomena argue similar in the whole. For as far as social experience shows, personality is evoked only in personal relations.

The modern man as truly as the primitive man is an element in a situation which demands harmony between himself and all its other elements. To attempt such harmony involves precisely the same attitude of mind as that which has found expression in all religion. The first impression that scientific investigation may make on some minds is that of the doom of religion, but a sober second thought is likely to bring the conviction that, so far from this being the case, our wider knowledge, infinitesimal as it is, of the universe which includes man as well as stars, evokes more strongly than ever that impulse which is the very heart of religion. History cannot be reduced to social processes unaffected by the so-called natural forces. To reinterpret God is not to dissolve him into a mere social survival.

To men who are indifferent to some of the elements in the problem, whether on the side of religion or of science, such a recasting of religion may seem impossible. When Socrates endeavored to free the minds of the Athenians from an erroneous, because imperfect, religious interpretation of their world, they killed him for atheism. Conversely, when earnest Christian men have attempted to utilize the findings of science in the interests of a cosmic conception of God and of religion there have not been wanting those who, in the spirit of Haeckel, have insisted upon a thoroughgoing materialism mitigated only by impersonal social forces. But the time for logomachy is past. An antithesis between terms, neither of which we can accurately define, is indefensible. It makes little difference whether a man calls himself a materialist or an idealist so long as he recognizes that there exist in the universe men and women. The religious man needs to use all the phenomena, to which we have applied for want of a better term

the word "personal." What we call that synthesis of thought and will and value judgments is of small significance compared to the fact that the actions to which we apply those terms really exist. And whether or not we get that interpretation of the universe, which, for lack of a better term, we call personal, from reading over into it our experiences, the fact remains that there are phenomena in the extra-human elements of environment which can be so interpreted. To recognize such elements as conditioning the outcome of the situation in which they and we mutually react is religious. For religion, whatever the interpretation it has given to its environment, has not created that environment. Whatever power social progress may have had to reconstitute situations in which men become religious, ideas have been only a part of environment. Religion no more lives in a solipsistic world that does housekeeping. A man used fire in precisely the same way when he thought it contained phlogiston as he uses it today when he explains it in terms of chemical dissolution and recombination. So religion persists in humanity regardless of the magic or the politics or the philosophy with which men have endeavored to give the rational correlate to the elemental constitutive functioning of the personal life. Fishes did not invent the ocean and religion did not invent God; it has gradually found, understood, and experienced a God who existed as one element of an objective environment which antedated and evoked experience.

### III. THE PERSISTENCE OF SURVIVALS IN RELIGION

But evolution in religion no more than in a living organism is a matter of ungenetic change. Each new stage in its expression perpetuates in a greater or less degree vestiges of previous stages. Religions have their embryology as truly as their physiology. Just as the human body in its present condition has within it the vestiges which mark the survival of organs which man no longer needs but which were essential to some lower forms of life which humanity has recapitulated, so does each new stage in religious evolution perpetuate those less-developed stages from which it has emerged. It could not be otherwise. Religion does not exist by itself, any more than life does. As already has been said, strictly speaking

there is no such thing as religion in the abstract. There are only people functioning religiously, holding religious ideas and customs, and incorporating them in religion institutions. I cannot help feeling that the recognition of this very simple fact would relieve some of our friends who seem to be greatly concerned to rehabilitate the mediaeval realism. We have long since passed from thinking of scientific law as doing anything or as being anything except a generalization drawn from experiment and observation. We no longer speak about the state as an entity existing apart from legislators and governors and the other machinery of what we call the body politic. Similarly it is time to realize that when we speak about religion we are speaking about the activities of real people acting and reacting in very real social situations from which institutions, customs, and programs evolve.

Now, real people are vastly interesting subjects of study, and no less so because of their inconsistencies. Sometimes we complacently speak as if in the political field the modern man was quite delivered from the crudities of primitive societies; and yet we lynch criminals and plead the "higher law" for acquitting murderers. It is difficult not to see in such actions the recrudescence of the state of mind of primitive social groups. So, too, in our economic life we cling most vigorously to the formulas of competition when, as a matter of fact, with a rapidity that we deliberately refuse to recognize, we are legalizing a conception of collective bargaining that gives the lie to *laissez-faire*. It is not abnormal therefore to find that religious people, even very intelligent religious people, include in their religious thinking and practices some of the elements which were once the dominating characteristics of a religion in its more simple stages.

1. Reference has already been made to magic, but we find non-magical survivals of primitive religion in all stages of religious development. In fact, a superstition may fairly be described as a vestige of some element of religious experience which has come over from a stage in which it was essential to a religion. One might almost say that to be superstitious is to suffer religious appendicitis. There is no cure for it but surgery. Thus there are women who would not dare say their children are unusually well without

knocking three times on wood, and there are men who would hesitate to be one of a party of thirteen at a table. Who would think a wedding complete without rice-throwing? What baseball club does not have its mascot? Now all of these simple-minded practices which presumably intelligently religious people practice are the survivals of some ancient religious custom of our far-away ancestors.

2. Then, too, religious institutions perpetuate, though generally without the knowledge of their devotees, elements of earlier types of institutionalized religion. The pious Mohammedan still ties rags to trees to remind genii and saints of his prayers and their duties. Even where a religion develops freely many early elements survive. Modern liberal Judaism presents striking illustrations of such phenomena and Christianity has possibly even more striking ones. Indeed, so far has the recognition of religious survivals progressed that, if certain tendencies in a modern theological world were to triumph, religion would have to be regarded as little more than history. The most devout churchmen among us might turn out to be Jerahmeelites or followers of Gilgamesh. But barring these extreme views, even a superficial knowledge of history enables one to know that the Saturnalia festival is preserved at Christmas time. In fact, much of the cult in any religion is composed of customs, the original meaning of which has been forgotten and which have become sacred or symbolical simply through age. Recall by way of familiar illustration the robes of some of our clergy which perpetuated the dress of the ancient world. The ritual of the Roman Catholic church is particularly rich in such survivals. If these vestiges are not regarded as sacrosanct, they are not without their aesthetic value. Some men will chant creeds they would not otherwise repeat. Almost any religious ceremony is enhanced by this means of linking the modern world with the great course of human history. In fact he would be a most impracticable iconoclast who would ask the complete elimination of cult from a religion or any institution that stands for the conception of the continuity of human experience.

3. In our religious thinking, these survivals and particularly those intellectual forms which have been derived from social expe-

rience, play an important and not always a harmless rôle. As has already been stated, the controlling theological ideas of practically all religions were shaped in the great creative period in which local gods become national and a national religion passed on to monotheism. The monarchical analogies are those which show most pertinacity. In fact, in our modern world there are few men who have thus far deliberately undertaken to set forth a theology that shall embody the changed conception of man's relation to the universe itself. It is, however, altogether unfair to think that such experiments have not been made and are not being made. Religious thought is not nearly so anachronistic as those who know nothing about it appear to suppose. It is true that it can never be quite as precise as a doctor's thesis, but it is making an honest, and I venture to say intelligent, effort to justify and systematize religion from the vantage ground of our modern experience and world-view. Religious thought can hardly be expected to reshape itself at the behest of every man who has his particular theory to champion. It, like scientific views themselves, will shape itself slowly, in common with the movement of the social mind; but such reshaping as truly as such a movement is already in progress.

Yet, in this retranslation of the situation in which religion is involved because of its appropriation of elements of new social experience, we find our thought and to some extent our experience controlled by the survivals of the monarchical type of religion. In this we are at one with men generally, but with this exception: no other type of religion has ever been held by a civilization as industrial and complicated as ours. It is almost impossible, therefore, at this point, to classify other religions with Christianity. Its nearest species is an academic Brahmanism and neo-Buddhism. In the former the ideal is perfectly distinct, namely, to eliminate and to raise the soul in contemplation as far as possible into the region of the impersonal or at least non-individual. Neo-Platonism somewhat in like fashion attempted to bring man to the Heavenly Vision by ecstasy, but was never able to free itself from the control of survivals and was handicapped by an empirical psychology that frustrated its search for its own ideals. Neo-Buddhism, as

it is emerging in the universities of Japan, is a restatement of moral ideals common to all highly-developed civilizations, under the impetus of Christianity. But for an insistence upon vestiges in vocabulary and thought that come from Japanese Buddhism it would be very difficult to distinguish one of these modern Buddhists from the radical Christians and liberal Jews who form the ethical culture groups of America.

In so far, however, as Christianity is a matter of the experience of the plain people it must be admitted that, on its intellectual side, it is still a more or less modified monarchy. The relations of God to the individual are conceived of in terms of sovereignty. So far as the orthodoxy of the schools is concerned, with all its splendid insistence upon genuine religious experience, its entire system is based upon divine sovereignty and it will not endure the slightest modification except at the expense of this fundamental conception. Attempts are being made to substitute the parental for the sovereignty conception; but any student of comparative theology of recent day, I think, will admit that so far as systematic thought is concerned such reconstructions are not thoroughgoing enough to meet the demands of the modern man who requires a complete systematization of religion with the totality of his experience. As a matter of fact, religion as it exists among the people at large in Christian lands presupposes Hebraism as its apprehensive mass. And one of the real problems the modern man faces today is whether he can utilize non-Hebraic presuppositions as a basis of a widespread institutional religious life in a world that is both scientific and democratic.

4. It will be apparent, further, to any student of society that religion without institutions is of small significance. Religion apart from an institution has not succeeded, any more than a state has succeeded without political institutions. If religion is to be socially effective, its institutions—and for Christianity this means those of the church—must be adapted to the changing social order. There are men who are by temperament anarchic optimists. They believe that institutions are a hindrance to society, and it matters little whether those institutions are those of state or those of religion. Yet even such transcendentalists form societies of



anarchists in order to make anarchy effective. By the same token the man who wishes to make religion a purely individualist matter is not without justification for the maintenance of such a personal luxury, but he overlooks the fact that in a world like ours religion always has and always must find social expression, and on both its intellectual and its institutional sides must partake of social evolution. So it has come about that religious institutions are in process of evolution as truly as are religious conceptions. Mohammedism itself begins to feel the effect of our modern world and, now that it has broken with political autocracy, is likely within a generation or two to break with that religious autocracy which we call fatalism. The Roman church has not only those new Humanists, the Modernists, but it is already seeing that in its struggle with socialism it must adopt the methods of the settlement. The movements in Asia and particularly in Japan among the non-Christian religions, though not as marked, are none the less of the same general type. The ancient Chinese education has been abandoned and modern textbooks are being introduced throughout the empire. While it is true that it would be a little difficult to regard Confucianism as more than a system of ethics, it can hardly be doubted that the adoption of the Western school will have decided results in the case of those religious survivals like ancestor-worship which Confucianism embodied and preserved. Protestant churches are already passing through rapid changes as the social aspects of religion and the social, not to mention the medical, opportunities of the church as an institution are becoming more apparent.

Thus everywhere social evolution finds expression in an evolution of religious thought and institutions that perpetuate vestiges of simpler and earlier stages. Inevitably such a process is accompanied with struggle, for religious survivals are always a conservative force. Just what will be the outcome of this struggle between the representatives of different stages of social experience in religions only the future can tell. But of one thing we may be sure, there will be no cessation either of the impulse to come into helpful reconciliation with a personally interpreted environment, or of the utilization of social experience to justify, control, enrich, and

systematize such impulse. And just here lies the pressing tasks of the apologist and the theologian. For our modern world needs to be reconvinced that religion is more than a survival, and that the appeal to the universe in terms of personalism is justifiable after concepts inherited from less complex social experience have been abandoned.

#### IV. THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN RELIGIONS FOR THE SURVIVAL OF THE FITTEST

In what has been said it must have become evident that a distinction is to be made between religion as a functional psychological expression of life, and a religion as a group of beliefs and rites by which this attitude of mind is conditioned and given social expression. The former is as generic as life; the latter is as specific as organisms. The history of religions makes it evident that no one of them can persist unchanged as regulative in a civilization whose moral ideals are superior to its own or whose scientific achievement makes the inherited religious interpretation of existence as a whole, outgrown. When a religion has thus found itself out of sympathy with the growing social environment two results follow: either it has been supplanted by another, as was the case in the Roman Empire when the gods of classic mythology were replaced at first in part by Mithraism and later entirely by Christianity; or the religion has adjusted itself in some fashion as has already in a general way been described, reducing its outgrown elements to vestiges, and becomes a new species of religion, as, e.g., in the evolution of rabbinical Judaism from Hebraism. So, too, in the case of the religion of Greece, the simple original Aryan faith was continuously modified by the artistic anthropomorphism of the Homeric literature as well as by Egyptian and Asiatic influences, the worship of the god Hercules, the rise of the Dionysiac enthusiasm and the mysteries, and the work of Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Pindar. With the rise of the great schools of philosophy the Greek religion grew extremely complicated, a cross-section of Grecian society showing the existence of the survivals of all the elements which had at some time been locally dominant. Yet the Greek religion did not stop in its philosophical stage but, after the

conquest of the Asiatic world, Greece and the Graeco-Roman world were invaded by all sorts of oriental beliefs, and the Greeks by the end of the Christian era ceased to possess any exclusive form of religion. In the place of the sharply-defined national faith of Homeric days, the Graeco-Roman Empire possessed a great number of philosophical sects and esoteric religious bodies alongside of popular religion. In it all, however, there was no actual domination of a single religious conception, and classical religion could not withstand the onset of a distinct, unified, aggressive religio-ethical faith like that of Christianity.

If the development of a cosmopolitan civilization thus proves fatal to the more primitive stages of a religion, precisely the opposite is true where a civilization stops at a level set by the religion. The two coalesce. Such, for example, is true in the case of Mohammedanism where the development of the political and religious concept seems to have stopped simultaneously at the stage of an imperfectly moral autocracy. In the break-up of Turkish civilization which is already beginning because of the introduction of Western ideals, Mohammedanism will undoubtedly find itself engaged in a life and death struggle with Christianity on the one side and materialistic agnosticism on the other. But such struggle is not likely to extend far below the level of those social strata affected by Western civilization. The great masses of the empire are likely to continue indefinitely under the control of a religion that fits the state of civilization in which they live. Only as Mohammedans are educated will Mahomet cease to be the prophet.

The struggle between religions is, then, a struggle not only between theologies and philosophies but between social orders. It may occur within a society which, because of economic growth, is differentiating into classes, or it may be due, as in the case of the Asiatic world, to the introduction of new social and religious ideals into an older order. From such a point of view missions became of the utmost sociological significance. Whatever may have been the motive with which Christians undertook to send missionaries of their religion to the devotees of another, whether such motive were the mere ambition to make proselytes or the genuinely altruistic motive to save ignorant souls from the pun-

ishment of the hereafter, missions today are one phase of the great interplay of social ideals which promises so much for the future. In the light of the past there can be no question that changes in the social order will both be conditioned by and will condition religious evolution, as is strikingly illustrated in Japan. But this change should be sharply defined. The religion best fitted to a social order will not be a religion foreign to that order. Social history seems to argue that it is impossible to annihilate one religion by another. Christianity seriously attempted to replace German folk-religion by conventional and wholesale baptisms. But it soon had to make over German gods into saints or devils. Mechanical conversion outside of social transformation is as impossible today as in the days of Charlemagne. What really will happen will be a biological development of religions through appropriation and assimilation. As Judaism took up elements from the religions of Canaan and Babylonia; as Greece and Rome appropriated the religious elements of Asia; as Christianity springing from Judaism was transformed by being rethought in terms of Greek philosophy and institutionized in terms of Roman law, so will the nations of the modern world find themselves possessed of religions in which inherited elements are grouped about some nucleating conception into an organic whole. And this organic whole will be the property of those groups of men to whom it is justified by social experience. In other words, a nation will have several religions, although they may be called by the same general name and have many elements in common. Some of these religions will be so unlike those of earlier stages of social evolution as to constitute a new species. In the struggle which comes between these various embodiments of the religious impulse those elements will disappear which are least in harmony with dominating social conceptions of various social groups, and those will survive which are most in accordance with and can contribute most to the development of superior stages of social evolution.

Prophecy is always risky, but unless we utterly misread the present it would seem that there is already emerging throughout the world, under different names it is true, but none the less essentially identical, a phase of religion the nucleus of which is that of

the teaching of Jesus. It is emphasizing brotherhood because of the divine sonship of those who agree with these religious ideals. On the one hand it cannot believe in an anthropathic God, but on the other it is not ready to deny personality in terms of purpose and reason to the great process in which mankind finds itself involved. Its sympathies are social rather than individual, and its theology is based not on metaphysics of the Godhead interpreted by human analogy but on those judgments of value and those undeniable facts of science which seem to condition all self-expression.

Thus the vanishing point of religious history is still evolution in the sense that the conscious attempt to bring humanity into helpful relationship with that environment with which it finds itself involved and which possess elements which justify our treating it as we treat persons, will never disappear. It is as real as environment and humanity. But the particular phases of religion and the modes of controlling the expression of this generic impulse are parts of social history. That religion which best enables religion to express itself in its increasingly complex social environment will survive all others. Other religions will not altogether disappear but they will become vestiges in the more highly developed religious life. And, in this struggle of religions to express religion, Christianity in its vitally ethical and theological sense is to be such a dominant element that the outcome, despite its varied names, will be essentially Christian. In the theologies of this universal Christianity there will be found all those truths which the other religions embody, but there will be also within them that unifying rational exposition of the way to personal reconciliation with a cosmic God of love which is Christianity's essential contribution to religious evolution. Whatever may be a given society's particular creed, whatever may be its metaphysics, the sense of dependence which science enforces, the need of divine help which human weakness arouses, and the call to sacrifice for social ends that the times demand will be given meaning and justification by the Christian doctrine of reconciliation as it centres about Jesus. And in this doctrine Christianity is but re-expressing the essence of religion itself.

## CRITICAL NOTES

### MATTHEW AND THE VIRGIN BIRTH

Recent reading of Andreas of Caesarea (Metropolitan of the Cappadocian see of this name about 550), undertaken from a quite different purpose, has brought to my attention what would appear to be new evidence in support of that strange form of the Gospel of Matthew so much under discussion of late because of the discovery of the Sinaitic Syriac,<sup>1</sup> wherein Jesus is spoken of as the son of Joseph by physical generation, thereby confirming certain older data. An accurate account of the new readings in Matt. 1:16 ff. is most easily accessible in §13 of the article on "Mary" by P. W. Schmiedel in the *Encycl. Bibl.*, III, col. 2961. Here we have placed before us (1) the readings of Syr. sin. in Matt. 1:16-25, as follows: 1:16, "Joseph . . . begat Jesus"; 1:21 "she shall bear *to thee* a son"; 1:25, "and she bore *to him* a son"; (2) the reading of the *Dialogue of Timothy and Aquila*, edited by Conybeare in *Anecd. Oxon. Class.* ser. 8, 1898, which Conybeare maintains to have been the basis of all existing readings. The *Dialogue* reading is as follows:

Jacob begat Joseph, the husband of Mary, of whom was born Jesus who is called Christ, and Joseph begat Jesus who is called Christ.<sup>2</sup>

Schmiedel, reviewing both forms, regards both (1) and (2) as composite. Syr. sin., (1) as he points out, contains only surviving traces, now quite overlaid by the canonical form of the text, of a reading which critical theology had long ago insisted on as the original, the only reading consistent with the employment of Joseph's genealogy, the simple form: "And Joseph begat Jesus."<sup>3</sup> But just as in Syr. sin. the two mutually inconsistent representations (a) of a birth of Jesus by physical descent through Joseph from the royal line of David, (b) of a miraculous conception in the womb of "Mary the Virgin" are fused together by conflation, although in this very ancient version the inharmonious parts still remain imperfectly adjusted to one another, so in the relatively late *Dialogue of Timothy and Aquila* a similar addition of opposites has

<sup>1</sup> We employ for this version of about 170 A.D. the abbreviation "Syr. sin."

<sup>2</sup> Ἰακώβ ἐγέννησεν τὸν Ἰωσήφ, τὸν ἄνδρα Μαρίας, ἐξ ἧς ἐγεννήθη Ἰησοῦς ὁ λεγόμενος Χριστός, καὶ Ἰωσήφ ἐγέννησεν τὸν Ἰησοῦν τὸν λεγόμενον Χριστόν.

<sup>3</sup> Ἰωσήφ δὲ ἐγέννησεν τὸν Ἰησοῦν.

taken place. Here also we have two unadjusted parts. Reading (a) is represented by the clause, "Joseph the husband of Mary, of whom was born Jesus, who is called Christ." Side by side with it, regardless of tautology stands reading (b) "Joseph begat Jesus who is called Christ." In this obscure document, as in the primitive Syriac version, the conflation had escaped that ultimate process of filing down and smoothing over to which our canonical gospels have been exposed, so that in the *Dialogue*, the edges still remain in the same abrupt apposition as in Syr. sin.

We need not re-enter the much-debated field of critical explanation of these and kindred phenomena of the textual sources. Schmiedel presents<sup>4</sup> a carefully framed genealogy of the text of Matt. 1:16 in support of his hypothesis of survival in conflation of the original form, "and Joseph begat Jesus." It should be added, however, that he further points (§15) to the fact as a third datum of the evidence that Cerinthus and Carpocrates, according to Epiphanius<sup>5</sup>

endeavored to prove from the genealogy in Matthew's gospel that Christ was of the seed of Joseph and Mary (ἐκ σπέρματος Ἰωσήφ καὶ Μαρίας ἐναι τον Χριστόν); and that the Ebionite Symmachus according to Eusebius' report (*H. E.* vi. 17) seems to rest upon Matthew's gospel his heresy that Christ came of Joseph and Mary (τὸν Χριστὸν ἐξ Ἰωσήφ καὶ Μαρίας γεγενῆαι).

On the other hand Dr. Rendel Harris and others have minimized the significance of the new readings, regarding them as mere heretical corruptions of relatively late origin. Dr. Harris in particular maintains that those of Syr. sin. were foisted in from heretical sources by some early transcriber characterized by adoptionist proclivities.

Those more competent than myself in the special field of textual criticism must decide as between these alternative explanations of the variants already recognized to exist. My present aim is simply to report what appears to be a hitherto unobserved fourth datum of evidence. I can best so do by a circumstantial statement of the case.

My reading of Andreas' *Commentary on Revelation* was undertaken with the purpose of ascertaining whether some unacknowledged employments of Papias might not be discovered in addition to his two explicit and well-known references, in the latter of which he professes to "quote him word for word." The search was disappointing. So far from discovering any new material of the kind, even with the help of Victorinus of Pettau (another commentator on Revelation who also used the work

<sup>4</sup> Ἰωσήφ δὲ ἐγέννησεν τὸν Ἰησοῦν, § 14.

<sup>5</sup> *Haer.* xxx. 14.

of Papias), I came back somewhat less rich than in my own estimate I had been before. I had been depending on the Lightfoot-Harmer (shorter) edition of *The Apostolic Fathers* (1891) for my "fragments of Papias." Here, under fragment XI we find, printed in the larger type, employed to distinguish the Papias material from the context, some five lines of Greek text. The last three of these lines are as follows: *Καὶ ἐβλήθη ὁ δράκων ὁ μέγας, ὁ ὄφις ὁ ἀρχαῖος ὁ καλούμενος διάβολος καὶ ὁ Σατανᾶς, ὁ πλανῶν τὴν οἰκουμένην ὅλην ἐβλήθη εἰς τὴν γῆν, καὶ οἱ ἄγγελοι αὐτοῦ.* These words, however, do *not* form part of the real quotation from Papias. They are not even words of Andreas. They are simply the text of Rev. 12:9, which in accord with his custom Andreas transcribes at the head of his next paragraph of comment. The reference to Papias forms the close of the preceding paragraph, which ends thus: *Παπίας δὲ οὕτως ἐπὶ λείξεως· Ἐνίοις δὲ αὐτῶν, [δηλαδὴ τῶν πάλαι θεῶν ἀγγέλων],<sup>6</sup> καὶ τῆς περὶ τὴν γῆν διακοσμήσεως ἔδωκεν ἄρχειν, καὶ καλῶς ἄρχειν παρηγγύησε. Καὶ ἐξῆς φησὶν· Εἰς οὐδὲν δέον συνέβη τελευτῆσαι τὴν τάξιν αὐτῶν.*

The clauses beginning Ἐνίοις δέ, and Εἰς οὐδέν are all that can properly be attributed to Papias, and are accordingly printed here in black-faced type. The two statements may have been made by him in his "exposition" of Matt. 4:8 f.

This disappointingly negative result was not, however, the only fruit of my reading of Andreas. As is well known, his plan of exposition is almost like that of the catenae of later times in subordinating his own conceptions to the piecing together of extracts from his predecessors, among whom he cites writers as early as Justin, the contemporary of Papias, and in addition, Irenaeus, Hippolytus, Methodius, Epiphanius, Gregory (of Nyssa) and Dionysius Areopagita. That which he offers of his own is given with great modesty and reserve, and scarcely transcends the level of edifying paraphrase. When, therefore, he makes explicit reference to some of these earlier authorities, his utterances may well have greater consideration than when he speaks for himself.

One of these quotations of Andreas is contained in his exposition of Rev. 4:7. The principal basis of the exposition is in fact a famous passage of Irenaeus, to whom Andreas explicitly refers it (ὥς φησιν Εἰρηναῖος). It is that wherein Irenaeus declares that the four "living creatures" (ζῶα) under the throne of God represent the four gospels."<sup>7</sup>

<sup>6</sup> The bracketed clause seems to be an explanatory interpolation by Andreas, and is therefore rightly printed in small type in Lightfoot-Harmer.

<sup>7</sup> Iren. *Haer.* III. xi. 8.



But it is not Irenaeus alone on whom Andreas rests. He combines with his abridged reproduction of the paragraph from Irenaeus at least one entirely independent interpretation from some unnamed expositor, who interprets the four ζῶα as representing the four cardinal virtues: "courage" (ἀνδρεία), "justice" (δικαιοσύνη), "temperance" (σωφροσύνη), and "prudence" (φρόνησις). This easily separable element I have distinguished by the designation (a), the element derived from Irenaeus being designated (b). Still further Andreas admits the likelihood of a third, if not also a fourth, interpretation, much nearer to the true spirit of Jewish apocalypse, wherein the four "living creatures" represent:

either the creative and constitutive function of the four "Elements" (στοιχεῖα) of God, as some think; or the divine lordship over things (1) in heaven and (2) on earth, and (3) in the sea, and (4) under the earth.<sup>8</sup>

These "creative" elements (δημιουργίαν τε καὶ συντήρησιν) are of course very different from the four impersonal, material "elements" of later expositors, who apply the term to the earth, air, fire, and water of Greek cosmology. These "demiurgic" στοιχεῖα are the "elements" of Graeco-Jewish apocalyptic angelology, who, for example, in the *Testament of Solomon*, introduce themselves first among the demonic or angelic powers by whose aid Solomon is to build the temple, saying, "We are the beings called Elements, the world-rulers of this world."<sup>9</sup>

But we must disregard for the present the question of the source and significance of this interpretation of the four "living creatures" as representing the στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου, interesting as it is from its connection on the one hand with the statement of Hermas that:

even as the Lady (the Church) sits firmly on a four-legged bench, so also the world is upheld by the four Elements,<sup>10</sup>

<sup>8</sup> Διὰ τῶν τεσσάρων προσώπων δηλοῦντα εἶτε τὴν τῶν τεσσάρων στοιχείων τοῦ θεοῦ δημιουργίαν τε καὶ συντήρησιν, ὥς τιςιν ἔδοξεν, εἶτε τῶν οὐρανίων καὶ ἐπιγείων καὶ τῶν ἐν θαλάσῃ καὶ καταχθονίῳ τὴν θεῖαν δεσποτείαν.

<sup>9</sup> Ἡμεῖς ἐσμεν τὰ λεγόμενα στοιχεῖα, οἱ κοσμοκράτορες τοῦ κόσμου τούτου. See the Hastings' B.D. s.v. "Elements."

<sup>10</sup> Vis. III. xiii. 3: "Ὅτι ἐπὶ συμφελίου εἶδες καθήμενῃν, ἰσχυρὰ ἡ θέσις· ὅτι τέσσαρας πόδας ἔχει τὸ συμφέλιον καὶ ἰσχυρῶς ἔστηκεν· καὶ γὰρ ὁ κόσμος διὰ τεσσάρων στοιχείων κρατεῖται. It is no longer needful to point out the futility of the attempt (Taylor: *Witness of Hermas to the Four Gospels*, 1892) to carry back Irenaeus' application of the symbolism of the συμφέλιον to Hermas. Irenaeus may have had a predecessor in the combination of Hermas with Rev. 4:8 and the application to the tetrevangelium. The confusion and inconsistency of his exposition and the simpler form exhibited in Andreas go to prove this. But it is a long step backward in the development of the dogma of the tetrevangelium from Irenaeus to Hermas.

and on the other with Irenaeus' combination of it with that which makes the "living creatures" represent the four gospels. We must confine ourselves to the new clearness of definition imported by Andreas into the confused and illogical rhetoric whereby Irenaeus seeks to make good the dogma, that in the nature of the case there can be neither more nor fewer than *four* gospels in the canon of the church. For by some means Andreas does restore a most unexpected clearness and consistency, as will be seen from a translation of his comment on the passage:

We consider that Isaiah also beheld these four living creatures, manifesting through the four figures either the creative and constitutive function of the four Elements of God, as some have thought, or the divine lordship over the things in heaven, the things on earth, the things in the sea, and the things under the earth; or else (a) the four (cardinal) virtues, and (b) the four Gospels, as has seemed most reasonable to others; the lion representing (a) courage, and (b) the Gospel according to John, as Irenaeus says, because of this evangelist's mention of the eternally preëxistent kingdom; for he proclaims the Logos as existent "in the beginning." But the ox,<sup>11</sup> because it is content with its allotted toil, represents (a) justice, and (b) the Gospel according to Luke as *giving the descent of Christ (τὸν Χριστὸν γενεαλογῆσαν) from the legal and priestly point of view.* And the eagle represents (a) temperance; for this creature is reported to love that virtue; also (b) the Gospel according to Mark, because it is both brief and takes its beginning from the Spirit of prophecy. And the man-creature represents (a) prudence, and also (b) the Gospel according to Matthew, *because it proclaims the birth of Christ as natural and not a matter of legal convention (ὡς φύσει καὶ οὐ νόμῳ κηρύξαν τὴν τοῦ χριστοῦ γέννησιν).* But perhaps through these (figures) there is also represented the dispensation (οἰκονομία) of Christ; by the lion as that of a king; by the calf, as that of a priest, or rather of a sacrificial victim; by the man, as made man for our sakes; by the eagle, as provider of the life-giving Spirit which soars down upon us from above.

Without attempting to disentangle all the various interpretations which Andreas is here attempting to combine, we direct our attention to his reproduction of Irenaeus' application of the figures of the "cherubim" to the four gospels. The non-Irenaeian element, here distinguished by an (a) from the Irenaeian (b) has manifestly been added from some interpreter who understood the four creatures to represent the four (cardinal) virtues.<sup>12</sup> Subtracting this we have (1) a comparison of the

<sup>11</sup> More properly *calf* (μῦσχος). Rev. 4:7 employs this term to signify the bull figure of the "cherub" (cf. the Assyrian bulls called *Kiroub*), as in Exod. 32:4; I Kings 12:28, the versions speak of "calves." Exposition a regards it as = "ox."

<sup>12</sup> As already noted this expositor takes μῦσχος in the sense "ox"; Irenaeus in the sense "calf."

"creatures" to the four gospels characterized in accordance with their opening paragraph; (2) a comparison of them to four aspects of the "dispensation of Christ." The former (1) is professedly derived from Irenaeus, and is in fact to be found in *Haer.* III. xi. 8. The latter (2) is also represented in Irenaeus, though much less fully than (1); but here Andreas does not expressly cite Irenaeus, and moreover he inverts the order.

The most important difference, however, is that Andreas, while in general abridging, introduces clauses (italicized in our extract) in the characterizations of the two gospels of Luke and Matthew respectively, *which have no warrant whatever in our text of Irenaeus*, and give a new and surprising application of the symbolism of the bull-creature and the man-creature to these two gospels respectively. The effect of these additions upon the confused and incoherent rhetoric of Irenaeus can best be judged by a close rendering of the well-known passage. We insert in the Irenaeus extract for purposes of distinction the designations ( $\alpha$ ) and ( $\beta$ ) before certain clauses; for, as will soon appear, Irenaeus himself gives evidence of already combining diverse expositions, if only to the extent of superimposing upon some predecessor's interpretation a more or less incongruous interpretation of his own. His argument for the four-fold gospel is as follows:

For it is not conceivable that there should be gospels more in number than these, inasmuch as there are four regions (*κλίματα*) of the world, in which we live, and four universal spirits;<sup>13</sup> but the church is dispersed over the whole earth, and the pillar and foundation of the church is the gospel and the Spirit of life. It is suitable, then, that she should have four pillars which exhale immortality on all sides and enkindle men with life. From which it is manifest that the Logos, the Artificer of all things, "He that sitteth upon the cherubim"<sup>14</sup> and "holds all things together,"<sup>15</sup> when he had been manifested to men, gave us the gospel in fourfold form, but held together by one Spirit. Even as David when praying for his advent says, "Let him that sitteth upon the cherubim shine forth."<sup>16</sup> For the cherubim too have four figures, (*πρόσωπα*) and their figures are ( $\alpha$ ) symbols of the mode of action (*πραγματεία*) of the Son of God. For "the first creature," it says, "was like a lion," signifying ( $\alpha$ ) his efficiency (*τὸ ἔμπρακτον*) and lordliness and royalty. "And the second was like a calf," exhibiting ( $\alpha$ ) the sacerdotal and priestly order. "And the third had the figure of a man," most clearly describing

<sup>13</sup> *Τέσσαρα καθολικά πνεύματα*. Comparison with the kindred interpretations of the "Cherubim" indicates that this is Irenaeus' equivalent for the four *στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου*.

<sup>14</sup> Ps. 80:1.

<sup>15</sup> Wisd. 1:7.

<sup>16</sup> Ps. 80:1.

(α) his advent as human (τὴν κατὰ ἄνθρωπον παρουσίαν φανερώτατα διαγράφον). "But the fourth like a flying eagle" setting forth (β) the gift of the Spirit which flies down upon the church (ἐφιπταμένον ἐπὶ τὴν ἐκκλησίαν). And the gospels, in which Christ sits enthroned, correspond to these [symbols]. For that according to John (β) relates his lordly and glorious origin (γένεαν) from the Father, saying "In the beginning was the Logos," and "All things came to being through him; and without him nothing came to being." But that according to Luke, (α) inasmuch as it is of a priestly type, began from Zacharias the priest, sacrificing to God. For already there was being prepared the fatted calf (μόσχος), about to be slain on account of the finding again of the younger son. But Matthew (β) proclaims his origin as human (τὴν κατὰ ἄνθρωπον αὐτοῦ γέννησιν), saying "The book of the generation (γενεσέως) of Jesus Christ, the son of David, the son of Abraham," and "Now the birth (γέννησις) of Jesus Christ was on this wise." This gospel accordingly is of the human type (ἀνθρωπομορφον). But Mark (β) made his beginning from the prophetic Spirit which descends upon men from on high, saying, "The beginning of the gospel of Jesus Christ, as it is written in Isaiah the prophet," showing the winged form of the gospel. (α) On this account he has also made the announcement abridged and rapid in its course; for such is the style of the prophets. And the Word of God himself spoke to the patriarchs before Moses in a form which was glorious and divine. But for those under the Law he ordained a sacerdotal order (ιεράτικην τάξιν ἀπένεμεν). Afterward, when he had become man (ἄνθρωπος γενόμενος), [ ] he sent forth the gift of the Holy Spirit into all the earth, sheltering us with his own wings (σκεπάζων ἡμᾶς ταῖς ἑαυτοῦ πτέρυξιν). Such, then, as was the mode of action (πραγματεία) of the Son of God, such also is the form of the "living creatures"; and whatever the form of the "living creatures," such is also the type of the [particular] Gospel. For the "living creatures" are fourfold in form, fourfold also the gospel and the mode of action of the Lord. Also on this account four universal covenants were granted to the human race: one that of the cataclysm of Noah with the token of the rainbow, the second that of Abraham with the sign of circumcision, the third the enactment of the Law under Moses, the fourth that of the gospel, through our Lord Jesus Christ.

Irenaeus' notion that the four "cherubim" correspond to (1) four aspects of Christ's mode of action, or administration (πραγματεία; Andreas: "dispensation," οἰκονομίᾳ), clearly tends to confuse his interpretation of them as representing (2) the four gospels. But, taking the latter (2) by itself, it is manifest that even the comparison of the gospels is being made on two entirely independent bases, which I have partially indicated by the designations (α) and (β). Thus the Gospel of John is said to be lion-like: (α) because it presents Christ's πραγματεία as efficient and lordly and royal; (β) because it presents his γένεα as "in the beginning" with the Father.

The Gospel of Luke is said to be calf-like: ( $\alpha$ ) because it exhibits the sacerdotal and priestly order, inasmuch as it begins with Zacharias the priest, and refers to Christ under the figure of the fatted calf. In this case correspondence  $\beta$  is wanting in *Irenaeus*; but cf. Andreas: *ὡς νομικῶς . . . τὸν Χριστὸν γενεαλογῆσαν*.

The Gospel of Matthew is said to be man-like: ( $\alpha$ ) because it describes his advent (*παρουσία*) as human (cf. Andreas δι' ἡμᾶς ἀνδρωθεῖς); ( $\beta$ ) because it proclaims his *origin* (*γέννησις*) as human (cf. Andreas ὡς φύσει καὶ οὐ νόμῳ κηρύξαν τὴν τοῦ Χριστοῦ γέννησιν).

The Gospel of Mark is said to be eagle-like: ( $\alpha$ ) because it has the abridged and rapidly moving style of the prophets;<sup>17</sup> ( $\beta$ ) because it begins from the Spirit which descends upon men from on high.

The  $\alpha$  series of correspondences, which deals by very far-fetched analogies with the various evangelists' style or point of view in describing the *πραγματεία* of Christ, may well be *Irenaeus'* own. The  $\beta$  series, once the key to its significance is in our hands, is perfectly clear, definite, and coherent. Indeed it evinces remarkable insight into the really distinctive characteristics of the several Gospels, approaching them after the oriental manner by their opening lines.<sup>18</sup> In series  $\beta$  the point of comparison is simply and solely the account given by each of the four evangelists of the *origin* of Jesus' Christhood. It has nothing to say about the administration, (*πραγματεία*) or dispensation (*οἰκονομία*) of the Christ, or the general style and view-point of the evangelists; it concerns itself only with their respective representations of his claim to divine sonship. It is a question of birth (*γέννησις*), origin (*γένεα*), genealogy (*γενεαλογία*) or adoption. According to  $\beta$  Mark is eagle-like, because it makes "the beginning of the gospel of Jesus Christ the Son of God"<sup>19</sup> to be from the Spirit (of adoption) which flies down upon us from above.<sup>20</sup> John is lion-like, because he boldly proclaims the *γένεα* as a pre-existence of the Logos from the beginning. Luke is symbolized by the "calf" because he presents the claim to Christhood under the form of a genealogy (*γενεαλόγησας*), which is not real (*φύσει*) but only a matter of legal convention (*νομικῶς*).<sup>21</sup> The "calf" is here

<sup>17</sup> I.e., apparently the *narrative* prophets, *prophetæ priores*.

<sup>18</sup> Cf. the Hebrew method of naming a book from its first significant words.

<sup>19</sup> Mark 1:1.

<sup>20</sup> *Irenaeus* obscures this by making it not the spirit of *adoption* which witnesses to Jesus in his baptism that he is born of God, but the spirit of prophecy, since Mark begins with a quotation from Isaiah.

<sup>21</sup> Cf. Luke 3:22 ὡν ὕδατος, ὡς ἐνομίζετο, Ἰωσήφ, κτλ.

supposed to recall the substitution of the outward and conventional system of worship (νομικὴ λατρεία) inaugurated through Moses by divine command at Sinai in consequence of Israel's incapacity for the spiritual and real. This substitution was due to the making of the golden "calf."<sup>22</sup> Matthew is man-like because he proclaims the birth (γέννησις) of Christ as real and not a matter of legal convention (φύσει καὶ οὐ νόμῳ).

But could anyone have discovered the key to this application of the figures of the "cherubim" from Irenaeus alone? On the contrary it is too carefully obscured by him (from a very obvious motive) to be easily discovered without the aid of Andreas. Yet the fact that Irenaeus himself is really borrowing is fairly apparent independently. The succeeding paragraph, not reproduced by Andreas, in which the "cherubim" and the gospels are compared to the fourfold mode of the divine manifestation (θεοφανεΐα), shows that it too has been mutilated. This appears through the lacuna perceptible at the point indicated by [ ]. For in point of fact not four but only *three* modes of evangelic manifestation remain. Nor is it in accord with the unbroken representation of New Testament and apostolic times to speak of the shedding abroad of the Holy Spirit as a result of the *incarnation*. This is always in primitive Christian thought a result of the *exaltation* of Christ to the right hand of the Father.<sup>23</sup> The proper form of the comparison of the four "creatures" to the fourfold mode of theophany would be as follows: The Logos spoke (1) to the patriarchs before Moses in his proper form of divine glory undisguised; (2) for those under the Law he ordained a sacerdotal order as the means of communication with the people;<sup>24</sup> (3) when he had become man [he spoke to those about him as man among men;<sup>25</sup> finally (4) when he had been exalted again to the bosom of the Father] he sent forth the gift of the Holy Spirit into all the earth, himself sheltering us with his own wings. Here (1), (2), (3), and (4) correspond respectively to John as symbolized by the lion, Luke as symbolized by the calf, Matthew as symbolized by the man, and Mark as symbolized by the flying eagle. Only the characterization of Matthew, the sense of which we have conjecturally restored in accord with the context on the basis of John 1:14, has been for some reason sup-

<sup>22</sup> For similar treatment of the episode of Exod., chap. 32 see Acts 7:38-43, *Ep. of Barn.* xiv, and cf. the treatment in the article "Stephen's Speech," Bacon, *Historical and Critical Contributions to Biblical Science*, Yale Bicentennial Volumes, 1901, pp. 252 ff.

<sup>23</sup> E.g., Acts 2:33; Eph. 4:7-12.

<sup>24</sup> Exod. 4:10-16.

<sup>25</sup> Cf. John 1:14.

pressed, together with the beginning of that of Mark, leaving only the mutilated ends: "When he had become man . . . he sent forth the gift of the Spirit."

Independently, then, there is evidence, apart from all consideration of Andreas and his data, that Irenaeus is employing a source in his famous argument for the "sacred quarternion of the gospels," but a source whose reason for applying the symbol of the man-creature to Matthew he preferred to suppress.

If now we return to the two additions italicized in our extract from Andreas which (1) modify Irenaeus' characterization of Luke as "priestly" in interest, into a characterization of it as resting Jesus' claim to messiahship on a "legal" genealogy, and (2) modify Irenaeus' characterization of Matthew as emphasizing the human aspect of Christ's coming (*παρουσία*) into a characterization of it as "proclaiming the birth of (*γέννησις*) of Christ to have been human not by legal convention, but in reality," we meet at once two insuperable obstacles to the supposition that Andreas, or any other post-Irenaeian interpreter, can have made these supplements out of his own head. First, they supply just the links which are missing in series  $\beta$  of the Irenaeian comparisons, viz., those which concern themselves with the *γένεα*, *γέννησις*, *γενεαλογία*, or *υιοθεσία* of Christ. Second, the character of the change, by which Matthew's account of Jesus' descent (*γέννησις*) is declared to justify the symbol of the man-creature, in that unlike Luke it was human *φύσει καὶ οὐ νόμῳ*, is such as no post-Irenaeian church writer could possibly have advanced on his own account. Irenaeus himself, as we have seen, has so obscured it as to obliterate almost every trace. And yet, with the loadstone of Andreas in our hands, it comes again to the surface even out of the tangle of Irenaeus' incoherent rhetoric.

It is perhaps beyond the strict limits of our task to inquire as to the possible derivation of this curious comparison of the two "gospels of the genealogies,"<sup>26</sup> with its apparent implication that, unlike Luke, Matthew makes Joseph the real and actual father of Jesus. Needless to say, at any time after the question of the number of gospels properly to be admitted to the canon had come under discussion, especially after Hermas' figure of the church's *συμφεδιον* had been combined with that of the cherub-throne of Rev. 4:7, a Gospel of Matthew having readings of this character can have circulated only among heretics. Yet where else than among the gnostics of Rome should we look for the ear-

<sup>26</sup> The expression is derived from the ancient tradition reported by Clement of Alexandria that "the gospels containing the genealogies are the oldest."

liest beginnings of the doctrine of the tetrevangelium? Orthodox conservatism is represented rather by Justin, cautious to a degree about the use of other gospels than the current three synoptics. His very acquaintance with the Fourth Gospel, made unmistakably apparent by unacknowledged echoes and influences, makes his refusal ever to appeal to it as authoritative stand in the more conspicuous contrast to the appeal which he makes to the apostolic authority of the synoptists and of the Apocalypse. For Justin accepts Revelation as "seen by a certain John, one of ourselves, an apostle of the Lord." Older church writers either depend on a single gospel; or, like Papias' "elder," who whatever his own geographical position, reflects the tradition and practice of Aramaic-speaking Palestine, they depend on two, one representing the Matthaean tradition of the "sayings," the other the Petrine tradition of the "sayings and doings." However long the Gospel of John may have circulated in the region of Ephesus and Phrygia before the first traces of its admittance in the Western world to parity of authority with the Matthaean and Petrine, as well as to that of Luke, which enjoyed especial repute among the followers of Marcion and Basilides, in Rome these traces are first found among the gnostics. It is an Apelles among the disciples of Marcion, a Ptolemaeus and Heraclion among the disciples of Valentinus, if not the great founder himself, who set the example of this greater catholicity in the inclusion of evangelic authorities. Our first trace of the actual use of a tetrevangelium in the church is Tatian's *Diatessaron*; but whether this gospel-harmony was produced by Tatian before or after his lapse into heresy is not known. It certainly marks an advance over the cautious conservatism of Tatian's master *Justin*. At about the same time Montanism makes its appearance at Rome, building largely upon the authority of the Johannine writings current in its native Phrygia and Asia. These encounter a similar conservatism which "endeavored to curb their rashness and boldness in setting forth new Scriptures."<sup>77</sup> But Irenaeus took their part, rebuking those who sought

to depreciate that gift of the Spirit which in very recent times has by the will of the Father been poured out upon the human race, by refusing to admit that aspect (of the gospel) which is according to the Gospel of John, in which the Lord promises that he will send the Paraclete; for they deny both the gospel and the prophetic Spirit.<sup>78</sup> Wretched men in truth, who will have it that there are false prophets, but deny to the church the grace of (genuine)

<sup>77</sup> Eusebius, referring to the *Dialogue* of Gaius against Proclus, *H.E.*, VI, xx. 3.

<sup>78</sup> I.e., the Revelation.



prophecy, having the same sort of malady as those who withdraw from fellowship with the (true) brethren, on account of those who come in hypocrisy.<sup>29</sup>

In point of fact we must either take the reference of Irenaeus here to be to "the very learned ecclesiastic Gaius" of Rome, who in order to refute his Montanist opponent Proclus had denied the authority of all the Johannine writings, a reference for which I have recently contended;<sup>30</sup> or else we must suppose that Gaius and Proclus had been anticipated by predecessors as early as 175-85 A.D. who took the same respective attitudes. In either case it must be apparent that Irenaeus in contending for the fourfold basis of evangelic authority and, as Eusebius declares, justifying his name of "peace-maker" by intervention on behalf of the Asiatics, is taking sides against the extreme conservatives at Rome, and allying himself in this particular with the more catholic progressives. Indeed, as we have seen, he is really following in the wake of the broader school of gnostics. Conservatism at Rome stood for three gospels only. If, then, the Athanasians themselves could borrow their war-cry of the *ὑμνοῦσα* from that same Valentinian Ptolemaeus, whose gnosticism Irenaeus is mainly concerned to refute, why should Irenaeus scruple to appropriate from his pages, or from some other Valentinian,<sup>31</sup> or Eucratite heretic, or Montanist fanatic, a helpful argument in favor of his contention for the *tetrevangelium*? In the paragraph immediately preceding that of his argument for the necessarily fourfold nature of the gospel he mentions first the Ebionites, as using Matthew; then Marcion, as using Luke; then "those who distinguish between Jesus and Christ" (Cerinthians), as using Mark; then "those who are of Valentinus, who make a very copious use of that which is according to John." In reality we know that the leaders of this school of gnosticism at Rome used all four gospels, deriving their false doctrines, not like Marcion through the use of the knife, nor like some of their predecessors by disregarding one or more of the canonical gospels, nor by substituting gospels of their own; but by an ingenious exegesis, which distorted the true sense. It is therefore quite within the bounds of possibility that the curious application of the symbolism of the "living creatures" of Rev. 4:7 to the four gospels which seems to underlie our text of Irenaeus, and which with the help of Andreas we have endeavored

<sup>29</sup> *Haer.*, III, xi. 9.

<sup>30</sup> Bacon, *Fourth Gospel in Research and Debate* (1910), chap. x.

<sup>31</sup> In the system of Valentinus the tetrad was fundamental. Ptolemaeus and others developed this according to the fantastic symbolism of numbers indulged in by the gnostics.

to restore, should have come into the channels of church tradition from sources originally alien or heretical.

But the question of the particular source whence Irenaeus and Andreas may have derived their conception of the lion, the calf, the man, and the eagle, symbolizing respectively, John, Luke, Matthew, and Mark, is secondary to the question of fact. The testimony of Epiphanius that Cerinthus and Carpocrates "endeavored to prove from the genealogy in Matthew's Gospel that Christ was of the seed of Joseph and Mary" is of some value as indicating the circulation among the gnostics, from the end of the first century down to at least the middle of the second, of a form of Matthew in which Jesus' birth was related as by human descent, φύσει καὶ οὐ νόμῳ. Eusebius' testimony that Symmachus "seems to rest upon Matthew's Gospel his heresy that Christ came of Joseph and Mary" seems to prove what Justin independently attests,<sup>32</sup> that among the Ebionites such a form of Matthew continued in circulation until 160-80 A.D. The authority enjoyed by Symmachus in his native Syria may even serve in some degree to explain the survival of the heretical reading as an unassimilated element in Syr. sin. These data and the similar survival in the *Dialogue of Timothy and Aquila* make it possible that Irenaeus and Andreas after him resort to some writer whose application of the symbolism of the "cherubim" of Rev. 4:7 to the four gospels was based directly or indirectly upon an Ebionite or gnostic form of the text. The primary question, however, is the question of fact: Do the modifications introduced by Andreas into the application of Irenaeus imply, or do they not imply, the existence, ca. 175 A.D., of a comparison of the four gospels to the four ζῶα from the point of view of their respective derivation of the Christhood of Jesus substantially according to the following scheme: John (the lion) deriving it from his γένεα προαιώνιος; Luke (the calf) from his γενεαλογία taken νομικῶς; Matthew (the man) from his γέννησις φύσει καὶ οὐ νόμῳ; Mark (the eagle) from the ζωοποιῶν Πνεύματος, τοῦ ἐπιπτόντος ἡμῶν ἀνθρώπων?

BENJAMIN WISNER BACON

YALE DIVINITY SCHOOL  
NEW HAVEN, CONN.

<sup>32</sup> *Dial. w. Trypho*, xlv, iii.

## THEOLOGICAL OBSCURANTISM

Obscurantism is defined as both a "tendency" to prevent inquiry and enlightenment, and as a "desire" to do this. In the following pages it will be used as descriptive only of the tendency, and this as a tendency of thought. If persons are mentioned or referred to, they are believed to be animated by no desire to prevent enlightenment. They are sincerely attached to what they think truth. They have not been convinced by what they have heard of modern objections to their positions. Possibly they have not fully appreciated the force or seen the bearing of these objections. They feel called upon to defend sacred truth against attacks. They defend it against the attacks they see and the objections they feel. They are holding the citadel till help shall arrive; and they doubtless feel that in due time another philosophy will take possession of the thinking world, and that the present attacks upon the faith will be seen to be as unreal and ill-judged even by their present foes as they are now by themselves. But it is the object of this paper to show that, in the cases discussed, which are to be taken as samples of innumerable other cases, these defenders of the faith, often its called and commissioned defenders, are really opposing enlightenment; that such is their "tendency"; and that they are darkening counsel by words without knowledge.

The antagonism to the current evangelical theology on the part of the modern world, that is, of thinking men who are conversant with the progress of modern knowledge and with the methods by which it has been acquired, has a threefold root. One of these divisions may be described as a new theory of the universe. This is the evolutionary theory. God is conceived as operating according to fixed laws and by resident forces in every realm of life. As a theory of the origination of the present living forms, it is opposed to the idea of specific creation. As a theory of life under law it is opposed to the idea of a succession of crises. Even earthquakes are believed to have their laws. The religious life and nature of man are placed by this theory under the scheme of an orderly development, which excludes belief in interference, even for such an object as man's salvation. Revelation is assimilated to the method by which God has given man his knowledge of the forces of material nature, such as electricity. Man has studied and learned in the one sphere as the other, and with the same kind of help from God. And while the possibility of such events as miracles is not denied by

modern thought, they are regarded, inasmuch as they set aside the laws of nature for a time and to a degree, as highly improbable.

A second branch of the root is the modern conception of proof. This is first a conception of facts. It may be said that our traditional theology, like all the early thinking of men, is seriously marred by its entire lack of a conception of what facts are, and how a knowledge of them is to be obtained. Any bright idea, not too obviously contradicted by some quite proximate fact, has passed muster as a truth, and has been made the basis of an argument. The laborious methods of the laboratory to determine what the facts actually are were not only unknown to early theologians and unimitated by them, but to the present day have remained equally unappreciated, if not unknown, and generally unimitated by the expounders and defenders of theological systems. Darwin once planted some seeds and watched every one of the one hundred and fifty plants which came up, and made notes on their life histories. This was to get the facts as to some minute point of investigation. And when the facts have been ascertained, the methods of proof are rigid to a degree of which theology has no conception. Whatever may be true of the philosophical speculations which have accompanied natural science, or of theories which scientific men themselves would call peripheral, and of no practical importance, when it comes to a fact or a principle upon which scientific reasoning is to be built up, it is the habit of the modern times to demand cogent proof. Often it is said that a man ought not to believe a position if he can doubt it; by which is meant that, if a principle is to be made the basis of reasoning by which other truth is to be discovered or defended, it must be supported by evidence which compels belief. Otherwise the thing based upon it will probably be incorrect, and certainly can never be known to be true. There is no more truth in the conclusion than there was in the premises. Hence modern thought is hard to be convinced, but equally hard to be refuted.

The third root is the body of results already arrived at by scientific workers in all departments of human thought. History, for instance, yields an ever-growing body of convincing truth upon the basis of the evolutionary supposition, in consequence of the treatment of historical sources under the conception of the uniformity of history, that it has always proceeded under the same great forces as are now carrying it forward. The greatest argument against miracles is that they do not occur in our own day. Hence the historian is inclined to say they never did. The realm of the merely mysterious has been steadily contracted

under the researches of science till we are strongly inclined to believe that a law will finally be found for everything without exception, authenticated miracles with all the rest. And historical methods have shown us that most so-called miracles have no proper authentication or attestation, and cannot be placed upon the standing of historical facts. The study of sociology, a field coinciding at many points with theology, has increased our confidence in the spiritual forces of society as competent to carry on the task of religious renovation and progress, and at the same time deepen our understanding of the meaning of evolution. Psychology has had the same effect. The persuasion is mounting that we have in our modern world of thought, a new body of truth, possessed of a new and altogether unanticipated degree of certainty, and also—and here is the nub of the matter—diametrically opposed to certain important presuppositions of traditional theology. This, then, is the modern objection to the evangelical system of theology: in its fundamental conception, in its methods, and in its characteristic concrete results, it has been superseded, as defective, when not positively wrong, by another system, which is at essential points its direct antithesis.

Under such circumstances the problem of modern theology must be and ought to be *to learn the truth*; and of modern apologetics *to defend the truth*, and incidentally to win over the objecting parties to an acceptance of evangelical principles. But it sometimes seems as if apologists, ostrich-like, thought that to ignore a danger were the same as banishing it, or as if theology (like the Italian cities when the emperors were threatening them and they continued to carry on their little contests between themselves over bits of land and what not) were ignoring the overwhelming danger which threatens entire destruction, to devote its strength to disputes which are, at best, of passing importance only. It sometimes even seems as if the apologist had only himself in mind, and was only justifying himself in his own eyes for holding on to old positions. Such an apologetic is obscurantist.

To put the issue between the old and the new as sharply as possible, we may summarize it as follows:

1. It is not what the evangelical system *is*; but whether it is *true*. It may fairly be claimed that the meaning of the Bible upon the basis of the current idea of inspiration is well understood, and that there is little dispute about it. Even if this were subject to doubt, it would remain certain that the modern position does not concern points upon which such denominations as the Baptists, Methodists, and Congregational-

ists differ, but those upon which they and even their great antagonists, the Roman Catholics, agree. Is the whole idea of a personal interference by God in history for man's salvation true? That is the question; and no discussions whether the New Testament teaches or does not teach the virgin birth of Jesus will help in the slightest in answering it.

2. It is not what the Bible teaches; but whether it possesses authority to control opinions. If the idea of law is consistently applied to theology, and the progress of man's mind in religion is like that in the knowledge of electricity, then every truth stands upon the authority of its own evidence, and nothing is believed because any man or any book declares it. Hence the authority of the Bible disappears. It becomes a light for our illumination, but what light we receive from it is recognized by its own shining, not because the book gives it.

3. It is not what may be regarded as a probable or a pleasant result of speculation, but what has some degree of rigid proof. There are some who are quite upon the basis of modern thought in other respects, who defend the doctrine of the trinity upon the (general, sometimes very general) Hegelian basis of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. Pure Being (thesis), Concrete Being (antithesis), the Conscious Universe (Synthesis) are said to be the true meaning of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. This is called Trinitarianism. It ought not to be accepted as such by evangelical theologians, for it has no connection with the Pauline-Johannine doctrine of incarnation; but, if it is accepted by any as such, it would have no pertinence in meeting the issue with the current of thinking in the modern world, for it is an unproved speculation.

4. It is not what it is impossible to deny; but what it is necessary to affirm. A friend of the writer once wrote him as follows, putting the matter as well, in its way, as anybody can. He wrote: "I don't know how particles of matter might be carbonized or otherwise altered so as to change water into wine . . . but neither do I (or you, or anybody) know that it cannot be done harmoniously with, and by the use of deep laws which lie within and around laboratory laws. And if it happened that Jesus knew those deeper laws and used them, his knowledge and use of them (and not the mere physical phenomena) would be the real 'sign.'" The same argument is sometimes put more briefly thus: "Miracles are possible, for God is personal; therefore you *can't say* that they have *not* been actual." True, but can you say they *have* been actual? Can my friend say there *are* any such deep laws as

he has suggested? He may do something to sustain his position before himself, but he does actually nothing for the meeting of the modern objection, because that is after not *possibilities* but *truth*. We seek not what can be "defended," but what can be maintained.

That the considerations which have already been presented are not mere abstractions, but that modern apology is actually afflicted with marked obscurantism, is made evident by one of the most important volumes appearing in recent years upon the evangelical side, Principal Forsyth's *Person and Place of Christ*. To onlookers from this side of the Atlantic the author seems to be a prominent leader of religious thought in British dissent. He has appeared with great acceptance upon this side of the water on a number of occasions. He was selected to give the opening address at the International Congregational Council of 1908 in Edinburgh that he might strike the keynote of that assembly. He is a man of learning and power, and, what is more, of profound religious earnestness. He "desires," no doubt, to further the truth; but the "tendency" of this book is obscurantist. Of this alone we would speak.

The first half of the work is chiefly apologetic, the second half chiefly constructive. It seems at times as if the book (if we may thus distinguish it from the permanent position of the author's mind, of which we desire to say nothing critical) were aware of the true issue. We read (p. 103): "We are making a choice between the New Testament and the modern critical school." Of course, this implies that if we choose the critical school, we choose it as a whole, and this certainly implies its deep, fundamental principles. And hence the answer to it, and the reasons why it is to be rejected, if it is so, should be concerned with these first principles of criticism, of which the very first is the idea of law. Again we read (pp. 140, 141):

What we really believe is the gospel which, with the new soul, called the Bible also into being, and for whose sake it exists. It is not the church. For the books of the Bible were given *to* the church, more than *by* it, and they descended on it rather than rose from it. The canon of the Bible rose from the church, but not its contents. Bible and church were collateral products of the gospel. But we go on. Having fixed in the New Testament on what was held to be of faith and central to faith, we must ask, *was it true?*

This encourages us to hope that possibly we are yet to have, after a deal of discussion that did not meet the modern issue—indeed, that seemed absolutely ignorant of what it was—a final meeting of the demand of the modern time, to know whether the doctrines of the church are

true. But we are immediately disillusioned, for the remainder of the paragraph is: "How far is that theological faith a *true interpretation* of the historical Jesus Christ? Does it assign to Jesus Christ *what he himself claimed, or wished claimed*, when we read him as a whole?" Truth passes over here to "true interpretation," which is something very different; and the whole investigation is narrowed to what Jesus "claimed." But were his claims *true*? that is the very question of the modern time. The book is, then, not upon the quest of the truth, except upon the orthodox supposition as to the nature of Christ and revelation, and these are but *one form of the very point at issue!* And again we read:

If they (the apostles) were right about the source of their knowledge they were right about the object of it; these were one and the same. *It is a great "if," I admit.* If they were wrong about their authority and their centre, the outlying pieties of such fanatics [the word is the book's, not mine] have little moral worth, however beautiful. If they were wrong there, they were of little value anywhere else, except among the pieties and beauties of faith, which, however, do not need the apostles to their warrant, but appeal directly enough to our spiritual aesthetic. Only they do not lift us above an aesthetic religion."

Now, one would certainly expect some investigation of that "great if"; was Paul, for example, right about the source of his knowledge? Did he receive it direct from Christ, whom he "saw" upon the road to Damascus? Or was it the combination of his own mind to which he wrongly ascribed objectivity? Are the divine experiences which he referred to the present fellowships of Christ properly the results of that fellowship, or rather of the direct fellowship of the Father, whose Holy Spirit, that is, himself, is present with blessing in the hearts of his children? If Christ was truly God and taught what the early church thought about himself, the "if" is established; but, *were* these things so? That is the modern question; but one will look in vain through the 357 pages of this work for anything like an answer. And yet that answer ought to be the very heart of the book.

This relative appreciation of the true issue on the part of the book will be evident from the following passage:

The evolutionary idea is certainly compatible with Christianity; but not so long as it claims to be the supreme idea, to which Christianity must be shaped. Evolution is within Christianity, but Christianity is not within evolution. For evolution means the rule of a levelling relativism, which takes from Christ his absolute value and final place, reduces him to be but a stage of God's revelation, or a phase of it that can be outgrown, and makes



him the less of a creator as it ranges him vividly in the scale of the creature. There is no such foe to Christianity in thought today as this idea is; and we can make no terms with it so long as it claims the throne (pp. 10, 11).

One expects after this some discussion, some brief discussion, perhaps, but at least some discussion, of the antithesis between evolution and Christianity as to their relative truth; but he finds *none*.

The following passage gives so excellent a picture of the times that its full quotation seems desirable:

In the name of a simplicity which is not Christ's, lay Christianity is ceasing to be even the priesthood of each believer in virtue of the priesthood of Christ. It is coming to be understood as the rejection of apostolic, mediatorial, atoning Christianity and the sanctification of natural piety—sometimes only its refinement. It is more preoccupied with ethical conduct than with moral malady, with the fundamental truths of religion than with the fontal truths of mercy. And whereas we used to be able to appeal to our laymen and their experience against a Socinian and undogmatic and non-mediatorial Christianity, we can now appeal to them only against a sacerdotal and clerical. We used to be able to take refuge from Arianism (to which the ministers of the church might be tempted by certain philosophies) in the evangelical experience of its members. We used to think that the sense of sin which was lost from the intellectuals or the worldlings would be found among the Christian men who were in lay contact with the world—its temptations, its relapses, and its tragedies. But experience hardly now bears out this hope. Perhaps the general conscience has succumbed to the cheap comforts and varied interests of life; or the modern stress on the sympathies has muffled the moral note; or the decency of life has stifled the need of mercy; or Christian liberty has in the liberty lost the Christ. But whatever the cause, the lay mind becomes only too ready to interpret sin in a softer light than God's and to see it only under the pity of a Lord to whom judgment is quite a strange work, and who forgives all because he knows all. It is on a broken reed we too often lean when we turn from the theologian's "subtleties" to rely on the layman's faith. For the layman becomes slow to own a faith which begins in repentance rather than in benevolence. He is slow to confess a sin which is more than backwardness, untowardness, or ignorance. The number grows of high and clean-living youths who cherish an ideal Christianity but feel no need for an historic and perennial Christ. The tendency of the lay mind is backward to the eighteenth century, to a wise, and humane, and urbane religion, only enlarged by all the ideality and fraternity that enlarge Deism to modern Theism, etc. (Pp. 13, 14).

Barring some particulars of interpretation, one must say that this is a true picture of our times. And one would think that it would be followed by at least the *raising* of the question as to the validity of this new experience. May not Christians be growing? May not this new

type of piety be more in accordance with actual truth than the old? Certainly it is an impeachment of the evangelical theology, if its own sons, trained in its churches, and altogether friendly to it, indeed supposing themselves still to hold it, as they principally do, are in fact so widely separated from it, if its cardinal ideas find no real echo in their minds, and if they are actually living upon an altogether new basis of conception and principle! This is one of the profoundest questions before the evangelical communions. Is it a fact that men whom you theoretically call lost men, that is, men who do not believe in Christ in your sense, are enrolled in your churches, take the Lord's Supper from you, stand in your pulpits, and occupy the chairs of instruction in your theological seminaries? And are they, tested by their "fruits," as good Christians as the rest, or even better? Is your theology already practically repudiated? And is that which life has repudiated to be longer held as the revealed truth of God? One would expect such a discussion as that after the passage quoted, but the actual treatment of the subject is quite another. Read:

It (this "lay religion") regards Christ as the most inspired of the prophets of God's love, the most radical of social reformers, and the noblest of elder brothers. Whereas *the church must stand* on Christ the priest, his sacrifice, and his redemption; and it could not stand, as it did not arise, upon Christ the beneficent prophet or noble martyr. . . . I am trying to avoid the dogmatism of dogma. But I am also striving concisely to sharpen the issue, to be explicit and clear and to point the choice the church *must* make or go under.

That is, the question of the *truth* of those other positions is after all *not to be raised*. "The church *must stand* on Christ"—why? We are not told, nor is anything said which can throw light upon the success of those churches which have in recent times thrown off the doctrine of the priesthood of Christ. It "could not stand, as it *did not arise*"—is it then certain that traditional history has given us the true account of the rise of the church? The modern spirit expresses doubt at this point, and cannot be met by a mere assumption. But the book makes it. The unchanging position of the church is assumed without proof, and the purpose of the book is to maintain it. That is to darken counsel by words without knowledge. It is the "tendency to resist progress," obscurantism.

There was once an apology which might have been repeated here. It began by establishing the being and personality of God; then advanced to his benevolence; then exhibited the need of salvation on the part of sinful and miserable men; then the necessity of revelation as requisite

to man's salvation; and concluded with the actuality of revelation as attested by miracles. That was in its time a respectable argument. Today it seems antiquated. It is seldom brought forward by the defenders of the evangelical system although it is still the silent assumption upon which all their apology rests. Miracles in particular are much discussed. Various definitions are given of them which shall avoid the implication that they are a *violation* of the laws of nature. Sometimes their office in attesting revelation is blurred. But it remains that they are, whatever their occasion or design, proofs of the divine quality of the message of prophets and of Christ, "signs," and that they must be what God alone, and not man, however great his knowledge, could do, else they are no sign that God is the authority for the prophet's words. But what God only can do is still his personal interference in the course of things, and thus violates nature after all. A thorough-going discussion of the personality of God, of the meaning of salvation, and of the necessity of the church's idea of revelation to salvation, is absolutely essential before one can make the fundamental assumptions of this book in the present age. But of such discussions, the book contains not a trace.

One remaining point of this work we must mention. It is the very proper insistence upon the unity of the New Testament. Attention is called to the fact that, on account of the priority of the appearance of the Pauline epistles, "the three gospels were written for [and by] people living in the theological atmosphere of the epistles" (p. 175). It has long been recognized that the Johannine gospel is essentially Pauline; and it is rightfully maintained that the synoptic gospel is also Pauline. Hence it is impossible to separate out a synoptic Christ and say that he is the real Christ in distinction from the Christ of the epistles. So the book maintains, and this position will probably be acknowledged finally by all parties. The simple dates at which the books are held by the best critics (Harnack, for example) to have been written is enough to render this certain. But the book takes a peculiar turn at this point. It maintains that this view of the ultimate and heavenly Christ, this theology of a priest and a sacrifice, is to be accepted, being once understood as the true voice of the whole New Testament, not merely as that voice but as the absolute and final theology. Upon what ground? This is the question which modern thought has accustomed itself to ask at every stage of every investigation. No explicit answer is given to this question; but the implicit answer is, the divine authority of the New Testament—the very point at issue with the new thought!

One might have expected from a thorough treatment of the subject

that the matter would assume some such form as the following: Paul's conceptions lie evidently at the basis of the whole New Testament view of Christ. He was the greatest mind of all the apostles, he early formed his views, he preached them more widely than any other, he wrote them down in his epistles some years before the first brief gospel appeared, and thus his influence dominated the church and formed its theology. Everything therefore turns upon Paul's views. How extremely important to know whether they were correct! Where did he get them? for what reasons adopt them? in what agreement find himself with those about him? What can be said for them upon the ground of the Old Testament? To what extent is the miraculous element necessary to their development, and what was Paul's personal relation to miracles? An examination of such points should next follow.

Now, such an examination would naturally take into consideration the question whether Paul does not disconnect his view of Christ from objective sources of information ("not from men, neither through man," Gal. 1:1); whether he did not actually form his view of Christ in consequence of a vision which he had on the road to Damascus; and if so, what is the validity of this vision-experience? Charles G. Finney, for example, believed he saw Jesus Christ in his room at the time of his conversion, "fell down at his feet and poured out his soul to him"; and this lasted for a considerable time (*Memoirs*, 19, 20). Do we for a moment believe that he actually saw Christ? True, Finney himself afterward saw that the vision was "wholly a mental state," and Paul did not. But shall we believe this of one and not of the other? Our book ought really to take this matter up.

But we have nothing of the sort, the New Testament doctrine, in order to establish its unity, is referred to its original source; but when the pyramid has thus been set up upon its apex, no investigation is made as to whether the single stone which is thus to bear the weight of it all, is capable of sustaining so great a burden. This is *the very point at issue*, and is simply *assumed*!

But perhaps, ere we leave this book, there ought to be a plain answer given to a certain question which it puts:

You say that the one legacy of Jesus was a doctrine of the Father, reinforced by the powerful personality of the prophet. *Why* do you say that? What entitles you to say that the great thing Jesus brought the world was a doctrine, a doctrine rather than a deed, and that he left as his achievement his principle rather than his person? You admit that it was not the view of the apostles, nor of the first church; it was not the view of those who received whatever legacy he did leave. You are coming to admit that it was not the

view of the Synoptists. Why do you say they were all of them wrong? (p. 118).

Shall we put the answer as bluntly as a modernist, out of his deep earnestness and out of the sadness of a controversy troubled by the methods of obscurantism, would be likely to put it? He might say: Because I know that Jesus was a man and a prophet. But the idea that he was more, that he was qualified to make his person the object of his doctrine by his possession of a divine nature, I see no shred of a reason for accepting. It is suggested by writings which were written long after his death, by persons who never saw him, upon reports coming to them by unknown channels, and which are full of stories to which I can give no credence, and which base their attempts to prove their various positions as to his person by misquotations and bad exegesis of Old Testament passages. It is a doctrine which detracts from the fatherhood of God, since it makes him unwilling or unable to forgive except when bought off in some unexplainable way. I trace it all to a man who never saw Christ, who quarreled with the earliest apostles, upon his own testimony, as to certain fundamental ideas of the system, and whose personal capacity to testify to so great a doctrine as this theory of the supernatural being and nature of Christ is questionable. I say that "they were all of them wrong" because *not a particle of proof is advanced to show that they were right* which deserves the attention of a sober man.

In turn *we* ask, *Why* does not our book take up *that* answer?

And so we leave this book. It has nothing for the times. It is a great blunder—a terrible blunder, if evangelicalism is, after all, true; for it has confirmed and hardened the intellectual opposition of the times to that system. And, whatever may be true, it is a sad blunder; for it has failed to further the truth because it has not faced the true issue and sought out the real facts and learned thereby. Every discussion which does not further the truth in some way, damages it. Many a man has already risen from the reading of this book with the verdict, "It has nothing for me," and with the somewhat strengthened conviction that nothing can really be said in our day for the evangelical system. It is a pity to have such a conclusion reached after a sham battle! It were much better for all concerned if the conclusion came after a downright and genuine struggle between the opposing forces, whether it should lead to a victory or a defeat, a square, open defeat, for evangelicalism.

FRANK HUGH FOSTER

OLIVET, MICH.

## RECENT THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE

### A NEW HEBREW LEXICON

The primary aim of Professor König's new Hebrew and Aramaic lexicon<sup>1</sup> is practical. He wishes to furnish German students in *gymnasium* and university with a convenient textbook of small size at a reasonable cost. The Hebrew and the Aramaic words are separated, the former occupying the first 560 pages, the latter, the remaining 105 pages. In the Hebrew portion the vocabulary of the Old Testament is included, and the words are arranged in strictly alphabetic order, regardless of their etymology. This method has scientific disadvantages, inasmuch as it does not bring all the derivations of a root together; but for the practical use of the beginner it is probably most convenient, particularly as there are not less than a thousand cases in which the determination of the true root is at best problematic. All forms that are likely to present difficulties to a novice are inserted in alphabetic order in small type with cross-references to the roots under which they are discussed more fully. This is a new and valuable feature. Another useful addition is the inclusion in alphabetic order among the Hebrew words of the Massoretic technical terms and abbreviations that are found in the margins of Hebrew Bibles. These are not readily accessible to the ordinary student, yet knowledge of their meaning is indispensable for the understanding of the received text.

The Aramaic portion of the lexicon is constructed on the same principle as the Hebrew portion. It contains the vocabulary of the Aramaic sections of the Old Testament, namely, Gen. 31:47; Jer. 10:11; Dan. 2:4b-7:28; Ezra 4:8-6:18; 7:12-26, and in addition all the words in the newly discovered Asswân and Elephantine papyri. From a historical and philological point of view these papyri are most interesting, and this help to their interpretation is welcome.

At the end of the volume there stands a thorough index. This serves not merely as a German-Hebrew lexicon, but also as a guide to the more important philological and historical discussions in the body of the book. Proper names are given under their familiar German forms, so as to be more readily accessible to historians who are not acquainted

<sup>1</sup> *Hebräisches und aramäisches Wörterbuch zum Alten Testament.* Von Dr. phil. u. theol. Eduard König. Leipzig: Dieterich, 1910. vii+665 pages. M. 10.

with Hebrew, and all topics that bear on the history of civilization are carefully recorded. This is a feature that adds much to the practical usefulness of the book.

In the case of a work that aims to be brief and inexpensive it is perhaps ungracious to complain of lack of completeness, but in such matters the relative importance of material should always be considered. If space could be found for the Massoretic apparatus and for the vocabulary of the Asswân and Elephantine papyri, it would seem as if the vocabulary of the old Hebrew inscriptions and of the Hebrew Ecclesiasticus might have been added. This would have taken little space, and would have been more important both philologically and historically, than the other additions. Furthermore, it is indispensable in a Hebrew lexicon that derivatives of a root should be given under that root in order that students may make a complete study of their meanings. If a thoroughgoing alphabetic principle of arrangement be followed, cross-references to the derivatives should be given under all the roots. This important feature is neglected in this lexicon. Thus under ידע there is nothing to indicate that ידע is a derivative, while under ידע reference is made to ידע. Another serious defect is the omission of references to the documents in the Pentateuch and other books in which certain words are found. Surely Pentateuchal analysis is sufficiently established by this time to necessitate that its accepted results find a place in a modern lexicon, yet under ילד no mention is found of the fact that the Qal is used by J in the sense of "beget," while the Hiphil is used by P in the same sense. All the salient facts of diction on which Pentateuchal criticism rests are passed over in silence, although the mere insertion of a letter in parenthesis after the chapter and verse references would have served to indicate the facts.

In his treatment of the material the author sets before him as his first task "to complete the studies in regard to the development of the meaning of Hebrew words begun in his *Stilistik, Rhetorik, Poetik*, and to present them in a lexicon in an easily comprehended form. The inner—logical-psychological—connection between the meanings of words must be cleared up, and through this an absolute advance be secured not merely for Hebrew-Semitic lexicography but also for semasiology in general." This is a praiseworthy aim, but it is fraught with peril. When one is seeking for an orderly psychological development in the use of words, one is apt to assume as a theoretical starting-point a meaning that is never found in the language, and to give other meanings a more or less artificial shading. This is particularly the case if one belongs

to the school of Fleischer, and is inclined to regard the Arabic or Ethiopic meaning of words as primitive. Thus, on the strength of Ethiopic *'abda*, "*oberravit*," the fundamental meaning of אָבַד is given as "umherirren," and the secondary meaning as "zugrunde gehen." It is more than doubtful whether the development is not in exactly the opposite direction. A good many of the arrangements of meanings impress one as fanciful, and remind one of the earlier edition of Gesenius' *Thesaurus*. The only safe method for the Hebrew lexicographer is to record the actual phenomena of the language. All the meanings that occur in the Old Testament should be noted, and if they can readily be arranged in logical order, well and good; but etymological and psychological considerations should be kept in the background, as they are likely to lead to an inaccurate recording of facts.

A second aim of this lexicon is the interpretation of the proper names in the Old Testament. In this particular it goes far beyond its predecessors both in completeness and in accuracy. Most of the Hebrew names are theophorous, and on their correct explanation much depends for the history of the early Hebrew religion.

*El*, "god," König derives from אֱלֹהִים, "strengthen," then "curse," and he holds that it meant originally "power" or "powerful one." In proper names he translates it by "God," e.g., *Eli-melek*, "God is king"; but names of this formation are found in other Semitic languages, where there is no trace of monotheism; and, consequently, this name should be translated "a god is king," or "the (particular) god is king" (there being no article in primitive Semitic). Originally names of this sort had a polytheistic meaning among the Hebrews, and it was only with the triumph of Yahwism that they came to be taken in a monotheistic sense.

In the case of *'abî*, "father," as an element in proper names König rejects the view that it is construct before the following noun, and adopts the prevalent modern opinion that it is absolute, and is a title of deity. As to whether the vowel *î* is the suffix of the first person, or is merely a relic of an old case-ending, his judgment wavers. In some cases he regards it as the suffix, in others as the genitive ending. When one considers that *î* is often omitted, and that in Babylonian texts it alternates with *u* and *a*, it seems probable that it is not a suffix, but is always a case-ending that survives as a connecting vowel. *Abi-melek*, accordingly, means "father is king." This conclusion has some bearing on the question whether the "father" honored in the personal name was a god or a deified ancestor. *'Ahi*, "brother," he treats in the same



manner as *'abī*. *'Aḥī-Yah* does not mean "brother of Yahweh" (Nöl-deke), but "(my) brother is Yahweh."

With most modern philologists he takes *'amm* in proper names to mean "paternal uncle," not "people," and regards it as a divine title. *'Ammi-el*, or *Eli-'am*, means accordingly "(my) paternal uncle is God." It would be more accurate to say, "paternal uncle is (the) god." *'Amm* in the sense of "paternal uncle" he holds to be a different word from *'amm*, "people," but it is easy to see how out of the primitive meaning of "uncle" first "kinsman" and then "clan" might be developed.

*Dōd* or *dād* in Hebrew proper names he translates "beloved" not "paternal uncle," and refuses to recognize it as a divine title. *Dōd-Yahu*, accordingly, means "Yahweh is a friend," not "Dōd is Yahweh," and *El-dād* and *Bil-dād* mean respectively "God has loved" and "Bel has loved." It is doubtful whether this view is correct. *Dad* appears as a divine name in West Semitic personal names as early as the Obelisk of Manishtusu, e.g., *Bil-Dada* (C. xi. 4; cf. C. xvii. 1) and *Dada-waqar* (*Cun. Texts*. 3-43, 4).

A third aim of this lexicon is to pass a critical judgment upon the problems of text, etymology, and higher criticism that have been raised during the last few years so far as they affect matters of lexicography. This work is done in a thorough fashion with use of the latest authorities. The author's verdict is usually conservative. Textual emendation he adopts much less frequently than most modern commentators. Thus he accepts the very questionable מִקְדָּם in Isa. 2:6 and makes no mention of the substitutes that have been proposed. In Isa. 2:16 also he accepts מְכַבֵּירִית without mention of the plausible emendation to מְכַבֵּירִית. These instances taken at random are typical of his general attitude toward text-critical questions.

Of matters of lexicography in which the views of the modern school of higher criticism are involved the following specimens may be given: *Elōhim*, although used as a plural, may also be used as an abstract, "godhood," hence "God." There is, accordingly, no trace of primitive Hebrew polytheism in this name. Similarly *b'ālīm* is not a plural, "the ba'als," or "proprietors," but is an abstract, "lordship," then "Lord." The singular *ba'al*, is a secondary formation out of the abstract plural. "The *ba'al*," is not the particular proprietor of an individual shrine, but is "the Lord" κατ'ἐξοχήν, i.e., the sun-god, the chief male divinity of the Canaanites! In all this there is more of the dogmatic desire to establish a primitive Hebrew monotheism than there is of sound philological and historical investigation. If there is any fact that

stands out clearly in the history of West Semitic religions it is that there was no such thing as a god Ba'al, except in the speculations of late Greek and Latin authors, but that there was a herd of minor *b'ālm* that were worshiped "upon every high hill and beneath every green tree."

For the divine name Yahweh the etymology of Exod. 3:14 is accepted and it is interpreted as meaning "the existing," or "eternal." No effort is made to go back of this late prophetic theory to a more primitive meaning. יהוה אלהי is interpreted as an ellipsis for יהוה אלהי צבאות and is explained as meaning Yahweh, the leader of the armies of Israel and of the hosts of Heaven. On the word אֶפֶד we find the comment "Ueberwurf, Umwurf, Schulterkleid, (mit Behältnis für die heil. Loose). Diese Deutung wird auch für Ri. 8:26 f., etc., als die richtige erwiesen werden können." The author accordingly finds no trace of an Ephod-idol in ancient Israel. To פָּרֶךְ he assigns the primary meaning "one preparing," or "serving," hence "priest," and rejects the Arabic meaning "soothsayer, diviner," in spite of the fact that the functions of the priest as we meet him in the earliest Hebrew records are not sacrificial but oracular. Under פִּזְרָה he gives the two meanings "Weisung" and "Gesetz," but does not suggest that the fundamental meaning "casting" may originally have had something to do with the casting of the sacred lot. נְבִיא is connected with Arab. *naba'a* and Ass. *nabû*, and means "speaker, proclaimer." It contains, therefore, no suggestion of an ecstatic condition as a prerequisite of prophecy. From these illustrations it is evident that even in lexicography the dogmatic presuppositions of an author affect his treatment of the material.

A fourth aim of this lexicon is to illustrate the Hebrew by comparison with kindred words in the cognate languages. The Arabic equivalent is usually the only one given. If it is lacking, the Ethiopic, Aramaic, or Assyrian is given. This method was doubtless adopted to save space, but it has the unfortunate result of giving the impression that Arabic is nearer to Hebrew than any of the other Semitic languages, and that it is the most primitive of these languages, whereas, as a matter of fact, its meanings are notoriously the farthest away from the primitive. It would have been better to have given out of all the Semitic languages that word which came nearest to the primitive meaning. The transcription of the Arabic words is an excellent idea in a lexicon that is intended for beginners, but it is most unfortunate and unnecessary that the established practice of the lexicons, grammars, and encyclopaedias should be departed from so that ' is used for ה and ʒ for ז. The mere

fact that ' is the rough breathing in Greek is no sufficient reason for a change that is certain to confuse beginners. It is also a pity that *ch* is used for ך in Hebrew while *h* and *h* are used for Arabic ح and ح. Only in German does *ch* approximate the sound of ך. It is hard to see any reason why the meaning of the Arabic words should be given in Latin. In these degenerate days of classical studies there are probably many who undertake the study of Hebrew who have a very imperfect knowledge of Latin; and even when one is fairly well versed, one is likely to be puzzled by a rare word. What is the use of compelling a student to have a Latin dictionary at hand in order to use a Hebrew one? Latin is far less adapted for the exact translation of Arabic than is any modern language. It is easy to take the Latin meanings directly from Freytag, but in most cases they are less precise than the definitions that might be given in German.

Taken as a whole this dictionary is a welcome contribution to Hebrew lexicography. It is the best brief work in existence. American students who read German will find it a convenient manual at a reasonable price. Those who cannot afford to buy the large Brown-Driver-Briggs Hebrew Lexicon will find in this an excellent substitute; and even those who own the large lexicon will obtain from it much additional information.

LEWIS BAYLES PATON

HARTFORD THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY  
HARTFORD, CONN.

---

### SANDERS' EDITION OF THE FREER MANUSCRIPTS

An intelligent purchase by Mr. Charles L. Freer in the winter of 1906 secured for this country one of the greatest of biblical manuscripts, or rather series of manuscripts, now extant. With wise and unstinted liberality Mr. Freer has decided to donate these manuscripts with other archaeological treasures in his possession to the Smithsonian Institution at Washington, D.C., and so to the American people. Meanwhile his generous purse is financing the publication of the manuscripts in a splendid facsimile edition, the first volume of which appeared now some four months ago.<sup>1</sup> The preparation of the edition is entrusted to Mr. Henry A. Sanders, professor of Latin in the University of Michi-

<sup>1</sup> *Facsimile of the Washington Manuscript of Deuteronomy and Joshua in the Freer Collection*. With an Introduction by Henry A. Sanders. Ann Arbor, Michigan: The University of Michigan, 1910.

gan. Professor Sanders has chosen to cut the introduction to the facsimile very short, indeed, publishing most of the information, which might be looked for there, together with other material, in an extended monograph.<sup>2</sup>

Mr. Sanders' work shows the marks of much diligent and painstaking labor. That along with much that is fresh and ingenious, faults and errors are also to be found will be the less surprising, when we remember that this is the author's first incursion into the field of biblical text-criticism. A very sane and well-balanced *critique* of this work, which will be easily accessible to most of the readers of this journal, is given by Dr. E. J. Goodspeed, under the caption "Exploration and Discovery" in the September issue of the *Biblical World*. Little need be added in praise or blame to what was said there.

In the facsimile volume, aside from the absence of the notation of contents on each page, noted by Professor Goodspeed, one is somewhat surprised to find our time-honored biblical verses hidden in the table of contents under the name of "paragraphs." One is distinctly disappointed, also, in finding that the introduction to the magnificent facsimiles is so exclusively given up to minor details, such as well-known photographic processes and materials. A compact, comprehensive statement on the manuscript itself, such as has been developed for precisely this use from Montfaucon to Gregory, would surely not have been out of place.

Another fault, to which new investigators of old manuscripts are prone, and which Mr. Sanders has not entirely escaped, is a tendency to overestimate their find and to prop this up by somewhat hazardous hypotheses, considered too certain and often too tenaciously clung to. Mr. Sanders' theory of the provenance of the manuscripts is growing momentarily more complicated. He now needs "some more out-of-the-way monastery" for the preservation of the manuscripts between the destruction of his favorite Monastery of the Vinedresser and 1906. Yet his theory to him "seems sure," and the much simpler and rather more probable hypothesis of Carl Schmidt and others seems to him "discredited" upon very insufficient grounds. The interpretation of the use of poorer parchment in Θ than in B or N to help establish for Θ an age as great or greater than the others seems rather like an inversion of the

<sup>2</sup> *The Old Testament Manuscripts in the Freer Collection*. Part I, "The Washington Manuscript of Deuteronomy and Joshua." By Henry A. Sanders (University of Michigan Studies; Humanistic Series, Vol. VIII). New York: Macmillan, 1910. v+104 pages, 3 facsimiles. \$1.

meaning of this paleographical evidence. When people began to use parchment for their most sacred book, the Bible, this meant that parchment was therewith recognized as superior material to anything else for this purpose and that they would search for the best of this material. As to Professor Goodspeed, so to the eye of the present writer,  $\Theta$  seems paleographically nearer to the later Homer palimpsest (Brit. Mus. Add. 17210) than to the Berlin P. 6794 or Codex Ephraemi. Too great certainty seems to be shown by the editor of  $\Theta$  in regard to the precise beginning, also, of the once complete manuscript and in the assumption of an apparently immediate papyrus ancestor. The introductory quire, which Mr. Sanders assumes was lacking, would in many, perhaps in most cases, not be numbered with the rest. The weakest section in the book, as has been amply demonstrated by Professor Goodspeed, is that on "Lection Marks." In the discussion of the text problem, Mr. Sanders has shown much care and praiseworthy diligence in the collection of much material. In the sifting of  $\Theta$ , however, for Hexaplaric readings, the strands of the sieve seem too closely drawn for other manuscripts and rather too loosely for  $\Theta$ . That the text of  $\Theta$  is good, nearly or quite as good as A, B, F, etc., Mr. Sanders has proven beyond much doubt, yet the times are past when the "original Septuagint," or, still more, "the original Hebrew" could be too easily and too frequently deduced from one single manuscript. Minor matters are the misprints  $\text{נִחְמַנְוֹת}$  and  $\text{נִחְמַנְוֹת}$  for  $\text{נִחְמַנְוֹ}$ , and the assumption that the modern "Ain Yâld" near Jerusalem was identical with the Ajalon of Josh. 10:12. The collation is good, but, perhaps, not quite so absolute, as one might demand of a collation made at home. A rapid re-examination has shown the following errors: Deut. 4:6, the facsimile shows  $\text{ποιησ|ται}$  for Mr. Sanders'  $\text{ποιησεται}$ ; 4:47,  $\text{κατα}$  pro  $\text{κατ'}$  is omitted; 7:15,  $\text{επαξει}$  pro  $\text{επιθησει}^1$ ; 8:14, before  $\text{δουλειας}$  insert  $\text{εξαγαγος}$  pro  $\text{εξαγαγοντος}$ ; 8:15, after  $\text{εξαγαγος}$  the  $\text{σοι}$  seems corrected from  $\text{σε}$  or vice versa; 9:11,  $\text{δια}$  add ante  $\text{τεσσερακοντα}^2$ ; 12:2, after  $\text{υποκατω} + \text{παντος}$  insert  $\text{δασεως}$  pro  $\text{δασεος}$ ; 12:11, it might have been well on account of the punctuation to print in full the manuscript's reading  $\text{επικληθη|ναι εκει το ονομα | αυτου· εκει οισεται}$ ; 16:12, after  $\text{Αιγυπτω}$  add  $\text{πθι|ησεις}$  pro  $\text{ποιησεις}$ ; 18:20,  $\text{προφητης}$  should be  $\text{προφητης}^2$ ; 18:22,  $\text{εκεινος}$  should be  $\text{εκινος}^1$ ;  $\text{και}^2$  om |  $\text{μη}^2 + \text{δε}$  should read  $\text{μηδε}$  pro  $\text{και μη}^2$ ; 19:14,  $\text{ην}$  pro  $\text{η}^2$ ; 22:8, after  $\text{οικειαν}$  insert  $\text{ποιησης}$  pro  $\text{ποιησεις}^1$ ; 24:17,  $\text{και μνησθηση}$  really belongs, as in Swete, to vs. 18; 27:2, before  $\text{δυο}$  insert  $\text{λιαβητε}$  pro  $\text{διαβητε}$ ; 27:15, before  $\text{τεχνιτου}$  insert  $\text{o}$  add ante  $\text{ανθρωπος}$ ; 27:26, after  $\text{ος}$  insert  $\text{του}$  add ante  $\text{ποιησαι}$ ; 28:63,  $\text{υμας}^1 + | \text{και πληθυναι υμας}$ ; 31:8,

before *σε* insert *ανησι* pro *ανησει*; 31:29, *επ ε|σχατων* pro *εσχατων*<sup>2</sup>; 32:8, should read *ους* pro *ως*; Josh. 1:15, before the *εν | τω* insert *ημιν* pro *υμιν*; 7:17, *και προσηχθη*<sup>2</sup> om; 8:7, *πορευεσθαι* should be *πορευσεσθαι*; 10:39, after *αυτη*<sup>2</sup> om insert *τη χεβρων* pro *την χ.*; 10:41, the first "ante"; 15:3, *πορευθησεται* pro *εκπορευεται*<sup>2</sup>; 16:8, *αυτου* pro *αυτων*<sup>2</sup>; 17:1, before *Βασανιτιδι* insert *Γαλααδιτιδι*; 18:4, before *ηλθον* insert *εμου* pro *μου*; 18:16, *και* add ante *καταβησεται*<sup>3</sup>; 20:7, *οριω* pro *ορει*<sup>1</sup>; 21:44, before *ουδεις* insert *αντεστη* pro *ανεστη*; 22:5, *ποιειν*<sup>2</sup> om; 22:17, before *ου* insert *υμιν* pro *ημιν*; 23:16, should be spaced *και απολεισθε το ταχος*; 24:7, before *ιδον* insert *επ* add ante *αυτους*<sup>2</sup>; 24:12, *εξεβαλεν* pro *εξαπεστειλαν*<sup>2</sup>. A few points which are less clear may further be mentioned. Deut. 19:1, *δε | αφανιση* seems from the facsimile to be corrected from *δε | αφανιση* rather than from *δη αφ.* The *τον* of 19:4 seems corrected from *την*. In 19:17 the *των* before *ιερεων* seems to be a correction; from what? 22:6, the second *ω* of *ωω* is a correction, from M (?) or N (?). Josh. 15:21 had perhaps better read *πρωτη* pro *προς τη* rather than *πρω* pro *προς*. It is doubtful whether the *καριαθ' βααλ'*, Josh. 18:14, 15, deserves mention as a variant at all; there is no space between the two sections of the word as Mr. Sanders' spacing seems to indicate; and if the hook deserves mention in one place then why not in others, e.g., vss. 11, *ιωσηφ'*—et al? The capitalization is inconsistent, often doubtful, and it might have been better in a collation to have omitted it altogether; if *Λευιτης*, as frequently, is begun with a capital, why not *βασαν*, Deut. 29:7, and *αρνων*, Josh. 7:24? What guarantee have we that *οαζαν* pro *οζαν*, Josh. 6:26, stands for *Οαζαν*, and not for *ο Αζαν*? Another inconsistency is to be found in the designation of words or letters lacking entirely, of illegible portions, and of erasures, etc. Mr. Sanders does not use the usual symbols, nor has he a consistent system of his own.

All in all, Mr. Sanders' work displays much conscientious labor and many more good points than it is possible to mention here. As to the faults, here pointed out, they are natural and, in a measure, condonable, such as, with growing experience in the work, should disappear.

M. SPRENGLING

CHICAGO, ILL.

### MONTEFIORE'S COMMENTARY ON THE SYNOPTIC GOSPELS

A work on the Synoptic Gospels<sup>1</sup> from this well-known exponent of liberal Judaism in England has for us a double interest, as revealing the attitude of a liberal Jew toward the founder of Christianity and as shedding the light of Jewish scholarship upon the problems of gospel interpretation. There is much less of the latter in these volumes than we could wish, but the lack is to be supplied by a volume of "additional notes" prepared by I. Abrahams, Reader in Talmudic and Rabbinic Literature in the University of Cambridge, and promised for an early date.

The primary purpose of Montefiore's books is to furnish Jewish readers the latest results of critical study upon the first three gospels. This is done not merely to satisfy curiosity but because the author believes this literature has genuine religious value for Jews. Hence he is less concerned to make an original contribution to interpretation than to serve as a mediator between the intelligent Jewish public and modern Christian commentators; though he does not refrain from pointing out where, in his opinion, the latter have shown ignorance of Jewish thought or have made prejudiced statements. Yet the author's attitude toward the gospels is always appreciative, and he aims to have his readers cultivate a similar frame of mind.

After an introduction of about a hundred pages dealing with literary and historical questions, the gospels of Mark, Matthew, and Luke are taken up in order. First, the whole gospel is printed in a new translation which does not differ essentially from that of the Revised Version. This is done in order that one who may be coming to this literature for the first time may read the story as it stands undisturbed by remarks or even by verse divisions. The commentary proper prints the translation again, section by section, with comments. These notes do not pretend to be exhaustive, the main purpose being to concentrate attention upon those passages which have religious value or interest for Jewish readers today. Among the authorities cited, Loisy seems to be drawn upon oftenest and at greatest length. The views of Wellhausen, J. Weiss, H. J. Holtzmann, and a few others, are referred to frequently. These citations, interwoven with the writer's own reflections, make an

<sup>1</sup> *The Synoptic Gospels*. Edited with an Introduction and Commentary by C. G. Montefiore. New York and London: Macmillan, 1909. cviii+1118 pages, Vols. I and II. \$5.00.

interesting and informing body of interpretation. Problems of historicity, literary priority, and exegesis receive attention whenever they seem to have value for the Jewish student.

Christian readers will naturally be interested in the estimate of Jesus here presented. Historically, he is assumed to have preached the imminent end of the world. At first he may not have regarded himself as the Messiah, yet he early came to this conviction—just how or when we are not told. His preaching of final judgment overshadowed, at least in the early period, any thought of the personal or individual element, and righteousness was to be the keynote of the new kingdom as well as the passport of admission within its gates (p. 51 ff.). The terms in which he ultimately conceived his messiahship included the national and apocalyptic ideas, with the added thought of service, even a lowly service and a work which was for the present to culminate in death. He believed that the mysterious Man of Daniel 7:13 was himself—"himself as he was to be in his glory, rather than himself as he then was."

Jesus' significance for modern religion, so far as Jews are concerned, is estimated highly. There is a certain spirit and glow about his teaching which gives it the characteristics of genius. "It is great, stimulating, heroic." In comparison, a compendium of rabbinic ethics and religion is "average teaching"; Jews need, "in addition to the admirable sayings and exhortations of the rabbis, the ideal and heroic spirit which inspires the teaching of the Synoptic Gospels," though of course there is much in the gospels to which the Jew will always take exception (p. cv., f.). He can recognize the fundamental moral and religious elements in the Sermon on the Mount, he can put aside the vexed question of Jesus' originality, but Christians must recognize that the world has been satiated with Christology even to nausea; they must put more stress upon Jesus' teaching and less upon the church's teaching about him. "Christianity and Judaism must gradually approach each other. The one must shed the teachings which Jesus did not teach, the other must acknowledge more fully, more frankly, than has yet been done, what he did and was for religion and for the world" (p. 594). These are significant words.

SHIRLEY JACKSON CASE

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO



## RECENT FRENCH STUDIES IN THE NEW TESTAMENT

The three types of work that we are accustomed to receive from French scholars are illustrated in some recent studies upon New Testament problems. The orthodox Catholics are represented by Mangenot<sup>1</sup> and Durand,<sup>2</sup> a group of Catholic clergymen<sup>3</sup> expound the modernists' position, while Goguel<sup>4</sup> writes from the liberal Protestant point of view. Durand defends the historicity of every item in the gospel stories of Jesus' infancy and reiterates belief in the perpetual virginity of Mary, while Mangenot proposes to answer objections raised by modern critics, "rationalists, liberal Protestants, and modernists," against the historicity of Jesus' resurrection. Both writers have a wide acquaintance with the literature but they do not seem to realize that the fundamental difference between them and their opponents is the question of a world-view and not that of scriptural interpretation. Their arguments start from premises so radically different from the premises of those whom they would refute that the two types of argument can scarcely be said to meet at all.

Interest in the modernist movement nowadays lies chiefly, perhaps, in observing how its leaders are trying to work out their problems. The two volumes mentioned above illustrate their efforts in this direction. The writers attempt to show that their interpretation of the New Testament books is not inconsistent with the true Catholic faith. But it is the principle for which they stand rather than their positive contribution to historical study—they really advocate a very reserved position as compared with current critical opinion in other countries—that gives their work interest. They affirm that love of truth, good sense, liberty of spirit, and adequate study are the four factors necessary for

<sup>1</sup> *La résurrection de Jésus, suivie de deux appendices sur la crucifixion et l'ascension.* Par l'Abbé E. Mangenot. Paris: Beauchesne & Cie, 1910. 404 pages. Fr. 3. 50.

<sup>2</sup> *The Childhood of Jesus Christ according to the Canonical Gospels. With an Historical Essay on the Brethren of the Lord.* By A. Durand, S.J. An authorized translation from the French. Edited by J. Bruneau. Philadelphia: McVey, 1910. xxv+316 pages. \$1. 50.

<sup>3</sup> *Le dogme et l'évangile. Essai comparatif entre les dogmes de l'église catholique et les doctrines du Nouveau Testament.* Par un groupe de prêtres catholiques. Paris: Nourry, 1910. Tome I, vii+421 pages, Tome II, 284 pages. Fr. 7.

<sup>4</sup> *Les sources du récit johannique de la passion.* Par Maurice Goguel. Paris: Fischbacher, 1910. 109 pages. Fr. 3. *L'eucharistie, des origines à Justin Martyr.* Par Maurice Goguel. Paris: Fischbacher, 1910. ix+336 pages. Fr. 10.

a sane study of the sacred writings; while one who fears the "Index" is not able to have the love of the *Catholic* truth and the liberty of the *Catholic* spirit. They withhold their names however, not wishing unnecessarily to expose their heads "to the anathemas, the abuses, and proscriptions of those who with or without warrant would bind all spirits under conventional doctrines."

Goguel puts forward a partition hypothesis to explain the Fourth Gospel's account of Jesus' passion. The principles and method used in the critical analysis are very similar to those found in the same writer's recent study of Mark (reviewed in this Journal for July, 1910). He concludes that the present narrative in John 11:47-19:42 is a combination of fragments of quite different origin and character. For example, 12:13 represents the multitude receiving Jesus as messianic king, while 12:17-20 makes the raising of Lazarus the ground for their ovation. Similar discrepancies lead to the conclusion that the Synoptic Gospels, an older source which was probably also known to the synoptists, and the dogmatic and apologetic interests of the final author, all contribute to the present narrative. It is hardly possible to estimate the value of these results in their bearing upon the vexed problem of the Fourth Gospel until their relation to the entire gospel has been worked out. Of this nothing is said in the present discussion.

*L'eucharistie* is a much more important and thorough piece of work. The history of the institution is traced from its beginnings, in the last supper which Jesus took with his disciples, to the time of Justin Martyr. The author cannot follow those who find the origin of the rite in heathen religions, nor does he admit the probability of any great influence from this source. Paul may have incidentally taken some foreign features over into his thought but nothing that was really creative. Possibly too much reserve has been exercised at this point, yet it is compensated for somewhat by an appended chapter on *Le repas religieux en dehors du Christianisme* from which the reader may draw some inference for himself regarding the possibility of a larger influence of heathen ideas in the development and interpretation of the eucharist than Goguel has recognized.

Many difficulties raised in connection with Jesus' last supper are discussed at length. It is taken for granted that Jesus interpreted his messiahship in terms of eschatology, and this view is made basal in determining both the original significance of the supper and its character. Jesus and his disciples had been accustomed to eat together, the meal, as generally among the Jews, having a religious character.

But we are to suppose that many of Jesus' meals had a yet more distinctively religious character in anticipation of the messianic banquet to which he was looking forward. This was also the idea behind the story of the miraculous feeding of the multitudes. Jesus did not go to Jerusalem expecting death but to receive the full messianic consecration; the success which had failed him in Galilee would come when he appeared at the national capital. But he soon came to feel that a crisis was imminent which meant a temporary separation from the disciples, although in the near future they would come together again at the heavenly messianic feast. These were the ideas in his mind at the supper. The distribution of the bread, with the words "this is my body," had no mystical significance but was a purely symbolic act typifying what he was about to undergo in the process of bringing the kingdom to consummation; and the cup symbolized the reunion at the table in the new kingdom. It will be noticed that the validity of his explanation hangs wholly upon the theory that Jesus thought primarily in terms of Jewish apocalypse.

Jesus had given no command to repeat the supper. Little by little as the disciples continued their community life the memory of that last meal with Jesus was recalled and given special importance in relation to their thought of his death. Then Paul appeared on the scene and made of the commemorative meal (1) a ceremony in which the participants were brought into mystical union with Christ, especially with his death, and (2) a meal in which the believer partook of the deity through eating food offered to him. The Gospel of John substituted for the Pauline idea of the "body" of Christ the term "flesh," identifying this with the divine Logos. Ignatius' views in some respects resembled those of "John," though he was on the whole more concerned with the ecclesiastical than with the theological side of the question. The contribution of the *Didache* lies in limiting the right of participation to baptized persons and in prescribing ritualistic prayers. Justin's explanation starts from the ideas of the Logos, though he also preserves the Pauline conception making the ordinance commemorative of the suffering of Christ. But the flesh and the blood are viewed by Justin more from the side of the divine origin than from the side of Jesus' experience.

This examination of the development of thought in the eucharist is accompanied by an equally vigorous discussion of other features which cannot be noticed here. While it is hardly to be expected that any one scholar will satisfactorily answer every question in so difficult a field, this

comprehensive and thorough discussion certainly deserves the careful attention of every student of the subject.

SHIRLEY JACKSON CASE

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

---

### STUDIES IN EARLY CHURCH HISTORY

Beginning with the closing decade of the last century and continuing to the present time, there has been displayed a marked activity in discussing the subjects of the eucharist and penance. This discussion, as it has been developed both by Catholics and Protestants, has been summarized with eminent fairness and success by Professor Rauschen of the Catholic Theological Faculty of the University at Bonn.<sup>1</sup> Nor is the work a mere summary of others' opinions; Rauschen, himself, takes part in the discussion and speaks authoritatively for Catholic scholarship, particularly, for example, in the sections on "Public Penance," and "Public Confession." That he has acceptably represented the views of Catholic scholars is attested by the almost immediate translation of his work into Italian and French. It is in the latter form that Professor Rauschen's book has reached this Review.

Besides giving an orientation on the subjects of the eucharist and penance, Professor Rauschen's book serves anew to emphasize a fact of interest to scholarship at large, namely, the tendency on the part of Catholic and Protestant scholars to be drawn onto common ground by their mutual allegiance to truth. Thus, for instance, while Protestants were formerly unwilling to admit the existence of belief in the Real Presence either in the second or the third century, representative Protestant scholars like Loofs and Harnack now hold that this belief was widespread as early as the time of Justin Martyr. On the other hand, we find Rauschen ready to agree with Drews that the Roman canon of the mass underwent a considerable change in the fifth century. Furthermore, one sees Protestant and Catholic scholars contesting against Protestants and Catholics over the interpretation of Pope Callixtus' (217-22) decree concerning penance. In the case of Wieland, one even sees a Catholic maintaining not only that the idea of an objective sacrifice cannot be found in Justin (going beyond Loofs in this respect), but also that the idea cannot be found at all in the primitive church.

<sup>1</sup> *L'eucharistie et la pénitence durant les six premiers siècles de l'église.* G. Rauschen. Traduit par Decker et Ricard. Paris: Gabalda et Cie, 1910. xi+245 pages. Fr. 3.

In conclusion, it may be of interest to note that Lea's *History of Auricular Confession and Indulgences*, while esteemed for its conscientious research and impartiality, is held to be conditioned in value by the author's lack of general information on the first Christian centuries.

CURTIS H. WALKER

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

A recent important book by a Roman Catholic discusses the papacy or rather Roman primacy at the time of Cyprian, bishop of Carthage<sup>2</sup> (+258). Koch is a product of Roman Catholic education, a pupil of Funk's, and an ordained priest of the Roman Catholic church. He is also one of the best equipped scholars in his field, of extraordinarily keen and trenchant mind, and possessed of a brilliant literary style. And last but not least, Koch is thoroughly fearless and honest with himself and others on the results he reaches.

In this book Koch has made a searching examination of Cyprian's testimony on the existence or non-existence of a Roman primacy or papacy in his time. He finds, in brief, that "Cyprian knows no universal episcopate of the Roman bishop, no infallibility, no primacy, no 'pope.' Not the Roman bishop, but the whole episcopate, the totality of all bishops is the unifying center" of the church.

This result will be a surprise to not a few Protestant readers, conversant with the usual church histories. It goes beyond Harnack in his *History of Dogma*. It was no less than startling to less open-minded Catholic scholars, as the seven-column review given it in the *Theologische Revue* of October 4 shows. All that the reviewer, Karl Adam, finds himself able to save of the old position under the powerful rays of Koch's searchlight is the nebulous proposition that "at any rate a certain primacy and a certain obedience remain assured to the Roman church." And this is saved only at the cost of the confession: "So long as the ecclesiastical writers must be explained by the same philological means as the profane ones, so long Koch's exposition of the meaning of the words pure and simple is unassailable." Nothing that we might add will be able to set forth the genuine worth and value of Koch's work in clearer terms.

M. SPRENGLING

CHICAGO, ILL.

<sup>2</sup> *Cyprian und der Römische Primat*. von Hugo Koch. ["Texte und Untersuchungen" herausgegeben von Harnack und Schmidt, xxxv, i.] Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1910. iv+174 pages. M. 5.50.

## THE LATEST VOLUME OF SCHAFF'S CHURCH HISTORY

When the lamented Dr. Philip Schaff came to feel that his days of work were limited, he was greatly concerned to fill in the lacuna between Vol. IV and Vol. VI of his great *History of the Christian Church*. This he first thought to accomplish by securing the co-operation of a number of scholars. When he found that even so the volume would have to be left unfinished, he committed the task to his scholarly son, who is to be congratulated upon its very satisfactory performance.<sup>1</sup> Part V, Vol. I, covered the time from Gregory VII to Boniface VIII. The present volume deals with the later Middle Ages. It was Philip Schaff's original intention to treat the Middle Ages so concisely as to make a single volume suffice. The author found that double the space originally intended would be required to do justice to the subject. Whether after all it would not have been wiser to condense his materials into a single volume is a matter on which critics may differ. The larger limits gave opportunity for many interesting anecdotes and many useful quotations, as well as for the treatment of topics commonly passed over altogether, or barely referred to. On the other hand, the two volume arrangement encouraged a diffuseness of style that is not altogether pleasing. There is much in the manner of treatment that reminds one strikingly of that of the author's illustrious father; but it would be too much to expect equality of merit or of charm. One feels sure that the task has been accomplished in a way that would have thoroughly pleased him who set it. There has certainly been no lack of industry. A careful use of the best materials readily available is manifest on almost every page. Where his authorities differ, one usually feels that he deals judiciously and judiciously with the points at issue and reaches conclusions that are well grounded. It would be easy to point out many instances in which a less important matter is accorded more space than a more important. That ten pages should be devoted to Catharine of Siena and less than three to the Bohemian Brethren (*Unitas Fratrum*) could scarcely be justified on any rational ground. The explanation that readily suggests itself is that the author found ready at hand a wealth of interesting materials about Catharine and had never taken much interest in the great evangelical movement that did so much to prepare the way for the Protestant Revolution and whose influence has been perpetuated in

<sup>1</sup> *History of the Christian Church*. By Philip Schaff. Vol. V, Part II, "The Middle Ages, from Boniface VIII, 1294, to the Protestant Reformation, 1517." By David S. Schaff, D.D. New York: Scribner, 1910. xiv+795 pages. \$3.25.

several leading modern denominations. Twenty-three pages are given to the infamous Pope Alexander VI, while Peter Chelcicky of Bohemia, one of the soundest and most evangelical of the religious leaders in the time of the Hussite wars and controversies, is not even mentioned. The great forerunners of Hus, Conrad of Waldhausen, Militz of Krem-sier, and Matthias of Janow, to whom Neander devoted many pages, are all disposed of in less than six lines, while Thomas of Stitny seems not to be even mentioned. The later Waldensian movement is dealt with in two pages as furnishing materials for the Inquisition, while "Witchcraft and its Punishment" is accorded nineteen pages. While thirty-five pages are devoted to Wiclif, the forerunners of Wiclif and the politico-ecclesiastical events that led to the Wiclif movement are treated in a very stepmotherly fashion. No mention seems to be made of the statutes of *Provisors* and *Praemunire* that played so prominent a part in the Middle Ages and afterward. The reviewer has failed to find occasion for any recognition of the widespread influence of the trade guilds and of secret fraternities in propagating evangelical and rationalistic modes of thought, or of the activity of the Waldenses and Bohemian Brethren in the translation and circulation of the Scriptures. Instances of the omission or inadequate treatment of important matters and of the unnecessary expansion of less important matters could be multiplied. The style is straightforward and lucid, if not elegant. Infelicities occur, but not very frequently. It is scarcely correct to say (p. 489): "In his reverend regard for the papal office Luther did Leo [X] an unintentional injustice when he compared him to Daniel among the lions." Luther knew full well Leo's faults and was consciously using diplomatic language that fell short of his own sentiments, as is clear from the fact that in writing to a friend eight days later he declares that he does "not know whether the pope is antichrist or his apostle, so miserably is Christ (i.e., the truth) corrupted and crucified by him in his decretals." "Reverend" should be "reverent" and "unintentional injustice" is hardly the correct expression for a compliment, however disingenuously bestowed and however ill deserved. On the same page we read: "Art-ists were drawn from France and Spain as well as Italy, and every kind of personality who could afford amusement to others." On the preceding page we read: "On the other hand, Cardinal H. regrets that the Church has taken a position to it of a stepmother to her child."

But with all its defects the book supplies a long-felt need and will be heartily welcomed by teachers and students of Church history throughout the English-speaking world. If the two parts of Vol. V

could be supplemented by a volume of equal size on mediaeval evangelical and anti-Catholic parties, prepared with intelligent and sympathetic use of the rich materials now available, the value of the Schaff *History of the Christian Church* as a whole would be greatly enhanced.

ALBERT HENRY NEWMAN

SOUTHWESTERN BAPTIST THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY  
FORT WORTH, TEXAS

---

### PROBLEMS OF CHURCH UNITY

Few subjects in church history have greater immediate interest than those pertaining to polity. Dr. Thompson in the preface of his recent book<sup>1</sup> tells us that this work has engaged his attention at intervals for nearly half a century. The result justifies the time and the effort. His thesis is twofold. He seeks, not in the usual spirit of controversy, to show that episcopacy in origin and history is not the true church polity; and that both in origin and history presbytery is the true church polity. The Presbyterians believe in an historic episcopate. They "find the presbyter-bishop in all ages of the church, in unbroken succession until the present day. At the same time we are not disposed to constrain others to adopt our interpretation in this matter." The High Church party among the Episcopalians finds the monarchic episcopate in unbroken succession from the beginning to the present and would constrain others to adopt the same interpretation. Here then is a difference both in fact and in attitude. The emphasis is especially to be laid on the two attitudes. One is broad and free, the other is narrow and constrained. Having reached this conclusion our author prepares to show his readers the steps in the process. His argument gathers great force from the fact that he relies mainly on history as interpreted by Episcopalians themselves. There is, of course, no lack of Presbyterian scholarship, but he does not feel the need of relying exclusively—the reader sometimes feels at all—upon it. Moreover, he has quoted at considerable length all the passages that have especial bearing on the subject, so that the inquirer has right at hand the material out of which to form his own judgment.

Naturally he begins with the New Testament Age. He finds nothing there to establish monarchic episcopacy, but plural episcopacy

<sup>1</sup> *The Historic Episcopate*. By Robert Ellis Thompson. Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1910. vii+317 pages. \$1.50 net.



is everywhere in evidence. The monarchic episcopate does not get possession of the field until after 150 A.D., or after the period of the Presbyterian Fathers, among whom was Polycarp. On the best episcopal authority he shows, indeed, that until the middle of the second century the churches were governed by a plurality of presbyter-bishops. Ignatius was a figure of so much importance that a full chapter is given to the Ignatian epistles. The author concludes that they furnish "neither warrant nor precedent for that diocesan episcopacy which in later days has been put forward as the 'historic episcopate.' But after the middle of the second century the monarchic episcopate is generally established in the churches both east and west; and we also meet with writers who claim for it apostolic origin and authority" (p. 101).

Now, the advocates of the monarchic episcopate claim that since it was generally recognized in the second half of the second century it must have existed from apostolic lines. But Dr. Thompson replies: The records of the first half of the second century are scanty; there was also very outspoken disapproval; as a matter of fact the transition was made from pastor to prelate.

When farther along in the Middle Age we bring the episcopate before the bar of history its advocates must find their ardor chilled. Taking out some brilliant exceptions the student of mediaeval church polity cannot but concur in the judgment of Mr. Lea that: "The turbulent and martial prelates of the day were too wholly engrossed in wordly cares to bestow a thought upon the matter for which their unfitness was complete."

Very interesting chapters follow on Anglicanism under the Tudors, the Stewarts, and in modern times. Here it is maintained that: "The Anglican theory of succession is nowhere taught by the church of England," but is the result of a long series of assumptions for which the Oxford movement is chiefly responsible. Dr. Gore is the latest exponent of the theory in his book on *The Church and Ministry*. Dr. Hatch charged him with making a "free use of unproved assumptions."

It was the Protestant Episcopal church in America that first proposed the movement that should lead to Christian unity. But "the historical episcopate is likely to remain an efficient bar to any steps in that direction. As Bishop Doane of Albany says: "To approach the great Protestant churches of the world with the statement that their ministries are unlawful is to propose, not reunion, but absorption; not consideration, but contempt." This is what rendered ineffectual in 1887

the proposals for Christian reunion of the Presbyterians and Episcopalians.

To most non-conformists it will appear that Dr. Thompson has fully proved the negative part of his thesis. But to the congregational wing the positive part may not appear to be so well established.

After all that has been spoken and written on church union is it really possible, or even desirable? As church union is ordinarily conceived Mr. Barry unqualifiedly answers, No.\* He sets forth his reasons with much cogency. He has quoted from Sabatier's *Religions of Authority and the Religion of the Spirit*; Lindsay's *Free Church and Ministry in the Early Centuries*; Arnold's *Principles of Church Reform*; Harnack's *What Is Christianity?* and other standard authorities. But he has digested his material and reached his own conclusions in his own way—and challenges our respectful attention.

He begins by contrasting the Roman Catholic and Protestant ideals. Fundamentally the Roman Catholic ideal is rigid, all-pervasive, all-comprehensive unity. The system is paramount. All the ideas and functions of the religious life must be trimmed and filed and polished down until they exactly fit into the unitary system. In the very nature of the case growth here cannot be free. All the finer, impalpable qualities of growth are smothered, and either perish or are paralyzed. And so Romanism can never fully meet the exigencies of a growing civilization.

Fundamentally Protestantism seeks ever-increasing variation and complexity. With it unity is a desideratum, but it is little more than an ideal—perhaps never to be realized. The attitude of Protestantism is therefore sympathetic toward all possible variations and readjustments in society—provided they can give some reasonable assurance that they have value. Protestantism therefore takes up the taunt of Romanism that it is getting farther and farther away from unity and is overthrowing all authority and coming in full sight of anarchy, and rather glories in it—but without accepting the extreme deduction of Romanism.

Now, unwittingly, our zealous promoters of church union have been playing into the hands of Romanism, and sacrificing the principle of the very Protestantism of which they are such doughty champions.

Is there, then, after all any possibility of Christian—not to say

\* *Ideals and Principles of Church Reform*. By Rev. J. C. Barry. With introductory note by James Denney. London: Clark; New York: Scribner, 1910. 205 pages. \$1.25 net.

church—union? Mr. Barry thinks there is such a possibility, and the union he has in mind is a very deep, satisfactory, and abiding unity—a unity consistent with the truest, most variegated individual and corporate freedom; a unity meeting all the requirements of an ever-growing civilization. But the basis of this unity rests very far back in the spirit. This basis is ultimate—in it there is no variableness or shadow of turning. All good, benevolent, beneficent people ought to be able to unite on this basis.

If, then, we are to have a unity that leaves us free, many of our advocates of church union must give up as basal the ideas on which they have been putting the emphasis. They must begin anew and reconstruct on the primitive model. It goes without saying to all those who know the history of doctrine that there can be no unity in relation to doctrine. Such a unity would be a unity without unanimity and so defeat its own end.

Moreover it is equally futile to think about unity in polity. The different forms of church polity are practically certain to continue as far as we can look into the future—perhaps to the end of time—or at least as long as human nature shall remain the same.

The objective unity that Mr. Barry thinks possible would put far less emphasis on doctrine and polity and far more emphasis on social and economic relations.

The reviewer has dealt rather freely with the book. He believes, however, that the lamented author would accept this interpretation of his work. If this review shall lead some to a careful reading of the book it will not have been written in vain.

J. W. MONCRIEF

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

---

### THE THEOLOGY OF REFORMED JUDAISM

Dr. Kohler has produced a book of quite exceptional interest for the Christian theologian.<sup>1</sup> It is, so far as the reviewer is aware, the first example in any language of a systematic theology of Reformed Judaism. While written by an American, the book is published in Germany and appears as Vol. IV of the *Grundriss der Gesamtwissenschaft des Judentums*, a series published by the *Gesellschaft zur Förderung der Wissenschaft des Judentums*. Thoughtful observers of the religious

<sup>1</sup> *Grundriss einer systematischen Theologie des Judentums auf geschichtlicher Grundlage*. Von Dr. Kaufmann Kohler. Leipzig; Gustav Fock, 1910. 383 pages. M. 7.

life of Judaism have long been aware that its leading representatives have been powerfully influenced by the modern philosophical and scientific movement. The same influences which have wrought so great a transformation in the theology of Protestantism and which appear in the Roman Catholic church in Modernism, have been at work in Jewish thought as well. Books like Montefiore's Hibbert Lectures on the *Origin and Growth of Religion, as illustrated by the religion of the ancient Hebrews*, have given Christian students a new conception of the ideals and aspirations of modern Judaism. But hitherto there has been no single work covering the entire ground of religious thought which has summed up in concise compass the present beliefs of the more advanced representatives of this ancient and honored faith. For this reason Dr. Kohler's book deserves a hearty welcome and a careful study, and it is to be hoped that it will soon be made accessible to wider circles in an English translation.

I have spoken of the book as evidencing the influence of the modern scientific movement in Judaism. This appears in the very structure of the book itself. The way in which the problem is conceived, the order and the divisions of the treatment, show an acquaintance with the best work that has been done in contemporary Christian theology. Substitute the word Christianity for Judaism, and the captions of the first three divisions of the book might be transferred almost unchanged to a Christian dogmatics.

Nor is the influence one of form only. In substance of teaching also the author is profoundly influenced by the modern spirit. He accepts unreservedly the modern critical position. The Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch is denied. Instead of preceding the prophets, the law follows them, and, in its present form, sums up a long development which culminates in the exile. Miracle, in the old sense, is rejected. Dr. Kohler's world is the world of modern science where law reigns universal, and apparent exceptions are such only because of our ignorance.

Even more important, however, is the wide humanity of the book. While a loyal Jew, profoundly convinced of the divine mission of his people and the peculiar place assigned to them by God in the history of revelation, Dr. Kohler believes that the God of Israel is at the same time the God of all mankind. The individualistic elements in the Old Testament are carried by him to their legitimate conclusion, and we are told, quite after the fashion of contemporary Christian theology, that the special revelation in Israel was simply the means to a wider

end, namely, the establishment of the kingdom of God in all the world through a brotherhood of righteousness, sympathy, and service.

Moving in such a world of thought, and dealing with conceptions with which he has himself long been familiar, it is something of a shock to the Christian reader to find the author minimizing, if not altogether ignoring, the universal elements in Christianity. We are so accustomed to contrast Christianity as the universal religion with Judaism as a national and therefore limited religion, that it is with some surprise that we find Dr. Kohler representing the true relation as just the reverse.

To him Judaism is the universal religion, and Christianity, like Islam, her younger sister, a Jewish sect which has limited and perverted the freedom of the older faith. Judaism is the religion of the free spirit, knowing no creed or dogma, open to receive the truth of God from any source and therefore capable of infinite progress, whereas Christianity, committed from the start through its false conception of faith to a narrow and dogmatic creed, is incapable of assimilating the new truth which God is ever revealing, or, if at all, only through a reinterpretation which is in fact an abandonment of its own fundamental convictions.

Christian theology [so we read] is concerned with articles of faith which were prescribed by the founders and leaders of the church as conditions of salvation and can admit no change in the interest of free thought without undermining the plan of salvation of the church. Judaism, on the other hand, recognizes only such articles of faith as are taken over freely from the Jewish religious consciousness without compulsion, and which therefore at any time admit of union with sound reasoning. . . . He who denies the dogmas of the church ceases to be a Christian. In Judaism, on the other hand, the race relationship constitutes the foundation of religious fellowship in such a sense that even the unbelieving Jew is still a member of the religious organization. It is not faith but birth which lays upon the Jew the duty of laboring and fighting for the eternal truths, whose bearer Israel is called to be (p. 6).

But one might ask, even granting the justice of this picture of Christianity, wherein the superior freedom of the Jew consists? What does one gain by substituting the relation of birth for that of faith as the condition of religious fellowship? Do we not merely substitute one limitation for another?

Dr. Kohler's treatment of this difficulty is interesting. It has to do with his conception of the function of Israel in the divine economy of the nations. The truth which she possesses is held not for herself,

but in trust for all mankind. It is a pledge of the wider humanity which is some day to be realized upon earth.

Not the salvation of the soul—a purely individualistic conception—but that of humanity is the aim of Jewish theology. It is therefore interwoven most intimately with the historical progress of the human spirit. Jewish theology does not profess to offer the perfect or absolute truth, as does Christian theology, whether it calls itself conservative or liberal, but only to point the way to the highest and most perfect truth as the goal of human history (p. 7).

It will not surprise us, in view of such sentences, to find that the author consistently subordinates the legal element in the religion of Israel to the prophetic. He regards the identification of Judaism with legalism as a perversion going back originally to the apostle Paul, the first great opponent of Judaism, to whose misrepresentation much of the later understanding is due. He does not deny indeed that there is a legalistic element in the Jewish religion, but he maintains that it has never held the dominant and exclusive place which is given to it in Christian theology. Ever side by side there has existed in Israel the free prophetic spirit, in which the true genius of the religion is to be found. The doctrine of the fatherhood of God in the individual as well as in the national sense, the conviction of his care for and sympathy with each human soul, the thought of his nearness, as expressed in the divine immanence—all these truths which Christian theologians are accustomed to appropriate as distinctively Christian, Dr. Kohler finds characteristic of his own faith.

It would be interesting, if there were time, to follow Dr. Kohler's treatment in detail. The book falls into three main divisions, preceded by an introduction. In the latter he discusses the conception of theology, the idea and the essence of Judaism, and the nature of its articles of faith. The first division of the theology proper treats of God under the following three captions: (a) God in his self revelation; (b) the idea of God in Judaism; (c) God's relation to the world. The second main division treats of man, and discusses such questions as the nature of man, moral responsibility, sin and guilt, and immortality. The third and last section treats of Israel and the kingdom of God, and discusses the world mission of Israel, the messianic hope, the relation of Israel to the heathen and particularly to Christianity and Islam, the two "daughter religions."

The trained theologian will find many interesting points over which to linger in the course of these richly-filled pages. It is an illuminating

and inspiring experience to find the subjects of one's own long meditation discussed by one who approaches them from a different experience and a new point of view. The reviewer has been surprised and gratified to find with what large measure of sympathy he could follow the greater part of Dr. Kohler's treatment. It has confirmed an opinion to which his own studies have increasingly led, that the disposition to exaggerate the contrast between Christianity and its preparation in the Old Testament has been carried too far, and that most of the great distinctive truths of our Christian faith are to be found already rooted in the prophetic teaching.

One disappointment must frankly be registered, and that is that the author, writing as a Jew of the religion of his own people, should not have felt constrained to make wider use among his sources, of the teaching of that great son of his people, from whom the first of the two daughter religions has taken its name. So far as the reviewer is aware, the only reference to Jesus in the book save a passing mention on p. 279 of the misfortune brought upon the Jewish people by the Christian identification of the crucified Jesus with the Suffering Servant of Isa. chap. 53, occurs on p. 318. It is so interesting and so illuminates the author's point of view, that I shall be pardoned for quoting it in full.

After referring to the baptism of Jesus by John Dr. Kohler goes on as follows:

That which the gospels further relate concerning the workings of the Holy Spirit, in which all Essenes believe, and the miracles which accompanied the life of Jesus from the cradle to the grave, is mythology whose historical kernel may be thus summed up. Through his miraculous healings and his utterances filled with true human wisdom, the young Nazarene won among his simple countrymen, the fishermen and shepherds of Galilee, the reputation of a saint, a conqueror of Satan, and a prophet, and felt himself drawn by a mighty impulse of pure human love—a spirit which the community of Essenes in particular zealously fostered—to that class of men whom the proud Pharisees as well as the stricter Essenes repelled as impure and sinful. He felt called to become a preacher of salvation to the poor and sick, and to seek and to save the lost sheep of Israel. So there formed itself about him a circle of disciples who, in connection with a pilgrimage to Jerusalem, impelled him to make a public claim of Messiahship. Powerful attacks against the dominant party of the Sadducees, as well as against the self-satisfied Scribes, and finally, an expedition directed against the stalls and money-changers' tables of the greedy high priests in the temple, brought about the momentous decision, and the council of the high priests delivered the pretended Messiah (and that

meant for the Romans, the revolutionary) to the Prefect Pontius Pilate for punishment, and he was crucified by the mocking soldiers of Rome as "King of the Jews."

Yet, the influence of Jesus was far from ceasing with his death.

Too deeply had the crucified Messiah lived himself into the hearts of his disciples to make it possible for him, like so many other claimants to the messiahship in that stormy time, to fall a prey to forgetfulness. The disciples looked for the resurrection and the return of their Messiah in the glory of the heavenly Son of Man and their excited fancy saw his living figure still walking upon the sea or upon the mountain top, or in their nearest neighborhood. And this became the point of departure for a religious movement which at first laid hold upon the lower classes in Palestine and Syria and later, little by little, upon the same classes throughout the Roman Empire, until finally it so mastered the entire heathen world of antiquity that all the gods of heathenism yielded to the God of Israel, the Father of the crucified Saviour. The Jewish gospel for the poor and the lowly conquered the proud might of heathenism (pp. 309-10).

Thus, Christianity, according to Dr. Kohler, is in truth one chapter in the history of Israel's religion. It is a sad and melancholy chapter, for it involves perversions and misrepresentations of a lamentable kind. These perversions, as we have already seen, go back to Paul, who is the author of that identification of Judaism with an external legalism, which has endured until this day. None the less, Dr. Kohler recognizes the great services of Paul to the spread of the religious ideas of Judaism, and ends with this significant confession that "in spite of all, it must never be forgotten that Pauline Christianity, raised to a world-conquering church, has done for the propagation of the doctrines of Sinai what neither Judaism nor the Jewish Christian sects alone would ever have been able to do (p. 321).

Enough has been said to show the importance of Dr. Kohler's work for the Christian theologian. If the reader feels that in his emphasis upon the ideal and universal elements in his own religion the learned author has often overlooked, or at all events, underestimated the presence of similar elements in the great religion with which he contrasts Judaism, we must remember how often the faith which he defends has been subject to similar misrepresentation on the part of Christian theologians in the past. What is important for us as Christians is not that others should rightly understand us, but that we should rightly understand them; and as we enter into the breadth and richness of the hopes and ideals which Dr. Kohler has drawn for us from the records of his



own religion we shall be taking the first step toward that mutual understanding which will free the eternal message of him who is for us God's final word to his own countrymen as to all mankind, from those associations of narrowness and intolerance which have robbed it of its rightful hearing.

WILLIAM ADAMS BROWN

UNION THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY  
NEW YORK CITY

### THE CHRISTOLOGICAL PROBLEM

Professor Sanday's recent stimulating volume on Christology<sup>1</sup> falls naturally—but not formally—into two parts. The first consists of two lectures on ancient christology and the second on six lectures dealing with modern christologies, including that of author's, and concluding with a lecture on symbolism in which Professor Sanday presents a method of using the creeds without committing one's self to individual detailed belief therein.

The two lectures on ancient christologies are marked by Professor Sanday's characteristic judicial treatment, tolerance, delightfully liberal spirit, and engaging honesty. In them he points out the main line of christological development in the ecumenical church. His starting-point is what he calls "the net result of the Apostolic Age, namely, that the church at large thought of its founder as divine" (p. 6). Such a statement on its face is undeniable, but it by no means represents the entire situation, and so formulated is likely to lead the investigator to overlook the vital matter that another net result of the Apostolic Age was the belief that Jesus was the Jewish Messiah who was to return to establish his kingdom from heaven whither he had gone. If there is anything which appears in the New Testament or the early Fathers it is this messianic valuation of Jesus. Of course it is true that they regarded him as possessed of the Holy Spirit and in that sense divine. It is also true that he could be spoken of as God by an enthusiast like Ignatius. But the christology which the New Testament bequeathed the second century was essentially messianic, functional, and official, rather than ontological; Christ was the savior and his kingdom, into which men were to be saved through assimilating—to use Clement's

<sup>1</sup> "*Christologies Ancient and Modern.*" By William Sanday, D.D., LL.D., Litt.D. Lady Margaret Professor and Canon of Christ Church, Oxford. New York: Oxford University Press, American Branch, 1910. vii + 244 pages. \$1.75.

word—God and through resurrection, was universally regarded as eschatological.

The real problem which the second century faced, as appears from many indications, was threefold: first, the recasting of messiahship in terms of the Logos; second, further knowledge as regards the part of God in this divine salvation which the Christians expected; and third, the exploration of the philosophical significance of the three great elements of the Rule of Faith, Monotheism, the messiahship of Jesus, and the certainty of coming judgment and deliverance. The radical expression of this threefold tendency is found in Justin Martyr, Clement, and Origen, while the equally radical hostility to this "seeking after truth" is to be seen in Tertullian.

Professor Sanday seems to have adopted the usual course of considering the early church as building up its christology exclusively from a speculative interest. This was not true even in the case of gnosticism. The real interest in the messianic conception was lost in the relation of the Logos (identified with the messianic savior) on the one side to God and on the other side to man. And this was by no means exclusively speculative. Socialized conceptions, almost entirely overlooked in Professor Sanday's treatment, are practical as well. A historical valuation is often approached by Professor Sanday but usually in the way of an appeal to make an allowance for philosophical and scientific limitations of the past. A more thoroughly historical treatment would have emphasized the value of the various concepts and definitions as a means of adjusting the old soteriological messianic faith to a world to which messiahship had both to be brought literally and evaluated metaphysically. Professor Sanday has clearly stated the main party divisions in the controversies, but he seems to have missed the real motives which lay back of the Arian struggle. Fundamentally his position is an apologetic for the Nicean formula and his two lectures are full of pregnant comment looking toward a "loose construction" of ecclesiastical tests and orthodoxy.

The significance of the book lies in its treatment of modern christology. Professor Sanday here gives a sympathetic treatment of various christological tendencies of today, especially among the Ritschlians with whom he disagrees and yet from whom he confesses to have received much help. Without being a compromising mediator he would not stop with the minimum which he is glad to confess the Ritschlian group has made fast in christology, but moves on toward the more explicitly credal position. In so doing, however, he protests against the

too rigorous division of the natures in the person of the historical Jesus, and at this point he makes an ingenious, if not altogether novel, use of the idea of the subliminal self. He cannot agree with what in many quarters now passes for orthodoxy, namely, that the humanity of Jesus was impersonal, and that personality was given him by the Logos. He would apparently hold that the person of Jesus was the apex of a great pyramid, much of which lay in the unconscious self where God and man could be really interpenetrative. Just how the Logos would become thus indented with the human self-consciousness sufficient to produce a person possessed of both divine and human natures as set forth by the later ecumenical creeds Professor Sanday does not discuss in detail. He certainly does not base his view upon the Virgin birth, which is not even mentioned in the "Index." If the subliminal consciousness is, as he says, "The proper seat or *locus* of the Incarnate Christ," in such a statement it would seem as if he had gone as far as he plans to go in the matter of the union of the natures for he passes at once to the conception of the consciousness of Jesus. This he declares to be messianic, and goes on to state (p. 179) what might well have been his original point of departure, that this messianic consciousness is one of office and character, rather than ontological.

In other words, Professor Sanday has followed the main drift of modern christological thought in centering attention upon the person of the historical Jesus with its unity of self-consciousness and has argued therefrom that God had been built into this person through the subliminal self. In this he is more of a Ritchlian than perhaps he thinks, for the metaphysical elements of his thought are submerged in the psychological. And this is what gives the book value as a mediating study. It indicates that the tendency of modern christology is psychological and pragmatic, rather than metaphysical. Had Professor Sanday devoted as much attention to the social psychology of ancient christologies as he has to the debatable psychology of the unconscious, he would have discovered in the process by which they were developed no inconsiderable amount of material for the support of his own position.

SHAILER MATHEWS

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

## METAPHYSICS AND THEOLOGY

In his introductory chapter, Dr. Lindsay<sup>1</sup> combines an apparent appreciation of science with theistic theological presuppositions. He maintains that metaphysics is differentiated "from the other sciences not by its method, but only by the universality of its task. . . . It must take due account of the given in all its forms. . . . It starts out from experience and . . . has the whole world of experience for its basis." Instead, however, of continuing in this vein, he insists that "the metaphysic we seek will ground its laws, not in any molecular movements of things physical, but in the Divine Nature or Essence," which he seems to regard as known. "The proper presupposition of metaphysics," he continues, "is the homogeneity of God and the world," which is tenable from a scientific point of view, if God be interpreted in terms of the world, but decidedly theological and unscientific, if it be meant that the world should be interpreted in terms of the Divine Essence. The lacunae, however, which one feels, may be due to the extremely condensed treatment.

In the body of the book, the concepts of "substance" and of "causality" are discussed, the latter rather exhaustively. Historical and critical material in abundance from the early Greeks to the present is used, and yet the treatment is not convincing, partly because of the juggling of old and new points of view. The author's purpose seems to be to get a concept which shall make provision for both substance and cause at the same time. "Substance," he says, "is cause at rest, as cause is substance in operation." Again, "We take the conception of substance to be that of an absolute form-concept—the absolute self-determining activity, in fact, and foundational in importance for metaphysics." He also adds, "The substance concept is most really known by us as related to, and in a sense one with, the concept of First Cause." He recognizes the inadequacy of the ordinary treatment accorded to the concept of God as Cause, but insists that "we have nothing better if we reject the postulation of a First Cause." Eliminating, then, what he regards as invalid in the usual "First Cause argument," he maintains the validity of a "self-existent and eternal World-Ground" as "the necessary correlate" of the "finitude" of the world.

From the title of the book one expects a vigorous, philosophical treatment of a real, modern problem, viz., to present a world-view which

<sup>1</sup> *The Fundamental Problems of Metaphysics*. By James Lindsay, D.D. Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood & Sons, 1910. 135 pages.

shall make adequate provision for the results of scientific investigation and the idealism of Plato variously modified in the course of the centuries. This may be an impossible task, and yet men with a metaphysical turn of mind are facing it. Dr. Lindsay fails, partly through his inadequate apprehension of scientific presuppositions, and partly through his theological bias. One turns from the book, which is good for starting almost countless trains of thought, with a distinct feeling of disappointment.

Kant, as "the philosopher of Protestantism," in close thought harmony with Luther, Dr. Katzer<sup>a</sup> expounds in a scholarly and, within certain limits, in a convincing manner. For anyone who has made a special study of these two fields, the book yields scarcely anything new, but for one familiar with the subject only in a general way, it is exceedingly stimulating and suggestive.

Aside from not a few superficial resemblances and differences, the author insists that there is a fundamental agreement in the thinking of these two men. Luther dwelt upon the limits of human knowledge with reference to God. What God has not revealed of himself, one would better not attempt to find out. Kant's clear-cut distinction between knowledge of a scientific sort and metaphysical knowledge, which would better be called faith, is well known. A more fundamental resemblance, however, is their teaching about the freedom of the will. This is central with both. According to Luther, the human will is between God and Satan. The Christian's will is determined by the Divine Being. According to Kant, "the will may be determined either by the sense-world or the intelligible world." In the latter case, there is freedom in the sense of "freedom from the sense-world." In the last analysis, it is God who is the determining factor, since he is "the free cause of the world in general, absolute spontaneity." "Ethical determinism" is the proper characterization of both views.

No attempt is made to show a definite dependence of Kant upon Luther, save in a very general way through Pietism which is mentioned in one brief paragraph. Rather are they regarded as "belonging together in the historical evolution of the German spirit (*Geist*)."

The numerous references to sources are valuable in themselves, and also show the first-hand study which the author has made. The exposition of Kant's teaching is especially well done, and, based as it is upon his entire writings in the productive critical period, it serves as a good

<sup>a</sup> *Luther und Kant*. Von Ernst Katzer. Giessen: Töpelmann, 1910. 128 pages. M. 2.80.

corrective for views derived simply from the first *Critique*. As a whole, the book is a creditable addition to the growing theological literature of the Ritschlian type.

A word of criticism might be added. In making Kant "the philosopher of Protestantism" because of his close thought relation to Luther, must that movement be interpreted simply from the angle of Luther's views, or is it broader? Still further, are those two to be regarded simply as exponents of the developing German spirit, or is the tendency of thought found in them but a continuation of earlier theological distinctions reaching back even to Neoplatonism, and, in fact, merely an expression of a fundamental distinction between philosophy and religion? To the reviewer, this broader aspect seems truer.

GREGORY D. WALCOTT

HAMLIN UNIVERSITY  
ST. PAUL, MINN.

---

In Professor Lyman's lectures delivered at Yale in 1909 on the Nathaniel William Taylor foundation<sup>3</sup> we have the deliberate attempt to detach Christian theology from its hitherto general affinity for absolutism, and to link it to a conservative type of pragmatism. The natural pathway to this new method is through Ritschlianism. So far as the theory of religious belief is concerned, Ritschlianism had long anticipated the pragmatic movement, frankly making faith to consist in practical valuations, and declining to guarantee the validity of these valuations by appeal to a transcendent ontology. But in the realm of non-religious judgments, Ritschlianism affirmed a realism which completely separated secular from religious beliefs. Professor Lyman constructs his religious faith in general on a Ritschlian basis. But his apologetic consists, not in isolating religious beliefs and guarding them from invasion by a Chinese wall, but in leveling the wall which Ritschlians had attempted to maintain between faith and knowledge.

The consequences of this method are interesting. God ceases to be a timeless absolute. Professor Lyman shows that the moral interests of Christian faith are incompatible with belief in a deity who has no real share in our struggling and growing life. The time-process has significance for God. The relation of God to the world is characterized as "ethical monotheism," which provides for a real dependence of the

<sup>3</sup> *Theology and Human Problems: A Comparative Study of Absolute Idealism and Pragmatism as Interpreters of Religion.* By Eugene William Lyman. New York: Scribner, 1910. 219 pages. \$1.00 net.

world in all its parts upon God, but which recognizes the moral incompleteness of the present stage of our universe; it hence views God as an active immanent Being working out his moral purpose through the changes which he brings about in the process of evolution.

This same doctrine of ethical monotheism enables Professor Lyman to give what he frankly admits to be a practical rather than a speculative interpretation of the problem of evil. It is due to the moral incompleteness possible in a growing universe. In particular, human individuals may introduce disorder by failure to affirm and to seek the divine will. Such evil is a source of genuine pain to God, and occasions the efforts on his part to remedy it. Thus the Christian doctrine of a divine atonement receives positive content.

Jesus is the creator of the profoundest type of religious faith, for he completely blends the two elements of the moral-immanence of God and the active self-dedication of man to the moral ideal. It is through this dedication that real communion is found with God in his characteristic activity of devotion to his moral end. By revealing to us the character of God as moral activity and as repairer of the evil in the world, Jesus is the indispensable ground of religious faith; while by actually living under the sway of moral devotion to the God of immanent purpose he becomes the supreme exemplar and inspirer of religious life.

The book is significant as indicating the newer apprehension of the task of systematic theology among younger theologians. It no longer consists in an exegesis of an authoritative system, but rather in an immediate grappling with the problems of present-day life. In the furtherance of this task, probably no more fruitful method than that suggested by pragmatism is available for discovering exactly where the vital needs of humanity demand the construction of theological working hypotheses. The present difficulty lies in disengaging *real* demands of present experience from the suggested obligations to believe which are inherited from the regime of authority-religion. It is perhaps too much to ask of a brief popular exposition that it should enter upon such an analysis. But the argument is so frequently forced to take for granted the validity of certain claimants in the realm of religious beliefs that the reader perhaps will be tempted to think that the philosophical solution of our present religious problems is a little simpler than it will eventually prove to be. However, the suggestion that empirical philosophy will probably enable us to reaffirm the great essentials of Christian belief is a much needed message to an age which is reluctantly losing its grasp on

the authority-method. For rendering this service the author deserves and will receive the appreciation of his fellow-workers in his special field.

GERALD BIRNEY SMITH

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

Three distinct conditions urge a renewed study of the doctrine of the Holy Spirit: first, the cheap, if not vicious trash being palmed off upon the public as the genuine New Testament teaching; second, the confusion wrought within pious but uncritical minds by teachers of a certain standing whose zeal outreaches their capacity for discriminating and painstaking study of the Scriptures; and third, a deepening sense on the part of scholars that the mere reconstruction of Christ's earthly life cannot meet the requirements of the moral and religious nature.

Dr. Downer has written<sup>4</sup> with a realizing sense of these conditions. His purpose has been twofold: to present a comprehensive and systematic, though not detailed, treatment of the whole doctrine; and to distinguish between the Holy Spirit in his cosmical relation and the nature and purpose of the Pentecostal Gift.

As a statistical survey of Bible statements concerning the Holy Spirit, the book is quite complete, and students will refer to it with profit. In choicest diction and in sentences over which the mind lingers in delight, the whole range of scriptural reference to the divine Spirit is traversed, and in not a few instances great texts are unusually illuminated. In its aim and scope the book is to be commended and for his comprehensive treatment Dr. Downer lays the church under great obligation.

In respect to his second aim we cannot concede Dr. Downer the same degree of success that we grant him in reaching his first aim. In the twelfth chapter he acknowledges that revelation has been progressive; his book does not show it in respect to the doctrine of the Spirit. In spite of its beautiful language the book is slow reading, because where one expects the teaching to rise to distinctness he is disappointed by a dull, dead level. The obvious cause of this is that the thought of the book is suspended on the creeds of the ancient church and not upon the ultimate data of the New Testament. Other weaknesses flow from this also. What is craved is an interpretation of the doctrine in keeping with our best knowledge of Bible teaching. The creeds could not give

<sup>4</sup> *The Mission and Ministration of the Holy Spirit*. By C. A. Downer. Edinburgh: Clark; New York: Scribner, 1910. xxx+347 pages. \$3.



this; Dr. Downer does not give it to us. Again, Dr. Downer's treatment of the Scriptures is, in general, influenced by his close adherence to the creeds. He even sees in certain passages indications of certain controversial victories which in their historical statement are metaphysical and not in the least interpretative of the New Testament mind. Another weakness is this: throughout the discussion the sacred distinctions in the Godhead seem to be absolute, and the author seems to convey to them the same distinct and separate self-hood as he himself is conscious of possessing. This fault is due not to adherence to the creeds but to an imperfect knowledge of the evolutionary use of the term "Person" by the creed-makers. This is a grave though general fault and works much mischief and is one from which the New Testament is free.

JOHN J. MARTIN

CHICAGO, ILL.

### PRAGMATISM AND MYSTICISM

The interest in viewing together the recent volumes of Professor Dewey<sup>1</sup> of Columbia and Professor Inge<sup>2</sup> of Cambridge is due to the extremely antithetical positions held by the two authors. It would not be unfair to characterize the former as an anti-mystical, or even, in ordinary senses of the term, anti-religious pragmatist, and the latter as an anti-pragmatic mystic. Neither of them seems to regard as worthy of consideration the attempt to transcend the opposition and reach a synthesis in religious pragmatism.

Professor Dewey has done a service to philosophical readers in republishing in the volume under review some of the most important of those acute and stimulating philosophical essays of his which have been appearing in various periodicals for more than a decade past. Moreover, viewing thus in better perspective the recent work of this significant thinker, one can detect more unmistakably the motives which underlie his philosophical work.

What one at least of these fundamental motives is, becomes abundantly clear from several passages in the book before us. It is nothing less than the complete eradication from philosophy of the last vestiges of the positively religious view of the universe. Toward this end the author makes his instrumentalism an instrument, and it is largely this

<sup>1</sup> *The Influence of Darwin upon Philosophy, and Other Essays in Contemporary Thought*. By John Dewey. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1910. vi+309 pages.

<sup>2</sup> *Faith and Its Psychology*. By William Ralph Inge. New York: Scribner, 1910. x+248 pages.

fact which accounts for the violently anti-metaphysical character of his pragmatism. It is a new and revised positivism, not based like Comte's upon the physical sciences primarily, but upon functional psychology.

To enter into particulars, one notes that Professor Dewey finds the significance of Darwinism for philosophy in its tendency to withdraw attention from such religio-philosophical questions as have to do with the origin, purpose, and destiny of all things. The endeavor to give a philosophical defense of belief in God, freedom, and immortality, is treated with ill-disguised contempt. The effort to substantiate a spiritual view of the universe is regarded as a mythologizing of reality, a mere survival of animism. No interest being felt in the validity of religious knowledge, epistemology is naturally (and justifiably, according to common-sense) dismissed on the ground that knowledge is not a mystery, but a natural event. In short, all metaphysics, it is held, is bound to decline and disappear, like the theology of which it is the last lingering shadow. Only psychology and social ethics are to be allowed to remain.

Out of his own mouth one is inclined to judge this pragmatic positivist, when he defines philosophy as "a Catholic and far-sighted theory of the adjustment of the conflicting factors of life," but the opening here for metaphysics is apparent only; for religion, in any significant sense of the word, is not regarded as one of the legitimate factors of life. Religion is held to be essentially pre-scientific, that blank submission of the individual, under the compulsion of external authority, to the blank reality beyond, a surrender which was an excusable weakness when tools were rare and clumsy and when, in general, man's command of the methods that control action was precarious and disturbed. Now, however, science is the recognized instrument for the maintenance even of moral values, and as such has fallen heir to the religious value formerly found in theological beliefs. Of course, then, if one admits that this is an adequate account of what religion is, not only is theology bound to go, but the chief element of interest in the problems of cosmology and epistemology likewise disappears.

To the support of his positivistic propaganda Professor Dewey brings powers of analysis, construction, and exposition that are worthy of a better cause. The essays entitled, "The Intellectualist Criterion of Truth," "Experience and Objective Idealism," and "The Postulate of Immediate Empiricism," for example, show the fruitfulness of the application of functional psychology to logical problems; while the his-

torical interpretations contained in the title-essay and in those on "Beliefs and Existences" and "The Significance of the Problem of Knowledge" are most suggestive.

It is not necessary to attempt here an exposition of the now well-known and, as it seems to the reviewer, largely justified instrumentalism of Dewey's logical theory. It may be noted, however, that he expressly repudiates the narrow utilitarianism commonly charged against pragmatism, and defines truth cumbrously, but carefully, as "the union of abstract postulated meanings and concrete brute facts in a way that circumvents the latter by judging them from a new standpoint, while it tests concepts by using them as methods in the same active experience." He is not always equally careful, however. For example, when he asserts that the effective working of an idea and its truth are one and the same thing, and that the capacity of the idea to fulfil the purpose for which it was projected is equivalent to its truth, the ambiguity of statement certainly leaves his position exposed to the charge of being unduly subjective and individualistic. The idea may work effectively with reference to an unduly narrow or unjustifiable purpose, and yet not be true at all. And with reference to the statement that the pragmatic account of truth is nothing but a statement of its nature, one is inclined to ask whether pragmatism is not primarily a view of the *test* of truth, rather than a definition of its *nature*; and whether, further, it is not because pragmatists commonly pass uncritically from the one to the other that their important positive contribution still fails to meet with adequate appreciation. Or, to state the criticism differently, pragmatists become confusing when they speak, as Professor Dewey repeatedly does in the work before us, as if truth were a quality of ideas, instead of being, as it always is, a quality of judgments. And, inasmuch as judgments always involve a relation of ideas to reality, one may admit the essential contention of pragmatism, that the test of the truth of the judgment, however thoroughgoing, is always the testing of the usefulness of the idea, while still maintaining that the nature of truth is such a relation of idea to reality as makes possible adjustment to it with satisfaction to every interest that *ought* to be recognized. Thus the ideal character of truth is preserved, while its invariably practical test is recognized.

Professor Inge's book is one of the new "Studies in Theology" edited by Dr. Fairbairn. Some of the most marked features of the book are the admirable critique of external authority, the antagonism manifested toward pragmatism and Ritschlianism, and the decidedly

sympathetic attitude toward mysticism, it being this last well-known feature of Dr. Inge's thinking which makes him such an interesting figure in contemporary religious thought.

One cannot but regret that the author's criticism of pragmatism is not based upon a more intelligent appreciation of what that much-discussed philosophy essentially is. It is characterized as a philosophy of personal atomism, a skeptical opportunism, which habitually disparages the intellectual life. In short, he identifies it with the pseudo-pragmatism of modernist Catholics, such as Laberthonnière and LeRoy, who hold that, while many of the dogmas of the church are intellectually objectionable, they are to be regarded as symbols, so serviceable, practically, to the church and ultimately to life, that they are to be affirmed as true on the ground that all truths anyway are simply useful symbols. Now the fallacy here is obvious, and Dr. Inge's criticisms are undoubtedly valid as against this Catholic pragmatism, but they are pointless as directed against essential pragmatism.

But it is in mysticism that our author is specially interested. His central thesis is that the life of faith (intense subjective religion) admits us to an immediate experience of God. This faith is not to be grounded on mere feeling, but rational and practical tests are needed to enable one to distinguish genuine divine revelation. Thus a place is made for metaphysics in religious knowledge; but that there is involved in the practical criterion a virtual subjection of mystical knowledge to the pragmatic test, the author does not seem to realize. On the contrary, he regards the sane mysticism he intends to stand for, and the religious pragmatism he opposes, as mutually exclusive. For example, he says that Christ's knowledge of God must have been derived from direct personal union with God, or else have been only the intellectual concomitant of the right direction of his will. What is needed is a synthesis of these mutually supplementary elements.

The failure to sufficiently test in practical life the suggestions of the more pronounced and even abnormal states of the mystical experience leaves Dr. Inge favorably disposed to most of the peculiar doctrines of the extreme mystics. Thus, in addition to the religiously essential ideas of the immanence of God in human experience and the possibility of a genuine communion with God in the spiritual life, great value is attached to a mystical christology, the exalted Christ being identified with the Holy Spirit, and complaint being made against Ritschl for repudiating this doctrine. One finds also a favorable attitude expressed toward the view that the real world is timeless, a static heaven in which

desire and will have ceased to be. It should be recognized that this is a suggestion coming from the abnormal trance experience of the mystic, and that it is due to the inhibition of activity and the consequent intensely emotional character of such states. The fact that it does not work in practical life to so regard the real world should be decisive against the suggestion, even when it is supported by subsequent metaphysical speculation.

What seems desirable, then, is the fusion and mutual supplementation of pragmatism and mysticism. If pragmatism is to be saved from an ignoble utilitarianism, it must learn to appreciate and use as a fundamental norm the values experienced in vital personal religion. And if mysticism is to be anything but a form of spiritual dissipation it must submit all its insights and values to the test of practical life.

YALE DIVINITY SCHOOL  
NEW HAVEN, CONN.

DOUGLAS C. MACINTOSH

---

### CHRISTIANITY AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS

Professor Thomas C. Hall's *Social Solutions in the Light of Christian Ethics*<sup>1</sup> presumably embodies some of his work with students at Union Theological Seminary, but in simplified form, adapted to the average reader. The language is as free as possible from technicalities, and there is a certain homeliness and common-sense in the method of discussion that is very satisfying and attractive.

He undertakes to examine one by one the various solutions proposed for the cure of social ills, to get whatever good each one contains, and to make clear its limitations and dangers. He speaks throughout from the point of view of the ethical man, rather than the political economist, but by no means as an amateur in his field of knowledge. The life and purpose of Jesus are his highest authority; the Bible, too, is authority, but only as historically understood and critically interpreted.

The book contains 32 chapters, most of them very brief, and there is nothing in the outward makeup to show the superficial or untaught reader that the thought is built up on larger lines. There are, in fact, four large divisions. The first ten chapters give the orientation; chaps. x-xvi give the social solutions proposed on the basis of individualism; chaps. xvii-xxi those based on "the social emphasis," i.e., socialism with

<sup>1</sup> *Social Solutions in the Light of Christian Ethics*. By Thomas C. Hall. New York: Eaton & Mains, 1910. 390 pages. \$1.50.

its precursors and modifications; and chaps. xxii-xxx the proposed social ameliorations on the basis of the present social order. The last two chapters present a summary, and a classified and very useful bibliography.

He begins with a somewhat meager discussion of Jesus and Paul, and a very excellent analysis of our social order in its economic structure and moral spirit, which comes to the conclusion that its "inward spirit no more reflects the teachings of the Kingdom of God than did the social order which put Jesus to death; yet we call it Christian." He then presents the "Kingdom Dream," insisting both on the individualistic and the social emphasis contained in it. I think he weakens his cause unnecessarily by calling it a "dream." "The Kingdom Hope" or "the Kingdom Purpose" would have expressed the same element of transcendence without belittling it through the notion of unreality. It is the author's great guiding idea, as it ought to be.

In discussing the individualistic solutions, he dismisses the later classical political economy with scant courtesy, but justly appreciates the noble spirit of the Manchester school in its attack on the decadent feudalism in the midst of which it developed its protest. He laments the close historical union between economic individualism and Protestant thought. The analysis of Anarchism is fair and that of the single tax very kindly. He thinks the average Christian man will have more points of contact with the single-tax movement than with any other because it has sprung from the middle class from which the Protestant denominations have drawn their main strength. The chapter on "Individualism and Democracy" is also very good. Professor Hall is a convinced Democrat and sees beneath the surface advantages of a government by "superior persons."

The third part presents the socialist proposals in their embryonic forms, in developed Marxian socialism, in state socialism, in Catholic socialism, and in the modifications of the Revisionist school. The discussion of Marxianism is one of the longest chapters of the book, evidently based on full personal acquaintance with Marx, and is so fair and impartial that it will puzzle the reader to find out where the author stands.

In the last portion of the book he deals with the solutions for concrete evils on the basis of the present order; with charitable relief, the dangers to the home, the work of education, trades unionism and voluntary co-operation, the treatment of admitted social evils, etc.

The book is above all a practical book. It excels in sound common-

sense and balance. Its short chapters would each furnish an excellent basis for an evening's study, or a nucleus for a social address for one who needs pithy information combined with wise ethical guidance. Its strokes are somewhat too short to gather momentum, and I found myself more instructed than moved by the thought. But it abounds in clever summaries and sayings, and I found its historical reflections unusually ripe and wise. It traverses a wide range of thought, and will certainly broaden and liberalize those who are passionate and young in their social convictions.

WALTER RAUSCHENBUSCH

ROCHESTER THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY  
ROCHESTER, N.Y.

### AUTHORITY IN ETHICS

A recent important book by Dr. Hall<sup>1</sup> has one central theme, however many its variations, viz., the rise of authority in Christian ethics and the successive efforts to work free from its control and reach a genuinely ethical, as distinct from legal, conception of conduct. The chief value of the book is the insistence with which this theme is kept to the fore, and the result of the treatment, in spite of more or less material which does not so directly bear on this development, is a strong impression of this one movement in its two phases of culmination and disintegration.

The first phase—the rise of authority—is not treated as a mere “corruption” or “perversion” of the simpler teaching of Jesus; it is shown to have a natural and even a necessary reason in the formation of a Christian community which was to include the “weak in the faith” as well as the spiritually mature, and which must maintain itself amid hostile groups. But the effect of setting up and establishing an absolute authority was none the less an injury, both on its formal side as limiting the free development of the spirit and on the side of content by hindering the formation of new ideals:

They have had to shelter themselves almost sneakingly under the cover of misinterpretations of the past. Thus almost every battle against slavery, feudalism, private war, the duel, persecution for faith's sake, for freedom and toleration has been waged in the face of an absolute ethics that claimed a completed and divinely given content, sanctioned by a revealed authority (p. 373).

<sup>1</sup> *History of Ethics within Organized Christianity*. By Thomas Cuming Hall. New York: Scribner, 1910. xi+605 pages. \$3.00.

The standpoint of Jesus was primarily religious: his central thought was unity of purpose with God. But God was for Jesus so fully ethical that this unity of purpose gave, not a mere acceptance of authority, but a vital ethical purpose as the dominant note. His ethical purpose was to find fulfilment in a Reign of God. As the agency for this reign Jesus looked at first to an ethically reformed Judaism; then when his hopes for this were disappointed he turned to a small chosen group. The essence of the reign was to be a compassionate righteousness. "The dynamic force by which this is to be realized is the love of God awakened in men's hearts by the proclamation of his free forgiveness to repentant men, enabling them to live the forgiven life." The ethical content is thus given in a religious consciousness.

Paul, too, had an ethical attitude based primarily on his own experience, though it was an experience of revolution rather than of advancing vision, and his exaltation of ethical freedom was the result. But his poor little household churches seemed wholly unfitted for such a struggle:

Paul's faith was in the supernatural indwelling grace of the forgiven life, but more than once he had to appeal to his own authority and even to threaten with spiritual penalty . . . . Undeveloped human life lends itself to tyranny, the weak long for shifted responsibility, the strong eagerly grasp the opportunity for exploitation.

There was another factor. For Jesus and Paul, as for John also, righteousness and peace with God were eternal life. For the vast mass of Christians righteousness was a condition on which an eternal life could be secured, and eternal life was the new era of social justice, when the propertyless social class would enter upon its rights, joys, and rewards. The ethics of this group became a law to be imposed on others. "The force of the 'communal ban' was even by Paul used evidently as a powerful external coercion." Similarly today, the trades union, if fighting for life, is confronted by the same questions of communal coercion. "The whole question of the 'open shop,' the 'scab,' and the enforcement of the boycott throws a flood of light upon the gradual transformation of a Pauline ethics into a moral coercion, and finally into an ecclesiastical legalism."

It was not always as a "coercive" community that the church proceeded toward its goal of absolute authority. The little community was also a brotherhood, a "family," and with the aristocratic Roman conception of a family it was an easy transition for the lay Christian to be regarded as a child of the church while the priest became a permanent



"father." "If over against the world there were indeed freedom, as toward the church with its magic sacraments, there could be only one attitude, that of humble, reverential submission to its overwhelming authority." The machinery of cultus borrowed from various sources augmented this authority. Still later, when united with the state in various aspects, the hierarchy had a still more imposing front. In its work among the barbarians, it dealt not as at first with the "proletariat" or "peasant" elements, but with the roving military aristocracy. Finally, when the philosophy of Greece as well as the political power of Rome has been absorbed, scholasticism gives us an authority as commanding for the intellect as the hierarchy for the life.

There were indeed in Greek thought, as in economic progress, forces which urged toward a more independent attitude. Haltingly, at first, and with attempts to set up new "absolutes," such as a "pure" church instead of a "corrupt" church, or the "Scriptures" instead of the church, or "reason" conceived under the influence of mathematics, the struggle has gone on, until at last ethics has come to its own. "Not now as an absolute content given on authority and within the limits of a closed system of human duty, but as a science of human conduct, working like any other science on the material given in human experience, and limited like all science by the capacity of the human mind."

Such is the outline of Dr. Hall's story, and no one who masters it can fail to have a firmer grasp of the reasons for both the rise and the passing of ethical authority. In particular, the internal necessities of authority, arising from community organization, to preserve valuable contents in difficult situations, are very suggestively treated. The book is written from the sources and there are sufficient references to enable the reader to check the text, or to read further. In covering such a large field the question necessarily arises whether it is better to say something about a great many authors or a good deal about a few typical leaders. Dr. Hall has perhaps leaned toward the former of the two methods, although by grouping writers under certain general topics the difficulties of preserving unity have to some degree been met. A general idea of the perspective of the book may be gained from the space devoted to its nine divisions: The longest chapters are given to the Continental Reformation (108 pp.) and to the English Reformation (103 pp.). Scholasticism and the Early Church come next (83 pp., 82 pp.). Then follow the Old Catholic or Bishop's Church (71 pp.), the New Testament (57 pp.), Preparation for Christianity (47 pp.), Militant Papacy (24 pp.) and a brief summary of recent ethics.

Of single authors, Luther is treated at greatest length (28 pp.). To the ethics of Jesus is given 20 pages; to Paul, 18; to Aquinas, 16; to Calvin, 14.

It is reasonable to judge an author by what he has done, rather than to query whether he might not also have done something else. In a history of ethics one reader might prize most an exposition and thorough analysis of certain great conceptions about which systems have been built, and in which preacher as well as theologian has interpreted Christian experience. Such conceptions as sin, atonement, righteousness, justification, divine law, goodness, felicity, love (charity), contain a whole view of life which needs repeated analysis as the advance of psychology on the one hand, and of historical knowledge on the other, affords means for a more penetrating insight. There is little of this in the present volume. Most of these fundamental conceptions are taken at their face value as they are used, rather than reinterpreted as psychological attitudes. Another reader might like more material on the relation of the church to the different social and economic groups. How far was its own standpoint affected by the fact that it has, at successive times, or in various branches, been prevailingly a company of the poor, of the ruling classes, of the middle classes? How far, on the other hand, has it sought to control industrial and political life, and with what results? These questions are given more space than those of the preceding group, and the remarks made are highly suggestive. It is to be hoped that Dr. Hall will work further on these special problems on which we have too little available material. Now that the church is facing a great task of social ethics all the light that can come from history is needed. But in making the question of authority central it was necessary to subordinate other interests, and Dr. Hall's volume will take its place not only as a solid contribution to our understanding of the past, but as a stimulating work for every thoughtful preacher who faces the question: What am I preaching—the principles of Jesus, or of the church? And if the latter, then how much is a genuine development of what is fruitful, and how much is due to situations once all-compelling but now long past?

J. H. TUFTS

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

## THE PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPLANATION OF RELIGION

Professor Irving King has produced an exceedingly fruitful study of primitive religion in terms of social psychology.<sup>1</sup> It is an attempt to present religious consciousness in its genesis and growth within the experience of the race. The contrast is marked between this empirical, historical inquiry and the more familiar effort "to limit the scientific study of religion to its bare content or to its existential aspects, excluding the sphere of meaning as something too sacred or subtle to be thus desecrated."

Professor King sets to work in a thoroughly scientific frame of mind. He cannot regard religion as the development of a religious instinct because the term instinct is vague, and is used loosely. If taken in the biological sense of an overt reaction, there is no such specific reaction which can be called religious. Neither is religion original or innate in any other way. It is not due to some inner "sense" or "perception."

Having rejected all such conceptions, it becomes necessary to furnish some positive account of the religious consciousness. This is undertaken in good earnest and with a stout heart. Not finding religion as an instinct or as a faculty or element of human nature, it will be sought as a "construct" within normal experience. "The general problem is to show how and why, given certain acts, the religious consciousness, or attitude, has been built up."

The overt activities of social groups, such as hunting, fishing, fighting, dancing, feasting, themselves the outgrowths of man's vital needs, give rise to complex habits and to mental attitudes of valuation. This is a radical point of the whole treatise. Customs and rituals have sprung up as products of a relatively unconscious evolution, and these customs have become the causes and sustainers of definite states of consciousness. "The overt activity is not only the index of the hidden internal states of consciousness, but is also a factor of prime importance in the very production of these states" (p. 38). This conception naturally leads to an investigation of the dominant activities of primitive peoples, and of the related attitudes of consciousness. The materials are abundant. W. R. Smith and Barton have shown that many rituals of the Semites were the development of practical activities centering in the care of flocks and of the date palm. Skeat's studies of the Malays, Spencer and Gillen's notable account of the Australians,

<sup>1</sup> *The Development of Religion*. By Irving King. New York: Macmillan, 1910, xxii+371 pages.

and similar records of other peoples furnish an abundance of material which the author employs in working out his hypothesis. He shows how these elaborate rituals intensify and sustain emotional valuations. Where food is scarce and precarious, as among the Australians, the process of securing it is complicated and sustained, and the emotional tension becomes very great. The objects in which the tensions center have a commanding interest. The food objects, for example, are the deities.

These most important activities and tensions are social in character—they involve the whole group. Professor King undertakes to distinguish these group interests into those which are practical and those which are accessory, identifying religion with the latter. It is exceedingly difficult to follow this part of the discussion, however, owing to a seeming confusion of terms. Take, for example, this sentence on page 101:

In many cases the practice, while distinctly religious, will bear marks of a more or less definite relationship to the "practical" or "accessory" activities of the group, while in others the *primary* character will be *social* or *practical*, although they will seem to have a decided religious coloring.

The term "social" is apparently used here as synonymous with "playful," but in the next sentence it signifies group organization.

In other passages the religious attitude appears to be represented as developing out of the practical and the social (playful) attitudes. The Pueblo governmental functions, primarily practical, have taken on a religious quality. The dances of the Bushmen, at first sportive, by repetition and elaboration, came to take on a more earnest character and thereby became religious (p. 112). When the practical habit of cleanliness among the Japanese was sufficiently ingrained, it came to be considered a religious duty. Many similar illustrations are given, but there is always a tendency to qualify the distinctions by admitting that the religious cannot be sharply separated. All that the contention amounts to seems to be this, that a social activity is felt to be religious in proportion as it has a high emotional value for the group. If this is meant, it would be simpler to say that the religious attitude varies in intensity and definiteness, and that in its most typical expression it embodies a serious sense of great emotional valuation in terms of the group life.

There may easily be a fallacy in regard to the play impulse. Sometimes "play" is very serious business, as in the case of children playing

school or store. They take their rôles soberly enough and perhaps it is only "play" to the spectator. The professional sportsman makes real work out of the "fun."

In the treatment of the Mysterious Power, the functional point of view, generally so well employed throughout the book, seems to have been forgotten. Neither the term "concept" nor "impersonal force" is happily chosen in this connection. The savage takes a characteristic attitude in the presence of anything which strikes his attention, anything which is strange, menacing, novel, or surprising. His attitude is that of alertness, caution, and heightened emotion. Any situation or object which begets that feeling of uneasiness and tension is "wakonda" or "maitou." It is attributing too much to the primitive mind to say that it generalizes these experiences into the "concept" of an "impersonal force" which "resides in" all strange objects. Undoubtedly all savages take this attitude of caution toward their totems, churinga, "holy" places, and "sacred" beings. King rightly calls it the "watch-out" attitude and considers it less developed than a notion of spirits. His descriptions and illustrations support this "watch-out" attitude, but to call it Mysterious Power, written with capital letters, makes it seem like a deity of the old, metaphysical sort which has been so erroneously ascribed to the natural races.

This unfortunate terminology appears in the discussion of magic. "As far as primitive man states to himself the cause of the efficacy of a magical rite, it is largely that such a rite sets free, or renders active, not spirits, but that mystic potency with which he believes nature is surcharged" (p. 185). It would be keeping much closer to his own psychological standpoint if the author had said that magical rites, like other mysterious events and strange objects, set up the "watch-out" attitude and arouse tension, expectancy, and emotional reactions.

In the treatment of magic and religion, neither is regarded as prior to the other, but both are viewed as arising from the primitive complex of naïve reactions, magic being related to the practical, more individual activities, and religion to the "accessory," social activities (p. 172). Yet the characterization of magic as individual is not everywhere maintained. There is also "public magic" (p. 193, p. 195). One has the feeling that the author is here somewhat influenced by the older theories which seemed to feel it necessary to separate magic and religion entirely. But there is abundant evidence that the religious ceremonials are also magical. It is only necessary to distinguish between the approved magical practices which are public, social, and religious,

and the illicit, tabooed magical rites which are usually individual and secret.

The tendency to relate magic to science also lacks convincing force despite the weighty authority quoted in its support. It certainly cannot be maintained that science is a private and secret matter. It is even doubtful whether it involves any greater individual initiative than modern religious developments. There is certainly an abundance of class spirit and class control in science, and it is coming to be recognized, for example, in the history of invention, that the individual works with the knowledge, technique, and stimulus of groups of like-minded men. The "conflict" between science and religion is doubtless a conflict between the descriptive and the appreciative attitudes, but there is much reason to think this conflict is not so deep-seated, nor so inevitable, as is suggested at the top of page 197. The new sense of the religious value of scientific historical criticism and of the doctrine of evolution among religious people at the present time shows that the "conflict" is already passing away. The tendency to substitute a critical, rational method of control in the prosecution of religious ideals through social reforms, and the decadence of old-time controversial battles on the part of religionists (as well as of scientists) point in the same direction.

The author's psychology bears some of its best fruit in the criticism of the conventional conception of the development of religion through animism, naturalism, pantheism, henotheism, and monotheism. "Even the simplest extant society is so complicated that it is usually highly developed in at least one of its phases" (p. 212). "The only continuity, then, in religious evolution is, we hold, the continuity of the social background, which, under varying conditions, produces varying types of religious growth" (p. 217). Consequently, as would be expected, the thesis with reference to deities is "that social bodies may quite naturally differentiate deities of various types" (p. 225). However, the unfortunate impersonal conception of mysterious power becomes troublesome here again, for "before this notion can become in any sense a religious one, it must be associated with conscious personal agents" (p. 262). The complete elimination of "spirits" from the impersonal force of the lower stages results in overstating the function of "personal deities" in the higher stages, so that the "true religious type" is confined to the latter. If the writer had employed a thoroughly functional interpretation of "spirits" he would have been spared the embarrassment of having to get over from an impersonal force to a per-

sonal deity. Psychologically, the transition from the lower to the higher forms should be statable in terms of complexity, comprehensiveness, and ideality.

In the statement of the moral character of the primitive customs, the book is more successful in maintaining continuity. The chapter on Religion and Morals presents a clear and illuminating discussion of the morality of the Australian aborigines. In the higher developments also, the deity exercises a moral function. This is particularly significant in connection with the discussion of the objective reality of God, where the case is put thus: "All our realities are of the functional variety" (p. 342). "It is frequently assumed that the deities of heathendom are non-ethical, reflecting simply the everyday social customs of their worshippers." In a measure this is true, but it is also true that, in so far as social custom, with its inevitable valuations, crystallizes into a deity, that deity *does* exert a controlling influence of some sort upon his worshippers" (p. 218). This point might have been profitably developed to greater length, to emphasize the fact that the deity which is functional in character is thereby of a nature to function effectively in the control and moralization of conduct.

The book is well made. The table of contents is extended, as is the index, thus furnishing means of easy reference, especially valuable in a work where so many authorities are cited.

E. S. AMES

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

---

## BRIEF MENTION

### OLD TESTAMENT

ADAMS, JOHN. *Israel's Ideal, or Studies in Old Testament Theology*. Edinburgh: Clark; New York: Scribner, 1909. xi+232 pages. \$1.50.

In spite of the first few pages, which promise better things, this book is nothing but the usual attempt to read into the Old Testament the traditional theology of the church. We hardly look for any contribution to such a subject as sacrifice from a writer who explains "this feeling after God . . . only by the persistence of the divine image originally stamped upon man," much less for a scientific study of the Old Testament doctrine of God, or of messianism, from one who finds that the Old Testament has grasped "after the manner of presentiment, . . . the idea of an essential distinction in the Godhead," that "it is no abstract monotheism, such as we have in the later Judaism and in Mohammedanism"—in a word that the Old Testament foreshadows the Trinity.

BERRY, GEORGE RICHARD. *The Old Testament among the Semitic Religions*. Philadelphia: The Griffith & Rowland Press, 1910. 215 pages. \$1.00.

The purpose of this book is to compare the theology of the Old Testament with the religious teachings of the other Semitic nations. The author seems to recognize a tendency toward monotheism in the Babylonian religion, but goes on to explain that this "doctrine was of an esoteric nature, being confined to the priests." In this he is correct. So he holds that the "pantheistic speculation of the Egyptian looks in the direction of spirituality . . . but this—probably had but little effect upon the religion as a whole." This too is correct, but the author fails to make it clear that the highest conceptions of God, righteousness, etc., as exemplified in the teachings of the prophets of Israel, made equally little impression upon the religion of the Israelites. In a word, the fault of the book is that it compares the ideals of the Old Testament with the practices of the other Semitic peoples. It was just such unfair comparisons of Israel's "religion" with that of the Babylonians that aroused Professor Delitzsch's righteous indignation and precipitated the "Babel-Bibel" controversy.

TORREY, C. C. *Notes on the Aramaic Part of Daniel*. Reprint from the *Transactions of the Connecticut Academy of Arts and Sciences*, XV (July, 1909), 241-282.

Professor Torrey has already done valuable service on the Aramaic portion of Ezra. He opens these *Notes* by a discussion of the unity, date, and language of Daniel. His conclusions are that the Book of Daniel is composed of two parts, the original Daniel, chaps. 1-6, and the later portion, chaps. 7-12. The original Daniel was composed in Aramaic and "must be dated between 245 and 225 B.C. . . . To this oldest collection of tales, the apocalypticist of the Maccabean time attached his 'Visions of Daniel,' chaps. 7-12."

The variation in the two languages is used as an argument for, rather than against, such a view. In order to dovetail the Aramaic portion into the Hebrew and cover up the seams, the author of the second portion translated the Hebrew of 7:1-26 into Aramaic. And to complete the task of making the book a unit he translated the Aramaic of chap. 1 into Hebrew, and continues the process to where the "Chaldeans" begin their narrative (2:4). The *Notes* proper are linguistic, historical, exegetical, and religious; and give us useful material gathered from the latest investigations of scholars on the Daniel period or periods of history.

THOMSEN, PETER. *Palästina und seine Kultur in fünf Jahrtausenden*. Nach den neuesten Ausgrabungen und Forschungen. [*Aus Natur und Geisteswelt*: Sammlung wissenschaftlich-gemeinverständlicher Darstellungen; 260 Bändchen.] Leipzig: Teubner, 1909. 108 pages. M. 1.

Palestine has become a new center of interest for excavators and archaeologists. The last twenty years have seen notable excavations at several of the scores of mounds covering ancient cities. The latest results of such work have been published in large and costly volumes. Thomsen compresses into this handy little book, bound in cloth, with 36 illustrations, a popular record of such excavations with an estimate of their value, for the German-reading public. Its up-to-date character, its delightful style, and its adaptedness for the popular reader are a sufficient commendation of its general usefulness.



JOYCE, G. C. *The Inspiration of Prophecy. An Essay in the Psychology of Revelation.* [The S. Deiniol's Series.] New York: Henry Frowde, 1910. 195 pages. \$1.40.

The attempt of this study is to discover the source of the prophet's insight. All the interest of the author is in the question of origins. Yet he insists upon the principle "that the authority of a revelation is not really authenticated by the circumstances of its communication but by the nature of its contents," and draws therefrom the necessary conclusion that "we shall no longer feel ourselves bound in the interest of revealed religion to demand that divine truth should have entered the soul of man along a channel reserved for its own peculiar use." The study will prove itself suggestive and helpful in many ways toward a better understanding of the prophets on the part of the public in general. But it cannot be pronounced an unqualified success. The author recognizes the legitimacy of the historical method of interpretation and employs it, but he has failed to put himself at all times in close sympathy with the historical conditions amid which the prophets worked. The chapter on "The Psychology of False Prophecy" is a case in point. His interpretation of the activities of these prophets lays large emphasis upon the element of deliberate deception and misrepresentation. But there is insufficient basis for such a charge. The denunciations of Micah, Jeremiah, and others must not be given too much weight in such questions. A more charitable judgment, and at the same time a truer one, sees in the so-called "false-prophet" a man of narrow vision, limited in all of his utterances by his inability to break away from tradition and to reach new and better views of God. Hananiah sincerely and enthusiastically predicting deliverance from the Babylonian army through the unfailling power and goodness of Yahweh is very much more easily accounted for than is Jeremiah setting himself resolutely against the prevailing currents of thought and consigning Jerusalem to destruction. There is no reason to suspect Hananiah of sinister motives in this case; he was but voicing the desires and convictions of all loyal, God-fearing Hebrews whose faith in Yahweh's power and favor was unlimited because they failed totally to realize the necessity of right character as the indispensable prerequisite to the exercise of that favor.

HAUTSCH, ERNST. *Die Evangelienstätze des Origines.* (Texte und Untersuchungen, XXXIV 2a.) Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1909. 169 pages. M. 5.50.

The quotations made by Origen from the gospels are here collected and discussed with a view to determining their textual affinities. Hautsch observes that Origen did not by any means always adhere to one manuscript or type of text; and furthermore that he frequently blended parallel passages from different gospels. A very convenient conspectus of Origen's citations, with the textual witnesses supporting and opposing, concludes the volume.

STRACK, HERMANN L. *Jesus, die Häretiker, und die Christen nach der ältesten Jüdischen Angaben.* Texte, Uebersetzung und Erläuterungen. (Schriften des Institutum Judaicum, 37.) Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1910. 88+40 pages. M. 3.

Such passages in early Jewish literature as seem to refer to Jesus or his followers have been collected by Professor Strack from the Talmud and the Midrash, and are here presented in Hebrew and, with compact notes, in a German translation.

A brief introduction deals with Jewish references to Jesus as reflected in the Greek and western churches, and there are convenient indices. Students of the gospels will appreciate this scholarly and compact compendium of early Jewish allusions, vague and biased as they are, to Jesus and his followers.

STÄHLIN, OTTO. *Clemens Alexandrinus: Dritter Band. Stromata Buch VII und VIII—Excerpta ex Theodoto—Eclogae Propheticae—Quis Dives Salvetur—Fragmente*. Herausgegeben im Auftrage der Kirchenväter-Commission der königl. Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften. Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1909. xc+231 pages. M. 11.

The third volume of Stählin's admirable edition of Clement of Alexandria brings the work practically to a conclusion. The fourth and final volume will contain the elaborate and indispensable indices which the extraordinary variety and range of Clement's interests demand. Stählin's introduction is largely devoted to remarks on those works of Clement of which only fragments remain. The Greek texts which occupy the bulk of the volume are based upon original manuscript investigations, and are accompanied by a compact apparatus of variant readings. Three photographic facsimiles illustrate the manuscript sources. Stählin's edition is an important addition to the Prussian Academy's great patristic series.

PATON, L. B. *The Early Religion of Israel*. Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin Co., 1910. 115 pages.

Dr. Paton's popular little handbook is one of Vernon's "Modern Religious Problems" series. In the present state of biblical scholarship it is of course impossible to embody in such a work the exact views of all leading scholars upon details. A critical minor interrogation might be interjected upon almost every page. Were the Kenites certainly descendants from the eponymic Cain? Was totemism certainly characteristic of early Israel? Is the plural Elohim to be explained as a general Canaanite term for gods adopted and identified with Yahweh? But the general lines of religious development would be considered well portrayed. Dr. Paton's position may be fairly described as "left center." He gives full assent to the view of exceedingly primitive conditions in early Israel while emphasizing Israel's great religious superiority at the same period over Egypt or Babylonia, and emphasizing divine purpose and guidance in its history. Over-condensation is almost inevitable. The popular reader will not know what totemism is, nor polyandry, nor the matriarchate; yet many such terms are used without explanation. This will aid in stimulating inquiry, the real end to be achieved by any brief popular presentation. The survey is divided into five periods: Primitive Semitic, Patriarchal, Mosaic, Conquest, and Early Monarchy. The volume should prove a useful summary for reference in advanced Bible classes.

JEREMIAS, ALFRED. *Das Alter der babylonischen Astronomie*. 2<sup>te</sup> erweiterte Auflage. [Im Kampfe um den Alten Orient. Wehr- und Streitschriften herausgegeben von A. Jeremias und Hugo Winckler, Part 3]. Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1909. 92 pages. M. 1.60.

The second edition of Jeremias' work has increased nearly 50 per cent in size. The new matter has much to say in reply to Kugler's arraignment of Jeremias' knowledge of astronomy as displayed in his discussion of what he (Jeremias) terms "astron-

omy" in early Babylonia. One of the most helpful expansions of the pamphlet consists of fifteen illustrations and charts illustrative of the ancient Babylonian conception of the heavens. With all his quotations from literature and references to Babylonian statements regarding the heavens, we are still not convinced that there was anything more than the crudest notion of the heavenly bodies—nothing that can in any real sense be called "astronomy."

SMITH, SAMUEL G. *Religion in the Making: A Study in Biblical Sociology.* New York: Macmillan, 1910. 253 pages. \$1.25 net.

The subtitle more nearly describes the work before us. But we are at a loss to know the definition of "Biblical Sociology." Of the thirteen chapters of the book, the first three are general, the fourth is entitled "Scientific Views of the Bible," while chaps. v to xii are treatments of Palestine and the Old Testament. Scientific discussions they are not, nor are they based on a scientific view of the Old Testament. There is a lot of material in this part of the Bible, which after proper sifting, can be used legitimately by the sociologist; but he must not caricature the work of the best scholars, (cf. pp. 4, 5) nor pursue his task with some of the preconceived opinions that often discount such investigation. Smith has said some things in new and telling phrases, and has done a thoughtful piece of work, but it lacks a method or a system of treatment which can be designated either as logical or scientific.

---

#### NEW TESTAMENT

"Modern Religious Problems." Edited by A. W. VERNON. F. C. BURKITT, *The Earliest Sources for the Life of Jesus*, 1910. 131 pages. \$0.50. J. MOFFATT, *Paul and Paulinism*, 1910. 77 pages. \$0.50. Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Co.

Burkitt prefers Mark above all other sources (the so-called Logia included) as a guide to the history of Jesus. The existence of an early non-Markan source (or sources) is not denied, but the possibility of determining its content with certainty is doubted. Mark's account is thought to be free from any ruling theological bias, nor did the evangelist employ any earlier written sources. It follows that the historical Jesus was a vigorous champion of the apocalyptic hope, identifying himself with the expected Messiah.

*Paul and Paulinism* is a brief survey of the apostle's Christian career and a short summary of his system of thought. His whole religious life and thinking are found to center about his experience of the spirit. As for his position in the founding of Christianity, though he was original in many respects, the faith which underlay his gospel was the same as that of his contemporaries—absolute confidence in Jesus' lordship. "Paul was a Christian before he was a Paulinist."

ABBOTT, E. A. *The Message of the Son of Man.* London: A. & C. Black, 1909. xxii+166 pages. 4s. 6d.

Here it is held that Jesus took the title "Son of Man" from Ezekiel rather than from Daniel or the non-canonical apocalyptic literature. The expression in Ezekiel is taken to be one of encouragement: the prophet has had a vision of God in the form of man, so to be addressed as the "Son of Man" implies a unity between man and God.

So Jesus used it of himself as the "image" of the divine archetype, thus emphasizing both the divinity of Jesus and the humanity of God. The author promises a larger work which will give detailed proof for his theory. Proof surely is needed.

VON SODEN, HANS FREIHERR. *Das lateinische Neue Testament in Afrika zur Zeit Cyprians, nach Bibelhandschriften und Väterzeugnissen.* [Texte und Untersuchungen, Bd. XXXIII.] Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1909. x+663 pages. M. 21.

In the New Testament quotations of Cyprian, von Soden finds a norm for determining the African Old-Latin text of the third century. Applying this to Old-Latin manuscripts, Bobbiensis (*k*), Palatinus (*e*), and the Fleury Palimpsest (*h*) show striking agreements with Cyprian, whose text is especially like *k*; the same Greek text clearly underlies these two. On the basis of these three manuscripts and Cyprian, von Soden then constructs, as far as these fragmentary materials permit, the African Old-Latin text of the New Testament, the oldest Latin version made, reflecting a Greek text current in Africa at least as early as the early years of the third century. The whole constitutes a work of much immediate value and great further promise for textual study.

LAKE, KIRSOPP. *The Early Days of Monasticism on Mount Athos.* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1909. 117 pages. 8s. 6d.

Professor Lake has been a frequent visitor at Athos, and has brought back much of value for the study of biblical and patristic texts. In this volume he presents and interprets Greek documents of the ninth and tenth centuries relating to the early development of monastic communities on Athos. The legendary period is reflected in the Life of Peter the Athonite, a hermit of the ninth century; the early historical time in the Life of Euthymius of Thessalonica, who gathered about him a group of hermits into a laura—a loose organization of hermits living near together, with some notable recluse as center. Professor Lake concludes from these and similar records that at the beginning of the tenth century there were hermits and lauras on Athos, but no actual monastery. The first definite monastery was that founded by Athanasius of Trebizond, in the latter part of the tenth century, and now known as The Laura.

---

#### CHURCH HISTORY

COCKSHOT, WINNIFRED. *The Pilgrim Fathers, Their Church and Colony.* New York: Putnam; London: Methuen & Co., 1909. 348 pages. \$2.25.

A new book on Plymouth and the Pilgrims can be accounted for probably simply on the ground that the subject has in itself perennial interest. We usually expect to find in a book, as an excuse for its appearance, either new material or an old story retold in a more fascinating or illuminating fashion. This old tale is respectably and calmly related, but the writer has scrupulously refrained from adding the allurements of an attractive style. The facts are in the main old; but in the treatment of the earlier portion which gives the European background and the experiences of the Pilgrims in Holland, there is considerable freshness and evidence of a good deal of careful study. This earlier portion given in connection with the later narrative of settlement may serve as sufficient justification for the appearance of the book—if justification is needed.

The attempt to point out in a few general terms America's indebtedness to Holland is trivial; on the other hand the significance of the compact and of the congregational form of church government with their place and influence has not taken strong hold upon the author. If for no other reason, in order to show that the writer is *en rapport* with the literature of the subject, the bibliographical list—which is in bad form—certainly ought to have included a number of titles that are not mentioned among the authorities consulted.

HARNACK, ADOLF. *Monasticism: Its Ideals and History, and "The Confessions of St. Augustine."* Two Lectures. Translated by E. E. Kellett and T. H. Marseille. ["Crown Theological Library, XXVIII."] New York: Putnam, 1909. 171 pages.

These two essays of Professor Harnack's are neither new nor considerable: one of them at least is nearly thirty years old, and beside the author's monumental works on the *History of Dogma* and of *Early Christian Literature*, these lectures make but a slender volume. Yet the translators have done a useful and welcome service to students and general readers. The sketch of monasticism is brilliant, forceful, and full of insight. The rise and development of the movement are rapidly sketched and interpreted, in a way that not only shows its strength and its weakness, but illuminates the whole course of Christian history. And all who have heard Professor Harnack's inspiring lectures on St. Augustine will be glad to renew that uplifting religious experience in the reading of this lecture on the *Confessions*. The translators have succeeded admirably, and the book should be widely read.

VACANDARD, E. *Études de critique et d'histoire religieuse.* Deuxième série. Paris: Gabalda, 1909. 306 pages. Fr. 3.50.

In his *Études de critique et d'histoire religieuse*, E. Vacandard reprints, with minor alterations and with appended criticisms, six carefully annotated articles which have appeared either in various reviews or in the *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique*. Though Protestants may be interested in the "Origins of Sacramental Confession," "The Early Christians and Military Service," "The Albigensian Heresy," and the legendary question "Whether Women Have Souls," the author's co-religionists will find but two of the discussions really vital. These are "The Nature of the Coercive Power of the Church," which asserts the propriety of the theoretical limitation of that power to "moral constraint"; and "The Formal Institution of the Church by Christ," which, accepting Loisy's admission that the gospels as they stand teach that the church was founded by the risen Christ, endeavors to draw the risen Christ from the sphere of faith, where Loisy leaves him, into the sphere of history.

JORDAN, LOUIS HENRY. *Modernism in Italy, Its Origin, Its Incentive, Its Leaders, and Its Aims.* London: Oxford University Press; New York: Froude, 1909. 64 pages. 2s.

This pamphlet consists of a single lecture setting forth the origin, incentive, and the aims of the Modernist movement in Italy, together with brief characterizations of its leaders. The footnotes which have been added are of quite as much interest and value as the text of the lecture itself. As distinguished from the movement in other countries the movement in Italy has taken on more of a social or political nature:

yet it shared alike in the criticism, philosophy, and theology of the movement in other countries.

The author goes back to 1850 for the beginnings of the movement in Italy and derives it from the work of Rosmini and Gioberti, the leaders of the Catholic Reformist party of that time. Among the contemporary leaders he treats of the work of Don Romolo Murri, editor and socialist reformer; Padre Giovanni Semeria, student and writer; Professor Salvatore Minocchi, teacher of Hebrew in Florence; Signor Antonio Fogazzaro, Senator and Italy's greatest novelist. Especially characteristic of the propaganda in Italy has been the campaign of anonymous pamphlets and books which have been very influential, such as *A Soul-Crisis in Catholicism*; *To Pius X: What We Want. An Open Letter from a Group of Priests*; and the deservedly famous, *Programme of Modernism*, all of which have been translated into the English.

In the absence of a fuller discussion and history of the Italian Modernists, this statement will fill a very serious want of information in the English. The author has rendered a much-needed service in bringing together into a connected view, the scattered events and personages of this interesting movement.

---

#### DOCTRINAL

SCHMIDT, D. WILHELM. *Der Kampf um die Seele*. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1909. 406 pages. M. 6.

This work is an exhaustive and rather exhausting critique of the various views about the soul, held by leading philosophers and scientists, including psychologists, from the time of Locke and Descartes, until the present. There are copious citations in the text and in the footnotes from the authors discussed, together with running comments. The chronological order, in the main, guides the discussion. The bulk of the book deals with the views of Avenarius, Ernst Mach, Ostwald, Verworn, James, Münsterberg, and Ziehen. The author defends the reality of the soul in the traditional sense against all comers, together with a dualistic view of the world. His criticisms are keen and presented with skill and a mass of learning, but one feels that his chief difficulty springs from his failure to appreciate the application of the scientific method to psychic phenomena. "Not proven" is the burden of his argument. Consequently, he falls back upon earlier views, which, though also not proven (a point which he does not seem to realize), have respectability guaranteed (*sic*) by age. The unfinished character of experimental psychology, in the reviewer's opinion, may not properly be urged against the tentative results of that young science. Altogether, the work may be regarded as the production of a man who prefers that his settled convictions should not be modified in any way by new points of view.

HALL, JOHN A. *The Nature of God*. Philadelphia: The Lutheran Publication Society, 1910. 328 pages. \$1.25.

This series of lectures represents an interesting and not altogether consistent combination of interests. The Lutheran doctrines are interpreted partly under the dominance of a desire to show the incompetency of philosophy in the field and partly under the dominance of strong Hegelian influences. The result is a mysticism which appeals now to "experience," now to "revelation," and now to monistic personalism. At times the author's zeal leads him into indefensible statements. Bud-

dthism is "not a religion but a philosophy" (p. 121). "A comparison of one religion with another is out of the question. You might as well speak of comparative truth or comparative reality" (*ibid*). Religion "descends upon man and overpowers him. It has no earthly antecedents" (*ibid*). After reading an exposition of the doctrine of the trinity, the Hegelianism of which displaces any accurate historical appreciation of the Nicene doctrine, it will amuse the historian to read that the doctrine "was not a product of human thinking about God. Philosophy had no part in it" (p. 309). The author's loose use of philosophical concepts and his primary appeal to mysticism in the interests of a pre-conceived doctrinal position largely nullify the value of his book for scholarly readers.

MCCONNELL, FRANCIS J. *Religious Certainty*. New York: Eaton & Mains, 1910. 222 pages. \$1.00 net.

Although Dr. McConnell criticizes adversely what he conceives pragmatism to be, his argument represents an almost jubilant confidence in the functional vindication of religious beliefs. The concessions which he readily makes in the realm of biblical criticism are remarkable when we consider that the book bears the imprint of an evangelical denominational publishing house. But the eclecticism in his method precludes any clear or fundamental analysis of the problem. As a symptom of the passing of reliance on formal authority the book is significant. But the easy confidence of the author in his proposed substitutes leads one to wonder whether this newer style of apologetic will not beget a superficial satisfaction in the church which will rob religion of its old-time power.

GARDEIL, A. *Le donne rivelé et la theologie*. Paris: Gabalda et Cie., 1909. xxvii + 372 pages. Fr. 3.50.

The author's purpose is to defend Thomism against modernism. His entire argument rests upon the contention that human affirmation implies an absolute reality. He recognizes degrees in affirmation from concrete experience through the generalization of common-sense to necessary, reflective truth. Dogma and theology are corresponding developments from revelation. While their worth depends upon the worth of revelation, yet the Holy Spirit has been active in assuring the homogeneity of the development. Thomas represents the final word of theology; his doctrines are those of the church and are a true echo of the words of Christ which will never pass away.

SHUMAKER, E. ELLSWORTH. *God and Man. Philosophy of the Higher Life*. New York and London: Putnam, 1909. xi + 408 pages.

This volume disclaims metaphysical intent though it urges "a philosophy of life on its higher planes." The substance of the book was originally a doctorate dissertation. The thesis is that man is environed by many spheres, the greatest of all being that of Divine Spirit or God himself. By action and reaction God is seeking to impart himself to man, while man finds his richest life in God. The author believes that he has pointed the future path for the human mind. But the argument lacks firmness and in detail is not always exact. The reader notes a monotone of general illustrations. The effort to maintain a poetic trend affects the vigor of the thought. To the thinker the work will not appeal as a noteworthy contribution.

*The New Schaff-Herzog Encyclopedia of Religious Knowledge.* Edited by SAMUEL MACAULEY JACKSON, D.D., LL.D. (editor-in-chief), GEORGE W. GILMORE, M.A. (associate editor), and others. Vol. VI, Innocents-Liudger; Vol. VII, Liutprand-Moralities. New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1910. xvi+505 and xviii+502 pages. \$5.00 per volume.

The general character of this work has already been indicated in these columns in noticing earlier parts of the series. The present volume shows the same hesitating attitude toward modern methods of theological study, though, as before, writers from opposite standpoints are sometimes given a hearing. The custom of appending fairly full and up-to-date bibliographies to the more important articles is continued.

Vols. VI and VII have considerable material of special interest to biblical and theological students. Among the more extended treatments of Old Testament subjects are "Isaiah" (in which seven pages are given to expounding the traditional view of unity of authorship and pre-exilic origin for the entire book, while the theory of composite origin is set forth in two pages only), "History of Israel," covering both the biblical and post-biblical periods, "Jeremiah," "Jerusalem," "Job," and "Judea."

Some particularly important New Testament topics come within the scope of these volumes. Professors Warfield, of Princeton, and Bacon, of Yale, write on "Jesus Christ." The former condemns severely, sometimes even sneeringly and sarcastically, the method of so-called historical and literary criticism as applied to the study of the life of Jesus. Bacon (without reference to the preceding ten-page discussion by Warfield) in seven pages sets forth the modern critical view of Jesus' life. "Matthew" and "Mark," for which Jülicher is responsible, are concise statements of modern opinion about these gospels. Of less value, from the critical point of view, are the articles on "Luke," "John," "James." "Lord's Supper" (17 pages), only briefly touches on the New Testament phase of the subject. "Messiah, Messianism" is a valuable article. Of a more specifically theological character are "Inspiration," "Justification," and "Kingdom of God."

There are many other articles of value, some of them being given an unusually large, and perhaps disproportionate, amount of space; for example, "Japan" 9 pages, while "Judea" has only seven, "Lutherans" 15 pages, "The Mass" 16 pages, "Mennonites" 10 pages, "Methodists" 24 pages.



## BOOKS RECEIVED

The more important books in this list will be reviewed at length.

### OLD TESTAMENT AND ALLIED SUBJECTS

- Caspari, W. Vorstellung und Wort "Friede" im Alten Testament. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1910. 168 pages. M. 3.
- Die Schriften des Alten Testaments. Lieferungen 6 u. 7. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1910. xviii+163 pages. M. 1.60.
- Glazebrook, M. G. Studies in the Book of Isaiah. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1910. 349 pages. \$1.00.
- Paton, Lewis B. The Early Religion of Israel. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1910. 115 pages. \$0.50.
- Puukko, A. F. Das Deuteronomium. Eine literarkritische Untersuchung. Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1910. 303 pages. M. 6.
- Viteau, J. Les Psaumes de Salomon. Introduction, texte grec et traduction. Paris: Letouzey et Ane, 1911. 423 pages. Fr. 6.75.

### NEW TESTAMENT AND PATRISTICS

- Blagden, C. M. (editor). The Epistles of Peter, John, and Jude. Cambridge: University Press, 1910. 96 pages. 1s. 6d.
- Bouchany, J. La résurrection de Jesus-Christ. Les miracles évangéliques. Paris, Lecoffre, 1910. xxi+312 pages. Fr. 3.50.
- Brandt, W. Jüdische Reinheitslehre und ihre Beschreibung in den Evangelien. Giessen: Töpelmann, 1910. 64 pages. M. 2.70.
- D'Alma, Jean. Philon d'Alexandrie et le quatrième évangile. Paris: Nourry, 1910. viii+130 pages. Fr. 1.25.
- Holscher, G. Sanhedrin und Makkot. Die Mischnatractate "Sanhedrin" und "Makkot" ins Deutsche übersetzt und unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des verhältnisses zum neuen Testament mit Anmerkungen versehen. Tübingen: Mohr, 1910. viii+148 pages. M. 3.80.

- Huck, A. Synopse der drei ersten Evangelien. Tübingen: Mohr, 1910. xxxvii+223 pages. M. 4.40.
- Lietzmann, Hans. Liturgische Texte VI: Die Klementinische Liturgie aus den Constitutionen Apostolorum VIII nebst Anhang. Bonn: Marcus, 1910. 32 pages.
- Resch, Alfred. Das Galiläa bei Jerusalem. Eine biblische Studie. Ein Beitrag zur Palästina-kunde. Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1910. 53 pages. M. 1.30.
- Roi, Joh. de la. Neujüdische Stimmen über Jesum Christum. Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1910. 54 pages. M. 75.
- Schmitz, Otto. Die Opferanschauung des späteren Judentums und die Opferausagen des Neuen Testaments. Tübingen: Mohr, 1910. xii+324 pages. M. 9.60.
- Stosch, G. Die apostolischen Sendschreiben nach ihren Gedankengängen dargestellt. III Band. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1910. 165 pages.
- Thomas, Jules. Le Concordat de 1516 des origines, son histoire au XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle. Première Partie: Les origines du Concordat de 1516. Paris: Picard, 1910. 446 pages. Fr. 50.
- Ungnad, A. and Staerk, W. Die Oden Salomos aus dem Syrischen übersetzt, mit Anmerkungen. (Kleine Texte für theologische und philologische vorlesungen und Uebungen. Herausgegeben von Hans Lietzmann, No. 64). Bonn: Marcus und Weber, 1910. 40 pages. M. 0.80.

### CHURCH HISTORY

- Brown, John. The English Puritans. Cambridge: University Press, 1910. 160 pages. 1s.
- Burrage, C. New Facts concerning John Robinson, Pastor of the Pilgrim Fathers. Oxford: The University Press; London: Frowde, 1910. 35 pages. \$0.60.
- Gramaussel, E. La philosophie religieuse de Schleiermacher. Paris: Alcan, 1910. 288 pages. Fr. 5.

- Grimley, Horatio (translator). Saint Bernard, Abbot of Clairvaux. Selections from his writings. Cambridge: University Press, 1910. xv+286 pages. 1s. 6d.
- Holl, Karl. Die handschriftliche Ueberlieferung des Epiphanius. (Ancaratus und Panarion.) Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1910. 98 pages. M. 3.
- Humbert, A. Les origines de la théologie moderne. I. La renaissance de l'antiquité chrétienne (1450-1521). Paris: Lecoivre, 1910. 356 pages. Fr. 3.50.
- Knodt, E. Die Bedeutung Calvins und des Calvinismus für die protestantische Welt im Lichte der neueren und neuesten Forschung. Giessen: Töpelmann, 1910. 70 pages. M. 1.80.
- Maclean, A. J. The Ancient Church Orders. Cambridge: University Press, 1910. x+181 pages. 4s.
- Netzer, H. L'introduction de la messe romaine en France sous les Carolingiens. Paris: Picard, 1910. 366 pages. Fr. 7.
- Pisani, P. L'église de Paris et la révolution. III, 1796-1799. Paris: Picard, 1910. Fr. 3.50.
- Reichart, O. Religionsgeschichtliche Volksbücher. Martin Luther's Deutsche Bibel. Tübingen: Mohr, 1910. 44 pages. M. 0.80.
- Schermann, Theodor. Der liturgische Papyrus von der Balyzeh. Eine Abendmahlsliturgie des Ostermorgens. Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1910. 45 pages. M. 1.50.
- Thimme, Wilhelm. Augustin. Ein Lebens- und Characterbild auf Grund seiner Briefe. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1910. 206 pages. M. 3.
- Waring, J. H. The Political Theories of Martin Luther. New York: Putnam, 1910. 293 pages. \$1.50.
- Zegarski, Teofil. Polen und das basler Konzil. Inaugural Dissertation zur Erlangung der Philosophischen Doktorwürde. Posen: Verlags-Druckerei "Praca," 1910. 77 pages.
- Lahitton, J. Deux conceptions divergentes de la vocation sacerdotale. Paris: Lethielleux, 1910. 298 pages.
- Le dogme et l'évangile. Essai comparatif entre les dogmes de l'église catholique et les doctrines du Nouveau Testament. 2 vols. Paris: Nourry, 1910. 421 and 248 pages. Fr. 7.
- Lobstein, P. An Introduction to Protestant Dogmatics. 2d edition. Translated from the French by A. M. Smith. Chicago: University Press, 1910. 298 pages. \$1.62.
- Lyman, E. W. Theology and Human Problems. New York: Scribner, 1910. 219 pages. \$1.00.
- Mackenzie, W. D. The Final Faith. A Statement of the Nature and Authority of Christianity as the Religion of the World. New York: Macmillan, 1910. 243 pages. \$1.75.
- Montgomery, C. R. The Unexplored Self. An Introduction to Christian Doctrine for Teachers and Students. New York: Putnam, 1910. 249 pages. \$1.25.
- Turton, W. H. The Truth of Christianity. 7th ed., revised. New York: Putnam, 1910. 604 pages. \$1.25.
- Wendland, J. Der Wunderglaube im Christentum. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1910. viii+134 pages. M. 3.

## COMPARATIVE RELIGION

- Grill, J. Lao-Tszes Buch vom höchsten Wesen und vom höchsten Gut. (Tao-Te-King.) Tübingen: Mohr, 1910. 208 pages. M. 4.50.

## PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

- Ames, E. S. The Psychology of Religious Experience. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1910. 428 pages. \$2.50.
- Bornhausen, K. Der religiöse Wahrheitsbegriff in der Philosophie Rudolf Euckens. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck u. Ruprecht, 1910. 70 pages. M. 1.60.
- de Laguna, Theodore and Grace Andrus. Dogmatism and Evolution. Studies in Modern Philosophy. New York: Macmillan, 1910. 259 pages. \$1.75.
- Inge, W. R. Faith and Its Psychology. New York: Scribner, 1910. x+248 pages.
- Snowden, James H. The World a Spiritual System. New York: Macmillan, 1910. 316 pages. \$1.50.

## DOCTRINAL

- The Fundamentals. A Testimony. Vol. III. Chicago: Testimony Publishing Co., 1910. 126 pages. \$0.15.
- Krenher, Johannes. Zur Philosophie der Offenbarung. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1910. 238 pages.

## PRACTICAL THEOLOGY

- Bowne, B. P. *The Essence of Religion*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1910. 298 pages. \$1.50.
- Cunningham, W. *Christianity and Social Questions*. New York: Scribner, 1910. xv+232 pages. \$0.75.
- Mott, John R. *The Decisive Hour of Christian Missions*. New York: Student Volunteer Movement, 1910. 251 pages. \$1.
- Ward, Harry F. (editor). *Social Ministry. An Introduction to the Study and Practice of Social Service*. New York: Eaton & Mains, 1910. 318 pages. \$1.

## MISCELLANEOUS

- Philosophy. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1910. 406 pages. \$1.60.
- Dewey, John. *Influence of Darwin on Philosophy*. New York: Holt, 1910. vi+309 pages.
- Dowden, J. *The Church Year and Kalendar*. Cambridge: University Press, 1910. xxvi+160 pages. 4s.
- Henke, F. G. *A Study in the Psychology of Ritualism*. Chicago: University Press, 1910. 96 pages. \$1.05.
- Mehlis, G. *Logos Internationale Zeitschrift für Philosophie der Kultur*. Band 1, Heft 2. Tübingen: Mohr, 1910. 165 to 288 pages.
- Moore, A. W. *Pragmatism and Its Critics*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1910. 283 pages. \$1.25.
- Small, Albion W. *The Meaning of Social Science*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1910. 309 pages. \$1.50.
- Tanner, Amy E. *Studies in Spiritism*. New York: Appleton, 1910. 408 pages, \$2.50.
- Bonucci, A. *Verità e Realtà*. Rome: Formiggini, 1910. 518 pages.
- Cushman, H. E. *Beginner's History of Philosophy. Ancient and Mediaeval*

# THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY

Volume XV

APRIL, 1911

Number 2

## THE HISTORICAL CHARACTER OF THE GOSPEL OF MARK

---

F. CRAWFORD BURKITT

The University of Cambridge, Cambridge, England •

---

In the spring of 1910 I published a little work called *The Earliest Sources for the Life of Jesus*, forming one of the series called "Modern Religious Problems" edited by Dr. A. W. Vernon. In a work of 131 small pages much must be assumed rather than proved, and I am very grateful for the opportunity afforded me by the editors of the *American Journal of Theology* to explain more at length and in detail the view of the Gospel according to Mark which I sketched in my little book. I am inclined to believe in the traditional authorship of this gospel, and that a chief source of the information possessed by the author consisted of what he had heard from Simon Peter. Now-a-days such an opinion calls for some detailed defense. At the present moment there is going on in Germany a prolonged controversy about the general historicity of the New Testament under the title "Hat Jesus gelebt?" ("Did Jesus ever live?"). The leading skeptics are Professor Jensen, the Assyriologist, and Professor Arthur Drews; the defenders are "liberals" such as Professors Jülicher and Weinel. I do not propose to follow this controversy here, but I mention it to show that an investigation of the historicity of the Gospel according to Mark is not out of place.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See on this controversy the article by Professor Case in the last number of this Journal, pp. 20-42.

## TRADITION AND DOGMA

It may be convenient to make one or two preliminary observations on a question of principle. Ancient history, as it has come down to us, may be said to be derived from two sources, *Tradition* and *Dogma*. Another name for Dogma is Myth, but whereas some "dogma" may be true, "myth" is always used by us for something unhistorical. Tradition is ultimately something handed down from those who saw and heard; it may be distorted in transmission, but it had its origin in direct testimony. All true history is of this category, for true history cannot be invented, it must be handed down. On the other hand, there are things in the form of history which are ultimately based on an idea, not on testimony; this is what I am calling Dogma.

Now, of course, a tale which is pure tradition is perfectly rational, for no one doubts that the course of events, as seen with the eye of omniscience, is perfectly rational. Again, a tale which is pure dogma perfectly exhibits the dogmatic idea upon which it is based, for it is not bound down to the fixed and complicated course of actual fact. In practice, however, the two kinds of tale tend to become confused. Those who hand down tradition are often tempted to "improve" it by smoothing away what appear to be irrelevancies. More especially, in ages which had little conception of the massive uniformity of Nature, tales of wonder were introduced or (more often still) tales originally wonderful were in various ways heightened till they became miracles indeed. It is the general tendency of tradition to become more "miraculous" as it gets farther from the source, and less perfectly "natural." I am not thinking only of the wonders we read of in the New Testament. What I mean is this: the real historical George Washington was a remarkably truthful man; the current tradition about George Washington has come to represent him as a miracle of truthfulness.

The reverse process is often seen in the dogmatic tale. Mythological deities undergo a kind of humanization and become partly rationalized in the process. Hercules, for instance, is ultimately founded upon the sun, and the Twelve Labors of Hercules represent the sun's journey during the year through the twelve signs of the

Zodiac. But in the most familiar form of the story Hercules comes before us as a man, magnified and non-natural, but a man for all that, with human traits and partly conditioned by human limitations. Some of the saints in the churches' Calendar are certainly not mere holy men, around whom pious legend has woven tales of wonder: the contrary is the case; they are mythical personages, such as the Great Twin Brethren of heathen religion, who have been turned into human beings in the process of making their cult Christian, and they have dropped some of the wonders that belonged to them as gods in the course of their transformation.

The mere presence or absence of "miracles" in a document cannot decide for us whether we are to reckon it as "traditional" or "dogmatic," as historical or mythical. And in any case general rules may always mislead, if they are applied without intelligence and discrimination. But there is one rule that generally holds. It is this: as we trace to its source a story known in successive stages or recensions, one that is ultimately mythical gets less and less rational, while the underlying dogma or idea becomes clearer; on the other hand, the nearer we trace to its source a story that is ultimately historical, the better it fits in with a rational view of things, though sometimes the "point" of the story seems to suffer. Irrelevant details appear, the hero is not so uniformly successful, his adversaries not so uniformly discomfited. As we get nearer the source of a real historical story, the complexity of the real course of events makes its appearance; we get a nearer view, with details that are often different from what we should have expected when we stood further off.

#### TEXT AND INTEGRITY OF MARK

The Gospel according to Mark, in the earliest text that has come down to us, ends at 16:8 with the words *ἐφοβοῦντο γάρ*. To most persons accustomed to the cadence of a Greek sentence, whether Attic or vulgar, this is almost enough of itself to prove that the conclusion is mutilated. As, however, Wellhausen still maintains<sup>2</sup> that the Gospel originally ended at 16:8, it may be worth while enumerating the arguments against such a view.

<sup>2</sup> *Das Evangelium Marci* (1909), 137.

These arguments, I venture to think, will show at the same time the difficulties in the way of those who regarded the curtailment as intentional.

At Mark 16:8 the narrative is left unfinished, the paragraph is left unfinished, the sentence is left unfinished. The narrative is left unfinished, for the evangelist's readers have been carefully prepared in 14:28 and 16:7 for an appearance of the Risen Jesus in Galilee; we expect either an account of it, or an explanation of why it did not happen. The paragraph is left unfinished, for we want to know when the women, who fled from the tomb and said nothing to anyone, finally broke silence.<sup>3</sup> Most clearly of all, the sentence is left unfinished. Greek sentences do not often end with *γάρ*, and it is almost safe to say Greek paragraphs never end with *γάρ*. The only other sentence in the New Testament that ends with *γάρ* is John 13:13, and that (*εἰμὶ γάρ*) is a mere parenthesis in the middle of a continuous speech. When Mark wishes to tell us that certain persons did not know what to say because they were afraid, he does not end with *γάρ*: he tells us that Peter and his companions did not know what reply to make, *ἐκφοβοῖ γὰρ ἐγένοντο* (9:6). Or again, we may consider how very abrupt the paragraph Mark 11:15-18 would be, if it had finished in the middle of vs. 18 with *ἐκφοβοῦντο γάρ*. In fact, I venture to think Westcott and Hort have not gone far enough when they end Mark 16:8 with a colon (*ἐκφοβοῦντο γάρ*); the clause is unfinished, *γάρ* should have no stop after it at all and it should have a grave accent *ἐκφοβοῦντο γὰρ . . .*). In a word, we ought to translate the half-verse "and they said nothing to any one, for they were afraid of . . .," leaving it to conjecture whether the next missing words were "the Jews" or "telling their companions."

But if the sentence, as well as the paragraph, is not finished at Mark 16:8, it becomes improbable that the Gospel can have been intentionally curtailed at this point. What originally followed it is impossible to know for certain. It has been conjectured that the Resurrection appearances may have been more "docetic" than those given in Matthew, Luke, and John. But if that were

<sup>3</sup> See Lake, *The Historical Evidence for the Resurrection*, 73, 78 f.

the reason for cancelling the end of Mark, why should the cancel have been made in the middle of a sentence? If the person who made the cancellation was unable or unwilling himself to supply a passable conclusion (a most improbable supposition), why was the cut not made at 16:7? It may safely be affirmed that it ought to be possible to add *Amen!* at the end of every early Christian writing of which the conclusion is preserved, if not as part of the work itself, yet at least as the response of those to whom it was read. But who feels inclined to add *Amen!* at the end of Mark 16:8?

I believe that there is no satisfactory answer to be given to these questions, and that the only conclusion possible is that the end of the Gospel of Mark is not extant, because the work has been *accidentally* mutilated. But then it follows (i) that we do not know the original extent of the work, and (ii) that all our texts are derived from the one mutilated copy. It is not improbable that what is missing at the end is more, considerably more, than a single "leaf" or a few columns at the end of a roll. As I pointed out in my book,<sup>4</sup> it is not unlikely that Rhoda the servant-girl owes her literary immortality to Mark: it was in the house of the mother of "John surnamed Mark" that she ran back and told her tale while "Peter continued knocking."

Most of what I have been saying is hardly new, though some of it has often been forgotten. My special reason for laying stress upon it here is to consider the second corollary. If all our copies of Mark be derived from a single copy mutilated at the end, some signs of mutilation will appear elsewhere, and the most likely form this will take is paleographical corruption in the text. If the ancestor of all our copies was torn at the end, it may very well have been torn or illegible in other places.

Minute corruptions, such as *ὑπὸ* for *ἐπὶ* in Mark 4:21, or those concerned with the spelling of *πλήρης* in 4:28, do not concern us here, for they are incidents of transcription which may have occurred and been corrected again many times independently. Nor again do I venture to include the broken construction of 4:31, 32, or the amazingly inaccurate chronological statement

<sup>4</sup> *Sources*, 84.



about the Passover in 14:12: such things are the faults of an author, rather than of a transcriber or editor. But the transmitted text of Mark 3:17; 8:10; 12:4 does look to me like the result of paleographical corruption.

Mark 3:17: *βοανηργές*. "Boanerges" is explained by the evangelist to mean "Sons of Thunder," but without this explanation no Hebrew or Aramaic scholar would have guessed the meaning. We should expect *βανηράμα*, or *βανηράμ*, or (as Jerome thought) *βανηρέμ*.<sup>5</sup> It is, I fear, impossible to discover what Mark wrote, or precisely how our present text originated: the one thing certain is that *Boanerges* presents every token of being a scribe's blunder.

Mark 8:10: *ἦλθεν εἰς ταμερηδαλμανουθα*. Here again we have a misspelt proper name, this time a geographical one. It is an old puzzle, for our First Evangelist evidently knew as little as we do about "the parts of Dalmanutha," and turned them into "the neighborhood of Magadan" (*τὰ ὄρια Μαγαδάν*, Matt. 15:39).<sup>6</sup> Following this conjecture most of the "Western" texts read in Mark 8:10 *finis Mageda*, or *τὸ ὄρος Μαγεδᾶ*.<sup>7</sup> At the same time the ordinary text (with "Dalmanutha") is so odd, that we must regard it as relatively genuine and these Western approximations to the Matthaean text as secondary. But the corruption should be taken to include *τὰ μέρη* as well as *Δαλμανουθά*. The context demands that Jesus went definitely to some *town*, such as Capernaum or Bethsaida, not to "the parts of" some *country*, such as Galilee or Samaria. I venture to suggest that *ταμερηδαλμανουθα* is intended for Tiberias-near-Amathus (Josephus, *Ant.*, xviii, 2, 3), whether the form written by Mark was *ἦλθεν εἰς Τιβερίάδα Ἀμαθοῦς*, or something similar. In any case, "the parts of Dalmanutha" do not belong to real geography.

<sup>5</sup> "*Banereem* filii tonitruī, quod corrupte *Boanerges* usus optinuit" (*Lagarde, O S*, 669).

<sup>6</sup> According to Eusebius (*O S*, 282:83), this is *ἡ Μαγεδάνη*, a then known locality in the neighborhood of Gerasa. That it does not quite fit the context only shows that Matthew's emendation was not based on authentic tradition.

<sup>7</sup> So the Greek minuscule numbered 28 (*sic*) and the Sinai Palimpsest (*Syr. S*). This piece of Greek evidence is fatal to Wellhausen's conjecture that *כרם* in *Syr. S* does not mean "the hill" (Wellhausen's *Marcus*, ed. 2, p. 61).

Mark 12:4: *ἐκεφαλῶσαν* is surely nothing more than a paleographical blunder for *ἐκολάφισαν*. The first slave sent by the Lord of the Vineyard to receive the produce from the Wicked Husbandmen was beaten, the third was killed. This second one was insulted (*ἠτίμασαν*) as well as subjected to the treatment indicated by *ἐκεφαλῶσαν*, or (as most MSS read) *ἐκεφαλαίωσαν*. It is much more likely that this was a scribal error of the copy which was torn at the end, from which all our copies are derived, than that Mark invented quite unnecessarily a new Greek word to tell us that the man had something done to his head.

There may be other accidental primitive corruptions in the transmitted text of Mark, such as the omission of a word or short clause which does not seriously disturb the sense, where therefore the corruption cannot be certainly demonstrated. In that way some critics may feel inclined to explain away the few striking verbal resemblances between Matthew and Luke not shared by Mark. I am not prepared to lay much stress on this, for it is by no means certain that Matthew had the full un mutilated Mark before him. It is not inconceivable that the compiler of our Gospel according to Matthew may have been acquainted only with the mutilated form of Mark that ends with 16:8 (at *ἐφοβοῦντο γὰρ . . .*). Be that as it may, the importance of the demonstration of the transmission of Mark through a single mutilated copy lies chiefly in this—that it illustrates the extreme narrowness of the channel through which our knowledge of the external events of the Ministry has come down to us.

#### WREDE'S "MESSIASGEHEIMNIS"

The controversy to which I referred at the beginning of this paper is mainly interesting as an indication of the state of general information about the Gospel in the most learned country in the world. The investigator can, if he chooses, leave it more or less on one side. But no one who treats Mark as a historical document can afford to neglect the book called *Messiasgeheimnis*, published in 1901 by the late Professor Wrede.<sup>8</sup> This work is the most radical attack upon the historicity of the gospel tradition that has

<sup>8</sup> William Wrede was professor at Breslau. He died in 1907.

ever been made. It is not that Wrede's solution is satisfactory; far from it. But some of the questions which he raised are real and fundamental problems, which cannot be settled by offhand or conventional answers.

Wrede starts off by assuming the literary priority of the Gospel of Mark. Fifty years of investigation from various points of view have proved that Matthew and Luke are based on a document which is either our Mark (as I myself believe), or a document which only differs from our Mark in small and comparatively unimportant details. Above all, it is the Markan framework upon which the fresh matter in the other gospels is arranged. The Fourth Gospel, of course, Wrede leaves out of account, at least in his preliminary stages, as being from a historical point of view altogether secondary. But this way of looking at our authorities for the gospel history, a way not peculiar to Wrede, and shared indeed by him with almost all modern investigators, makes our knowledge of the course and development of the life of Jesus to rest entirely on the authority of the Gospel of Mark.<sup>9</sup> If the general plan of Mark be historical, our general notion of the career of Jesus may be historical; if not, our general notion rests on nothing and must simply fall to pieces.

Wrede further points out that very few investigators of the gospel history are content to take the narrative of Mark as it stands. "Man subtrahiert und man deutet um" (p. 85). This process of *diminishing* and of *explaining away* the perplexing element in Mark, an element by no means confined only to "miracles," is, according to Wrede, unscientific and historically unsound. It assumes that Mark is a historical account overlaid with unhistorical embroidery. But what right have we, if we declare so much of the tale to be unhistorical, to be sure that there is any historical kernel at all?

Naturally Wrede does not deny the existence of Jesus of Nazareth, and he is quite willing to admit a number of more or less historical features which have been incorporated in the picture drawn by Mark, and to have come down to us. According to Wrede,

<sup>9</sup> Wrede, *op. cit.*, 6.

Jesus came forward as a teacher, first and principally in Galilee. He was surrounded by a company of disciples, went about with them, and gave them instruction. To some of them he accorded a special confidence. A large multitude sometimes attached itself to him, in addition to the disciples. He is fond of discoursing in parables. Besides the teaching there are the miracles. These make a stir, and he is thronged by the multitudes. He gives special attention to the cases of demoniacs. He is in such close touch with the people that he does not hesitate to associate even with publicans and sinners. Towards the law he takes up an attitude of some freedom. He encounters the opposition of the Pharisees and the Jewish authorities. They set traps for him and endeavour to bring about his fall. Finally they succeed, when he ventures to show himself not only on Judæan soil, but in Jerusalem. He remains passive and is condemned to death. The Roman administration supports the Jewish authorities.<sup>10</sup>

Wrede then goes on to point out that these are very far from being the chief features of the portrait of Jesus given us in Mark. The characteristic feature in that portrait is that Jesus is, and at the same time is not, the Messiah. According to Wrede, the historical Jesus, though he may have been the ethical teacher and the good physician, was not the Christ and did not claim to be the Christ. It was the conviction of Peter and Peter's companions that Jesus had appeared to them alive after his crucifixion, which made them for the first time draw the inference, "Our Rabbi must have been the Messiah."

Those who have read Schweitzer's *Von Reimarus zu Wrede* know the answer that a thoroughgoing eschatologist can make to Wrede's general conclusions. We might further ask Wrede what reason there is for regarding the historical Jesus as a teacher or as a healer, if the account in Mark be regarded as quite unhistorical. But after all, this is giving up the case to the professed skeptic: it does not answer the difficulties of detail raised by Wrede in the exegesis of the actual text of Mark.

And Wrede's book undoubtedly makes out a most impressive case. How are we to look at the claim of Jesus to have been the Messiah in his own lifetime? In what sense did he "come forward as Messiah"? What do the "injunctions of silence" after mighty works really mean? And how are we to interpret the public acts

<sup>10</sup> Wrede, *op. cit.*, 130, quoted also in Schweitzer's *Quest of the Historical Jesus* (i.e., the English translation of *Von Reimarus zu Wrede*), 336.

of Jesus that do really imply "Messianic claims"? By what defense can we save the historical credit of the Gospel of Mark from Wrede's formidable attack?

It is undoubtedly a formidable attack, slow, methodical, relentless, moving along like the Car of Juggernaut. I confess that I am going to "take it lying down," and that all I venture to do by way of amelioration is by way of *subtrahieren* and *umdeuten*, by diminishing some of the weight of the attack, and by moving the car a little, ever so little, to the side. By these means I hope to do something toward saving the credit of Mark's Gospel as a historical document.

#### THE EVANGELIST AND HIS MATERIALS

We do not possess the sources, whatever they may have been, from which the evangelist Mark worked. But the way in which the text of Mark itself is altered in certain directions by later evangelists does in some cases suggest that, so far from forcing history to fit his dogmas, he was rather encumbered by historical data that he did not dare to modify. No better instance can be given than the familiar tale of the Barren Fig Tree.

Everyone knows the story in Matt. 21:18-22:

In the morning as he returned to the city, he hungered. And seeing a fig tree by the wayside he came to it and found nothing thereon but leaves only; and he saith to it "Let there be no fruit from thee henceforward for ever." And the fig tree withered away immediately. And seeing it the disciples marvelled, saying "How did the fig tree wither away immediately?" And Jesus answered and said to them "Amen, I say to you, if ye have faith and doubt not, ye shall not only do what is done to the fig tree, but even if ye should say to this mountain Be thou taken up and cast into the sea, it shall be done. And all things, whatsoever ye shall ask in prayer, believing, ye shall receive."

There is really no fault to be found with the telling of this story, except its general improbability. According to the tale as told by Matthew, no room is left for rationalization on *a priori* grounds. Jesus withers the fig tree immediately by a word, showing thereby his complete control over nature, and he uses the incident to enforce the lesson that a man with perfect faith will obtain in prayer whatever he asks for. If the incident had been

reported by Matthew alone, we should have felt ourselves justified not only in disbelieving the story, but also in regarding it as manifestly mythical, a piece of invention designed to enforce the doctrine of the magical efficacy of believing prayer.

But, as a matter of fact, this is not the literary genesis of the story in Matthew. Really it is derived from the story told in Mark 11:12-14, 19-25. From the point of view of effect, the truth of the tale being assumed, it has been immensely improved by Matthew's recasting, but from the point of view of the historian, who does not assume that what he is told is all true, but desires to elicit the truth if there be any, the original in Mark is far more instructive. Mark has:

On the morrow when they were come out from Bethany he hungered. And seeing a fig tree afar off having leaves, he came if haply he might find anything thereon: and coming to it he found nothing but leaves; for it was not the season of figs. And he answered and said to it "No man eat fruit from thee henceforward for ever." And his disciples heard. . . . [*Here follows the Cleansing of the Temple.*]

And every evening he went forth out of the city; and passing by in the morning they saw the fig tree withered away from the roots, and Peter calling to remembrance saith to Him "Rabbi, lo, the fig tree which thou cursedst is withered away!" And Jesus answering saith to him "Have faith in God,—Amen, I say to you, whosoever shall say to this mountain Be thou taken up and cast into the sea, and shall not doubt in his heart, but shall believe that what he saith cometh to pass, he shall have it. Therefore I say to you, All things whatsoever ye pray and ask for, believe that ye have received them and ye shall have them. And whensoever ye stand praying, forgive if ye have aught against any man, that your Father in heaven also may forgive you your trespasses."

I do not propose to set forth a conjecture as to what really happened to the fig tree, for I do not know and I do not think the evidence is of a kind that will tell us. But the impression made upon me by the tale in Mark is not of dogmatically invented history, but of a transmission of traditions with which the writer is somewhat embarrassed.

Of all current explanations, surely the most improbable is the often-repeated theory that Mark's narrative is a distorted version of the Parable of the Fig Tree given in Luke 13:6-9. I cannot but suppose that the story in Mark, so odd, so unmoral, so unlike

conventional ideas of what Jesus ought to have done and said, does really rest upon reminiscence, however inaccurate, of an actual occurrence. I do not profess to know what caused the fig tree to be withered twenty-four hours after Jesus had spoken, but the final verse about forgiveness—quite unexpected, quite unlike what a mere compiler would have added—suggests to me a genuine Saying, corresponding to a change of mood in Jesus himself. It was not Jesus, but Peter, who noticed the tree this second morning. On the previous day Jesus was crossing over to set the Temple in order. He is now convinced that his word had doomed the tree; does it warn him to forgive his adversaries in Jerusalem?

In any case it would have been perfectly easy for Mark to have told the story more effectively, if he had felt himself free to do so; the narrative in Matthew shows us how easily it could be done. The real value of the tale of the Fig Tree for us today is that it exhibits the evangelist as a transmitter of reminiscence, rather than as a dogmatic historian.

#### THE ENTRY INTO JERUSALEM

We can now go back to discuss the Entry into Jerusalem, as told in Mark. The importance of the incident for the modern critic lies in its alleged messianic character. This is more or less true of the tale as told both in Matthew and in Luke. And here again we may use their methods as giving us some kind of idea in what directions an early Christian evangelist would modify tradition.

The characteristic of the Entry is its publicity: what interests the modern critic in it is the action of the crowd. The Evangelist Matthew tells us *his* view of the matter; he says, What came to pass happened that the prophecy of Zechariah might be fulfilled. That is a perfectly proper view for a later Christian to take, given the current theory of prophecy; but Matthew is not so unhistorically minded as to tell us that the crowds who shouted were trying to fulfil a passage in the Old Testament. We may go further: it is possible that Jesus himself, or one or two out of those who intimately shared their Master's thoughts, may have

thought that the King was coming to the Daughter of Zion as had been foretold. The question is whether they imparted their thoughts to the crowd, whether this modest procession was messianic to the crowd, whether it was a *public* claim by Jesus and his followers that he was the Christ.

According to Matt. 21:9 the crowds cried "Hosanna to the Son of David"; according to Luke 19:38 they cried "Blessed is the King." With such phases going before, "Blessed is he that cometh in the Name of the Lord" can mean nothing but "Here is the Christ, David's predestined heir." On the other hand, it is right to notice that each of these evangelists actually tells us what was in the minds of the crowd. Luke (vs. 37) says they were praising God for all the mighty works they had seen, and Matthew (vs. 11) says that they told the people of Jerusalem that Jesus was a prophet from Galilee. Here then is a patent contradiction: the crowd uses messianic cries, but its intention is not to herald the Messiah.

We turn to Mark, the source of both Matthew and Luke, for an explanation, and we find it is quite simple. All that has happened is that the later evangelists, in paraphrasing the words of their source, have made the *voces populi* more Christian than the earliest tradition had handed down. With every inducement to make the Galilean crowd salute Jesus as king, Mark has avoided doing so. According to Mark, Jesus rides in the midst of a group of enthusiastic adherents, but what they say is merely (Mark 11:9, 10): "Hosanna! Blessed is he that cometh in the Name of the Lord! Blessed is the coming Kingdom of our father David! Hosanna in the highest!" In this, the phrase from Ps. 118:26 means no more than it usually does in a Jewish mouth, viz., "greeting in God's name," a saying appropriate to anyone who comes on a religious errand. The disciples do proclaim the kingdom of David, which is Messiah's kingdom, the kingdom of God; they proclaim this kingdom to be at hand, just as Jesus (Mark 1:15) and John the Baptist had done. But they do not proclaim the Prophet of Galilee to be the Messiah.

And what is the conclusion of the Entry into Jerusalem, according to Mark? Is all the city moved? Does Jesus proceed at



once to cast out the buyers and sellers from the Temple, while the children cry "Hosanna to the Son of David"? No: Mark says (11:11), "And he entered into Jerusalem into the Temple, and having looked round on everything, it being now late, he went forth to Bethany with the Twelve." I find it difficult to believe that this is the voice of a dogmatic historian; it sounds to me more like that of the interpreter of Simon Peter, the chronicler of Simon Peter's reminiscences.

All this is not to belittle the gospel history. In the light of after events the doings of Jesus and the disciples are of great importance *to us*, but it is a mistake to suppose that to contemporary observers they must have seemed more than a ripple on the surface. And still more mistaken is the view that turns the shouting crowd into anything more than a company of Galileans who had come up to the Holy City from Jericho with one whom they believed to be a prophet sent from God.

But someone may say, "What of the blind man Bartimaeus at Jericho? Did not he greet Jesus as 'Son of David'?" Here again it seems to me that we must distinguish between the actual incident and what Christian thought made of it. That a blind beggar should call anyone "Son of David," when expecting or begging for a gift, is surely not in itself very remarkable. Peter might take it for an omen, Jesus himself might take it for an omen, but the crowd merely tell the blind man to hold his tongue.

If this view be taken of the Entry into Jerusalem, Wrede's remark, that here Jesus let himself be the subject of "a messianic ovation," simply falls to the ground.<sup>11</sup> As we have seen, the Entry into Jerusalem was, according to Mark, the ovation of a prophet of the kingdom of God, but not a public claim to be Messiah. It does not contradict the refusal of Jesus two days later to tell the Temple aristocracy by what authority he acted.<sup>12</sup>

<sup>11</sup> Wrede, *op. cit.*, 40, 69, 237.

<sup>12</sup> This is a convenient place to record my opinion that the events related in Mark 11:2-6; 14:13-16, do hint at previous acquaintanceships and arrangements in Jerusalem, but surely if the evangelist had intended the colt tied by the way-side or the man bearing the water-pot to have been there by miracle, or have been known to have been there by miracle, he would have given some indication of it. We are not told that the disciples "marveled," or said, "Who then is this?"

It must not be forgotten that the question whether Jesus of Nazareth was the Christ and the question whether he spoke and acted with divine Authority are two questions, not one. To us, indeed, they seem like two ways of regarding the same problem. We are inclined to doubt the reality of messages from the unseen world, so that if we regard the Mission of Jesus as having been in any sense real we are probably content to think of him as the true Messiah. But that is not the way in which Jews looked at the matter in the first century A.D. Of the special historical positions championed by Schweitzer none seems to me more probable, or more illuminating, than the theory that what changed the populace at Jerusalem from an attitude of friendly attention to one of contemptuous indifference, was simply this—that they found out that the prophet from Galilee actually had claimed to be the Messiah.<sup>13</sup>

Eighteen centuries and a half of Christian theology have dulled our appreciation of the paradox implied by such a claim. We tend to confuse the rôle of Elijah, who prepares for the kingdom of God, with that of the Messiah, who rules in the kingdom when God has made it a present reality. For a man to claim to be the Messiah, when he was not *de facto* King of Israel and Ruler of the kings of the earth, was a patent contradiction. That Jesus the Nazarene was really a prophet, sent with a message from the God of Israel, was not an unreasonable claim. It might be true; even so Amos had come to the capital with a message from God to his people. But when the Messiah is come, all the world will know it: "he will summon all the nations, and some of them he will spare and some of them he will slay."<sup>14</sup> When the Jewish multitudes at Jerusalem heard that the Galilean prophet had claimed to be Messiah, being at the time a prisoner in custody, they lost interest in him altogether. A Messiah in prison, a Messiah who was being done to death, was no Messiah at all: "Let the Messiah," said they, "the King of Israel, come down now from the cross that we may see and believe!" There is no reason to suppose that those who mocked Jesus on the cross would have mocked him, substituting "Prophet" for "Messiah, King of

<sup>13</sup> *Quest.*, 395 (end of chap. xix).

<sup>14</sup> *Apocalypse of Baruch*, 72:2.

Israel," had he merely been put to death for claiming to be sent from God. No one doubted that John the Baptist had been sent from God, merely because Herod had murdered him. But an unsuccessful Messiah, as Paul very truly says, was a scandal.

#### MARK'S PICTURE OF THE MINISTRY

The discussion of the Entry into Jerusalem concerns much more than a detail of exegesis. If the view here taken be correct, both as to the event itself and as to Mark's account of it, then what is reckoned by Wrede as the great inconsistency of Mark disappears, and the question arises why we should not take as genuine history Mark's "dogma" that the messiahship of Jesus was a secret. There are three alternatives. There is the ordinary view, that Jesus, at least in the later period of his career, publicly declared himself as Messiah. There is Wrede's view, that he did not claim to be Messiah in his lifetime nor was thought to be so by his disciples, but was first believed to have been the Messiah as a result of the visions or appearances which the disciples experienced after his death on the cross. And there is the view set forth in Mark, that Jesus was indeed convinced that he was the Messiah and that his intimate disciples came to believe it, too, but that he bade them keep it secret from the world in general. According to Mark, Jesus avows his messiahship before Caiaphas, but only when his condemnation to death was already decided on and his judges were merely seeking a convenient pretext for the sentence.

One of the most serious objections to Wrede's view is that it does not explain why the appearances of Jesus to Simon Peter and others after his death should have made them think that their Master was the Messiah. There is a vast difference between the inference "Our Rabbi must have been the Messiah," which is what Wrede makes Peter draw, and "Our Rabbi must have been the Messiah *after all*," which is what the other theories demand. It is possible to understand that the disciples came to believe that Jesus was what he claimed to be; it is very hard to believe that his appearing to them should have made them think of him for the first time as Messiah.

But now we have to consider in turn Wrede's main objection

to Mark's account of the Ministry, that the course of events as given by Mark is totally inconceivable and contradictory, and that what makes it so contradictory is the "dogma" of the secret messiahship. It is inconceivable, according to Wrede, that the disciples should have been so unreceptive; it is inconceivable that the demoniacs should have been so quick to recognize him; it is inconceivable that the injunctions of silence after miraculous cures should have had any effect, if cures such as are described took place—and if they did not take place, what becomes of Mark's picture?

Let us begin by admitting a great deal of Wrede's acute criticism of the narrative of Mark to be fair and to the point. He reminds us that we cannot regard the gospel demoniacs as being cases of nervous disease and at the same time ascribe to them supernatural knowledge. Mark does ascribe to them, or rather to the demons by which these men were "possessed," supernatural knowledge of the person of Jesus; but then he regards the demons as real persons, not as pathological states. If we are to continue to understand what Mark calls "a man with an unclean spirit" to be a man suffering from epileptic fits or some form of "alienation," we must further understand that the definite recognition of Jesus by the unclean spirit as "Holy one of God" (1:24), or "Christ" (1:34), or "Son of the Most High" (vs. 7), must be regarded as interpretations given to inarticulate cries by Mark or by the tradition which he is following.

In doing this, however, we ought to realize quite clearly that we are reconstructing the scene in accordance with what we think probable, and so far as we do so we must recognize that the details of the story as given in Mark arise from imagination and not directly from reminiscence. But after all, is not the operation of this kind of imagination historically probable? These stories that we read in the gospel, supposing them to be based on Peter's reminiscences, are what Peter remembered of the few decisive months in Galilee after twenty years of Christian experience. Indeed, according to Christian tradition, they are not even that: they are what Mark remembered of Peter's reminiscences after Peter's death. We need not, therefore, expect an impossible standard of accuracy in reporting. That Jesus impressed those

who heard him as one who spoke with personal authority, that he cured men afflicted with nervous disorders by exercising his personal authority, that such men frequently showed that they felt the personal influence of Jesus, as soon or even before he spoke directly to him—that is what I consider historically probable, and that is what seems to me to be indicated by the narratives of Mark in which the demons are said to recognize Jesus as the Messiah or the Son of God at a time when no normal human being was giving him such titles.

We come now to the "Injunctions of Silence": what are we to make of them? And here I venture to think that some of the difficulty arises from *Vorstellungen*, from preconceived notions, not Peter's and Mark's, but of our own modern hygienic philanthropy. Do we not tend to consider our Lord as if he were the medical officer of a philanthropic institution, bound to give his professional services to all who come forward? We sometimes do not think the matter out and so we allow ourselves to mix up incongruous historical presentations. Even if Jesus were endowed with full divine power to heal all and every disease, there is no more reason to suppose that the divine power incarnate in Jesus would have entered into a general crusade to cure and heal indiscriminately, than the same divine power does today in London or Chicago. In any case the message of Jesus was, "The kingdom of God is at hand; repent and believe," not, "The kingdom of God is at hand; come and be cured." Luke the Physician does indeed tend to lay stress on the cures accomplished by Jesus, but even he never represents Jesus as searching out patients. The gospel cures are all occasional, unpremeditated.

Is it then surprising that our oldest historical source should represent Jesus as commanding those whom he did heal to say as little as possible about it? It represents him not indeed as withdrawing himself from the ignorant or the sinner (2:17), but yet as withdrawing from the crowd (3:9); it is by a special and occasional feeling of pity, not out of general and constitutional philanthropy, that he gives up a plan of temporary retirement (6:34).

In one respect these injunctions of silence differ from the rebukes to the demons. The sick folk who have been healed are simply

told to say nothing about their cure. Mark does not say that the sick folk recognized Jesus to be the Messiah as the result of their cure, or indeed that anyone recognized Jesus as the Messiah because he did cures. No one expected the Messiah to do cures or exorcisms. Elijah had raised the widow's son, Elisha had cured Naaman, but David had not been a healer, and whether the Messiah was conceived as the Son of David or as the altogether supernatural Judge of men, there is nothing to show that they looked for him to be an exorcist. After the event, the evangelist Matthew sees in the healings performed by Jesus a fulfilment of prophecy<sup>15</sup> and turns the mere astonishment of the crowds into the question "Can this be the Son of David?"<sup>16</sup> But there is nothing of this in Mark. There we read, and it is supported by the source Q, that the adversaries of Jesus supposed that he worked exorcisms by a pact with the demon Beelzebul, and the reply of Jesus is, "No, if the demons are being driven out, that shows their time is fast coming to an end. It is as I say, the Kingdom of God is at hand."<sup>17</sup>

In Mark what we sometimes call "the ministry of healing" is represented as an accident and an importunity, something which takes place as the result of an interruption, something granted as a special favor, certainly as something unsought by Jesus and outside his own plans. Can we wonder that the boon is sometimes granted with a caution to say nothing about it? And why? The reason is surely plain. Not so much that the past cure shall not be talked of, but that no further encouragement may be given to future applicants, who may be, and probably will be, quite unsuitable.<sup>18</sup>

It will be convenient rapidly to run through the various "mighty works" recorded in Mark and see where the injunctions of silence actually come.

Mark 1:21-27 (the Demoniac in the Synagogue): Here we have an interruption of the "teaching" by a madman who is quieted by the personal

<sup>15</sup> Matt. 8:17.

<sup>16</sup> Matt. 12:23: contrast Luke 11:14.

<sup>17</sup> Mark 3:26: cf. Luke 11:20=Matt. 12:28 (from Q).

<sup>18</sup> What the belief that a man is a *hakim* means in the East may be seen from the pathetic account in E. G. Browne's *Year among the Persians*, e.g., pp. 342, 345.

authority of Jesus. It is the first incident of the kind and makes a great sensation. There is no injunction of silence as to the cure: it is the "demon" who is told to hold his tongue and go (*φίμωθῆτι καὶ ἔξελθε*).

Mark 1:28 (the fame of Jesus): cf. 7:37: No doubt these perorations are the composition of the evangelist; there is no hint in them that anyone takes the wonder-worker to be the Messiah.

Mark 1:29-31 (Peter's wife's mother): The first cure of illness, as distinct from what was regarded as exorcism.

Mark 1:32-38 ("At even, when the sun did set"): The result of the scene in the synagogue is that as soon as the legal Sabbath is over a great crowd comes with invalids and madmen to be treated: "many" are healed. There is no injunction of silence—what would have been the good?—but the ejaculations of the mad and the half-witted are suppressed. This was understood by the evangelist, and probably by the evangelist's informant, whoever it may have been, to have been occasioned by the supernatural knowledge of the demons, who are commanded not to betray the secret of the messiahship. Given the commanding influence which Jesus possessed and exercised over these "alienists" (to use the modern medical slang), is not the interpretation given in Mark psychologically natural for a Christian, who had been an eyewitness, to make?

Mark 1:35-38 (Jesus goes away alone): What is the result of the sudden popularity of Jesus, not as a prophet of the coming kingdom of God, but as a faith-healer and exorcist? The result is that he goes away alone, in order to make a new start elsewhere.

Mark 1:39 (another peroration).

Mark 1:40-45 (the Leper): The Leper's request, though granted, is received *with anger* (*ὀργισθεὶς*).<sup>19</sup> He is told to say nothing, but disobeys. As a result Jesus is thronged, and therefore avoids the towns. For all that, people begin to search him out in lonely places.

Mark 2:1-12 (the Paralytic), and 3:1-6 (the Withered Hand): These are cures done in public, where any injunction of silence would have been out of place. In each case the successful healing is followed by a withdrawal of Jesus from the town to the shores of the Sea of Galilee (2:13; 3:7), where he can get privacy from the crowd in a boat (3:9).

Mark 3:10, 11: This is another peroration, repeating what has been already said, that Jesus habitually silenced the demons.

Mark 4:35-41 (the Stilling of the Storm): No injunction of silence, but in its place we find a rebuke to the disciples for being "fearful."

Mark 5:1-20 (the Gerasene Demoniac and the Swine): The effect of the miracle here in this gentile district is not that Jesus is thronged by an importunate crowd, but that the inhabitants press him to go away (vs. 17). Here

<sup>19</sup> So Tatian, Codex Bezae, and the earlier Latins, instead of *σπλαγχνισθεὶς*. I cannot doubt that *ὀργισθεὶς* is the true reading.

again an injunction of silence would have been out of place and so we do not find one. The cured demoniac is told to go to his home in the Decapolis, very likely at Gerasa itself, and to tell in that heathen land how the *God of Israel* (ὁ κύριος, vs. 19) had had mercy on him. It seems to me probable that the story may have reached Mark from Gerasa, and that that is why the action is represented as taking place in "the country of the Gerasenes." In that case the ultimate authority for the tale would be the reminiscences of the recovered alienist himself.

Mark 5:21-43 (Jairus and the Woman with an Issue): In the Woman with an Issue we have the story of a cure done in public and therefore without an injunction of silence. But the daughter of Jairus is raised in a room from which the crowd has been excluded. What form, as a matter of fact, does the injunction take? Jesus belittles the case to the crowd: "the girl is not dead but asleep" (vs. 39); to the parents he says, "Say nothing about it, but take care of your child" (vs. 43), and—he goes elsewhere (6:1a).

Mark 6:5 (cures done in "his own country"): Here Jesus is not thronged, but meets with opposition. There is therefore no need for any "injunction of silence," and we find none.

Mark 6:35-45 (the Five Thousand): No injunction of silence, but the crowd is sent away at once; cf. 1:35; 3:13.

Mark 6:46-52 ("Walking on the Sea"): No injunction of silence; cf. 4:35-41.

Mark 6:53-56. A peroration, similar in scope to 1:28; 3:10 ff. There are here no injunctions of silence, but according to Mark it is now that Jesus actually carries out his plan of retiring into the heathen district of Tyre.

Mark 7:24-30 (the Syrophenician Woman): This whole story starts by explaining that Jesus had desired privacy, but failed to obtain it.

Mark 7:31-37 ("Ephphatha"): Here the deaf man is cured away from the crowd, and Jesus enjoins silence but is disobeyed. The concluding verses form a peroration similar to 1:28, etc.

Mark 8:1-10 (the Four Thousand): Similar to 6:46-52.

Mark 9:14-29 (the Lunatic Boy), 10:46-52 (Bartimaeus), and 11:12-14, 20-25 (the Barren Fig-Tree), contain no injunctions of silence.

Finally we have Mark 8:30 and 9:9, in which Peter and his companions are told not to speak of the messiahship or the Transfiguration of Jesus. It will be sufficient here to remark on these most important passages, that Peter, being now aware of the messiahship of Jesus, is thereby put on the same footing as the demons. The same reasons that made it expedient for the demons to keep silence will now also apply to Peter.

When all these passages are considered together, it will be seen



that they are consistent. They represent the messiahship of Jesus as a secret from men, not to be published abroad by those, whether men or demons, who for any reason are aware of it. Further, they represent Jesus as one who possessed indeed wonderful and inexplicable gifts of healing and power over Nature, but at the same time was unwilling to make these powers part of his plan. He goes out of his way to escape the crowds who flock to him on account of his reputation as a healer and exorcist. If he is persuaded to exercise his powers in circumstances where concealment is impossible he leaves the place at once. All this is inexplicable if the design of Jesus had been to "found a society" there and then, or to teach a new morality, or in any way to appeal to his own influence or activity. But it is quite consistent with the view that the main content of his "teaching" was, "The time is fulfilled and the Kingdom of God is at hand; repent and believe in the good news" (Mark 1:15). It is quite consistent with the view that he was waiting for the approaching End of the Age. It is consistent also with the view that he himself was persuaded that he was the destined Messiah, foreordained to be manifested as Messiah in God's good time. But meanwhile his work was to rouse God's people to repent. He had been sent not to be ministered unto but to minister, to save Israel from the wrath to come, not to be gazed at as a successful medicine-man. "Rejoice not," he said to some of his disciples when they boasted of their success, "rejoice not that the spirits are subject to you, but rejoice that your names are written in heaven."<sup>20</sup>

I have attempted to show that the "injunctions of silence" to Peter, and to the demons who were believed to have supernatural knowledge, not to betray the secret of the messiahship, were conditioned by the very idea of the messiahship. I have further pointed out that the "injunctions of silence" after wonderful healings are due to the very peculiar attitude ascribed by Mark to Jesus with reference to his powers over disease. In neither of these points are Wrede's strictures on Mark as a chronicler really justified. How are we to consider the remaining accusation,

<sup>20</sup> Luke 10:20; compare Enoch 114:1 f.: "Your names are written before the glory of the Great One. Be hopeful. . . . Soon ye will shine as the stars of heaven."

that the unreceptiveness of the disciples is inconceivable, if the course of events had really been as Mark depicts?

To begin with, we are surely right in "subtracting" something from the narrative as it stands. Most of us have read Dr. Sanday's interesting remark about accepting the narratives of miracle and the miraculous "with a note of interrogation."<sup>21</sup> We should no doubt have used different language had we witnessed the deeds of the Savior, for our whole view of the universe is different from that which was current in the first century A.D. among high and low, ignorant and educated alike. Besides, our narrative, even if it be based on the reminiscences of Peter the eyewitness, has passed through twenty or thirty years of Peter's Christian experience. No wonder that he may have blamed himself for not recognizing sooner in the Prophet of Galilee the Messiah-to-be. But after all, does the narrative of Mark represent the disciples as really so blind and unreceptive? When the storm appeared to die down at Jesus' word, they said, "Who then is this?" Were they justified in saying more? It was a proof to them that God was with their masterful Prophet, but it did not prove him to be the Messiah. The yoke of the Romans remained unbroken, things went on just as they had always done, there was no sign from heaven.

But though the followers of Jesus do not think of their Master as Messiah, they are loyal to him as a prophet. We only hear of one "traitor," and it is not certain what prompted the action of Judas Iscariot. It must be admitted that there was a good deal to try their loyalty. The "kingdom of God" was not more visibly at hand at the end of the ministry than at the beginning. Then, again, whenever Jesus spoke of the future it was always of the fiery trial coming: "Look at your own fate; you will be beaten and killed!" (Mark 13:9 ff.). "If anyone wants to follow me, let him follow me—to execution!" (Mark 8:34). Notwithstanding this, a company of Galileans do follow their Prophet and enter Jerusalem with him. Peter and some others of the more intimate associates of Jesus have guessed his secret. *They* know that he believes himself to be the destined Messiah and they believe it,

<sup>21</sup> Sanday, *Life of Christ in Recent Research* (1907), 103.

too, though some appear, from Mark 10:32, to have at times had their misgivings. But it is likely enough that their ideas about the future were both vague and crude. We have in Mark 8:31 f.; 9:31 f.; 10:33 f., what Peter remembered of his Master's predictions of his Passion in the light of after events, but even if the words were correctly remembered, what is it to be supposed that the disciples made of them? If "the Son of Man" had anything to do with the Man whom Daniel had seen in vision, what had he to do with being killed by men?

It seems to me that both the extreme views which have been held about the predictions of the Passion are untenable, and that the historical truth lies along the lines recorded by Mark. On the one hand, it is unreasonable to assume the complete accuracy of the words as given in Mark, and further to interpret them in the light of after events, and then to turn round and say that Peter after the arrest and trial of Jesus acted as though he had never heard the predictions. When a trusted leader prophesies disaster, even if the words be remembered, they are remembered with a saving clause—"it won't be so bad as all that." Afterward, on reflection, the disciple may say, "Ah! he was right after all," but that is a reflection for the period after the catastrophe, not during it. The memory of Jesus' predictions of ignominy and death with the hope of supernatural victory in the end, might come back to Peter after the crucifixion and prepare him for belief in the resurrection; at the moment of the crucifixion he might very well be conscious of nothing but the collapse of his hopes. On the other hand, the position championed by Wrede and others, who regard the predictions of the Passion as *vaticinia ex eventu*, leaves the belief in the resurrection, so persistent, so victorious, more mysterious than ever. It seems to me that the view set forth in Mark is essentially the historical view. The messiahship of Jesus was a conviction of the inner circle of disciples, a secret from the multitude. The minds of this inner circle were running on thrones and the messianic glory shortly to be revealed. Jesus had not "transformed the messianic idea," but he was thinking less of the messianic glory than of the bitter cup that he must first drink and the deep waters in which he must be "baptized."

Nevertheless there is a sense, on the eschatological view, in which it is true to say that Jesus had radically changed the messianic ideal. He had changed it, not by "spiritualizing" it, but by adding to it. The ideal of King Messiah, coming in glory on the clouds of heaven to judge the world and vindicate the elect of God, he left untouched, but he prefixed to it a prologue. He prefixed to it not a doctrine about Messiah, but the actual course of his own career. We call it his *ministry*—why? Because his view of the office of the Man who was predestined to be Messiah was that he should "minister" to the needs of God's people (Mark 10:45). According to Mark, Jesus went up to Jerusalem to die, to be killed, believing that thereby the kingdom of God would come. And his great resolve has to be judged in the light of its amazing success.

## THE INFLUENCE OF PSYCHOLOGY UPON THEOLOGY

---

CLARENCE AUGUSTINE BECKWITH  
Chicago Theological Seminary, Chicago

---

The application of psychology to the interpretation of religious experience is no new thing. The two most impressive instances of this are Augustine's *Confessions* and Edwards' *Treatise concerning the Religious Affections*. In Augustine the moral and religious consciousness is subjected to the most subtle and exhaustive analysis, the various forms of sin are hunted down through all the devious and intricate labyrinths of passionate and conflicting desire, and of will which both purposes and is baffled by its own mysterious contradiction. It is as if one were admitted to the holy of holies where the soul alone with its redeeming God searches, lays bare, and tests all its most hidden thoughts and feelings in the light which reveals and judges, condemns or forgives. It is indeed a *Via Dolorosa*, an *Imitatio Christi*, a spiritual prototype of the *Pilgrim's Progress*. Edwards' *Treatise concerning the Religious Affections* moves not so much in the region of autobiographical self-analysis as in the sphere of objective experience. After premising that the true religion in great part consists of holy affections, i.e., in vigorous and lively actings of the will or inclination, he subjects the ordinary signs that a work of grace is real to incomparably keen and subtle inquiry, and then proceeds to exhibit the universal and essential characteristics of truly gracious and holy affections. The theology here may be defective, the ideal too mediaeval and individualistic, but never have the inner qualities that mark the Christian life been searched out and described with more exact and penetrating psychological analysis than in Edwards' *Treatise*.

Such psychology as the church possessed would have influenced theology much more than it has but for two serious hindrances. In the first place, many phenomena found their sufficient explanation in their aloofness from general human experience; they were

miraculous and hence were referred not to men but to God. Prophecy "in its narrow sense as prediction" has been defined as the "foretelling of future events by virtue of divine communication from God."<sup>1</sup> This is not conceived as contravening any laws of the human mind, yet whatever may be true of these laws, the secret of the prediction lay in a miraculous action of the divine will upon the human mind. Inspiration has been defined as such an influence of the Spirit of God upon the sacred writers, that every statement of these writers was infallibly accurate, whether "scientific, historical, or geographical."<sup>2</sup> This is indeed asserted only of the "original, autographic text."<sup>3</sup>

Another class of phenomena from which the aid of psychology has been precluded comprises those which were referred to the presence and power of evil spirits. In the Old Testament, e.g., were such cases as that of the evil spirit which tormented Saul<sup>4</sup> and the evil spirit which came between Abimelech and the Shechemites.<sup>5</sup> In the New Testament the number and malign power of evil spirits as demons is vastly augmented. Theology has provided an elaborate angelology, in the lowest orders of which demons are classified, their functions defined, with capacity of controlling men second only to that of God himself. Like the Spirit of God in the Westminster Confession, these spirits work when and where and how they will, and psychology could no more account for their seizures and obsessions than it could for a thunderbolt.

Other phenomena are taken out of the range of human action and referred to God as their sole cause. The most striking instance of this is the doctrine of regeneration. This has been defined as a "change wrought by creative power in the inherent moral condition of the soul."<sup>6</sup> In this change "God recreates the governing disposition," "the soul being rightly said to be passive with respect to that act of the Holy Spirit whereby it is regenerated." The "operation is miraculous and therefore inscrutable."<sup>7</sup> Here then

<sup>1</sup> A. H. Strong, *Systematic Theology*, I, 134 (Philadelphia, 1907-9).

<sup>2</sup> C. Hodge, *Systematic Theology*, I, 163 (New York, 1871-73).

<sup>3</sup> Hodge and Warfield, *Presbyterian Review*, II, 245.

<sup>4</sup> I Sam. 16:14-15.

<sup>5</sup> Judg. 9:23.

<sup>6</sup> A. A. Hodge, *Outlines of Christian Theology*, 464 (New York, 1878).

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, 458, 460, 464.

is a point from which, as in Edwards' treatise on the religious affections, psychology has been excluded. Accordingly, regeneration has its theological but not its psychological history. There is predestination of some to salvation, based on the absolute divine decree, there is utter impotence of the fallen will, an atonement sufficient for all but efficient for the elect only, and there is irresistible grace—"the efficacious operation of an extrinsic agent."<sup>8</sup> Yet even here psychology was not so completely ignored as appears at first sight. Two questions were raised, first, in respect to the proper improvement of the appointed means of grace, which became a question of harassing, even torturing perplexity, and secondly, the exceeding variety in the manner and circumstances of the Spirit's operations, sometimes more secret and gradual, and from smaller beginnings than at other times.<sup>9</sup>

The psychological approach to theology has not, however, been so badly blocked as the suggestions already made seem to imply. From two different directions—if indeed the two apparent directions are not really different aspects of the same movement—profound influences have been at work. First, from the Socinian and Arminian interest which has been ever jealous for the human element in the Scriptures and religious experience. Whatever of one-sided emphasis has been due to these sources, they have provided a necessary and wholesome corrective of an overweening supernaturalism in the Augustinian and Calvinistic attitude toward the Scriptures and the Christian life. Still further, in our own country movements in Calvinistic circles—so far as there have been such—have all been in the same direction. Dr. Edwards said that his father, President Edwards, and those associated with him had made ten improvements in theology. The very names of these improvements will indicate their character: (1) the ultimate end of the creation, in which the son said that President Edwards had reconciled the happiness of the creature with the glory of the Creator; (2) liberty and necessity; (3) nature of true virtue; (4) origin of moral evil; (5) doctrine of the atonement, in which the consciousness of the divine authority and of the pardon of sins was

<sup>8</sup> J. Edwards, *Works*, V, 45 (New York, 1830).

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, 45.

protected; (6) doctrine of the imputation of Adam's sin and of Christ's righteousness; (7) the state of the unregenerate, the use of means, and exhortations which ought to be addressed to the impenitent; (8) nature of experimental religion; (9) religious affections as disinterested; (10) regeneration.<sup>10</sup> Until the middle of the nineteenth century the battle raged around these questions, and around others more central still—the explanation of sin in a moral universe, natural and moral ability, and the human nature of Christ. The singular thing here is that every one of these questions is not theological but anthropological. It is a sign of the new day. Man is coming to his own. He has vindicated his rights even in a theological system.

The impulse which has been operative in these ways has been active in other directions also. First, with reference to miracles. Here the point of view has changed from the objective and theological to the subjective and psychological. Hume started the ball rolling which seems not yet to have found a resting-place at the bottom of the hill. He held that since acceptance of the miracle depends on testimony, and no testimony is credible which conflicts with universal experience, i.e., the uniformity of nature, some other than the traditional explanation must be provided. Paulus discriminated two elements in the narrative—the purely natural and credible, and that which was due to fancy or imagination. Strauss distinguished the pure religious idea from the representation of that idea in religious history; miracles were events changed into legends or ideas changed into myths. Renan affirmed not that the miracles were impossible but that hitherto none had been established. F. A. B. Nitzsch describes a miracle as an event which makes on the pious consciousness the impression of an immediate interference of God in the course of events, whether on more serious consideration this event appears to be supernatural or not. Thus the stress of the inquiry lies not as formerly in relating the event to God but to the human mind. This may be seen in its most characteristic and thoroughgoing presentation in discussions concerning the resurrection of Christ, and particularly by Strauss in his *Leben Jesu*, by Keim in his *Die Geschichte Jesu von Nazara*, and by Lake

<sup>10</sup> *Works of Jonathan Edwards, D.D.*, I, 481-93 (Boston, 1842).



in his recent treatise on *The Historical Evidence for the Resurrection of Jesus Christ*. The common starting-point is a belief that Jesus made himself known to his disciples after his death; the assumption is not, however, that this belief represents an objective fact in the traditional sense, but the entire energy is devoted to an inquiry as to how such a belief arose in the consciousness of the disciples, and concerning its present meaning for faith.<sup>11</sup>

A like significant process marks the modern study of Jesus Christ. Time was when the doctrine of his person was defined in terms of metaphysics—nature, essence, hypostasis, and the like. Even so highly concrete experiences as his knowledge of particular events, his temptation, his agony in the garden, and his death were thought to be explained with reference to two metaphysical natures and their relation to each other. A profound change has, however, taken place in the approach to the study of Christ. At first the new path was not selected with full consciousness whither it led. Strauss, to whom more than to anyone else this movement was due, had divested Christ of his divinity, and had at the same time threatened to rob him of what was highest and best in human life. To the defense of this priceless consciousness came Ullmann with his *Sinlessness of Jesus* (although at first written with a different aim), Bushnell's well-known tenth chapter in his *Nature and the Supernatural* on the "Character of Jesus," followed by a notable galaxy of treatises with the object of interpreting this wonderful life in terms of human qualities raised to their highest power indeed, yet identified with what is essential to the ideal man. Such books as H. N. Bernard's *Mental Characteristics of the Lord Jesus Christ* (London, 1888); J. Stalker's *Imago Christi* (New York, 1890); and J. A. Broadus' *Jesus of Nazareth* (New York, 1890), would have been as impossible to Origen, Athanasius, and Anselm as Professor James's *Psychology* would have been to Aristotle. Now that the transition has come to pass, no one fancies that the old wine is better. Every commentary on the gospels, every fresh life of Christ, and treatises on single aspects of Jesus' life take for granted the potency of the psychological approach to the New Testament presentation of him. Nor must we overlook the light cast on this

<sup>11</sup> Cf. G. A. Gordon, *Religion and Miracle* (Boston, 1910).

supreme personality by Ritschl who sought the evidence of Christ's divinity in his love for men, in his dominion over the world, and his success in establishing his community with attributes like his own; who also summed up the work of Christ in his personal vocation, in his likeness to his followers, in his personal representation of God to men and of men to God, and in his continued action in the state of exaltation with the same qualities which marked his earthly life. Here again is no transcendental metaphysics, but an inquiry every stage of which proceeds on the basis of experience and the unquestioned data of the New Testament. One may fairly ask whether this exhausts the presentation of the New Testament; but no one doubts that it gathers up and makes available for the Christian life material which has been too much ignored—material which would not have been even discovered but for the psychological approach.

Other fields have yielded rich harvests by the same process of culture. For example, the conversion of Saul of Tarsus is not yet relieved of all mysteries, but it is no longer regarded as purely miraculous and therefore utterly inscrutable, but submits itself to psychological analysis in a way similar to other striking conversions, as those of Augustine and of J. H. Begbie's *Twice-Born Men*. Demoniacal possession is another problem to which psychology has at length furnished the key. Medical science has indeed been appealed to and its verdict has been rendered in no ambiguous terms. On the other hand, missionaries have told us that demoniacal possession is still a fact in China and in other lands,<sup>12</sup> and an elaborate demonology has been worked out to account for these pathological conditions. For all such phenomena, however, psychology holds it unnecessary to look beyond the human subject for the explanation. First of all the stories are accounted for by the fact that the authors of them believed that the phenomena in question were due to "possession"; secondly, the experiences thus described had in part a physical basis, but even more than this, so far as they were nervous disorders, a mental basis. Semler was among the first to attribute these phenomena to natural causes; and more recently Charcot in France and Hammond and Prince

<sup>12</sup> Cf. J. L. Nevius, *Demon Possession* (Chicago, 1895).

in America have shown that so-called possession is due to some form of hysteria and that when curable it yields to suggestion.<sup>13</sup> Having proceeded thus far, by the logic of the situation psychology cannot halt; it must knock and gain entrance to every unusual or abnormal form of religious experience. Accordingly, everything is yielding to psychological treatment. We have the psychology of visions, of dreams, of ecstasy, of stigmatization, of speaking with tongues, and even of the phenomena referred to the Holy Spirit.

The directions in which psychology may be expected hereafter to be particularly influential in theology are genetic psychology and psychology of the subconsciousness. Genetic or functional psychology offers itself for the solution of problems which concern the individual and the race. Nowhere, perhaps, will its aid be more cordially welcomed than in the explanation of sin. The traditional doctrine of sin is that of "original sin." This is defined as a corruption of nature caused by the sin of Adam, transmitted by natural generation, of which all actual sins are a consequence. Every one is, therefore, of his own nature wholly inclined to evil, so that the flesh lusteth always contrary to the spirit and thus deserves wrath and damnation. This is claimed as the teaching of the Scriptures.<sup>14</sup> Now psychology has a perfectly definite and unmistakable testimony on the subject.<sup>15</sup> First, the racial experience in which sin emerges goes back to the natural impulses and instincts of animal ancestors which in these are non-moral and not abnormal. There was and is in human life a period in which voluntary action, however different from what the perfected moral law requires, takes place without the consciousness of moral law and is therefore without sin. It is an unreflecting expression of nature or in response to custom. When, later, moral sentiment is born and moral sanctions appear, acts which once were innocent are now seen to be wrong and are judged to be sin. Secondly, as a fact of individual experience, sin is pictured by the apostle in the most vivid form in Rom., chap. 7.

<sup>13</sup> Cf. J. Charcot, *Les maladies du système nerveux* (Paris, 1886-87); J. Charcot and P. Richer, *Les démoniaques dans l'art* (Paris, 1887); W. A. Hammond, *On Certain Conditions of Nervous Derangement* (New York, 1883); M. A. Prince, *The Dissociation of a Personality* (New York, 1908).

<sup>14</sup> See especially Rom. 5:12-19; 2:10-12; I Cor. 15:21-22.

<sup>15</sup> Cf. F. R. Tennant, *The Origin and Propagation of Sin* (Cambridge, 1906).

The various customary interpretations of this passage unite in a common affirmation, that the "flesh" here spoken of, whether that of the unrenewed or of the renewed man, is universally corrupt and sinful and the opposition between the flesh and the spirit absolute. By psychology, however, this alleged condition receives a very different interpretation. Its significance lies in its description of a "divided self," a condition which is not essentially sinful but natural. Augustine in his *Confessions* (Book VIII) has given an accurate account of a like experience, only less vivid and masterful than that of Paul. The several features are, (1) at the outset of each individual life are natural impulses and instincts which are non-moral and therefore innocent, and (2) the development of moral sentiment is partly through suggestion and imitation and reflection, awakening an ideal from within—between these impulses and the moral sentiment a conflict is inevitable; (3) added to this, habits have been forming in which the natural impulses and instincts are already organized into energetic action, and these resist control by the personal, social, and divine ideal; (4) still further, not infrequently the thorough ethicizing and unifying of the inner personal forces is rendered more difficult by pathological conditions and by an unfavorable environment. Psychology will never eliminate sin from the seventh chapter of the Romans, but it will remove from it the veil of mystery and dogmatism in which it has been shrouded by theology.

Even more significant for theology in the field of genetic psychology is that view of religion which regards it as the conservation of value, of social value, of the highest social values. All these values have been built up in the customary activities of primitive peoples and have originated in the practical requirements of the life-process or in the joyous impulses spontaneously arising in social relations. The activities were already in existence before men had become aware of their value for the social body or the individual life. Once the sense of these values had emerged, the attitude of mind in which it was enshrined and the activities by which it was created are henceforth mutually conditioned—differences of attitude being due to the different conditions of which they are the product. Thus the consciousness of values or the

religious ideas as symbolized in ceremonials, sacrifices, prayer, divine personalities, ethical monotheism, and, indeed, with whatever of content, are referred to the social *milieu* for their origination and meaning. This view places under contribution ethnology, folklore, observations of travelers among nature peoples, and the history and comparison of religions. Since, however, the Jewish and Christian religions can claim no exemption from the law according to which the highest social values have been reached in other religions, the Old and the New Testaments as historical documents and the customs and mental attitudes there recorded must be judged by the same criteria which are applied to all religious practices and values among other peoples. It would be difficult to exaggerate the influence of these psychological postulates upon the exegetical, historical, and dogmatic interpretations of the Scriptures and upon Christian experience in general.<sup>16</sup>

A further application of psychology deals with those experiences which are held to involve the subconscious. Some instances of this have already been referred to; two others may be suggested. The first involves inspiration and prophecy. Here the investigation is naturally concerned with consciousness of the prophetic call, premonition, prescience and prediction, revelation, dreams, vision, audition, ecstasy, and inspiration.<sup>17</sup> As a precondition of the prophetic call the man must be the child of his nation who becomes perforce its critic and statesman-judge, gifted with extreme sensitivity in respect to good and evil in the ethical life of his people, with a temperament corresponding. Premonition paralleled even if not equaled in many modern psychic phenomena is a real mental experience originating in a finer although self-unconscious adjustment of the individual to his environment. Revelation is a sudden, mysterious awakening of mind, an "up-rush" from the subjective to the objective mind, due to intense mental excitement, on account of its unpremeditated and startling emergence referred to God. Inspiration—a product of tempera-

<sup>16</sup> Cf. H. Höffding, *Philosophy of Religion* (London, 1906); I. King, *The Development of Religion* (New York, 1910); E. S. Ames, *The Psychology of Religious Experience* (Boston, 1910).

<sup>17</sup> J. H. Kaplan, *Psychology of Prophecy* (Philadelphia, 1908); cf. G. L. Raymond, *The Psychology of Inspiration* (New York, 1908).

ment, genius, enthusiasm—discloses itself in an eloquence so far surpassing the ordinary capacity of the prophet, that it is easily referred to a higher power. The other phenomena are similarly explained. Whatever limitations beset such attempts to give reality to the events in question, they at least point the way we are going.

The most recent endeavor in the same line is concerned with the person of Christ. It was inevitable that sooner or later the disclosures of psychology in relation to the subconscious should be made to do service in solving the age-long problem of traditional christology. And this is indeed the line adopted by a widely known scholar and theologian who has for many years been engaged in studies preliminary to writing a life of Jesus Christ.<sup>18</sup> His two propositions are, (1) that the subliminal consciousness is in all men and also in Christ the sphere of the indwelling and activity of the Deity, and (2) that the line between the two natures of Christ is to be drawn not perpendicularly as has been the case traditionally, but horizontally, between the conscious and the subconscious. The consciousness and experiences of Jesus were strictly and genuinely human. Only in his subliminal consciousness which was continuous with the life of God are we to look for the presence of Deity in him. This Deity is evidenced by the wealth of latent powers gradually and at last in fullest degree at the end of his life disclosed, particularly by his announcement of the new law, his forgiveness of sins, his claim to superiority to the greatest ones of the past, and his promised reward to those who have served his disciples. Yet the divine nature made only such expression of itself as was possible through the "narrow neck" of the human consciousness. Finally, it is held that this interpretation is just to the historical data—the manhood and the Godhead in Jesus. One can only express the hope that the learned propounder of this hypothesis will not allow it to vitiate a work which promises to be of high value in the interpretation of the historical Jesus.

A pair of suggestions may be added. First, the tendency is to be deprecated which refers the secret of the divine action wholly to the subconsciousness. It is a legitimate presupposition that

<sup>18</sup> W. Sanday, *Christologies Ancient and Modern* (New York, 1910).

the subconscious is, quite as fully as the conscious, the sphere of the natural. To limit the divine to the subconscious appears to involve a return to the occultism of the earlier assumption of miraculous action, even although the language employed to discuss the phenomena is that of science. I believe that we are to seek a more subtle analysis of the conscious processes which precede the phenomena in question, and there ascertain the source of the changes and expressions of the subconscious.

The other suggestion relates to the limitations of this method of approach. One wonders at times whether psychology will eliminate religion altogether—to say nothing of God. It might be that psychology would be so confident of its sufficiency or so oblivious of its essential restrictions as to leave no room for the philosophy or metaphysics of religion. In that event it would only follow the wake of other over-confident young sciences. A longer experience will broaden its vision, sober its arrogance, and enable it to correlate its results with other assured findings of human intelligence.

## IS JESUS A HISTORICAL CHARACTER? EVIDENCE FOR AN AFFIRMATIVE OPINION

SHIRLEY JACKSON CASE  
The University of Chicago

On a former occasion we examined the arguments put forward in denial of Jesus' historicity.<sup>1</sup> They were found to be altogether inadequate as proof that the Jesus of whom the New Testament writers speak is a purely fictitious character. The prospects of success for this hypothesis seem to be slight, and no vital and widespread interest in it seems to be imminent. Unless its advocates can offer more substantial reasons for their skepticism, and can make the constructive side of their argument agree more closely with all the data in the field of primitive Christian history, they can scarcely hope to win a following among investigators who are accustomed to treat historical materials comprehensively.<sup>2</sup> This does not mean that we have no real problems. As everyone knows, many serious historical difficulties regarding Jesus are quite generally recognized today. The definite determination of his words and deeds, or the question of historical substantiation of the ideas which traditional Christology has connected with his person, are now felt to be timely and important topics for investigation, but no evident necessity is commonly recognized for asking, Did a historical Jesus ever live?

Yet when the question is asked can an affirmative answer be formulated sufficiently strong to prove, beyond the possibility of a reasonable doubt, that Jesus is truly a historical character? It may not be inappropriate to set forth here some specific

<sup>1</sup> In this Journal for January, 1911, pp. 20-42.

<sup>2</sup> In the opinion of J. Weiss the arguments of the radicals in this controversy are worse than worthless: "Ich habe mich aufs neue überzeugt, dass es die schwerste Aufgabe von der Welt ist, dem Unsinn zu beweisen, dass er Unsinn ist. Oft habe ich mich geschämt, geschämt für unsere deutsche Wissenschaft, die lange brauchen wird, ehe sie diesen Flecken abgewaschen hat, geschämt für mich, dass ich mich mit solchem Kram beschäftigen muss."—*Jesus von Nazareth*, 4.



reasons for believing in his historicity, especially since those who adhere to the opposite view sometimes urge that they are not compelled to defend their opinion, but may assume it outright, unless a convincing argument for historicity is advanced. It is not enough that one should point as proof to the uniformity of Christian opinion today, or to Christian tradition of the past, for it must be granted that not the Jesus of history but rather the risen and heavenly Christ of faith has held the central position in Christian interpretation. This state of affairs existed even as early as the time of Paul who, it will be remembered, had relatively little to say of an earthly Jesus apart from the thought of his becoming the heaven-exalted individual who was soon to come in judgment.

To be sure, it may be difficult to imagine that the Christ of faith could in the first instance have come to occupy the place he did without the reality of an earthly Jesus. But to assume this connection as a presupposition is to beg the question at issue. Moreover, the New Testament records are now admitted to contain some elements created by the pious fancy of primitive believers; and since disagreement among the critics seems to make the decision upon questions of historicity sometimes largely a matter of taste, may not belief in the very existence of Jesus ultimately belong in this same category? So it is sometimes argued. Therefore we ask, What can be said in support of the claim that the incentive for the new religious movement, and for the literature it produced, was derived from a historical Jesus? We shall not be concerned here to determine the amount of information about him now available; we confine attention to the single issue, Did Jesus ever live?

The obscurity enshrouding the beginnings of Christianity makes our task a difficult one. At first the adherents of the new faith seem to have had no idea of any prolonged propaganda, or of a time when, after the first generation should have passed away, information about the thought and life of the community would need to be derived from written sources. Great value is naturally attached to Paul's letters since they are the earliest extant Christian writings, yet these were not composed with any deliberate purpose

of instructing posterity, or even of expounding the content of contemporary thinking, but rather to meet the special exigencies of that day. And it is well known that the literature which purports to narrate the story of Jesus' career has no immediate connection with the first days of Christianity. Mark, though the earliest gospel, was written at a time when the author would be compelled to thread his way back to Jesus through from thirty to forty years of development in the thought and life of the church, and that too in a period when tradition was in its most fluid state. The other evangelists were under a similar necessity, the difficulty being perhaps greater in their case since they were chronologically farther removed from the original events. Nor is it at all certain that any evangelist made an effort to write the *pure facts* of history; his interest was to make the story he told count in favor of the type of faith which he preached, and which appealed to him as being the true interpretation of the history.<sup>3</sup> What the later church found itself believing and doing, as the result of the circumstances which molded its early life, this its theologians, in all good conscience, to be sure, naturally endeavored to find warrant for in the life and teaching of Jesus. Had the evangelists failed to appreciate this demand of their time there would have been but slight occasion for them to write anything, and still less probability that what they wrote would have been preserved.

If interest in recording the story of Jesus' life was a secondary development within Christianity itself, it is not surprising that he is almost entirely ignored in extra-Christian sources. There is no certainty that Josephus spoke from first-hand knowledge, even if the passage in Josephus is genuine.<sup>4</sup> Tacitus' mention of Chris-

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Luke 1:4; John 20:31.

<sup>4</sup> J. Weiss, *Jesus von Nazareth*, 88 f., is disposed to take the Josephus passage as genuine. Other scholars think the very language used—the implication of Jesus' divinity, reference to his miracles, recognition of his messiahship, and the like—marks the material as a Christian interpolation. The paragraph reads: Γίνεται δὲ κατὰ τούτων τὸν χρόνον Ἰησοῦς σοφὸς ἀνὴρ, εἶγε ἀνδρὰ αὐτὸν λέγειν χρή· ἦν γὰρ παραδίδων ἔργων ποιητής, διδάσκαλος ἀνθρώπων τῶν ἡδονῇ τάληθ' ἀδεχόμενων, καὶ πολλοὺς μὲν Ἰουδαίους, πολλοὺς δὲ καὶ τοῦ Ἑλληνικοῦ ἐπηγάγετο· ὁ χριστὸς οὗτος ἦν. καὶ αὐτὸν ἐνδείξει τῶν πρώτων ἀνδρῶν παρ' ἡμῶν σταυρῷ ἐπιτετιμηκότος Πιλάτου οὐκ ἐπαύσαντο οἱ τὸ πρῶτον ἀπακησάντες· ἐφάνη γὰρ αὐτοῖς τρίτην ἔχων ἡμέραν πάλιν ζῶν τῶν θείων προφητῶν ταυτὰ τε καὶ ἄλλα μυρία περὶ αὐτοῦ θαυμάσια εἰρηκότων. εἰς ἔτι τε νῦν τῶν

tians in Rome in Nero's day, named from "Christ" who had been killed by Pontius Pilate in the reign of Tiberius, is of little value as an independent witness for the life of Jesus, since a Roman historian writing about 110 A.D. may well have obtained this information from current tradition.<sup>5</sup> Suetonius, though writing perhaps a decade later, is very much in the dark on the subject. He seems to have heard of the name "Christ," but he fails to distinguish between Jews and Christians.<sup>6</sup>

Since reference to Jesus is so uncertain in non-Christian sources for the first century, it is sometimes urged that belief in his existence was not then current.<sup>7</sup> While it must be admitted that sources for this period are very meager, Jewish silence might seem particularly surprising. But the Mishna and Talmud as known today are literary products of a subsequent date, and their references to Jesus most naturally reflect only the later phases of the

Χριστιανῶν ἀπὸ τοῦδε ὠνομασμένον οὐκ ἐπέλιπε τὸ φύλον (Anl., XVIII, 3, 3). There is perhaps less reason to doubt the reference to James, "the brother of Jesus, the so-called Christ" (ἄτε δὴ οὖν τοιοῦτος ὢν ὁ Ἄνατος, νομίμας ἔχειν καιρὸν ἐπιτήδειον διὰ τὸ τεθνήσκειν μὲν Φῆστον, Ἀλβῖνον δ' ἔτι κατὰ τὴν ὁδὸν ὑπάρχειν, καθίζει συνέδριον κριτῶν καὶ παραγαγὼν εἰς αὐτὸν τὸν ἀδελφὸν Ἰησοῦ τοῦ λεγομένου Χριστοῦ, Ἰάκωβος ὄνομα αὐτοῦ, καὶ τινὰς ἐτέρους, ὡς παρανομησάντων κατηγορίαν ποιησάμενος παρέδωκε λυσθησόμενους.—Anl., XX, 9, 1).

<sup>5</sup> Even the authenticity of Tacitus at this point has been doubted (e.g., by Drews, *Christusmythe*, 179, following Hochart, *Études au sujet de la persécution des Chrétiens sous Néron*, 1885, 222-37), but the language certainly is not "Christian" in its point of view: "ergo abolendi rumori [that he had himself burned Rome] Nero subdidit reos et quæsitissimis poenis affecit quos per flagitia invisos vulgus Christianos appellabat. auctor nominis eius Christus Tiberio imperitante per procuratorem Pontium Pilatum supplicio affectus erat, repressaque in præsens exitiabilis superstitio rursum erumpebat non modo per Judeam, originem eius mali, sed per urbem etiam, quo cuncta undique atrocia aut pudenda confluunt celebranturque."—*Annals*, XV, 44.

<sup>6</sup> In *Claud.* 25 he states that the Jews "who raised a constant commotion under the guidance of a certain Christ" were banished from Rome by the emperor ("Iudæcos impulsore Chresto assidue tumultuantes Roma expulsi"). Perhaps this expulsion took place about 50 A.D., and if we may infer, from Suetonius' unintelligent references to the situation, that the disturbance was due to controversy between Christians and Jews, we have here an evidence of the early spread of Christianity to the capital. Paul's letter to the Romans less than ten years later also implies an early date for the planting of the new faith in Rome.

<sup>7</sup> Steudel is particularly insistent upon the negative significance of this silence (*Wir Gelehrten vom Fach!* 17-30). A very different estimate is reached by von Soden (*Hat Jesus gelebt?* 9-14) and J. Weiss (*Jesus von Nazareth*, 85-94).

conflict between Judaism and Christianity.<sup>8</sup> That Philo ignored the subject, even if it had come to his attention, can hardly surprise us; nor is it remarkable that Justus of Tiberius, in a very brief chronicle of Jewish kings, found no occasion to mention Jesus. In Josephus only does this silence press for an explanation. He records with some fulness Jewish history in the first century A.D., but never refers to Jesus and his followers, or, at most, very briefly.<sup>9</sup> Various reasons for this oversight have been suggested. As illustrated in his treatment of the Book of Daniel, Josephus slurs over the messianic hopes of the Jews; and to derive from a Jewish source Christianity, in his day an unpopular movement in the eyes of the Roman state, would not have added to the respect for his ancestors and their religion which he sought to inspire in his readers.<sup>10</sup> But is it not quite possible that indifference on his part is the main reason for silence? He may not have thought this movement particularly significant, and, so far as it had come to public notice, it was no doubt mainly confined to the lower classes of society with whom a contemporary historian would have little concern, especially if, as in Josephus' case, he assumed the Roman point of view.<sup>11</sup> Indeed, as for the story of Jesus' life, only those who were personally interested in him were concerned with this subject, and even they do not seem to have been thoroughly alive to this interest at the very beginning of the new religious movement.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. Strack, *Jesus, die Hureliker und die Christen nach den ältesten jüdischen Angaben* (1910).

<sup>9</sup> Cf. note 4 above.

<sup>10</sup> Concerning Josephus' treatment of the Christians, Jülicher says: "Von ihnen zu schweigen war klügere Taktik, als sie mühsam von den Rocksöhnen abzuschütteln."—*Hat Jesus gelebt?* 19. Similarly Weinelt: "Der Grund liegt aber nicht im Christentum oder in der Nichtexistenz Jesu, sondern bei Josephus, der übrigens auch von Johannes dem Täufer und von der ganzen messianischen Bewegung in seinem Volk in einer Weise erzählt, die den Römern die Juden als möglichst harmlose und ruhige, philosophische Staatsbürger darstellen soll."—*Ist das "liberale" Jesusbild widerlegt?* 107. J. Weiss is of a different opinion: "Es ist eher, wie mir scheint, ein Zeichen freundlicher, mindestens objektiver Gesinnung, dass Josephus die Christen und ihren Gründer nicht erwähnt—wenn er sie nicht erwähnt."—*Jesus von Nazareth*, 91; cf. note 4 above.

<sup>11</sup> Deissmann, *Licht vom Osten* (1908), 209, cites an interesting modern illustration of this point.

The result is that practically all our information about Jesus must be derived from the words of his friends who were interested to show him worthy of veneration—the very fiber of their thinking made anything else impossible. While there seems to be abundant evidence that Christianity was in existence by the end of the first century, there certainly is no contemporary account of its beginnings, much less such an account of the life of its alleged founder. In its earliest documents, the epistles of Paul, Jesus appears as the heaven-exalted Lord whom believers reverence almost as God himself. Consequently it has been claimed that the New Testament representation of Jesus is inconceivable as starting from recollections of a real person. It is felt that the memory of his human limitations must have been too vivid to admit of so bold an idealization by his personal companions; the situation is explicable only on the assumption that Jesus was primarily an anthropomorphized god, not a deified man.<sup>12</sup>

This contention cannot be given great weight, for it will be remembered that the deification of men was not unknown to this age; and if it is objected that Jesus had done nothing to prompt belief in him as a heaven-exalted hero—that he was no world-conquering Alexander—one may urge that his heroic suffering was the pathway by which he ascended to heavenly honors. If a priori considerations are to be urged, is it not quite impossible to imagine a company of believers claiming to have been companions of a fictitious person and reverencing him even to the extent of sacrificing their lives for his cause? There are two factors in this situation which distinguish it from the mythical anthropomorphizing of deities: the order of progress in early interpretation is from Jesus the man to Christ the heavenly Lord, and emphasis falls upon the proximity of the events. Already we have shown that the evolution of New Testament thought about Jesus starts from his activity as a man and proceeds by degrees to read back divine qualities into his earthly career.<sup>13</sup> As for the element of proximity, it is true that no New Testament book is unquestionably the work of a personal follower of Jesus, but that part of

<sup>12</sup> E.g., Drews, *Christusmythe*, 29 f.

<sup>13</sup> Cf. pp. 33–35 of the article cited above, note 1.

the literature which is commonly supposed to have been written by persons who had intimate acquaintances with eyewitnesses, if not slight acquaintance with Jesus, is considerable; for example, the Gospel of Mark and the letters of Paul, to mention only those books whose authorship is least in dispute.<sup>14</sup> The general impression which many New Testament writings make on the reader is that the unique phenomena behind the New Testament faith, and the person whom it reverences, are not projected into some remote past but have appeared within the memory of men still living.

Especially important in this connection are the so-called Pauline epistles. According to tradition they were written mostly in the sixth decade of the first century, and they are so definite in their reference to the historical Jesus that their spuriousness, either wholly or in part, is commonly admitted to be a necessary presupposition for the denial of Jesus' historicity. If not genuine they must have been the product of an age when both Jesus and Paul belonged to so remote a past that there was little danger of any serious difficulty in accepting as real their assumed existence. It is true that among primitive peoples historical feeling is not exacting in its demands and the borderland between fancy and fact is often vague, so perhaps the lapse of only a few decades would make the launching of this fiction possible, but it can hardly have been successfully accomplished among men who personally knew the times and places in which these fictitious characters were assumed to have lived. Consequently the Pauline section of the New Testament literature is commonly regarded as a pseudographic product by those who argue against the historicity of Jesus.<sup>15</sup> In all fairness, however, we may note that no thorough-

<sup>14</sup> The contention made by J. Weiss in his *Paulus und Jesus* (1909), that Paul in II Cor. 5:16 claims a personal acquaintanceship with the earthly Jesus, seems precarious. But of course Paul had ample opportunity after his conversion to learn from personal followers of Jesus, as pointed out in *The American Journal of Theology* for April, 1907, pp. 269 ff. Mark may have had some personal recollection of Jesus' last week in Jerusalem (cf. Mark 14:51 f.), and he certainly was intimately associated with the first generation of Christians.

<sup>15</sup> Drews stands almost alone in holding to the historicity of Paul and denying that of Jesus, though a convenient freedom is allowed in striking out as later insertions such passages of Paul's letters as seem too emphatic in pointing to a historical

going effort has been made by recent writers on this theme to prove the spuriousness of all Paul's letters.<sup>16</sup> Rather is it commonly assumed that no substantial argument for genuineness can be offered and that the theory of pseudonymity is capable of explaining all the data.

This theory is not of itself impossible, particularly for an age whose literary method was to set forth teaching under the authority of persons prominent in the past. The names of Moses, Enoch, Elijah, Isaiah, Daniel, were used in this way, so that prominent figures in early Christian history were quite naturally made to play a similar rôle. Since the Christians of the second and third centuries rejected some writings put forward under the name of Peter and of Paul because the marks of pseudepigraphy seemed evident, it is certainly proper in the interests of accurate scholarship to ask whether those who made the canonical selection were sufficiently exact in distinguishing between the genuine and the spurious. The very fact that some pseudepigraphic writings are known to have been in circulation opens the way for the supposition that still more may have been of this character; and, indeed, present-day criticism, of even the moderately conservative type, has accustomed us to thinking of the so-called Pastoral Epistles, if not indeed of some other alleged Pauline letters, as belonging in this class of literature. But if some letters are spurious, then may not all be so? This possibility is appealed to by those who do not treat seriously the probability of genuineness in the case of any writing in the Pauline collection, thus seeking to relieve themselves of the responsibility of proving spuriousness and throwing the whole burden of proof upon the one who entertains

Jesus (*Christusmythe*<sup>3</sup>, 120-63). Similarly Steudel, speaking of such passages as I Cor. 9:14; 11:23 ff.; 15:1 ff.: "Wenn diese Stellen *nicht* eingeschoben sind, dann gibt es im Alten und Neuen Testament überhaupt keine Interpolate."—*Wir Gelehrten vom Fach!* 65.

<sup>16</sup> In order to be brought up to date, if for no other reason, B. Bauer's arguments (*Kritik der paulinischen Briefe*, 1850-52) need revision. The negative position of the Dutch school, represented in more recent times by van Manen, or of the Swiss scholar Steck, is sometimes cited in this connection; but this cannot be done legitimately since the theory of Jesus' non-historicity would of itself invalidate the arguments of these critics.

the more usual opinion that the chief epistles of Paul are historical documents of first importance.

The genuineness of the principal Pauline epistles is among the most generally accepted conclusions of what may be called modern critical opinion.<sup>17</sup> The evidence for this acceptance is usually regarded as exceptionally good. For instance, Clement of Rome, near the close of the first century A.D., writing to the Corinthians not only calls to mind Paul's life as a "notable pattern of patient endurance" but exhorts his readers to peruse again "the epistle of the blessed Paul" which he wrote them in "the beginning of the gospel," and in which he charged them to avoid all party spirit.<sup>18</sup> Here is clearly a reference to our canonical First Corinthians. Furthermore, Clement's letter often shows in thought and language very strong resemblances to Paul's writings.<sup>19</sup> The evidence of Ignatius, from the first quarter of the second century, is less specific; but Marcion, a few years later, is a most significant witness. He attached so much value to the principal Pauline letters that he would make them his main scriptural authority; and the rest of the church, while it regarded Marcion as a heretic, did not dispute his high estimate of these writings, although it

<sup>17</sup> The status of present opinion is too well known to need detailed statement here. The extreme views of B. Bauer and of the Dutch school are quite generally discarded. Steck (*Der Galaterbrief* [1888]), though he admits the possibility of a few Pauline fragments in Romans, has not won adherents for his skeptical opinions. The partition hypotheses of, e.g., Völter (*Die Komposition der paulinischen Briefe* [1890]) and R. Scott (*The Pauline Epistles* [1909]), are not looked upon with even partial favor among specialists in this field. The results of the Tübingen criticism, reworked to meet the requirements of later investigation, leave not only Galatians, I and II Corinthians, and Romans as unquestionably Pauline, but also Philippians and I Thessalonians. Colossians, Ephesians, and II Thessalonians are nowadays less widely rejected than formerly, and even the Pastorals are thought to contain some Pauline elements.

<sup>18</sup> Clem. 5:5 ff.; 47:1 ff.

<sup>19</sup> As an example compare Paul's thought and phraseology in I Cor., chap. 13, with Clem. 49:1-5: 'Ο ἔχων ἀγάπην ἐν Χριστῷ ποιησάτω τὰ τοῦ Χριστοῦ παραγγέλματα. τὸν δεσμὸν τῆς ἀγάπης τοῦ θεοῦ τίς δύναται ἐξηγήσασθαι; τὸ μεγαλεῖον τῆς καλλονῆς αὐτοῦ τίς ἀρκετὸς ἐξεπεῖν; τὸ ὕψος εἰς ὃ ἀνάγει ἡ ἀγάπη ἀνεκδιήγητόν ἐστιν. ἀγάπη κολλᾷ ἡμᾶς τῷ θεῷ· ἀγάπη καλύπτει πλῆθος ἁμαρτιῶν· ἀγάπη πάντα ἀνέχεται, πάντα μακροθυμεῖ· οὐδὲν βάνανσον ἐν ἀγάπῃ, οὐδὲν ὑπερήφανον· ἀγάπη σχίσμα οὐκ ἔχει, ἀγάπη οὐ στασιάζει, ἀγάπη πάντα κοιεῖ ἐν ὁμονοίᾳ· ἐν τῇ ἀγάπῃ ἐτελειώθησαν πάντες οἱ ἐκλεκτοὶ τοῦ θεοῦ· διὲνα ἀγάπης οὐδὲν εὐάρεστόν ἐστιν τῷ θεῷ.



did not hold to them quite so exclusively as Marcion did. By the end of the century several available sources of information bear similar testimony to the Pauline authorship of this part of the New Testament.

Yet this external evidence which appeals so strongly to many investigators is easily set aside as itself spurious by those who deny the genuineness of the literature traditionally connected with Paul's name. Doubtless this procedure seems arbitrary and subjective to one who is accustomed to weigh all the historical evidence with care, nevertheless the type of argument which is usually directed against the historicity of Jesus and of Paul does not seem sensitive to statistics of this sort. Consequently any attempt to meet this skeptical argument on its own ground must proceed mainly from considerations, perhaps more or less general and *a priori*, based upon the content of the literature in question. Here lie before us certain documents which purport to belong to a definite historical setting. On the strength of the internal evidence do the probabilities seem to favor the genuineness of this representation, or does close examination show that the picture is a later fabrication depicting an idealized period in the past? We may present a few considerations which seem to us to turn the scales decisively in favor of genuineness.

One of the first canons of a pseudonymous writer is that the individual impersonated shall take the point of view and think the thoughts of the actual writer, and of the age to which he belongs. His primary motive is to claim the support of a great name for his own opinions. Now the Pauline literature contains elements which do not answer to this situation. In the first place, the realistic eschatology credited to Paul, whose active career is pictured as belonging near the middle of the first century A.D., will hardly have been invented at a later date when subsequent history had proved the falsity of such expectations. Yet this idea is pervasive in the writings which are assumed to be put forward here in Paul's name. The Romans are told that the night is far spent and the day is at hand when all shall stand before the judgment seat.<sup>20</sup> Marriage is discouraged among the Corin-

<sup>20</sup> Rom. 13:12; 14:10; cf. II Cor. 5:10.

thians because of the shortness of the time;<sup>21</sup> they are commended for their attitude in "waiting for the revelation of our Lord Jesus Christ," and are exhorted to refrain from judging one another in view of the near approach of the final judgment—"judge nothing before the time, until the Lord come."<sup>22</sup> In the closing words of the first letter they are reminded of the immediateness which characterized the primitive hope as expressed in the phrase *marana tha*. Speaking of the Philippians, Paul is confident that God who has begun a good work in them "will perfect it until the day of Jesus Christ," further Paul expects them to remain "void of offence unto the day of Christ" and encourages them to stand fast confident that "the Lord is at hand."<sup>23</sup> The Thessalonians are called to serve the true God and to "wait for his son from heaven which delivereth us from the wrath to come," and they are advised to live a holy life that they may stand blameless before God "at the coming of our Lord Jesus with all his saints," for his coming will be sudden like that of a thief in the night. The hope is for those that are now alive who are to be caught up in the air to meet the Lord, and Paul closes his letter with the pious wish that their "spirit and soul and body be preserved entire without blame at the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ."<sup>24</sup> History proved that these vivid expectations of the end of the world were not to be realized, and an impersonator will hardly have created for his hero ideas that would discredit him in the eyes of a later generation.<sup>25</sup>

<sup>21</sup> I Cor. 7:29 ff.<sup>22</sup> I Cor. 1:7 ff.; 4:5.<sup>23</sup> Philip. 1:6, 10; 4:5.<sup>24</sup> I Thess. 1:10; 3:13; 4:15-18; 5:2, 23.

<sup>25</sup> Belief in the immediateness of Jesus' return gradually became less vivid as time wore on. Even within the New Testament period this change is marked. Paul looks for the coming soon, expecting, until toward the close of his life, at least, to see it in his own day. Mark thinks "some" of Jesus' personal followers will live to see the day (9:1; 13:30), but before it comes the gospel must be preached to all the nations (13:10). Though no one may know the exact time, the tribulation attending the siege and fall of Jerusalem is a premonition of the end which is to come suddenly (13:24-37). The writers of Matthew and Luke have a similar idea, though a little farther postponed. The former changes Mark's "in those days after that tribulation" to "immediately after the tribulation of those days" (Matt. 24:29), while in Luke a period of some length subsequent to the fall of Jerusalem must be awaited "until the times of the gentiles be fulfilled" (Luke 21:24). The writer of

Against the hypothesis of pseudonymity we may set also the minute biographical details of the epistles. Sometimes data are given purposely to tell the story of Paul's life, as when the Galatians are informed of his career from the time of his conversion until the meeting at Jerusalem;<sup>26</sup> but more commonly the mention of his doings is entirely subordinate to the main line of thought. For example, he briefly notes in closing his letter to the Romans that he is on the point of going up to Jerusalem with a gift for the saints, and after fulfilling this mission he hopes to proceed to Rome.<sup>27</sup> He also tells the Corinthians in a few closing words that he hopes to come to them by way of Macedonia, though at present he is in Ephesus where he will remain until Pentecost.<sup>28</sup> The list of these details could be enlarged, if necessary, and they are all the more significant because they usually come in quite incidentally and show no disposition on the part of the author to give a full account of the apostle's career. Had an impersonator wished to make Paul tell his own life-story we can easily imagine that he may have been sufficiently skilful to invent details, but under those circumstances the information would surely have been more uniformly distributed and its lifelike quality less pronounced. The very incompleteness of the material as a whole, together with the exactness of detail at certain points, even where the information conveyed is relatively unimportant, seems a strong credential for the genuineness of these letters.

A similar inference may be drawn from the realistic elements in the general historical situation. How strongly one feels the heart-throb of reality in Paul's passionate appeal to the Galatians not to apostatize from the true faith; or in the more extensive Corinthian correspondence regarding living problems in the primitive church? The personal element is particularly pro-

II Peter 3:8-10 apologized for the delay by asserting that "one day is with the Lord as a thousand years, and a thousand years as one day." In the Fourth Gospel the idea of a literal return has disappeared and the coming of Jesus in spiritual form as the Paraclete has taken its place—an idea which later interpreters have often tried to read back into the Synoptic Gospels and the Pauline letters. This whole progression of thought throws an interesting light on the primitive character and the genuineness of the notions credited to Paul.

<sup>26</sup> Gal. 1:15—2:1.

<sup>27</sup> Rom. 15:25.

<sup>28</sup> I Cor. 16:5-9.

nounced. One has only to read in Acts the narrative for the corresponding periods of Paul's career to feel the difference in spirit between the representation of one who actually participated in the events and the description of him by a subsequent narrator. Having once met Paul in his capacity as a Christian missionary in Acts one knows what to expect of him on all future occasions; he moves on with stately tread, always presenting to view the same somewhat stereotyped features. There is variety, to be sure, but it is the type of variety one finds in the colors of a portrait rather than in the changing aspects of real life. In Paul's letters, on the other hand, there is no conventionalized portrait of his personality. He appears there as one who is vitally influenced by actual experience, making a normal response through the free play of changing moods.

To illustrate this point, according to Acts he goes up to Jerusalem at the instigation of the church in Antioch to discuss the problem of the gentile Christians' obligations to the law; the facts of the gentile mission are calmly rehearsed, the decision is made in favor of Paul's position, he retires to Antioch, and then moves on quietly to further evangelization. We are given no hint of the anxiety he felt on this occasion, nor do we appreciate the personal energy he expended on the problem. But turn to Galatians and how different is the situation! Anxiety for the future welfare of his brethren in the gentile churches prompts him to push the question to a decision in Jerusalem; in order to make the problem pointed, and thus to avoid future misunderstandings, he puts Titus forward as a test case; with nervous energy he presses the issue almost to the point of belligerency; he wins the decision, but his joy is short-lived for, on returning to Antioch, new conditions develop which result not only in a break with Peter but in the severance of relations with his friend and former traveling companion, Barnabas. We are left at last with no picture of an ideal victory for Paul but with a very realistic situation: his efforts had at first seemed successful, in the flush of victory new troubles broke out, the result was not only the antagonism of the Jerusalem church but separation from Peter and Barnabas, and to what extent Paul was able still to hold the sympathies of the Antiochian church

may be questioned. Here is no idealization in favor of either party, but a break which shows its raw edges just as we are wont to find them in the experiences of real life. So it is throughout Paul's entire career as portrayed in his letters.

To a remarkable degree his personality, as revealed in these writings, rings true to reality. He represents himself as possessing a strongly emotional temperament; he is exceptionally efficient in speaking with tongues, he is on occasion caught up into the seventh heaven, visions and revelations of the Lord are often his privilege. And this is the type of person he proves to be in the ordinary relations of daily life. On hearing of the trouble in Galatia his emotions are deeply stirred, he calls down anathemas upon the disturbers and upbraids the Christians for their fickleness, then he pleads in gentle tones with his "little children" for whom he is again in travail. The same interplay of feelings is even more strongly marked in the story of his relations with the Corinthians. Now he threatens the rod but in the next breath he expresses the hope that they will permit him to come to them "in love and a spirit of gentleness"; and when the crisis becomes exceptionally critical instead of visiting them in severity he writes a letter "out of much affliction" and "with many tears." At one time he commends himself in extravagant language, and then his sensitive nature seems to recoil and he pleads with his readers to bear with him "in a little foolishness," since circumstances compel him to defend his rights as an apostle. Later in his career, when his own fate seems to be hanging in the balances, he alternates between despair and hope in truly normal fashion and, as he reflects upon the possibilities for the future, two conflicting desires rise within him: to depart and be with Christ is better for him, yet to abide in the flesh is more needful for the churches. In all this one sees not a made-up character of the stage but an actual person who traversed wide ranges of human experience.

Finally, the realistic character of Paul's work, the vigor of his thought, and the uniqueness of his letters show him to have been a genuinely vital factor in the propagation of the new religion. On the supposition of spuriousness, we must assume a character of the past known to the real author and to his constituency as

worthy of the rôle here assigned him, and we must also assume for the writer himself a creative genius which would surely leave its mark on the life, as well as on the literature, of the time. But where do we find all this more fittingly than in a genuine Paul himself? The task of fabricating the material which lies before us in chapter after chapter of these letters, where the definiteness and vividness of an actual situation shows behind every sentence, is quite inconceivable.<sup>29</sup> The force of one strong and distinctive personality predominates throughout the main part of the Pauline literature, whether this individual is viewed from the standpoint of his activity, or in his capacity of thinker and writer. That an impersonator should create a character so unique in personality, and yet so verisimilar in all the relations of life, that minute yet sometimes insignificant details about him should be told without any attempt to depict his career in full, that he should be assigned some phases of thought which history in the next generation was compelled to set aside, is scarcely within the range of possibility. The historicity of Paul and the genuineness of the principal Pauline letters is supported by the data of both external and internal testimony; and if, say, only the letter to the Galatians, or one of the Corinthian epistles, is genuine, the existence of a historical Jesus would seem to be amply attested.

Yet it has been said that a reader who had not prejudged the question would not be likely to suppose that the apostle ever thought of an earthly Jesus.<sup>30</sup> A few passages from the more important Pauline writings may show the impropriety of this statement. Paul speaks of Jesus as "born of the seed of David,

<sup>29</sup> Speaking of the failure of the extreme negative criticism to supply an adequate historical setting for the phenomena, J. Weiss says: "Woher diese Stoffe und Gedanken, wer hat denn die Person des Paulus und seine Briefe ersonnen, wer war dieser Genius? Eine plötzliche anonyme Produktivität erhebt sich, ein Konfluxus von Geist und Begeisterung wächst aus dem Boden, man weiss nicht, woher er kommt. Und das alles muss in wenigen Dezennien fertig geworden sein, denn es ist dann da und lässt sich nicht mehr ableugnen." Further: "Man sollte einmal diesen Radikalen die Aufgabe stellen, ein oder zwei Kapitel, etwa 2. Kor. 4 oder 10, aus der Seele eines Fälschers heraus Wort für Wort zu erklären—dann würden sie schon merken, wie unmöglich das ist, wie gänzlich unschablonenhaft und ungekünstelt, wie springend und augenblicksmässig hier alles ist."—*Jesus von Nazareth*, 94 and 100.

<sup>30</sup> Drews, *Christusmythos*, 158.

according to the flesh";<sup>31</sup> in contrast with Adam, whose disobedience brought condemnation upon his descendants, Jesus is the "man" through whom God's grace abounds toward believers;<sup>32</sup> he was crucified, and this fact became for Paul the cornerstone of interpretation;<sup>33</sup> specific events in connection with his death—the last meal eaten with his disciples and his betrayal—were remembered;<sup>34</sup> Paul also knew of a company of followers whose sadness was turned into joy by an experience which they regarded as evidence of Jesus' resurrection;<sup>35</sup> and these events had taken place in recent times, Paul having personal acquaintance with relatives and friends of this Jesus.<sup>36</sup> The reality of an earthly Jesus, according to these sample passages, seems to be an indisputable presupposition of Paul's thinking, a reality both for him and for his contemporaries. Although he speculates boldly upon the question of Jesus' significance, emphasizing on the one side his pre-existence and on the other his heavenly exaltation, nevertheless Jesus' appearance upon earth in truly human form, the lowliness and naturalness of his life, and his submission to death on the cross are basal historic facts without which Paul's interpretation of Jesus would have been impossible.

We must admit that Paul stood too near to the age which professed to know Jesus, to be successfully hoodwinked on the historical question. If Jesus never lived it is not at all probable that even the most enterprising propagandists could have succeeded in persuading Paul of the reality of this mythical person within the generation to which Paul himself belonged. But another possibility presents itself. Did he not deliberately create this historical character to suit his own scheme of interpretation; instead of being deceived was he not playing the part of a myth-maker? The absence from his letters of any effort to argue for the historicity of Jesus, which would surely be a matter of dispute at least with the opponents of Christianity, together with the prevailing acknowledgment that a historical person had been known by certain leaders of the new movement before Paul's

<sup>31</sup> Rom. 1:3.

<sup>32</sup> Rom. 5:12 ff.

<sup>33</sup> I Cor. 2:2.

<sup>34</sup> I Cor. 11:23 ff.

<sup>35</sup> I Cor. 15:5 ff.

<sup>36</sup> Cf. I Cor. 15:6; Gal., chap. 2.

conversion, seems an overwhelming objection to this supposition. Not only does Paul everywhere take for granted the existence of a Jesus whose memory is fresh in men's minds, but a good part of his attention is given to resisting opponents who claim superiority over him because they have been, or have received their commission from men who had been, personal companions of Jesus—a fact which Paul never denies, though he disputes the legitimacy of the inference regarding superiority which they deduce from the fact. Paul would scarcely have engaged so seriously in the controversy with the legalists, or have had so much anxiety for the possible outcome of the Judaizers' efforts to undo his work on gentile soil, if the chief credential of the "pillars," namely, their claim to have known Jesus personally, was all a fiction.

From all these data we are able to deduce but one conclusion. Not only is Paul a genuine personality who strongly impressed himself upon the life of his time, and some of whose thoughts are preserved for us in fragments of correspondence with his churches, but the historicity of Jesus is also a prerequisite to Paul's Christian life and work. While the apostle freely interpreted, and at times no doubt greatly idealized, the person of Jesus, there never was a time when to deny the reality of Jesus' earthly career would not have been a fatal shock to Paul's entire interpretative scheme. But such a disaster was in that day out of the question, for the age to which Paul belonged held the generation which had witnessed the career of Jesus and had experienced the force of his personality in its own life. Consequently his personal conduct became the model and the inspiration for conduct in the new community. Nor was this influence confined to those who had associated with him on earth; it was felt by future converts, of whom Paul was a conspicuous example. He strenuously emulated this type of life himself and strove constantly to inculcate it among the new converts to the faith. His exhortation to the Corinthians, in speaking against the self-seeking spirit, "be ye imitators of me even as I also am of Christ,"<sup>37</sup> is expressive of that spirit of service for "the profit of the many" which characterized Christianity from the first, and which was consistently traced back to the life of its

<sup>37</sup> I Cor. 11:1.



founder who, on calling disciples, had not offered them enticing rewards, but had given them an opportunity to become fishers of men, and had inspired them with the ideal of self-giving service: "Whosoever would become great among you shall be your minister, and whosoever would be first among you shall be servant of all,"<sup>38</sup>

A consideration of the gospels in this connection need not detain us long, since our problem is not to determine the full content of reliable information about Jesus but only to ask whether these writings testify at all reliably to the bare fact of his existence. That they purport to portray the career of a historical individual is self-evident; but does the portrait, on close inspection, show whether the artist painted from a model in real life or whether his creation was purely imaginative?

Here again a statement of the results of modern critical study regarding the historical origin of the gospels may have little or no weight with those who deny Jesus' historicity. The tradition of Papias seems to them "notoriously unreliable," while the efforts of literary criticism to discover the earliest elements in Mark, or to reconstruct the common non-Markan source or sources behind Matthew and Luke, are thought to be quite fanciful and devoid of trustworthy results historically. On the other hand, critical investigation furnishes some substantial conclusions for those who will treat seriously this type of evidence. The Gospel of Mark, though composed somewhat later than the letters of Paul, is seen to belong near enough to Jesus' own day to come within the lifetime of some of the original disciples; while the more extended reports of Jesus' teaching now found in Matthew and Luke seem unquestionably to have been derived from a common written tradition whose composition very probably antedates that of Mark. That is, the kernel of synoptic tradition dates from the same general period as Paul's letters, when the new religious movement was being propagated under the guidance of leaders who traced, either directly or indirectly, their authority as well as their inspiration to a period of personal association with an earthly Jesus whose personality had so strongly impressed them that they now, through the transforming influence of belief in his resurrec-

<sup>38</sup> Mark 10:43 f.

tion and heavenly exaltation, may have found it possible to heighten the story of his life by introducing large and bold interpretative features. To assume the fictitiousness of the earthly Jesus takes away both the objective of and the incentive for their interpretation; while to assert in their day—or at any other time for that matter—the historicity of a fictitious Jesus, will surely have called forth a corresponding apologetic on the part of the devotees of the new faith. But of this there is never a hint in any of the literature. On the contrary, the believers are constantly under the necessity of defending the elevated type of interpretation which their faith imposed upon this individual whose historicity was uniformly accepted as a matter of course.

It is significant that the earliest parts of gospel tradition contain the most realistic representation of Jesus. It is Mark who says that Jesus was not able to do any mighty work in Nazareth except to heal a few sick people by laying his hands on them, while in Matthew the statement is simply "he did not do many mighty works there." In Mark, too, he refuses to be called "good," while in Matthew the conversation concerns what "good thing" the young man shall do (*τί ἀγαθὸν ποιήσω*) in order to have eternal life. Again, Jesus appears in the primitive non-Markan source chiefly as a teacher rather than as a miracle-worker. In fact, the story of his career, as introduced in the temptation incident of this source, begins by his deliberately setting aside the idea of miraculous display as a means of self-attestation. This is an early type of interpretation which still reflects the prevailingly normal character of Jesus' actions; and yet ardent faith in his present heavenly lordship made it necessary to explain why so significant an individual had not lived a more striking and outwardly brilliant career on earth. Naturally believers could not but suppose that he had possessed unique power, hence he must have deliberately refrained from its use. As time removed the memory of his actual life farther into the past, the difficulty was met by so interpreting his activity as to show actual demonstrations of his unique power. Thus in Mark he figures prominently at the beginning as a worker of miracles; yet Mark is still sufficiently under the influence of the earlier tradition to remember that this

was no open sign of Jesus' uniqueness but only a hidden one, that is, the significance of Jesus' conduct was not understood at the time even by the disciples. Mark also records that Jesus refused to give an open sign when pressed to do so, but on turning to Matthew and Luke we find this refusal relieved by the modifying phrase "except the sign of Jonah."<sup>39</sup> This is naturally taken in Matthew as a reference to Jesus' resurrection, the event which had served as the great initial and transforming sign for the faith of the first believers. In the Fourth Gospel Jesus takes pains to display a long series of signs to attest his uniqueness, the culminating event being the resurrection of Lazarus. In its earliest stages gospel tradition had by no means shaken itself free from the restraining influence of the memory of Jesus as a historical individual, and only in course of time did his earthly features become less distinct as they were more and more overshadowed by the heavenly image upon which his devoted followers loved to gaze.

Especially significant as evidence for the existence of Jesus is Mark's almost uniform representation that Jesus during his lifetime is generally misunderstood, and that his real significance is rarely if ever fully appreciated even by his closest associates. The members of his own family think him beside himself, and even the Twelve show a remarkable dulness on nearly every occasion when his uniqueness might, seemingly, be easily perceived. When he would feed the four thousand they are as unsuspecting of the method he is about to employ as if they had not, only a short time before, witnessed his miraculous feeding of the five thousand. And after the second incident they are still without understanding, so that Jesus marvels, "Do ye not yet perceive neither understand, have ye your heart hardened?" When he casts out demons the latter speak of his messiahship in seemingly unmistakable terms, and Jesus apparently acknowledges the accusation in the disciples' presence, yet they attain no conviction of his messiahship until near the close of his career. Even then their understanding of it is very crude, and their confidence is quickly shaken by his arrest and death. Similarly they fail to comprehend his meaning when he teaches in parables; when the sick woman is healed by

<sup>39</sup> Mark 8:12; Matt. 16:4; 12:39; Luke 11:29.

touching his garment they are so stupid as to reprove him for asking who touched him; when he predicts his arrest, death, and resurrection, though he several times repeats the statement, they fail to grasp the idea; on the mount of transfiguration even the most favored of his associates are completely mystified; in the Garden of Gethsemane, in view of all that Jesus had said and the situation that recent events had brought about, they display amazing stupidity; and, finally, the women at the tomb depart astonished, silent, and fearful, notwithstanding the angel's explicit announcement of Jesus' resurrection. In all this Mark is clearly recognizing that Jesus produced no such impression upon his contemporaries as his later interpreters would have him produce on the minds of their hearers; but, by making men's blindness responsible for this failure, the early theologians could, at least partially, harmonize the history with their Christology. This situation will have arisen at a time when men were still living who knew that Jesus had been regarded by his personal companions less significantly than subsequent thought of him would presuppose. A writer who was entirely free to follow his fancy will scarcely have left Jesus in this position, or have introduced his readers to a picture that reflected so unfavorably upon the disciples. Had the primitive tradition been purely the product of fancy we should have had at first that free idealization which is more in evidence a generation or two later when death and time had largely removed the limitations which actual recollection of Jesus imposed upon his first interpreters.

Moreover, there were elements in the early tradition that were not thought especially creditable to Jesus, yet were too generally known to be ignored. These will certainly not have been created for him by his worshipers, and we may believe they will have been overlooked by his biographers in so far as circumstances permitted. We may place here such incidents as his refusal to be called good and his acknowledgment that he could not do any miracle in Nazareth, but perhaps no incident of this class gave interpreters more difficulty than his baptism by John. When the movements inaugurated by these leaders came into competition, as they certainly did in the course of time, the founders' relation to

one another inevitably became a subject of controversy. Christian tradition recognized the value of John's work, even affirming his greatness, according to a reported saying of Jesus; yet the tradition was careful to state that he who was least in the "kingdom" was greater than John. But it was a well-known fact that Jesus had originally been among John's followers—had indeed received baptism at John's hands. How, then, were Christian interpreters to save the supremacy of their master? Mark sees Jesus' superiority displayed in the baptism of the Holy Spirit received at this time—an experience after the manner of the spiritual outpouring attending the baptism of converts to the new faith. In Matthew Jesus has outgrown the necessity of baptism by John; he is already greater than John according to the latter's own acknowledgment. While the act did not primarily benefit him it did serve two useful purposes: it gave his sanction to baptism as a church ordinance, and it gave the assembled multitude an opportunity to hear the divine testimony to Jesus' messiahship—a result which the scribe effected by changing Mark's "thou art" into "this is" my beloved son. In the Fourth Gospel the benefit of the baptism accrues to John himself, in that he thus learns who the Messiah is to whom he is to turn over his own followers. Here, as usual, Christianity triumphed by absorbing that which at first opposed it, but the very fact that it acknowledged the existence of these and similar difficulties shows that it was dealing with the tradition of a real person, the known facts of whose life did not always harmonize offhand with the interests of primitive Christology.

If space permitted, further evidence for Jesus' historicity might be deduced from the verisimilar type of his personality as seen in the earliest sources, and especially from his forceful individuality as revealed in his life of loyal service for humanity and in his simple yet profoundly significant religious teaching. To find this ideal without a historical Jesus—as to create Paul without Paul—is a problem which those who deny Jesus' historicity seem to have treated far too superficially. In fact, the very existence of the early Christian community is itself one of the most substantial evidences of his existence. It has been urged that ideas, not persons, are the important elements in the origin of Christianity.

Certainly ideas do figure prominently in the history of Christianity, but to presuppose a moment at the beginning when the idea as an abstract entity exerted a uniquely creative influence is hardly in accord with the ascertainable facts of history in general, much less with Christian tradition which so uniformly credits the incentive for the new movement to the individuality of Jesus. While ideas certainly played a considerable part in the formation of the new religion as a system of thought, its success must be credited primarily to those forceful personalities who championed these ideas. For instance, Paul the individual is a much more significant factor in the propagation of Christianity in Asia Minor, Macedonia, and Greece than is Paul the theologian. And we find Paul constantly harking back to a type of life exemplified in Jesus; here was the personal embodiment and the source of inspiration of his ideal, and not of his alone, but of all who were adherents of the new faith. Each became, according to individual ability, a coefficient of the Jesus life.

Only a historical Jesus, whose personality impressed itself vividly upon his followers, explains the vital element in the new religion. To be sure, current types of thought and ritualistic formalities were employed in the attempt at self-expression, but the starting-point of theology and ritual, as well as of literary activity and religious impulse, was the memory of an earthly Jesus.

## THE CRISIS IN DOCTRINAL CHRISTIANITY

---

JOHN E. RUSSELL  
Williams College, Williamstown, Mass.

---

That there exists a widespread indifference and even hostility to ecclesiastical Christianity; that the church is losing its hold upon minds who share most largely the ruling ideas in our modern civilization, are facts admitted by whoever thoughtfully surveys the religious situation today.

One cause (and I am inclined to think the deeper cause) of this really critical situation is the break between modern thought and the doctrines of the church. This situation is the more serious, because the upholders of doctrinal Christianity for the most part do not seem to be aware of the existence of this ever-widening chasm between the age in which we live and the world-view which forms the substructure of the main doctrines of the church. Either the leaders in our Protestant Christianity do not see this break, or they think it can be left to the agencies of time to cover it over, or that it will be safely passed by the compromising expedients of tolerating slight modifications in the form of ancient dogmas, greater freedom in assent to creeds, and larger liberty in interpreting authoritative scriptures. The one fact of momentous import that is not being squarely faced is, that the whole framework of doctrinal Christianity is threatened by modern science and the change in mental attitude that has come with the growing dominion of the scientific method. The substructure of these dogmas is steadily being crumbled by the "waves of unbelieving criticism."

Between modern thought and these doctrines of the church there is an irreconcilable conflict. In respect to these its inherited doctrines the church—Protestant not less than Catholic—is facing a crisis such as it has never faced before; and the church stands before an alternative which permits no middle course.

An examination of the cardinal doctrines which the church still holds will, I think, support my proposition. Let me first instance

the church doctrine of Sacred Scriptures. However much has been conceded to historical criticism and to historical investigation, the essential doctrine of miraculously inspired and authoritative Scriptures is still maintained. This conception of the Scriptures is indispensable to the entire system of doctrine which the church still retains. If by some section of the church the claim to literal and plenary inspiration is no longer made, it is still maintained that the unique character and function of these Scriptures is, that they contain or are a historic record of a revelation of God and his actions in the world which are supernatural and miraculous. It is vital to this doctrine of the Scriptures to hold that they are unique and exceptional, not merely by the circumstance that they contain ethically higher conceptions and purer religious beliefs and sentiments than are found in other scriptures, but that they are unique and differenced from other scriptures by the manner of their formation. It is for this reason that they are held to be of absolute authority for religious belief. Now my position is, that this doctrine of Sacred Scriptures is based upon a conception of the relation of God to the world and to human history which is distinctly opposed by the whole trend of the scientific investigation, the historical criticism, and the deeper philosophical thinking of our time. The supernaturalism which this conception of revelation and Scriptures involves has no place in the world-view of the twentieth century. At this point, there is between the doctrine of the church and the scientific and philosophic thought of our time an irreconcilable disharmony.

The same fundamental antagonism appears when we examine the doctrine of man's sinfulness. The church doctrine still is, that this moral state of man, universal in its extent, is due to a lapse from a state of original righteousness; and this present status has been brought about, not merely by each individual's own conduct, but by what has come to every son of Adam through the operation of a divine method of moral government. This status of every individual member of the race can be changed only by an operation of divine grace, supernatural in its method, and wholly distinct from anything which man can do for himself. It is obvious that this ancient doctrine is based upon conceptions of God, of the



nature and of the spiritual history of man, that go squarely counter to those conceptions of the world and those ethical standards which rule our modern civilization.

Still more undeniable is the break between the church doctrine of Redemption and the dominant ideas of the twentieth century. This doctrine contains the following things: (1) It teaches that this redemption is effected by the mediation of a historic person who unites in himself, in a manner wholly transcending our comprehension, the essential natures of God and man. The person of man's Redeemer is the God-man. This union of God and man in a metaphysical sense is vital to this doctrine of human salvation. (2) Inseparable from this moment in the doctrine of Redemption is the second moment, the Incarnation as an event supernatural and miraculous, if we accept the story of Jesus' birth as historical; at all events, this assumption of human nature by the Logos' personality, and the formation in time of the God-man-personality of the Redeemer is the basal conception on which rests the church doctrine of Redemption and the new spiritual life in men. The Christ of theology is a Person who does not admit of historical explanation or comprehension. (3) The third constituent in the doctrine of Redemption is the Atonement, made by the vicarious sufferings and death of Jesus the Christ. The substance of this doctrine, after deducting all modifications it has undergone, is, that the sufferings and death of the cross were necessary to the removing of an obstacle to the forgiveness of man's sin which existed in the character of God as righteous. The satisfaction of divine justice made necessary just these experiences of the sinless Son of God. The doctrine teaches that, in consequence of that death on the cross, the status of the race as respects divine forgiveness is changed; man is put on a new objective footing; God is disposed toward him, and able to act toward him in a manner different from that in which he could otherwise act.

Now, it should be clear that this central dogma of the church rests upon presuppositions which the principles of historical criticism, philosophical thinking, and the ethical conceptions of our age distinctly reject. If the principles of modern historical criticism are sound, the story of that birth in Bethlehem is not

history. If the dominant philosophy of today is to be held, the Supernaturalism involved in this doctrine is impossible; and if our present ethical conceptions are not to be abandoned, God has not dealt with us men after the manner set forth in this doctrine.

To conclude our examination, we will take the doctrine of Future Punishment. The destiny of those who come under the operation of the retributive justice of God, is one which the reason and conscience of today cannot reconcile with the character of any God whose existence can be rationally believed. To ask men to believe in such a moral ruler of the universe is an insult to reason and an affront to the intelligent conscience of our age.

The thesis I have been maintaining is that the underlying conceptions of doctrinal Christianity are at war with those conceptions of the world of human history and the moral order which have become established in the minds of thinking men today. This, it seems to me, is the crisis which the theology of the church faces today. Is the church really awake to this situation? One is moved to ask this question in view of the easy-going and apparently unconcerned state of mind that characterizes most of the members of our so-called orthodox churches today. The same old doctrines are held apparently with no suspicion of the fundamental discord between them and those ideas—scientific, historical, and philosophical—which the same believer in doctrine may be holding at the same time. But, however it may be with those who are within the church, this break between the age and the theology of the church does not escape the notice of the truly religious but thoughtful men whom the doctrines of the church bar from her communion. To these minds the alternative which is presented to ecclesiastical Christianity is clear and uncompromising. Two ways, and two ways only, lie open. The church must either reaffirm her dogmas, and put herself against the current of modern thought which threatens to undermine and destroy them, or she must let her dogmas go, as outgrown shells—earthen vessels that can no longer hold that divine treasure men have sought to keep within them.

I have said a third alternative is not possible, and yet a *via media* is really being tried, though those who are taking it are for the most part quite unaware of what they are trying to do. There are others

who are in a way conscious of what they are about, and who appear honestly to think that a man who accepts the modern world-view in all its aspects can sincerely confess his religious faith in the same doctrinal creeds which are based upon a world-view that has passed away. These men say that these historic doctrines may properly be so interpreted as to leave nothing which a man who fully accepts the science and culture of our age cannot accept. It is maintained that, following the analogy of the interpretation put upon legal statutes, or the letter of our constitution, a broad enough construction can be given these similar documents which will bring them into working agreement with the knowledge, the thought, and the ideals of our age. The reasoning by which this constructive program, as it may be called, is advocated is specious; but a little examination suffices to show that it proceeds upon a false analogy, and affords evidence that those who think to meet the present crisis by this expedient fail to understand the true character of the break between these doctrines and modern thought. The doctrines of the church are, unfortunately for this reasoning, unlike legal statutes of the past and our federal constitution in just those points which are essential to this reasoning from analogy. These doctrines are conceptions of the world-reality, quite definite in their terms; they set forth certain alleged facts and real processes, assumed to have gone on, or to be actually going on, in the real world, in that these dogmas embody certain well-defined and accurately stated metaphysical ideas. It has never been a question what these dogmas mean; the sole question about them has always been, Are they true? To propose an interpretation of any one of these doctrines which will make it harmonize with the modern world-view is to propose something as contradictory and stultifying as would be the proposal to interpret our federal constitution so as to make it harmonize with the conception of government on which the German empire is based. Stripped of the plausible expressions in which this scheme for saving the ancient dogmas is clothed, it amounts to this: Let the church continue to hold its dogmas in the "form of sound words," while it permits the denial of their substance. We are taught that "men do not put new wine into old bottles but into new bottles"; but these advocates of a *via*

*media* have apparently discovered a way of making old bottles hold new wine, or of making old bottles hold both new and old wine.

The more clear-sighted minds within the church see the impossibility of so interpreting the doctrines of the church as to make them harmonize with the ruling ideas of our age. Not less clear is the recognition of this impossibility by those men who find their admission to membership in the church barred by those doctrines which their intelligent consciences will not allow them to accept. To propose to these men a subscription to the creeds on the terms which the advocates of this *via media* suggest, only provokes from them a response that carries contempt for those who can so misunderstand, or so slightly regard the doctrines they profess to believe. No, while these doctrines remain, thousands of men whom, we believe, Jesus would have recognized as his followers will feel themselves excluded from the church which bears his name; and so long as these dogmas hold their present position, the great body of consistent believers in them will not extend the hand of Christian fellowship to those who cannot join them in the same doctrinal confession. These considerations lead me to conclude there can be no *via media* in the solution of this grave problem that confronts doctrinal Christianity.

Think as we may concerning the course taken by the Vatican in the matter of the modernist movement, one thing must be admitted, i.e., that the head of the Catholic church has rightly appreciated the critical character of the present situation. He reads correctly the meaning, and rightly discerns the outcome of the current of modern thought as it will affect the very foundation on which Roman Catholicism rests. The Pope is to be credited with seeing what the leaders of Protestant Christianity apparently do not see, viz., that the acceptance of modern ideas carries with it the disintegration of the entire doctrinal structure of the Protestant churches no less than of the Catholic church. The upholders of the Protestant doctrinal Christianity, did they see it, have a common cause with the head of the Catholic church in his present struggle against modernism. They have the same thing at stake; the same waves of unbelieving criticism that are shaking the foundation

stones of the Catholic church are threatening also the Protestant doctrines.

However ineffectual his attempt may prove to be, no one can help admiring the courage, the high faith, of the Roman pontiff in making this open warfare against the enlightenment, the science, and the culture of his age. This action of the Pope is consistent with the presuppositions on which both Catholic and Protestant doctrines are based. If the church is effectually to maintain her doctrines, she must openly challenge the whole spirit of the modern age; she must dispute the claims of science; she must reject the principles of historical criticism and the regulative principles of historical explanation of man's spiritual life; she must see in the reigning doctrine of evolution a deadly foe to her vital dogmas. If we rightly read the signs of the times, we Protestants cannot look on with unconcern, while Pius X is fighting for the existence of the Catholic system. He is fighting at the same time for the existence of the doctrinal system of Protestant Christianity. Do we flatter ourselves that the Catholic church can fall in ruins and that our Protestant dogmas will escape the same doom? Do we think the claims to authority can successfully be denied to the head of the Roman church, and the same denial not be extended to those claims to authoritative revelation on which Protestant doctrines are based? It is the claim to a supra-rational and authoritative source of religious knowledge that is at stake; and it matters little where the seat of this authority is placed, whether in the Pope, in scriptures, or in a body of interpreters of these scriptures, the main issue is the same.

In his struggle against modernism Pius X is fighting for the maintenance of the historic doctrines of the church and the world-view on which they are based, against the intellectual forces and the prevalent temper of the modern world. The issue the Pope has raised is clearly drawn and admits of no compromise. The leaders of the modernist movement doubtless think this movement will rest when it has swept away only some superstitions and unfounded beliefs and claims to authority, and secured to reason a larger freedom in matters of faith; but the Pope and his advisers see more clearly the true character of this movement and the actual

forces which are behind it; they are far more logical and far-sighted and are better discerners of spirits than are the modernists who, for the most part, lack clearness of vision and consistency in thinking. The Pope is not mistaken in his judgment, that the impelling ideas of this movement spring from an age that is essentially hostile to what is vital to the Catholic system. These ideas are disintegrative of the structure of that church "whose foundation stones are a deposit of doctrine" which can have but one authoritative interpretation.

But the same disintegrative forces are at work in Protestant Christianity, only here—thanks to the absence of a central authority and of an alert and watchful custodian of these inherited doctrines—this work goes on with only here and there a suspicion of its character and outcome. Let no one imagine, however, that Protestant dogmas are not really endangered because, yielding to the current of modern thought, those who still teach and who still profess to believe these doctrines are being steadily carried away from them. Thanks to our careless thinking, to our elastic consciences, we still profess to believe these doctrines while pulpit and pew for the most part give themselves no further concern: we are simply drifting with the current, apparently careless of whither it is bearing us. The leaders of the Catholic church, on the other hand, do see whither this current is moving. They are trying to stem it; and they are measuring its force. Thoughtful and observant men outside of the church see this movement of things; and these men cannot understand our state of mind: our orthodoxy in dogmas, our toleration in interpretation, our acceptance of modern science and ways of thinking, and our retention of these historic dogmas. These men can hardly be blamed for suspecting our sincerity in subscribing to both creeds at the same time. They find it hard to believe that we really understand either the doctrines of science or the doctrines of the church, if we honestly believe them to be in harmony. The time was, when a Leibniz or a Locke could reconcile the doctrines of theology with science and philosophy; but that age has passed. Such compromise schemes seem to the critical mind of today as unsubstantial as the child's house of card-boards. It is no longer possible, in the way proposed by these

reconcilers of faith and reason, to render to Reason the things that are Reason's, and to Faith the things that are Faith's.

I think the only alternative open to Protestant Christianity is either to maintain her doctrines in their original purity, with a distinct consciousness of the chasm that separates them from the doctrines of science and the main current of twentieth-century thinking; or she must cease to insist upon the acceptance of these dogmas as the test of Christian faith and the basis of Christian fellowship. She must dare to say, as does the Catholic church, human thinking is wrong if it opposes the doctrines which rest upon divine revelation, or she must frankly admit that these doctrines cannot claim to be true. That there is a fundamental disagreement between the thoughts of men that have broadened and become quite other than they were centuries ago, and these doctrines, is, I think, indisputable.

The time is ripe for the decisive step I have indicated. The very life of the religion of Jesus demands it. Unless this dissociation of Christianity from these ancient doctrines is made, the world will leave both behind. The educated classes in ever-increasing ratio are falling away from the church; and whither the educated mind tends in these matters, thither the masses will in the end follow. If Christianity ceases to command the respect and the support of the men who shape the thinking and the great moral and social movements of the world, only a perpetual miracle can save the church from extinction. The dissolution of the bond which has for centuries held the religion of the spirit in bondage to the letter of human dogmas will not be effected without protest and struggle. To separate Christian faith from these theological doctrines will seem to many the destruction of faith itself. The strength of mental associations of so long standing, mental inertia, that resists any change and makes it unwelcome and difficult, the fear of those who, in despair of anything better, cling to doctrines they do not really believe—all this stands in the way of the course I have suggested. But, on the other hand, there has never been a time that was more propitious to this undertaking. To recover original Christianity, to know what was the religion of Jesus, and what is the substance of Christian faith, is a task quite within the

limits of successful inquiry. Whoever will follow the path opened by historical investigation into the beginnings of Christianity, into the sources of our knowledge of Jesus, his teaching, and the purpose of his life, will not find it difficult to see a clear distinction between the religion of Jesus and the theology of the church. On the basis of a consensus of historical judgment, it can safely be affirmed that the teaching of Jesus gives no authoritative support to those dogmas of the church over which there has been so much un-Christian warfare, and which are the reason for so much opposition to the church today.

The entire system of church doctrines rests upon a view of the origin of Christianity which is unhistorical. The Jesus of history is not the Christ who has been made the founder of ecclesiastical Christianity. Once let this fact find its due recognition; once recognize the fact that all theology is man's metaphysics of man's religious experience; that Christian theology began with Paul and the first preachers of Christianity; and it will be admitted that we of this latest Christian century are as free to interpret Jesus as were Paul and his contemporaries and the great builders of theological doctrines in the following centuries. To us, as to them, is committed the same divine treasure; this treasure is no deposit of doctrine to be kept unchanged, but a life of moral unity with God awakened in man by the ministry of Jesus. The theologies that have been constructed from Paul to Calvin and Luther are but earthen vessels in which men have held this divine treasure. These vessels have been shaped by the needs and the conditions of culture that existed in the centuries in which they were formed; we of this century, if we are to keep the real faith of Christianity, must create for *our* age forms in which its living principle can find fitting and effective expression.



## THOUGHTS ON THE IDEA OF A FIRST CAUSE<sup>1</sup>

EDOUARD MONTET  
University of Geneva, Switzerland

The author of this study is neither a theologian nor a philosopher. He is an orientalist and a historian of religions who has directed his attention more especially to the religious problems of the Mohammedan world. He has, however, always had the keenest interest in philosophical questions of a religious and metaphysical nature, and it is because his mind has felt itself drawn continually to this line of research that he has decided it to be good for himself—and perhaps useful to others as well—to write out the following thoughts on a subject which he has long pondered.

At the present time, the philosophical problems which receive the most attention are those connected with psychology. But the questions raised by metaphysics still deserve an equal attention, for they have a most vital bearing upon life. Whatever view we may hold in ethics or in philosophy, whatever theories we may formulate about the universe—whether as materialists, positivists, transcendentalists, or agnostics—there yet remain certain questions which have power to compel the attention of all save the most indifferent or the most decided: such questions as, “Is there a First Cause?” and “What tomorrow follows death?”

These questions present themselves to us whether we wish them or not; they beset us with the persistence of a fixed idea, and sooner or later force most of us to ponder them seriously. To a study of the first of these questions—the question as to a First Cause—we propose to devote the following pages, considering the problem in its broadest possible bearings, and in the most modern spirit of investigation.

We have subsisted for a long time in Europe on a readymade system of metaphysics, with its *proofs* of the existence of God, and its *demonstration* of the immortality of the soul. The men of my generation (which indeed still seems to belong to an age of

<sup>1</sup> Translated by Carleton Ames Wheeler.

transition in philosophical thought) received in their youth an instruction fitted out with a priori proofs and demonstrations. I myself had, in the great national college where I studied, one of the most distinguished professors of philosophy, who gave us for intellectual nourishment what was called by the vague, but at that time almost universally accepted name, "mental philosophy" (*la philosophie spiritualiste*).

If the so-called "mental" school of philosophy has had its day and no longer makes a noise in the world, there yet remain the readymade metaphysics and theodicies of the religions and of the churches. Considering, for example, merely the countries of Europe and America, we must place under this head the Catholic, the Protestant, and the Jewish metaphysics, in which, alongside the great traditional currents of the stream, the waters of the liberal thought, freed from all tradition, must take their separate way. The metaphysics of the great majority of the followers of these religions is a thought-system drawn from symbols, creeds, decrees of councils or synods, etc. In brief, it is derived from a very miscellaneous collection of documents which give expression to the particular dogmas of each church (Catholic, Protestant, Jewish).

The most recent treatises on Christian dogma are in the form of a deep study of the ecclesiastical dogmas, and are, for the most part, attempts at interpretation, enlargement, and systematization of these formulas, to which formulas are attached a respect and an interest made even greater by the fact that they are, for the most part, the result of secular intellectual effort and the expression of faiths which have been, at a given moment in history, the faiths of entire nations.

It is not at all these traditional teachings which lend the inspiration for the study we have in hand. All our effort will be bent to the examination of the problem of the first cause, in a spirit of entire freedom from religious or philosophic tradition.

## I

The idea of first cause presents itself under many and surprisingly varied forms, for we find it everywhere—in experiences which we have every day of our lives, in the most dissimilar facts, in the

most diverse doctrines, and even in theories which appear or pretend to be a denial of it.

Hence arise the very different names given to the "first cause." In the religions and in a large number of philosophical systems, it is called God—a word used to express very diverse notions. Elsewhere, it is given the name of force, of power, of movement, of life, or of matter. For it is quite evident that, in putting at the foundation of one's explanation of the universe movement or matter, for example, one is thereby giving to movement or matter the rank of first cause, however much one may deny such a conception. This statement we shall work out farther on. Finally, it is elsewhere—or, to speak more correctly, as it seems to us—everywhere given the name of ideal (an idea in itself complex and rich in meanings); and in a seemingly endless variety of ways it receives the name of duty. If such diverse names as these can be applied to the idea of first cause, it is because the religious fact which is a sort of practical translation of this notion—or, if you prefer, the adequate expression of it—is of a general nature.

This obliges us to establish, in the first place, the universality of the religious fact or sentiment,<sup>2</sup> and consequently the universality of religion,<sup>3</sup> which is its manifestation to the senses. Religion is a human fact, or, as Benjamin Constant has said, an indefectible and perfectible attribute of our species. That is to say that the religious sense, which is at the foundation of religion, is universal.

It is true, this universality has been denied, and in support of this denial there has been invoked the existence of savage or half-civilized peoples said to be without religion. As Albert Réville has remarked, "The reports of travellers concerning peoples claimed by them to have been found without any sort of religion should be accepted only with the greatest caution; too often they base their conclusions either upon inexact information, or upon very superficial observation. There is already a large number of tribes,

<sup>2</sup> We define the religious sentiment as a feeling of dependence which we experience with regard to a power above us.

<sup>3</sup> We define religion as the direction given to human life by the feeling of dependence which man experiences in the face of a power above himself. We can also define it as the determining of our life by the feeling of satisfaction which unites us to this power.

relatively speaking, about whom such a statement was made, but in reference to whom a later examination, more observant and better directed, has brought to light just the contrary.”<sup>4</sup>

During a long visit which gave us opportunity to become acquainted with some Indian groups settled in the northern part of Patagonia, we ourselves discovered the grave errors one can fall into along this line, if with superficial haste one denies all religious feeling to some half-civilized or savage tribes in South America. The Indians with whom we came into contact appeared to have neither religious ideas nor religious customs. We had observed among them no trace of any worship of spirits, and we asked ourselves whether, in fact, we were not in the presence of a people without religion. It was not long, however, before we noticed among them certain superstitious practices which were the evident indication of an obscure religious sense, or, to use a favorite phrase of S. Reinach (in his *Orpheus*), “scruples limiting the free exercise of their faculties,” and undeniable witnesses to the most primitive form of religion. These curious superstitious practices had to do with unlucky numbers, and may briefly be illustrated.

An Indian wishes to buy a horse from Don X, who asks him 15 piasters for it; this price he refuses to pay but agrees to give 16 piasters. Don Z, in bargaining for the services of an Indian, offers him 15 piasters a month; the Indian refuses, but accepts the place as servant (*peón*) at a wage of 14 piasters a month. Two Indians from Chili arrive one day at the *estancia* of Maraco, where I was staying; both are in extreme poverty and wish to engage for a year's work. Don E offers them 120 piasters; this they refuse, but agree to a wage of 100 piasters. The strange debate between master and servants lasted a long time, so great was our difficulty in understanding the point of view of the Indians. There was, however, no (lingual) misunderstanding: one of the Indians spoke Spanish, and we had, besides, a Gaucho who knew Puelche (the dialect spoken by the two Indians), and who thus served as our interpreter. The contract was finally made on the basis of 100 piasters salary, and I myself signed, in the name of the Indians,

<sup>4</sup> *Prologomènes de l'histoire des religions* (Paris, 1881), 45.

the agreement exchanged between the two parties. In all this there were neither deceivers nor deceived; it was only a case of some poor fellows for whom certain numbers had a sinister meaning, under certain given circumstances—in this case, perhaps, merely from the fact that they had been proposed by Europeans. If we had insisted on 120 piasters, the Indians would have looked elsewhere for work. These strange practices are only explicable by what I will call a hidden religious thought—*une arrière-pensée religieuse*.

Doubtless the universality of the religious sense does not at all prevent there being atheists—men irreligious or unreligious—just as the physical law of gravitation, by virtue of which everything not firmly resting on the ground is inevitably destined to fall to the earth, does not prevent the existence of balloons and aeroplanes. Theoretically, one might even imagine a balloon always inflated, or an aviator always in motion; but even so they would represent merely an apparent contradiction of the law of attraction, for they would be obeying the general principle of gravitation. Albert Réville has well said,<sup>5</sup> “Do not give to the exception a value so great as to cause a misconception of the characteristic traits of the whole.” Theoretically, moreover, there is an explanation for every exception; hence the popular saying that the exception proves the rule. The innumerable blind or paralyzed persons on humanity’s list do not prevent sight from being a human sense, in the broadest and most general acceptation of the word, nor movement of the joints from being a characteristic of the human race as a whole. This universality of the religious feeling and of religion explains to us the great variety of forms under which the idea of first cause presents itself (as enumerated above)—forms which we shall now study one by one.

## II

Let us look first at the idea of *force* or *power*, considered as sovereign, above ourselves, and arousing in us the feeling of our dependence upon it.

This sovereign force manifests itself in Nature. Nature pre-

<sup>5</sup> *Op. cit.*, 47.

sents a chain of phenomena each link of which is inseparably bound to the next, in the relation of cause to effect, of antecedent to consequent—a series reaching back to infinity across the millenniums of our earth's history. It matters little here what one understands by infinite, or absolute infinity (in its metaphysical sense), or the indefinite extending without perceptible or known barrier in time or in space. The series of phenomena runs back till lost to view in the mists of time, and we are unable to assign to it any beginning, except by using some theory entirely hypothetical, or by setting an arbitrary point of departure at a given moment in its course. Even if one is loth to accept the idea of cause, there remains nevertheless the closely linked series of natural phenomena and facts, one depending on the other, succeeding each other by virtue of a law of fate, and extending back to infinity.

We shall not discuss the theoretical question of knowledge, whether or not one can run from cause to cause back to infinity; this ancient proof of the existence of God is without value, because it rests on a notion (Absolute Infinity) which cannot be defined or verified. We shall simply state that Nature leads us always from a consequent back to an antecedent which explains the consequent, and continues the series indefinitely into past time. Every phenomenon has, in this sense, not only a cause which precedes it, but an indefinite series of previous causes. Does this indefinite series lead us to an initial cause, to a point of departure? I cannot say; but what I do know is, that this indefinite series of causes, each successively determining the next, and stretching out through time—this immeasurable causal-past, if one may use the phrase, and consequently causal-future—is only the form of a sovereign power above me, a force to which I am absolutely subject, and which is for me the manifestation of that which I call the divine.<sup>6</sup>

This sovereign force shows itself in history. The serial connection of events is seen in history like that of phenomena in Nature, leading back indefinitely through the course of history to what we, in our ignorance, call the beginnings of humanity. Historical events are closely tied one to the other in a related order, consequent

<sup>6</sup> We do not touch in this essay upon the question of divine personality.

following antecedent, and effect cause. This causal-linking is very striking in the historical development of nations, whether we are dealing with their increasing size, progress, and grandeur, or whether the question concerns their lessening numbers, their recoil, and decadence. A power higher than they seems to preside over their destinies, a power which may be thought of as providential (God directing the course of history and of humanity), or which may be adjudged to be a blind force, in virtue of which nations are now elevated to the foremost place, now debased to the lowest rank. The fact that a power above the will of men rules their existence, this fact confronts us, whether we wish it or not, and imposes on us the absolute obligation to bow before it.

In spite of all possible denials, we are all nevertheless persuaded that humanity, from its earliest hour even to its most distant future, has been and will be subject to the law of progress. Notwithstanding all the backward turns, all the wars of devastation, all the plagues and all the evils of the physical, moral, political, and social order, in the course of all the reactions and of all the revolutions, humanity marches forward and improves, and this progress should, as it seems to us, continue indefinitely in time and in space.

On the one hand, then, we must conceive a sovereign power which rules history and manifests itself in the unbreakable chain of historic events; on the other, the law of humanity's progress, apparently undeniable; and both are the expression of a force above ourselves, under which we feel that we have been placed as dependents. This is the power which we call divine.

### III

Let us examine next the idea of *movement* and of *life*, on the one hand, and the idea of *matter*, on the other, considered each as a concept put forth in solution of the enigma of the world, thereby serving as the explanation of the universe.

First, the idea of motion and of life. The most striking, the most general, the primordial fact, everywhere and always seen, both in the earth below and in the heavens above, is motion, including life. Both are distinct forms of one and the same thing.

Movement and life are seen everywhere: in the mineral kingdom, in the vegetable kingdom, in the animal kingdom, and, if we pass from the earth to the universe, in the starry world. The celestial worlds move and change; they live. The mineral kingdom is full of activity (molecular movement, movements of the surface of the earth and of its depths, movements of the oceans and of the streams of water, volcanic eruptions, chemical reactions, phenomena of heat, electricity, etc.): everywhere is movement and life. And the same is true of the vegetable and of the animal kingdoms. This fact is so striking and so general that we cannot conceive of the earth which we inhabit or of the universe which surrounds us, without movement and life.

If everything, in a final analysis, may be reduced to motion and life, what does this mean, if not to give to the idea of motion and of life the value of an idea explanatory of the universe? The universe is inexplicable apart from motion and life. These, therefore, appear to me as forms of the idea of first cause.

Let us pass on to the idea of matter. According to the materialistic hypothesis, matter is considered as the foundation of everything, as the primitive element on which everything is rooted, to which everything returns, at last; so that everything which exists is formed by the infinitely varied modifications of matter. As has long been pointed out, the idea of matter is an abstract idea; matter is a pure abstraction. We find in Nature minerals, vegetables, animals, etc.—bodies of the most varied and the most dissimilar composition, materials of the most diverse and divergent formations; but as to “matter,” we find it nowhere, it is never met with. The idea of matter thus becomes an idea essentially belonging to the realm of mind. It is the expression of a general notion, of a theoretical hypothesis. If one admits this hypothesis, the idea becomes the expression of a universal principle, and as such is equivalent to the idea of cause, beyond which one does not need to pass—that is to say, an idea of first cause.

#### FV

Let us now consider *the ideal* and *duty* as forms of the divine. In all domains, especially in the domain of art and in those of the



moral, mental, and religious life, the ideal is an absolute. There is nothing in these different fields of action worthy of being lived except the human life which aspires to an ideal. We know that we shall never reach this ideal, because it is absolute, a hypothetical state of perfection. Nevertheless, we do not cease to place it as the goal of our efforts, to hold it up to our intellectual gaze, to present it for the acceptance of our will—an inaccessible goal, we are convinced, yet the source of voluntary acts repeatedly renewed and ever becoming more decisive.

Life has no value except through this ideal, which becomes the motive power of our existence. A life without an ideal is low, shallow, limited, face to face with the earth; it is like a pinioning, a burial, or an imprisonment of our will. Art without an ideal is only a trade; mental, moral, or religious life without an ideal is only the habitual, and in a way the mechanical, play of the faculties and feelings of a human being. To live on an ideal, in one's personal existence and in one's creative hours, is to live not only a superior life, but one almost superhuman. This is what is meant in common speech when, in reference to an artist, to a literary or a scientific man, to a philanthropist or to a saint (in religion), we say that he "lives in the clouds."

The ideal in the religious life belongs to the same category: it is a state of moral and religious perfection to which one ever aspires, without ever reaching it. The Christian mystics, men with the spirit of St. Francis of Assisi (and they are found in all the churches, in the liberal ranks as well as in the most traditionally orthodox), are striking examples of the need of the ideal, always felt and never fully satisfied, to whatever moral, mental, or religious height the saint may raise himself. The ideal, inasmuch as it represents the absolute, in whatever domain we consider it, is an expression of the divine.

Duty is another form of the absolute, giving us another expression of the divine. This is so true, that we easily speak of the religion of duty, an expression which signifies that man owes an absolute obedience to that which he considers to be his duty. The man led by duty (and he is found everywhere, in all the reli-

gions, in all the types of atheism and of positivism), seeks for the realization of an absolute; in this sense he is a religious man. The religion of duty forms, in fact, in very many cases, a veritable worship of the absolute: the sublime acts of devotion, inspired by an imperious duty from which one does not wish to free one's self, can be counted by the millions. Millions of human beings expose themselves, at the call of duty, to suffering, to mutilation, and to death.

And what shall we say of the religion of patriotism, for which so many men have sacrificed their lives? To give up voluntarily one's life, to give it up by an act of absolute self-denial, to give it up instantly, if necessary, and at the cost of untold physical pain, of untold tearing of the heart strings, to give it up on the field of battle, by a sudden and irrevocable decision—is not this the giving of one's self up to the worship of the absolute? When one speaks of sacrifice upon the altar of one's country, this figure of speech is not a flower of rhetoric: it is the expression of a vivid reality. The religion of patriotism is no empty phrase.

What shall we say finally of the worship of science? For there is duty in the realm of science; and what shall we say of the sacrifice of life made by so many learned men for the sake of the advancement of human knowledge? Here also, there is a religion, a sort of superhuman effort to seize an absolute. Duty becomes invested with diverse forms, in the individual life, but everywhere it is and it remains duty and, as such, it is a form of the absolute, and hence an expression of the divine.

The idea of an absolute, therefore, is not the possession of the religious man alone; he is not the only one who has the feeling of something above him which rules over him. At the side of the man who strives to fulfil his duty, and of the man who pursues the ideal (of whom we have just spoken and who in other domains has the same experiences of the absolute as the religious man) there is the man of science, whose experience leads to the same result. The scientific man, indeed, has the very clear sense of the endless progress to which science points. For knowledge appears to us to be without limits, and our energies are bent to penetrate ever farther into this limitless region. This absence of limits in the

knowledge which man can gain about the universe and about all that it contains, this is what religious souls conceive of more especially as the limitless or, in other words, as the divine.

## V

To the arguments which we have presented in the preceding pages, all of which are meant to show the necessity for a first cause (all the absolutes which we have enumerated being only different expressions for the idea of the divine), the religious man adds what he calls the inner testimony to the divine. This is the testimony of which the apostle Paul speaks, to whose own religious experience reference is of course made, when he says that God bears witness to himself in us.<sup>7</sup> This testimony is equivalent to the idea of the divine as something imprinted upon our minds. Is it an innate idea, as the ancient theologians and metaphysicians declare? Is it an idea acquired and received? Is it a prepossession handed down by tradition? Is it a preconceived idea? Is it a pure imagination? It makes little difference what theory is held concerning the existence of this idea in us. The fact is, that the notion exists in the minds of many religious men.

As for myself, if I may refer to my own personal experience, it would be impossible to say where or when I acquired this idea. I drew it in with my mother's milk, so to speak, which amounts to saying that I do not know to what period or to what circumstance to attribute the entrance of this idea into my mind; or, what is the same thing, that ever since I have led a conscious life, this idea has been mine. I have in myself the sense of the divine. I feel this idea closely bound up with my being, inseparately united to the very center of my personality. The mere supposition that this sense could one day be snatched away from my brain or could disappear from it, produces in me, by anticipation, the sensation of emptiness; it would be like the pouring out of the cerebral matter; it would be as if a desert had spread over my mental being, annihilating all my intellectual and moral faculties, and all my feelings.

<sup>7</sup> Rom. 8:16.

## CONCLUSION

The apparently unexpected conclusion which we draw from the preceding thoughts is, that the great problem presented to the human mind is not that of the existence of God. In fact, the result of the considerations which we have here given is, that the idea of first cause imposes itself upon us, even though this first cause cannot be demonstrated like a theorem in geometry. It is of a piece, shall we say, with the mathematical principle of unity, the point of departure and the foundation of the mathematical sciences. In itself this unity is undemonstrable; it is a purely theoretical concept, an abstract idea, an abstraction, in the absolute sense of the word; and yet it is as indispensable to the structure and development of the mathematical sciences as life is to our existence. No mathematician doubts this invisible unity. This is so true, that I have known a great mathematician who founded upon the principle of mathematical unity his belief in God. It is just the same with the first cause, the foundation of the universe and of all that it contains.

If the idea of first cause forces itself upon us, if it appears to each of us personally as evidence, the real problem is not that of the existence of God. The real problem is the wherefore of the first cause. Why is there a first cause? Why does God exist? Or, to make the question more general, why is there existence, and how has existence come to be? In the Christian church there was long ago erected the dogma of the creation *ex nihilo*. What is nothingness? Does nothingness correspond to anything which may exist? Is it indeed a thought, an idea, or simply the shadow of an idea? To these troubling questions, which are quite beyond solution, because they outstrip the forces and limits of our intelligence, the only answer is the anguish of our being, of our mind, of our heart—the disorder of our mental, moral, and emotional faculties!

## THE LOGICAL ASPECT OF RELIGIOUS UNITY

GREGORY D. WALCOTT  
Hamline University, St. Paul, Minn.

In the following discussion the writer has not been unmindful of the fact that religions grow, just as languages grow, oftentimes without much regard to logic. People are more inclined to act and then reflect, than to reflect before acting. The "trial and error method" has predominated in the development of the race. None the less, to look before one leaps is not without value. It is not the writer's thought that the immediate future development of religion will necessarily be in accordance with the logical principle emphasized in the article. In fact, the reference to Spencer toward the end suggests that the actual progress may be of another sort. If, however, one reflects upon the argument, it will be seen that the only ultimate unity, a unity satisfying to thought as well as sentiment, will be based upon a oneness of culture. To see this clearly does not mean to cut the nerve of action, but it may suggest the evils involved in a premature unity which are as real as are the evils of disunity.

The belief in a reunited Christendom not infrequently finds expression at the present day within distinctively religious circles.<sup>1</sup> A far more inspiring spectacle, it is maintained, would be presented to the world by such a union, and more good would be accomplished than is possible now by means of the heterogeneous organizations, divergent creeds, and varied assortment of functionaries, oftentimes opposed to one another, in Europe, America, and wherever missionary activities have borne fruit. The principle of union, however, is not very clearly discerned. The advocates of such a change seldom get farther than to suggest that those things upon which all agree be emphasized, and that divisive factors be eliminated.

<sup>1</sup> In the *New York Tribune* of July 18, 1910, appeared an extended account of "The Christian Unity Foundation" which has for its aim that "the various Christian bodies may be knit together in more evident unity in the essentials of faith and practice and in one organic life."

This thought of union, also, oftentimes finds a still wider application. Students of the science of religion, upon the basis of their knowledge of different religions that purport to be universal, enthusiastically maintain that there is a fundamental unity in that field, and that all the nations of the earth with their diversified beliefs might join in a common religion of mankind. The method by which this union could be effected, however, they do not clearly indicate.

Now it is in connection with such discussions and elaborate plans for unification that a simple logical principle is usually neglected. The moment we attempt to *think* religion, to speculate about its origin, and to discuss its present status and future prospects, we must consider ourselves bound by the ordinary principles of thought. While we may not hope to construct reality by means of formal logic, we may not neglect its principles when interpreting phenomena of any sort whatever, if we would avoid being fantastic in our thinking, and would not squander energy to no purpose.

The principle in question is a very elementary one, viz., the meaning of a term in intension and in extension. Possibly its very elementary character has contributed to its neglect. Its force is evidently felt when the suggestion is made that the emphasis in all Christian communities should be laid upon those beliefs and practices which are common to all, but the complete bearing of the logic involved in such a statement seems rarely to be suspected.

If we view a highly cultured congregation, such as can be found in any city in the land, and then compare it with some other congregation of the same denomination in a country district, what have the two in common? Each criticizes the other in spite of the "right hand of fellowship." If, further, we compare any ultra-Protestant body in its worship with a body of Roman Catholics with their elaborate ceremonial, the contrast becomes all the more striking. The differences stand out in bold relief, and each group tends to emphasize those differences as essential. If, now, two such bodies were to worship together, if they were to become amalgamated, a compromise would have to be effected. But such a compromise means that the intension of the term Christianity, so far as the combining bodies are concerned (provided that neither

goes over wholly to the side of the other), would be changed. The meaning of Christianity, that is, would be modified, really diminished in its intension for one party and increased somewhat for the other, if they were to stand on common ground. In order that a larger number of individuals might be affected—denoted, to use a strictly logical term—a change in the intension would necessarily ensue, provided, as already intimated, neither party adopted the interpretation of the other *in toto*.

The application of this argument to Christendom as a whole would run somewhat as follows: Of the various forms which Christianity has assumed, some one may be regarded as best, or at any rate, presumably, there is a best possible interpretation. It may be that the simplest interpretation is the best. It may be argued that Christianity is correlated with certain fundamental elements of human nature, and that the various complex forms, which the faith has assumed throughout the centuries, have been wilful departures from the simplicity of the truth once delivered to the fathers. If this position be maintained, as it sometimes is, the very apparent conclusion is that, when all the divergent bodies shall have sloughed off their idiosyncrasies and shall have decided to abide by that original simple truth, Christendom will be a unit, and the extension will be wide, corresponding to the simple intension. There are, however, several considerations that must be faced at this point.

The fathers to whom the faith was first delivered were comparatively civilized people. Christianity began (omitting for the present its Hebrew antecedents) among people who for centuries had been associated with civilized people and were themselves on a fairly high plane of civilization.<sup>2</sup> If those who first received the faith be taken as the norm, and all Christians in their outlook upon life and in their interpretation of the faith be reduced to this level, there certainly could be a wide extension of the term. But what would need to be said about more primitive peoples who are usually

<sup>2</sup> Another phase of this problem, but one which the writer does not care to discuss at this time, is that in almost every so-called civilized community there are individuals not so completely civilized as some of their neighbors of the same nationality. They are less sophisticated, more natural, indeed more primitive.

considered below the plane of civilization? Of these there are not a few in the world today.

Undoubtedly the statement suggested above, that "Christianity is correlated with certain fundamental elements of human nature," would be asserted as an answer by a champion of the "simple faith delivered to the fathers." But the question arises, What is human nature? Everybody is supposed to know, but like many other such items of common knowledge, definiteness of concept and of statement is woefully lacking. It is generally assumed that there is an irreducible minimum common and peculiar to all mankind, differentiating the human race from the merely animal creation. With this residuum, the simple faith is correlated, it is thought, and consequently intension and extension may be a perfect fit. Universality of faith and organic unity are wholly within the range of possibilities, despite the complexity of human life.

To offset such a view of the situation, it may be stated that modern psychologists are not so sure about this absolute division between men and so-called mere animals. "But the psychologists themselves are not in agreement," one might retort, making an objection that could not be denied. There are eminent psychologists who build their systems upon an analysis of the empirical content of consciousness, holding close to what they find. "We shall therefore take mind and consciousness to mean the same thing," says Titchener in his latest book.<sup>3</sup> "We shall speak of mind when we mean the sum-total of mental processes occurring in the life-time of an individual, and we shall speak of consciousness when we mean the sum-total of mental processes occurring *now*, at any given 'present' time." Other psychologists, with more of an eye to the irreducible minimum, make use of scientific analyses of consciousness, but explain it more nearly in harmony with metaphysical views which have, for the most part, insensibly molded the thinking of the mass of human beings in civilized communities. But what is a human being? This question, practically identical with that about human nature, will not down. What are those fundamental elements which make a man such, and without which

<sup>3</sup> Titchener, *A Text-Book of Psychology* (1910), 19.



an individual belongs simply to the brute creation?<sup>4</sup> The principle of extension and intension plays a prominent part here. Whatever elements may ultimately be grouped together to constitute the "intension" of a human being, will determine the circumference, larger or smaller, of the circle of humanity. If it be maintained that Christianity is correlated with such elements, it becomes of prime importance to know just what those elements are. While the scientists are not as yet agreed among themselves upon this point, Christian thinkers may indeed keep the interpretation of an earlier generation, but the prospects seem to be that finally a different interpretation will be reached and that, in consequence, they will need to make an entirely new arrangement of their material, after eliminating not a little of it.

Another possible answer to the question, What is the best interpretation of Christianity? might be found in some one of the historical complex forms of the faith, or in one yet to be. But whatever historical form might be selected, "extension" and "intension" would be vital with respect to universality. If a moderately complex form should be chosen as best, then all more complex forms would need to apply the pruning-hook, in order that their units might be denoted by that particular meaning. But what of the less complex forms? How could their adherents make real to themselves truths contained in forms and symbols which they had not as yet been sufficiently cultivated to appreciate? *Fides implicita* is the answer which historical Christianity gives to this question. Clement of Alexandria and Origen were thinkers in the early church. They did not expect that all Christians would be required to accept their interpretations. Later leaders were insistent upon this point, with consequent blind acceptance of doctrines upon the authority of the church. A forced and formal type of unity was thus secured.

It might be argued that, just as throughout the centuries of Christian history certain elements have maintained themselves and, in consequence, have given a fair degree of unity to the

<sup>4</sup> Naturally no attempt is made here to answer this question. The purpose is to raise questions which seem to be involved in the assumption of a possible united Christendom.

religious life of our western world, so we today may look out laterally, as it were, and may claim as Christian anywhere in the world whatever resembles the various phases of Christian life apparent among cultured and uncultured peoples in the past. Undoubtedly a degree of force attaches to such an argument, but the unity thus discerned is a thought unity, and as such quite different from any vital organic unity. For purposes of study, we may accept some minimal interpretation of Christianity as our criterion and arrange all Christian bodies, both those of the past and those that exist today, in a logically concatenated series; but any such thought arrangement would be quite different from an actual organic unity where the tendency is, in the light of history, to level up those who are below grade, so to speak, and to level down those who are of an especially high grade, in order that all may be of one mind, think the same, and act in the same way, or, in other words, that the intension of the term "Christian" may be the same in the case of each unit denoted.

Since, then, there are these rather apparent difficulties, might not the solution of the problem be found in the alternative suggested above? Instead of seeking the essence of Christianity in some rather simple truths capable of wide extension, or of looking to the past for the full significance of the faith, contained in any more or less complex form in any age or in any particular group, might we not far better look toward the future to reveal its richness in correlation with an even more complex life than any known historically? In so far as any group of people in the past, or present, have emphasized, or do emphasize, elements which are combined in the more complex or ideal Christianity, to that extent could such a group be regarded as Christian. If the time should ever come when the entire race would be upon a high plane culturally, when there would no longer be savage and barbarous peoples in the world, but all civilized, and that, too, to a high degree, then, presumably, there could be a oneness of interpretation of the faith coextensive with the individuals who might in any way profess that faith.<sup>5</sup> In this case the intension would not be minimal

<sup>5</sup> In the *American Journal of Theology* for January, 1910, the present writer discusses in an article on "Theological Reconstruction" the correlation of Christianity

but maximal, and at the same time the extension would be all inclusive.

The argument, thus briefly presented, applies with equal force to religions as a whole when viewed with reference to their possible union. It is true that common elements come to light in any scientific study of religion. It is, indeed, the common elements which science seeks. But if one attempts to construct a definition of religion which would be true for all religions, the intension of the terms used would be very slight. Such a definition might run as follows: Religion is the life of a man in his conscious relation to *his* God. For purposes of study, such a definition answers fairly well. It is very broad, and in that breadth makes provision for practically all historical religions. When we scrutinize the term "God," however, we find people breaking up into groups—savage, barbarous, and civilized—and into almost innumerable groups among civilized peoples, even within Christianity itself. There is little chance for unity when we view the matter in this way. We are dealing with variables, each group of people with its correlated concept of the Divine Being varying *pari passu* with the people themselves. If, now, turning aside from the various historical groups, we take the vantage ground of the highest culture that we know today, and interpret the term "God" as embracing within itself the best elements wrought out in the experience of the race, together with a plus something, we have a concept that meets present conditions, and in which there is also provision for additions upon the basis of future experiences.

If we view the matter in this way, a real thought unity is obtained, and the fundamental principles of logic are not violated. In so far as any people, even savages, have their lives colored in

with a scientific world-view. If that scientific type of culture should ever become universal and the correlation there suggested be realized, there would be in large measure such a oneness as this. Still further, if a different world-view should be constructed, such as might obtain from a harmonious blending of the results of scientific investigation and Platonic idealism, modified in large part no doubt—a combination like that which Aristotle effected in the ancient world—and if all people in the world should be elevated to such a plane of culture as to make such a world-view their own, then, if Christianity were correlated with it, there would be an extension commensurate with the race, while the intension would be high.

the least by their thought of their God, to that extent they would be religious. The term God may represent the best elements, or even a single good element, that had sprung up out of their experience or the experience of their fathers, provided that such element or elements are still regarded as valuable. They could thus be grouped with other peoples whose religion had been estimated in the same way, but in no case could it be asserted that the essence of religion, pure and simple, is to be found among such people. The fuller, richer form would be found in the later, more completely developed beliefs and practices. The earlier would be included because of its slight participation in the later, more complex form. If the time should ever come when all religious people would be upon the same cultural plane, and have practically the same interpretation of the Divine Being, then the intension of religion, although high, would also be common to all.

An objection that might be brought against this whole argument is that it presupposes progress in the race. That assumption, the writer frankly makes. It is hardly possible to prove progress in any demonstrable way. A great deal depends upon one's definition. The biologist, however, assumes that the more complex forms are the higher.<sup>6</sup> To a certain extent, the same test may be used to measure social progress. The more complex social structure, correlated as it is with the complex modern social life, may well be accepted as evidence of progress, and what is true of life as a whole may be assumed with propriety in the case of Christianity, or of religion *per se*, since both are phases of the human spirit's activity.

The multiplicity of denominations within Protestantism is often spoken of with sadness, and a longing for unity voices itself as indicated at the beginning of this article. But this great variety of religious belief has come in consequence of the free spiritual development made possible by the Reformation and may be a blessing rather than an evil. In the natural world, the higher forms of life have resulted from differentiation. This is the great principle of progress. It may be equally valuable in religion. Organic unity, so often clamored for, might mean the loss of much

<sup>6</sup> Minot, *Age, Growth, and Death* (1908), 154.

that is good in modern religious life, through a lessened intension, without yielding compensating values.

None the less, as Spencer has indicated, social evolution proceeds in cycles. Just as a unifying tendency brought the heterogeneous, widely scattered sects of the ancient world together into the one Catholic church, so it may be that, at the present time, under the guidance of men in whom the zeal for unity outweighs all other considerations, a consolidation of some sort may be effected. Just as the human mind, it is said, cannot long remain in skepticism and will often embrace the most extreme dogmatism as preferable, so, perhaps, Christians of all stripes may ultimately prefer unity to the present heterogeneity. But such a result will be only one swing of the pendulum. Obeying the same fundamental social law, there will undoubtedly later be a turn in the tide. If the goods uncovered by the isolated sects since the Reformation be reconciled and unified and Christendom be united again even for several centuries, there can be but little doubt that there will later be a new disintegration and denominational multiplicity. That law of progress even Christianity itself cannot escape. Not yet has the last bit of knowledge about the universe been garnered; not yet is there uniformity of culture. Until such uniformity be realized, it would be well to recognize the logical difficulties involved in any attempt to effect organic unity, and instead to allow the human spirit such scope in its religious manifestations as not to retard but rather to unfetter and foster the high and various outreaches of the human soul.

## CRITICAL NOTES

### THE PRE-CHRISTIAN JESUS

Even if the limited space at command did not forbid any wide survey of the field of argument covered by the article of Dr. Case on "The Historicity of Jesus," it would still be out of place for the writer to mingle in strife about points never raised in his own writings nor deemed essential to his own theories of Christian origins. In fact, it would be almost impertinent, for although Lublinski with Kalthoff has joined the majority, yet scholars like Drews, Jensen, Steudel, Robertson, Niemojewski need not that any man should fight their battles, and the great work of the first is now accessible in English. Accordingly, my comments shall be confined to such parts of Dr. Case's article as deal with *Der vorchristliche Jesus*, in itself or as incorporated into more recent publications.

1. It is gratifying to see recognized so clearly that the heart of the matter really lies in the contention that the *Jesus-Cult is pre-Christian*, the *pièce de résistance* of recent criticism. The New Testament actually presupposes such a cult. It is quite impossible to bring down the dates of its documents so low as to allow time for the origin, growth, and maturation of Jesus-worship on the basis of a brief human life and tragic death about A.D. 30. On this point the Conservative has won against the Liberal. There remains then only the dilemma: Either the Jesus was not pure-human, but a supernatural being (it matters not in what degree, for one miracle is just as miraculous as another or a hundred—in fact, *one* would lead us to expect *many*), or else he was pure-divine, i.e., God under a certain aspect or person, and the full bloom of his worship and propaganda in the New Testament implies preliminary pre-Christian stages. A well-developed cult can no more spring up and blossom in a year than can any other century plant. This dilemma has been recognized with clearness by certain French reviewers of *Der vorchristliche Jesus*, as in the *Revue biblique internationale* (1906, pp. 645-47), and it seems safe to predict that it will finally determine the position one shall assume in the new alignment that the Jesus-question forces upon the critical world. The attempt to deduce proto-Christianity from a single personal pure-human focus has failed finally

(witness Schweitzer's *Von Reimarus zu Wrede*<sup>2</sup>), and no choice is now left save between Jesus the God-Man and Jesus the God.

2. It rather surprises one at first to read that "W. B. Smith varied the theory (of Bauer and Kalthoff) by assigning the origin of the Jesus-Cult to pre-Christian times." In Germany the Bauerians lament that Smith is uninfluenced by Bauer, if not, indeed, quite ignorant of him! As to Kalthoff, Smith's campaign was begun in 1900 (*The Outlook*, November 17), when his general view had for years been taking shape and was already definite enough for statement, whereas Kalthoff's first book, *Das Christus-Problem*, appeared in 1902, and his *Entstehung des Christentums* in 1904, when the bulk of *Der vorchristliche Jesus* was already written. In fact, the contributions of the Bauer-Kalthoff theory to Smith's theory have been practically or absolutely *nil*, nay, the two theories agree in hardly any positive aspect, but only in *not* accepting the historicity—but for widely diverse reasons.

3. "For Smith the whole subject is less a problem than it was with his predecessors and more a question of phrases." And yet he had supposed himself intently occupied for over twenty years with precisely the *one problem* of understanding proto-Christianity and especially the New Testament as resultants from the pure-human personality of Jesus. When the liberal solution proved finally inadmissible, he was guided to its polar opposite by a number of hitherto neglected indications. These were the "phrases" in question. They did indeed point the way to the solution, but in no measure did they constitute it. They suggested the notion of the divine pre-Christian Jesus, which so many have found so "strangely illuminating." But surely Smith can hardly be said to have grappled less consciously than his predecessors with a "problem" every single phase of which he has treated at length "mit peinlich genauer Exegese" in published or as yet unpublished memoirs, and for which he has proposed a comprehensive solution. True, *Der vorchristliche Jesus* was only a reconnoissance in force, to develop the position and strength of the enemy, but it was plain from the *Vorrede* that the writer's studies touched the problem all around

<sup>2</sup> In this wide interval of intense and sustained endeavor, despite many long strides forward in knowledge and the most lavish display of acumen, no progress whatever but rather regress has been made in constructing a pure-human Jesus as the Author of Christianity. "Cette sublime personne" of Renan's fancy is far more attractive and inspiring, and as the "noble initiateur" of our religion is far more plausible than (to mention only "the first three") the paltry residuum of Harnack's, or Loisy's, or Wellhausen's analysis—whose great merit is to show not how such a religion *could* but only how it *could not* have issued from such a pure-human focus.

and aimed at a complete comprehension. That he did not follow the high a priori road, but preferred the humbler guidance of sporadic phrases and disregarded minutiae, was in full accord with scientific method: "im kleinsten Punkt die höchste Kraft." When the mathematician would discover the form of a function, he observes and studies its behavior in the vicinity of its singular points; this study complete, he proceeds to constitute it so as to satisfy the critical conditions evinced. Precisely so the writer sought to construct a Jesus-conception that would satisfy the conditions imposed by many apparently isolated crucial phenomena. Such seems to be not only a proper scientific procedure, but the only proper one under the peculiar circumstances of the case. Exactly this same has Schmiedel so felicitously characterized: "Noch überraschender wirkt die Kunst seiner wissenschaftlichen Methode. . . . Möge der Leser selbst die Beobachtung machen, wie er anfangs nichts als leicht zu umgehende Steine aufrichten, dann aber plötzlich sie zu einer Mauer zusammenfügen sieht, von der er vorerst absolut nicht weiss, wie er sie durchbrechen oder übersteigen soll." It must be plain then that these isolated phrases (or stones) do not remain isolated but do all knit together into a total compact argument which the ablest critics (as Clemen) have admitted "cannot easily be shown to be untenable."

I have dwelt upon this point, because unfriendly critics have made it the principal objection to *Der vorchristliche Jesus* that it "ist nicht ein einheitliches systematisch aufgebautes und eine Zentralidee vortragendes Werk." This amounts to condemning it because it is explorative, heuristic, and a posteriori, instead of expositive, dogmatic, and a priori; in other words, because it is strictly scientific instead of vaguely visionary. The *Westminster Review* thinks "the 'pre-Christian Jesus' theory throws a startling light upon a multitude of incidents and phrases which have puzzled expositors, and even incidents and expressions that have not seemed to need explanation, acquire a new and more striking meaning." It is this power to light up the dark and to organize and correlate and fill with significance seemingly unrelated, disconnected, and unmeaning details, that is the unerring and distinctive mark of an acceptable theory.

When now it comes to the individual "phrases," the remarkable fact is that on no single point have the assailants of the book been able to agree, not one argument have they answered in a manner quite satisfactory even to themselves. Take the case of Apollos. Note the clash of explanations. Clemen, admitting they are all unavailing,



can do nothing better than *reject the statement in Acts outright*: "It could not be that he knew only the baptism of John; it follows that this latter statement must be regarded as unhistorical, but not that τὰ περὶ τοῦ Ἰησοῦ is to be taken in a sense to which no other evidence points." Clemen here follows a counsel of desperation: what he cannot explain he entirely rejects. Besides, he is certainly wrong in his last statement; there is a host of indicia that all point the same way.

Soltau<sup>2</sup> admits that the Greek phrase must have the very meaning that Clemen disallows: "Diese Worte bedeuten in der Tat wohl nicht die Lebensschicksale Jesu als vielmehr die über Jesus geltende Religionsanschauung." Here this able philologist concedes precisely what Clemen rejects the historical datum in order to avoid.

Loisy<sup>3</sup> goes even further: "C'est surtout le livre des Actes qui est exploité en faveur du Jésus pré-chrétien, et il faut avouer, par exemple, que le cas d'Apollon . . . est au moins singulier. Les explications des commentateurs sont peu satisfaisantes. L'hypothèse d'une alteration dans le texte est trop commode et peut paraître invraisemblable. Reste à supposer que les conditions et les formes de l'évangélisation primitive ont été plus complexes et plus variées qu'on ne l'admet communément."

Here the illustrious critic seems to concede far more than is safe for his own cause. If "the conditions and forms of the first evangelization" were indeed so "complex and varied," then the whole Lukan theory of the diffusion from the single Jerusalem center vanishes, the theory of multifocal diffusion (as set forth in *Der vorchristliche Jesus*) remains alone, and what is left of the current liberal view? Where is there any room for complexity and variety of conditions and forms in preaching such simple historical facts as that Jesus was a noble and beautiful human character, that he was crucified in Jerusalem, buried, and yet appeared alive to his personal disciples? Plainly such a primitive preaching of mere history admits of no such variety and complexity of conditions and forms, and in conceding this variety and complexity M. Loisy incautiously concedes the very essence of the book he reviews.

Such illustrations as the foregoing might be indefinitely multiplied. Of no single contention in *Der vorschristliche Jesus* have the adverse critics produced a convincing or consentient refutation. Vollmer says: "Der Autor behandelt den Beinamen Nazoräus, den er mit guten Gründen auf die semitische Wurzel nazar zuruckführt"; Soltau admits

<sup>2</sup> *Berliner philologische Wochenschrift*, 1. Juni 1907.

<sup>3</sup> *Revue critique d'histoire et de littérature*, 24 Septembre 1906.

“der Name bedeutet zweifellos ‘Wächter,’ ‘Hüter,’ ist von der bekannten Wurzel nasar abzuleiten und hängt schwerlich mit Nazareth zusammen”; the others, even the ablest, as Oort and Nestle, seem rudderless at sea. The pre-Christian existence of the Nasarees critics have sought to evade in many ways, but all in vain. Wernle takes refuge in a modified reading, unsupported codically nor in any case of the least avail. Others think Epiphanius is obscure and perhaps knew not whereof he wrote. He is indeed a special pleader often dark, confused, contradictory, but the point is that he is here perfectly clear, explicit, and even emphatic, and that while he may be a very bad witness *for* himself and his cause, he is an exceeding good witness *against* himself and his cause. Many have felt the irresistible force of his testimony. Thus Schwen complains recently that in the matter of Epiphanius the assailants of *Der vorchristliche Jesus* “have partially capitulated.” He like Wernle tries hard to show that Epiphanius would distinguish between pre-Christian Nasarees and post-Christian Nazorees. But what if he would? What could it show? Merely that Epiphanius in the interest of his own theory would make a distinction where there was no real difference. For the eight varying forms of the word are used indifferently in the manuscripts.

Consider again the case of the Naassene Hymn containing the name Jesus. Weinel seems to yield grudgingly the pre-Christianity of the Naassenes.<sup>4</sup> Certainly they were the very oldest of the gnostics, and gnosticism is now proved to be pre-Christian. But he thinks these particular Naassenes must have been post-Christian. Why? Because he imagines they quote from the New Testament! Now it is easily shown that all his examples are misleading; there is no case when it is not much more probable that the New Testament writer has quoted from some gnostic work or its source. Thus Weinel and others point to the Naassene citation: “Awake thou that sleepest and arise (ἐξεγέρθητι), and the Christ shall shine upon thee,” as taken from Eph. 5:14, forgetting apparently that *the writer of Ephesians is himself quoting* (from some gnostic hymn), as shown by the formula διὰ λέγει and printed in the best editions; moreover ἐξεγέρθητι looks older than the Ephesian ἀνάστα ἐκ τῶν νεκρῶν. Furthermore, Hilgenfeld himself says of the Naassene hymn containing the name Jesus, “welcher freilich der älteren Gnosis noch näher steht.” Now this “older Gnosis” is certainly pre-Christian, as proved by me in a variety of ways and confirmed lexically by Reitzenstein, against the protest of Harnack.

<sup>4</sup> Ist das “liberale” Jesusbild widerlegt? 93.

Similarly anent the papyrus presenting the name Jesus. Weinel thinks it "childish" to understand the Essenes by "the pure," forgetting that Dieterich has no doubt at all of the Essenic origin of the "Hebraic Logos." Deissmann more discreetly does not attack the antiquity of the text as a whole, but merely rejects "den usurpierten Jesus-Namen" as "eingesetzt." Here too a counsel of despair is followed. Such interpolation is mere imagination, unsuggested by any textual phenomena but rather forbidden by all. For Ἰησοῦ stands at the beginning of line 3020 and is required as the name of "the God of the Hebrews." Deissmann says that the name is "in der Formel schwerlich alt," was inserted by a heathen, since neither Christian nor Jew would call Jesus "the God of the Hebrews"! Why not? It seems highly probable that the name was conceived as related to the sacred name IHVH; in some of its forms, popular etymology could hardly fail to combine the two. Besides, there is a famous epistle "TO HEBREWS" in which thirteen times Jesus is distinctly mentioned as a God.

This analysis might be pursued much further. It would be found in every case that the prediction quoted from Schmiedel had been fulfilled. At no point has the liberal German critic thus far been able either "to break through or to surmount." More recently Deissmann takes very kindly to the concept "Jesus-cult" and adopts the term as a favorite (see *Die Urgeschichte des Christentums im Lichte der Sprachforschung*, 23, 27, 28, 29).

As to the Pauline testimony, it is discussed in *Ecce Deus* (now under press in Germany) and needs no mention here. The larger question of the Pauline epistles, I hope to treat minutely before many years. Meantime it is not insignificant that even Zahn (as well as Harnack) has now yielded unconditionally to arguments in "The Address and Destination of St. Paul's Epistle to Romans" (*J.B.L.* [1901], Pt. I, 1-21), and surrenders Ρωμη in 1:7 as "unbelievably original" (*Römerbrief*, 50 f., 615-17).

On p. 41 Dr. Case makes the important point that "the stages of development in this tradition are seen to move away from Jesus, the man of Galilee, toward the heavenly Christ." But it seems proved decisively (in *Ecce Deus*) that the movement has been the exact opposite. The historization begins in Mark and Q. It passes over into humanization in Matthew and Luke and is even intensified into sentimentalization in John, where "Jesus weeps" and we "behold the Man." It is the Jesus of Mark that is a God most destitute of human features. The opening chapters of Matthew and Luke are late.

As touching the labors of Robertson, Zimmern, Jensen, they need not be valueless. As the planet speeds sweeping round the sun it gathers up showers of meteoric masses, the dust of shattered worlds, and imbeds them in its own crust. So, too, as the great idea of the Jesus, the healing, saving, demon-expelling God, circled round through the circum-Mediterranean consciousness, it could hardly fail to attract and attach to itself many wandering fragments of dismembered faiths, and the identification of these may well engage the attention of the orientalist and the comparative philologist; but the nucleus and central mass of the "new doctrine" would seem to lie nearer home and need not be sought for on the banks of the Ganges or the Nile, in the Gilgamesh Epos or in the Inscriptions of Crete.

WILLIAM BENJAMIN SMITH

TULANE UNIVERSITY OF LOUISIANA  
NEW ORLEANS, LA.

---

### JESUS' HISTORICITY: A STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The preceding note on the *Pre-Christian Jesus*, so kindly furnished by Professor W. B. Smith, seems to demand a further word. His optimism regarding his own view is perhaps natural, but it may not be out of place here to state briefly our reasons for not sharing this confidence and to indicate some of the crucial phases of the general problem. These seem to require a much more thoroughgoing treatment than has yet been given them, if a theory of Jesus' non-historicity is to receive recognition as a possible hypothesis—to say nothing of regarding it as an established conclusion.

Giving attention to some minor matters in passing, Professor Smith's complaint that he has been accused unjustly of dependence upon Bauer and Kalthoff rests on an erroneous understanding of the passage he quotes. Instead of supplying parenthetically "of Bauer and Kalthoff" he should have supplied "of the rise of the new religion," as referred to in the previous paragraph of the article in question. In citing "the ablest critics (as Clemen)" as witnesses to the strength of the argument of *Der vorchristliche Jesus*, it might have been well to give the whole of Clemen's sentence: "In the most various departments of science it happens from time to time that assertions are put forth which at once strike the experts in the science as untenable, and yet cannot easily be shown to be so." Is this difficulty credited to the strength of the argument or to its intangible quality? Seemingly to the latter, for

Clemen concludes: "Professor Smith has devoted extraordinary diligence and keenness to a lost cause; he must acquire a sense for the natural and the simple before he can enjoy historical knowledge of the beginnings of our religion."<sup>1</sup> And is it quite fair to Schmiedel to leave the impression that he approves of the presentation in *Der vorchristliche Jesus* as a "proper scientific procedure" or a "compact argument"? A few lines earlier in the paragraph from which Professor Smith cites, Schmiedel said: "Schon die theologischen Kenntnisse dieses Mathematikers stehen keineswegs jedem Theologen, auch nicht jedem streng wissenschaftlich arbeitenden, zu Gebote." And later: "Lebhaft zu bedauern ist, dass das Buch noch nichts Vollständiges bietet." That Schmiedel is willing to treat the subject with unbiased judgment would be presupposed from the fact that he consents with a *Vorwort* to start the book in question on its way, hence the significance of his closing words: "Wenn ich, wie vorausszusehen, mich früher oder später über die Aufstellungen von Professor Smith näher aussprechen muss und dabei seine Resultate in allen Hauptpunkten bekämpfen werde [we take the liberty of italicizing], so tut dies meiner Wertschätzung seiner anregenden und in der beschriebenen Weise fördernden Arbeit keinen Eintrag."<sup>2</sup>

Yet we would not lay undue stress upon the fact that Professor Smith's results, as indeed the results of all those who have thus far denied the historicity of Jesus, are widely rejected by the specialists in the field of early Christian history. It is rather the character of the negative arguments themselves than their failure to win adherents that seems to discredit them. For instance, the existence of a pre-Christian Jesus-cult is made to rest upon a few isolated data whose chief argumentative value appears to lie in the fact that, in their present context, they are obscure and consequently lend themselves readily to liberal hypothesizing. So it is with τὰ περὶ τοῦ Ἰησοῦ (Acts 18:25), with Epiphanius' reference to Ναζαπαῖοι and Ναοπαῖοι, with the date of the Naassene hymn and the Paris papyrus in which Jesus' name is found, and with the alleged non-existence of Nazareth as a place-name in early times. These main evidences for a pre-Christian Jesus-cult are all obscure either as to meaning or date; one may make surmises on this basis confident that a critic cannot produce any stronger evidence for the contrary opinion. An argument built upon such data, just because of the intangible character of its premises, cannot easily be submitted to detailed scientific criticism.

<sup>1</sup> *American Journal of Theology*, April, 1907, pp. 327-30.

<sup>2</sup> *Der vorchristliche Jesus*, ix-xi.

Another serious defect of the general procedure is the way in which the great bulk of testimony for the origin of Christianity is set aside in favor of a hypothetical reconstruction based upon obscure and isolated points. This results, of course, in a promiscuous forcing of all data into line with a hypothesis—and who ever failed, at least in his own opinion, in an effort of this kind when once he committed himself to the defense of a hypothesis! So it has happened that no advocate of the negative position, at least none since Bauer, has concerned himself primarily and comprehensively with the principal data in the field—showing, for example, that the letters of Paul or the primitive gospel tradition is wholly spurious. A theory of Christianity's origin has been foisted upon our attention before the way has been cleared for it in a field already occupied.

We venture to suggest that the fundamental problem beneath this whole controversy is Jesus' meaning for modern religion. A Christology which holds that Jesus is a supernatural being will find the origin of the new religion to be supernatural. Others do not believe Jesus to have been a supernatural person, and accordingly they propose to construct a new Christology from the raw materials brought to light by modern critical study of his life and teaching. Yet others find the connection between the historical Jesus and modern religion so unimportant that they eschew all christological speculation and treat Jesus as merely one of the phenomena—more or less significant—in the history of our religion. An extreme form of this last position eliminates Jesus not only from theology but also from history; but since a very primitive faith in Jesus cannot conceivably be eliminated, it must be made fictitious in origin—originating a century or so before our era and mainly on Jewish soil (so Smith, Drews, *et al.*), or else arising toward the close of the first century A.D. and on Roman soil (so Bauer, Kalthoff). We sometimes hear the slogan, "Make this a purely historical issue," but the historian as such does not find any occasion to raise the issue; and those who raise it can hardly be said to have been forced to the question from the historical side. In fact Drews admits outright that his interest is not such: "In Wahrheit ist die 'Christusmythe' gerade im Interesse der Religion verfasst worden, aus der Ueberzeugung heraus, dass deren bisherige Formen den Heutigen nicht mehr genügen, dass besonders der Jesuanismus der historischen Theologie im tiefsten Grunde irreligiös ist und dieser selbst das grösste Hindernis alles wahrhaft religiösen Fortschritts darstellt" (*Christusmythe*, xi; cf. also W. B. Smith, *Der vorchristliche Jesus*, 104). The vital problem, then, is not the meaning

of isolated phrases, or word-derivations, in proof of a pre-Christian Jesus-cult, but the question of the content of the religious life of primitive Christians as related to a historical individual whom they came to reverence very highly. Not the Jesus of doctrine and ritual but the Jesus of actual life must be regarded as the founder of Christianity, and if he were not a historical person we must find a personal substitute for him in the early age.<sup>3</sup>

SHIRLEY JACKSON CASE

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

---

### THE TORONTO GOSPELS

There is in the library of the University of Toronto a Greek manuscript of the four gospels, written on parchment in a minute cursive hand. The manuscript was written probably in the late eleventh or early twelfth century, and is of especial interest from the fact that it does not appear in any of the published lists of gospel cursives, either Gregory's, von Soden's, or Scrivener's, and its existence seems to have been quite unknown hitherto to the workers in the textual field. Nine gospel cursives are known to exist in America, and of these only two are complete in the original hand. A tenth, the Codex Torontonensis, as its former owner named it, must now be added to the list, and take its place among the known and registered manuscripts of the Greek gospels.

The Codex Torontonensis was exhibited with printed Bibles and manuscript facsimiles in an exhibition held at Toronto in connection with the Tercentenary of the King James Version, under the auspices of the Upper Canada Bible Society, February 13-25, 1911. Through the courtesy of my friend Ernest W. Parsons, a printed catalog of this exhibition reached me, and an effort was immediately made to gain an opportunity to examine the manuscript. At the request of Professor Burton, Director of the Libraries of the University, President Falconer and Librarian Langton, with great courtesy, promptly forwarded the manuscript to Chicago for full examination. Some results of that examination are here presented.

The manuscript formerly belonged to a well-known clergyman and writer of Toronto, the late Rev. Canon Henry Scadding, who, at his death in 1901, left his library to the University of Toronto. It appears from inquiries very kindly undertaken by Mr. Parsons and Professor

<sup>3</sup> For further remarks on Jesus' personal influence in the founding of Christianity see above, pp. 266 f.

J. L. Gilmour of Toronto, that Dr. Scadding purchased the manuscript from an English dealer more than twenty years ago. The binding had probably previously been restored with a new back, uniting the old worm-eaten leather-covered boards, and lettered Quatuor Evangelia M.S. Graec. Saec. XII, and Dr. Scadding had the name Codex Torontonensis stamped upon the outer case with which he protected it. A special interest attaches to Dr. Scadding's codex as the first Greek manuscript of the four gospels to appear in Canada.

The codex consists of 226 leaves, in twenty-nine quires. These are made in the usual Greek manner, with eight leaves in each quire, except the 14th (of six) and 23d (of four), and are numbered in the lower left-hand corner of the first recto. The leaves measure cmm. 13 by 15.4. The parchment is not very thin, and the book with its thick board covers makes a stout little volume 8 cmm. in thickness. There is appended to it a group of five quires, four of 7 and one of 6 leaves, or 34 in all, inscribed in a much later hand with the synaxarium and the menology. There are three coarse parchment fly leaves, one at the beginning and two at the end of the whole, which thus contains 263 parchment leaves. The writing is in single columns, in the gospels of 18 lines. The lines are carefully ruled, the writing depending from the lines. The margins contain the section and canon numbers, and the chapter numbers and titles. There are frequent marginal initials in gold over red. A later hand has added lection numbers and titles and, at the upper right-hand corner of each recto, the name of the evangelist.

The manuscript is not dated in the first hand, but a comparison with facsimiles of dated Greek cursives in the Bibliothèque Nationale published by Omont strongly favors a date toward the close of the eleventh century, or early in the twelfth. The hand of the Paris Psalter dated 1070 (Bibl. Nat. MS grec 164) closely resembles that of the Toronto manuscript, which must have been written in the same general period.

The contents of the manuscript are as follows. In an illuminated border, fol. 1a, τὸ κατὰ ματθαῖον εὐαγγέλιον, with pictures (1.2 cm. in diameter) of the four evangelists ὁ ἄ(γίος) ματθ(αῖος), ὁ ἄ(γίος) μάρκο(ς), ὁ ἄ(γίος) λουκᾶς, ὁ ἄ(γίος) ἰω(άννης) ὁ θεολό(γος). Below, κατ(ὰ) ματθαῖον εὐαγγέλιον. The Gospel of Matthew follows, in 68 chapters, 359 sections, foll. 1a-64a. A later hand has also marked 121 lessons, with ἀρχη and τέλος in the text, numbers in the margin, and titles at top or bottom of the page.

The 48 chapter titles for Mark, τοῦ κατ(ὰ) μάρκον εὐαγγε(λίον) τὰ κεφά(λαια), in red, follow, foll. 65a-66a, and then the Gospel of Mark,



entitled (in an illuminated border) τὸ κατὰ μάρκον ἅγιον καὶ σεπτὸν εὐαγγέλιον, and below, τὸ κατ(ὰ) μάρκον ἄγ(ιον) εὐαγγέλ(ιον) (fol. 67a), in 48 chapters, 241 sections, foll. 67a-107a. The later hand above mentioned has marked and entitled 70 lessons.

The 83 chapter titles for Luke, τοῦ κατὰ λουκᾶν εὐαγγέλιον τὰ κεφάλαια, in red, follow, foll. 108a-110a, and then the Gospel of Luke, τὸ κατὰ λουκᾶν ἅγιον εὐαγγέλιον, foll. 111a-177a, in 342 sections and 83 chapters. The later hand has indicated 116 readings.

The 18 chapter titles for John, τοῦ κατὰ ἰω(άννην) ἁγίου εὐαγγέλ(ιον) τὰ κεφάλαια, appear in red on fol. 178a, b. The Gospel of John, τὸ κατὰ ἰωάννην ἄγ(ιον) εὐαγγέλ(ιον), headed by a picture of Christ with a nimbus and a book (IC XC), follows, foll. 179a-226b. This is the end of the more ancient part of the manuscript.

There follow, in a rude and much later hand, (1) τίνας ἀκριβ(ε) τοῦ(του) τοῦ εὐαγγελίου, foll. 227a-247b; (2) μνηλόγιον σὺν θεῷ ἁγίῳ (Sept. 1—Aug. 31), foll. 248a-260a; concluding with, foll. 259a-260a, Εὐαγγέλια διάφορα εἰς μνήμας ἁγίων. On fol. 260b is a long dated note of 16 lines in a still later hand, beginning τέλος ἤληφεν ἐνταῦθα τὸ παρὸν βιβλίον and ending διότι ἄπειρος ἡμεῖς τῆς τέχνης τῶν γραμμάτων. Other rude Greek scrawls ancient or recent occupy the fly leaves.

In point of text, the Toronto codex is, like most cursives, fundamentally Syrian. Yet a considerable proportion of excellent early readings will be observed among its variants, and in one point its evidence becomes very interesting. The pericope (John 7:53—8:11) is omitted from its text, but another hand a century or more later (perhaps in the thirteenth?) has most interestingly supplied the text of the passage in the margins. In the subsequent trimming of the leaves some few letters of this writing were cut away, but the passage is quite complete enough to enable us to judge the character of the manuscript from which the missing pericope was supplied. The pericope clearly allies itself textually with the sixth (μ<sup>6</sup>) of the seven types distinguished by von Soden (*Schriften des N.T.*, pp. 507-8). Not a few cursives omit the pericope; Tischendorf's apparatus suggests that, of the cursives known to him, five out of six contained the passage as a part of John.

The unusual title of Mark, τὸ κατὰ μάρκον ἅγιον καὶ σεπτὸν εὐαγγέλιον, is a matter of interest. It does not appear in von Soden's list of gospel titles (*Schriften des N.T.*, p. 295), where seven types of gospel title are distinguished.

At the top of fol. 177a, the last page of Luke, an erasure of 25 letters seems to prove that the clause καὶ τὰ ἐπίλοιπα ἔδωκεν αὐτοῖς οὐσί-

nally stood here (Luke 24:43b) in the manuscript, and in its parent. This curious accretion is attested by KΠ\* and a small group of cursives, and it must be observed that the text of the manuscript frequently, though not constantly, coincides with K, Π\*, or KΠ. The lost Mediceus, formerly numbered 42 by Gregory, had this reading, and with AKΠ, and the Toronto codex, the strange *ἐλούετο* for *κατέβαινε*, John 5:4, but other particulars show that the Toronto manuscript cannot be identified with it. Nor can the manuscript be identified with the one sold by Hoskier to Quaritch some twenty years ago (Gregory, 1278), nor with any other cursive once known but now lost, although Gregory's old number 103, a manuscript used by Curcellaeus in his edition of 1658, shows many readings with the Toronto manuscript.

EDGAR J. GOODSPEED

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

## RECENT THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE

### SKINNER'S COMMENTARY ON GENESIS<sup>1</sup>

Dr. Skinner has given us a great commentary, which will at once take its place not only as one of the best of this indispensable series, but also as the most complete and scientific commentary on Genesis in the English language. This can be said without any disparagement to the other commentaries of recent years on this book. Those of Delitzsch (2 vols.) and Dillmann (2 vols.) appeared in English translations twenty-one and thirteen years ago respectively, and since that time the progress of biblical science has been such that a fresh treatment of Genesis was needed. On the other hand, while Professor Bennett in the *Century Bible* and Professor Driver in the Westminster series have each written ideal commentaries on Genesis, they were limited by the more popular character of the series to which they belong. The scope of the *International Critical Commentary* has furnished a much larger opportunity than was allowed to either of those eminent scholars. This commentary is all that we should naturally be led to expect from the excellent character of Dr. Skinner's work already published, such as the two volumes on Isaiah (*Cambridge Bible*) and the commentary on Kings (*Century Bible*). The same painstaking scholarship, saneness of judgment, and fine spiritual insight which characterized these former productions are displayed in this larger work.

One of the outstanding facts which will impress the student and reader is the immense amount of labor represented in its production. Every legitimate question of introduction or interpretation is considered. The volume comprises lxvii pages of introductory material and 540 of commentary proper, followed by 10 pages of indexes. Besides these, xx pages more are occupied with an admirable preface and a list of abbreviations employed. This might, at first thought, seem sufficient to include an ample treatment of all the problems legitimately connected with the book in good-sized type, but as Genesis presents so many and such difficult questions, it has been found necessary by the author, in order to cover all the ground adequately, to employ small

<sup>1</sup> *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on Genesis (International Critical Commentary)*. By Rev. John Skinner, D.D., Principal and Professor of Old Testament Language and Literature, Westminster College, Cambridge. New York: Scribner, 1910. lxvii+551 pages. \$3.

type to a large extent. This is one of the undesirable features of the book which the author clearly recognizes and frankly regrets (p. ix, Preface).

Another outstanding feature of the book is the judiciousness displayed in the treatment of all the various questions which come within the scope of introduction, both in the conclusions adopted and the amount of space devoted to them. As an illustration one may note how Dr. Skinner disposes of a question, which formerly was such a burning issue, viz., the relation of the opening chapters of Genesis to the results of science. It may surprise some to find that he has "not found it necessary to occupy much space" with this problem (p. viii, Preface; cf. p. 5). But surely this is a judicious decision and a mark of progress, as even Dr. Driver felt called upon to discuss this topic at length, though it is no longer really a living issue.<sup>2</sup> It is a matter of congratulation that we have reached this position, when we recall the various painstaking but painful harmonistic attempts of the past, or the space occupied in giving the grounds why these chapters should not be considered as scientific statements. Let us hope that it is now settled that Genesis was never designed as an authoritative pronouncement on scientific facts.

Among the topics of introduction, that of the composite authorship of the book naturally occupies a leading place. The author's discussion of this part of the subject covers about half of the introductory section (pp. xxxiv-lxvii), under such divisions as: "The sources of Genesis"; "the collective authorship of J and E—their relation to literary prophecy"; "date and place of origin—Redaction of JE"; "the Priestly code and the final redaction." One will find here an admirable summary of the main arguments for the critical position. With most recent scholars Dr. Skinner takes the view that the symbols J and E represent not two individual writers "but two *schools*, i.e., two series of narrators, animated by common conceptions, following a common literary method, and transmitting a common form of the tradition from one generation to another" (p. xlv). In his brief comparison between the view commonly accepted that J and E were the production of *literary* schools to whose efforts the different variations within each document are to be attributed, and the view of Gunkel that they were "first of all guilds of oral narrators, whose stories gradually took written shape within their respective circles, and were ultimately put together in the collections as we now have them," our author is guarded though favoring the latter theory (p. xlvi).

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Driver's *Genesis*, xxxvii-xlii; lxi-iii; 19-26.

Dr. Skinner takes issue with the common designation of J and E "as the *prophetic* narrative of the Pentateuch" (Hexateuch), especially as used by writers who claim that these sources were influenced by the prophets from the time of Amos onward. Nor is he inclined to recognize the great prophetic movement of the ninth century (i.e., Elijah and Elisha) as affecting these sources, since he maintains that the impulses "inherent in the religion from its foundation by Moses" are sufficient to account for their religious tone (p. li). This is perhaps not a question of great moment, but it seems to us that the usual name employed, "prophetic," is as fitting as any. Moses is certainly recognized by E as a prophet (Num. 18:1-13),<sup>3</sup> as well as by later writers (e.g., Deut. 18:18; Hos. 12:13). If, then, the religious teaching of JE can be traced back to impulses originating with Moses, *the prophet*, technically there can be no objection to the application of the term prophetic to them. But besides this, while the teaching of E is not on the same lofty moral and spiritual plane as that of the great prophets of the eighth century and following, it anticipates in many ways their lofty standpoint.<sup>4</sup>

In reference to P, Dr. Skinner controverts the view of Dr. Orr that the historical material of P is to be considered as simply supplementary, and not a continuous narrative, "which is a *source* as well as the framework of Genesis" (p. lvii). His treatment here is especially masterly and convincing. Two steps in his discussion may be mentioned, viz., the printing in full of the P material relating to Abraham (p. lviii), and the showing of the differences in representation compared with the older narratives whenever P is given with any fulness (p. lix).

The author is especially interesting and illuminating in his discussion of the narratives embodied in Genesis (pp. i-xxxii). Those addicted to a literalism which would shatter the poetic spirit of these narratives (legends, if you will) need to read with open mind pages iv ff. which abound in statements which deserve citation if space permitted. The following must suffice:

One of the strangest theological prepossessions is that which identifies revealed truth with matter-of-fact accuracy either in science or in history. Legend is after all a species of poetry, and it is hard to see why a revelation

<sup>3</sup> It is to be noted, however, that this section is regarded by many critics as belonging to the later stratum of E (E<sup>2</sup>).

<sup>4</sup> Cf., for example, President W. R. Harper's estimate of E: "In many points it is on a level with Amos and Hosea."—*International Critical Commentary* on Amos and Hosea, p. lxxxiv.

which has freely availed itself of so many other kinds of poetry—fable, allegory, parable—should disdain that form of it which is the most influential of all in the life of a primitive people. As a vehicle of religious ideas, poetic narrative possesses obvious advantages over literal history; and the spirit of religion, deeply implanted in the heart of a people, will so permeate and fashion its legendary lore as to make it a plastic expression of the imperishable truths which have come to it through its experience of God [p. v.]

Attention is called by the author to the significant fact of the spiritual influence of the Hebrew religion which in chaps. i–xi has “transformed and purified the crude speculations of pagan theology, and adapted them to the ideas of an ethical and monotheistic faith” (p. ix).

The view that the historical background of the patriarchal period, as revealed by archaeological research, proves the historical character of the narratives relating to this period is carefully examined and weighed, with the conclusion that “the case for the historicity of the tradition, based on correspondences with contemporary evidences from the period in question, appears to us to be greatly overstated” (p. xvii).

The ethnographical theories in their various forms are also considered with a verdict against them: “Each system has some plausible and attractive features; but each, to avoid absurdity, has to exercise a judicious restraint on the consistent extension of its principles” (p. xxi).

As regards the patriarchs as individuals he recognizes that all that the data will admit is not “more than a *substantial nucleus* of historic fact” (p. xxiii). At the same time his opinion is that the view that such names as Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, and Joseph were historic individuals is more probable than any other view advanced, though Abraham has much stronger claims as a historical character than the others (pp. xxv ff.; cf. pp. 356 f.). While agreeing in the main with the author’s contention at this point we cannot but question whether he has done full justice to the view of Cornill and others (viz., of a combination both of narratives of individuals [probably idealized in many features] together with tribal traditions which in their transmission became individualized), inasmuch as he apparently has adopted some of their conclusions.

Wiener’s arguments against the critical view based on the unreliability of the Massoretic text in reference to the occurrence of the divine names are dealt with briefly but summarily (pp. xxxv f.). Dr. Skinner ably defends the substantial accuracy of the Hebrew text and concludes with this statement: “It is idle to speculate on what would have happened if Astruc and his successors had been compelled to operate with

the Greek text instead of the Hebrew; but it is a rational surmise that in that case criticism would still have arrived, by a more laborious route, at very much the positions it occupies today" (p. xxxvii). In view of the importance attached to Wiener's arguments in conservative quarters it would seem that this section ought to have been printed in larger type. The author's discussion deserves a more prominent setting. The same may be said of the fine piece of dialectics in which Dr. Orr's arraignment of the critical view is incisively examined (pp. xlf.). It is unfortunate, to say the least, that this has been relegated to the aggravating, fine type. Eerdmans' view of the polytheistic background behind the Genesis traditions is more briefly treated (pp. xlii f.). Dr. Skinner concludes with this specimen of irony: "What with Winkler and Jeremias, and Cheyne, and now Eerdmans, O.T. scholars have a good many new eras dawning on them just now. Whether any of them will shine unto the perfect day, time will show."

As regards Dr. Skinner's treatment of the Genesis narratives in the section of the book especially devoted to their exposition, space does not permit, nor is it needful to do more than call attention to a few illustrations of his method or conclusions. Of the 540 pages included in this division of the book, 239 are occupied with chaps. i-xi, which indicates the number and difficulty of the problems connected with this part of the book. The remainder is apportioned as follows: to Abraham (chaps. xii-xxv:18), pp. 240-354; to Jacob (chaps. xxv:19-xxxvi), pp. 355-437; and to Joseph and his brethren (chaps. xxxvii-1), pp. 438-540. The interpretation is marked with great care and independence of judgment, even though it is pretty thoroughly *Gunkel*ed. This is simply a statement of fact, not a criticism. The spiritual meaning is everywhere recognized when present and clearly expressed. This may be illustrated in the following passages taken almost at random. The "religious significance" of Gen. 1:1-2:3 "lies in the fact that in it the monotheistic principle of the O.T. has obtained classical expression" (p. 6). It is not an account of "*creatic de nihilo*," "but a long advance toward the full theological doctrine" (pp. 7, 13 f., 15). Chap. iii "in depth of moral and religious insight" . . . "is unsurpassed in the O.T. We have but to think of its delicate handling of the question of sex, its profound psychology of temptation and conscience, and its serious view of sin, in order to realize the educative influence of revealed religion in the life of ancient Israel" (p. 52). Chap. xxiv sets forth a "profoundly religious conception of Yahwe's providence as an unseen power, overruling events in answer to prayer" (p. 340). The Joseph

stories illustrate the thought "of an overruling, yet immanent, divine Providence, realizing its purpose through the complex interaction of human motives, working out a result which no single actor contemplated" (p. 440).

On the other hand there is an honest dealing with the narratives as they are without reading into them spiritual meaning, which the author does not believe they legitimately contain. Dr. Skinner's position in this regard may be seen in the following instances. Of 3:15 he states, "it is doubtful if, from the standpoint of strict historical exegesis, the passage can be regarded as in any sense a *Protevangelium*" (p. 81). The offering of Isaac (chap. xxii) he thinks originally belonged to "the class of aetiological legends which everywhere weave themselves round peculiarities of ritual whose real origin has been forgotten or obscured" (p. 332). "No more boldly anthropomorphic narrative is found in Genesis" than that of Jacob wrestling with the Angel (32:22-32); "and unless we shut our eyes to some of its salient features, we must resign the attempt to translate it wholly into terms of religious experience. We have to do with a legend, originating at a low level of religion, in process of accommodation to the purer ideas of revealed religion" (p. 411).

On the interpretation of such passages as these, many who class themselves in the modern school will doubtless disagree with his views, preferring to follow more cautious and conservative conclusions, such as are given by Doctors Bennett and Driver. But whether one agrees or differs from Dr. Skinner on these or other points of interpretation, there can be no question that his conclusions are presented only after a careful examination of different claimant views, and with a marked freedom from the dogmatic spirit. Students of the Old Testament have been placed under a debt of deep and lasting obligation to Dr. Skinner, which can be fully appreciated only by a careful examination of the book itself.

HARLAN CREELMAN

AUBURN THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY  
AUBURN, N.Y.

---

### THE SAMARITAN LITURGY

Mr. Cowley has at last given the learned world the most important desideratum in Samaritan literature—a properly edited text of that mass of hymns and midrashic material current in the Samaritan Com-



munity which may be entitled its liturgy.<sup>1</sup> There is a perennial interest in Samaritana, as was recently instanced by the brief sensation over Dr. Gaster's publication of a Samaritan text of the biblical Joshua. There still remains much to be done in the way of careful editing of Samaritan texts; Von Gall is planning a variorum edition of the Samaritan Hebrew Pentateuch, which would seem to be a pressing need in view of the extent to which the Samaritan codex is now adduced by textual critics. In England Dr. Ginsburg has announced a like purpose. Those remarkable monuments of the early Samaritan dialect, the Aramaic Targums, also still present problems which have by no means been solved; the text of the Barberini Triglot has never been fully edited, and what has appeared has been insufficiently done. But withal the liturgy is the material which has most demanded critical attention, for it must be the chief mine for the exploration of the history of the Samaritan theology. It is the liturgy which has preserved for us the antique forms of primitive Samaritan messianism and other eschatological doctrines; as the product of the free religious spirit it is peculiarly independent of the crushing load of political oppression, and these songs of Mount Gerizim vindicate the spirituality of the wretched sect; also the liturgy appears to be less under the influence of rabbinism and Islam than most of the theological products of the Samaritans. Indeed, to the present writer's mind and experience it is the only department of that literature where the student of religion can move with any feeling of delight and interest. In this it is like the Hebrew Psalter. Like the Psalms so the Samaritan hymns are used at specific festivals and on the religious occasions of the private life, and are peculiarly the expression of the common religion of the people. They throw no light upon sacrificial cult; with the Samaritan as with the Jew psalmody and oral liturgy have replaced sacrifice.

Mr. Cowley has given us a monument of patient and devoted scholarship. He began the work in 1890, some early sheets were even printed in 1892; but it took him nearly twenty years to complete his task. His material was distributed throughout Europe, in London, Oxford, Manchester, Gotha, Paris, Rome, and he appears to have collated in whole or in part over seventy MSS. "The texts," he says, "are mostly edited for the first time." How extensive this material is, is shown by the Index of First Lines, which lists about 900 pieces, covering almost the same number of pages in fine Hebrew type compactly printed.

<sup>1</sup> *The Samaritan Liturgy*, edited by A. E. Cowley. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1909. 2 vols. c+879 pages. £3 3s. net.

The most extensive editor before Cowley was Heidenheim, who published about 140 hymns or portions of hymns. But unlike Heidenheim's edition the present text is critical, with a good apparatus of variant readings. Also the Arabic rubrics are fully given, and the diacritical marks used by the Samaritan scribes are preserved in the text. It may be remarked that the text is given in the Hebrew square character; a wise provision facilitating the use of the material, while in matter of fact the cast types of the Samaritan alphabet do not at all accurately represent Samaritan as it is written.

In a modest Introduction, only too brief, Cowley gives some interesting results of his investigations. Throughout his work he has been concerned in dating these compositions; as most of them have the author's name attached, a chronological clue appears to be given. But the annalistic material for identification is slight and unreliable, and the editor has gone to a self-sacrificing extent in his attempt to identify the author and age of each composition. This chronological study (pp. xviii ff.) is most valuable; it terminates in genealogical tables of the chief literary families, and a table of the succession of the high priests from the fourth to the seventeenth centuries, the period of literary activity.

There follows in the Introduction (p. xxxv) a brief account of the peculiarities of the Samaritan language in form and script as it appears in the hymns. There is an interesting account of the vowel-signs used in the texts, which appear to have escaped the notice of earlier scholars; Heidenheim repeated them in his texts without any explanation of them. The Arabic system of three vowel signs is used; the first and the third of the Arabic signs are borrowed, but a peculiar sign has been invented for the *e*-class vowel. These signs are used to indicate the existence of vowels, for the purpose of meter and interpretation, and to distinguish between variously vocalized words. There follows a brief account of grammatical peculiarities (p. xxxvii), and of great use to the student who may wish to sample this fresh material is the Glossary which the editor gives (p. xlix). There is no one living who would be so competent to translate and interpret this mass of literature as Mr. Cowley, and we wish it were in the scope of his purpose to continue his work in these lines. But he may think that he has done his duty by a crabbed literature.

The first portion of the edited texts is the so-called Defter, or Common Prayers, the eldest part of the liturgy, going back in part to the theologian Marqah in the fourth century. There follow the series for Passover,

Pentecost, the Seventh Month; then the occasional offices, for Marriage and Circumcision and for Burial. With the exception of a few extracts in Heidenheim these occasional offices are published for the first time.

The reviewer has looked up several hymns given in Heidenheim's and Gesenius' texts and has found them all in Cowley's edition. He judges, therefore, that this new work includes substantially the elder material and at the same time manifold more that has not been published. In the brief comparisons he has been able to make, the earlier editors do not appear to have been as much amiss in their readings as he had supposed. The hymns are full of difficulties which the textual transmission has only exaggerated. It might have been useful if Cowley had indicated those hymns published by him which have been edited elsewhere, so that the student who is not *au fait* with the whole of the literature might turn to the older commentaries.

Mr. Cowley has performed a most painstaking task for which great gratitude is due him. By presenting a definitive text of the liturgy he has tremendously eased the labors of those who are interested in Samaritan subjects and gives them the means for further research.

PHILADELPHIA DIVINITY SCHOOL  
PHILADELPHIA, PA.

JAMES A. MONTGOMERY

---

#### VIOLET'S EDITION OF IV EZRA

The eighteenth volume of the series called "The Greek-Christian Authors of the First Three Centuries" (Die griechischen Christlichen Schriftsteller der ersten drei Jahrhunderte) places IV Ezra in the category of Greek productions and of Christian origin.<sup>1</sup> In its present form the so-called Ezra-Apocalypse is certainly Jewish-Christian in its contents, with the Jewish element largely preponderating; but the work exists only in Latin manuscripts and in others for the most part surely derived from Latin. It is the firm conviction of Dr. Violet, as of most other authorities on the subject, that the Fourth Book of Ezra must have existed in Greek, from which it was rendered into Latin and possibly into other tongues.

<sup>1</sup> *Die Esra-Apokalypse* (IV Esra). Erster Teil, Die Ueberlieferung, herausgegeben im Auftrage der Kirchenväter Commission der Königl. Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, von LIC. DR. BRUNO VIOLET, Pfarrer an der Thaborkirche in Berlin. Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1910. lxiv+446 pages. M. 17.50.

Up to the present time, however, in spite of the gradual increase of other textual material, there is no scrap of a Greek manuscript. Yet there are many signs of a Greek text behind the versions. To quote an example: In the Apos. Const. viii. 7 there occurs the phrase "truth abides forever," a citation from IV Ezra 8:23. In the two groups of Latin manuscripts into which all now known are easily divided, we have in the French group *veritas testificatur*, and in the Spanish group *veritas testificata est*. Manifestly we have a variation easily explained as the rendering of different translators. Of the two Arabic MSS, one identified with the great name of Ewald, the other discovered and published by Gildemeister in 1877, the latter is deemed by its editor and by Dr. Violet to show evidences that it has come directly from a Greek original. These two Arabic versions in a German translation are printed in full in the volume before us, and their many differences are easily explained on the assumption that one is based on the Latin text and the other on an assumed Greek original.

But it is persistently claimed by scholars like Wellhausen, Gunkel, and others that the Ezra-Apocalypse was written in Hebrew or Aramaic by its author or authors. Dr. Violet accepts this hypothesis confidently, and expresses the hope that a Hebrew MS may yet be recovered. He does not, however, adduce any evidence to support the contention, and even doubts the force of arguments which he quotes from Gunkel. The fact is that evidence is hardly forthcoming as yet. The present texts and versions appear to be translations from the Greek. Without a fragment of that text in existence, it is manifestly only a conjecture that the lost Greek itself is but a translation. Apparently much hope is based upon the case of Sirach, of which a part of the Hebrew original has been recovered.

The Ezra-Apocalypse appears in the Vulgate and in the authorized and English revised versions as II Esdras. In this edition the work contains 16 chapters. Of these only chaps. 3-14 are the real Apocalypse, the rest being accretions. In some of the MSS these 12 chapters appear as a complete book, having various titles, the most consistent being IV Esdras, the title adopted by Bensly and James in their edition of the Latin text published in 1895. The Vulgate text lacks a long section, 7:36-105, which was discovered and published by Bensly in 1875 and is incorporated in the English Revised Version.

This large volume is but the first half of Dr. Violet's contribution to this apocryphal treatise. Yet it comprehends a large amount of material. In the introduction we have an account of all the known MSS, of which

there are seven in Latin; then there are the Syriac, the Ethiopic, the two Arabic (besides some fragments), the Armenian, and the Sahidic translations, and traces of a Georgian version. We find here by far the fullest information about these important MSS, and the author gives in every case some estimate of their origin and value.

In the major part we have the various texts in parallel columns, the Syriac Ethiopic, the two Arabic in German, the Armenian in Latin. There are copious notes, admirably arranged, so that the comments on the different texts are easily discerned. In the notes on the Latin text the variant readings of the MSS are cited with apparent fulness, so that we have here an edition of the text which practically supersedes all others; for nowhere else can be found such wealth of material. Virtually every known witness is brought to the stand in these pages.

In an appendix may be found a well-arranged list of the quotations from IV Ezra, of which there are strangely but three in Greek sources, while 21 are found in Latin works. Incidentally it may be said that this fact suggests that if the work ever existed in Greek, it made little impression upon the Greek writers, but very much upon the Latin authors. Here we find also printed in full the oldest introduction to IV Ezra from the Codex Legionensis.

In his preface the author gives generous praise to the publishers. They have earned commendation, for the printing of a book of this kind is a big task, and the form leaves little to be desired.

L. W. BATTEN

ST. MARK'S CHURCH  
NEW YORK CITY

---

### THE ETHICAL ELEMENT IN JESUS' TEACHING<sup>1</sup>

We need more books to present and interpret the teachings of Jesus as they pertain to character and conduct. Wendt's masterly work on the *Teaching of Jesus*<sup>2</sup> gives some attention to this element in his message, but is chiefly concerned with the religious and messianic element. The theological interest in Jesus has been so strong through the centuries as to overshadow the ethical interest in him, and the

<sup>1</sup> *The Ethics of Jesus*. By President Henry Churchill King, D.D., LL.D. [The William Belden Noble Lectures, 1909.] New York: Macmillan, 1910. 293 pages. \$1.50.

*The Ethic of Jesus according to the Synoptic Gospels*. By Rev. James Stalker, M.A., D.D. New York: Armstrong, 1909. 403 pages. \$1.75.

<sup>2</sup> *Die Lehre Jesu*, 2. Aufl., 1901; English translation from first German edition, 1892.

literature has followed where the current interest has led. There has been a real neglect of Jesus' moral teaching, not only in the observance of it but in attention to it. We do not know and appreciate this portion of his message as we should. For right living is the primary matter, and Jesus set forth an ideal of right living which the centuries have pronounced the highest and most imperative.

Christian people everywhere profess to accept and live by his standard, but without adequately searching out the historical perspective and the meaning of his words. As we have more books on Jewish messianism than we have on Jewish ethics, so we have more books on the doctrine of the person of Christ than we have on his ethical teaching. Notwithstanding the notably perspicuous, general, and fundamental nature of Jesus' message, it requires study; only historical and literary interpretation of a skilful, thorough kind can recover his exact thought; and only psychological, sociological, and ethical wisdom can bring his teaching from the first century into practical connection with and usefulness for twentieth-century living. One may say that Jesus' teaching as to right living needs to be *regrown from the roots*, in the modern environment, in order to be completely adapted to present needs. The interpreter of Jesus for today has, therefore, a twofold task: (1) to find out historically what Jesus thought and said on ethical matters; and (2) to show practically what meaning and value his teaching can have for us. There were few books that had attempted this, there were none that had accomplished it.

There is good reason, therefore, to welcome these two recent volumes on the ethics<sup>3</sup> of Jesus. President King and Dr. Stalker are eminent theologians, with many previous books on religious subjects to their credit. These latest writings from them make a useful contribution to the study of Jesus' teaching. The two books are quite different in their aim and method, as the chapter titles will show:

King, *The Ethics of Jesus*: (1) "Introduction"; (2) "The Ethical Teaching in Schmiedel's Foundation-Pillar Passages, and in the Doubly Attested Sayings; Criteria"; (3) "The Ethical Teaching in Mark and in the Other Common Source of Matthew and Luke; The Oldest Sources"; (4) "Estimate of the Ethical Teaching in the Sayings of Jesus Peculiar to Either Matthew or Luke"; (5) "The Sermon on the Mount as a Whole"; (6) "Jesus' Conception of the

<sup>3</sup> Common usage in America is for the spelling "ethics"; I had supposed the usage was the same in Great Britain. Need we change to the spelling "ethic" which Dr. Stalker employs for his title? To be sure, the Germans say *Ethik*, and the French *éthique*, from the singular of the adjective *ἠθικός*; but Aristotle himself employed the plural form *ἠθικά*.

Basic Qualities of Life: A Study of the Beatitudes"; (7) "The Great Motives to Living in the Sermon on the Mount"; (8) "Conclusion."

Stalker, *The Ethic of Jesus*: (1) "Introductory: What Is Ethic?" PART I—THE HIGHEST GOOD: (2) "The Gospel or Blessedness"; (3) "The Kingdom of God"; (4) "Righteousness"; (5) "Missing the Highest Good"; (6) "Sin." PART II—VIRTUE: (7) "Repentance"; (8) "Faith"; (9) "The Invitation of Christ"; (10) "The Cross and Offences." PART III—DUTY: (11) "The Love of God"; (12) "The Things of God"; (13) "The Love of Man"; (14) "The Things of Man"; (15) "The Family"; (16) "The State."<sup>4</sup>

The volume by President King proceeds upon a critical handling of the sources that present the teaching of Jesus, aiming to show which are the better attested of the sayings. Then attention is centered upon the Sermon on the Mount, and the ideas of Jesus are given a running exposition, with an affirmation of their supreme truth and value. The volume by Dr. Stalker does not enter upon the problem of sources and authenticity, groups the teaching of Jesus under great topics, reclothes his ideas in a diffuse homiletical garb, translates many of his expressions into Greek ethical terms, assumes rather than affirms the value and sufficiency of Jesus' teaching, and gives it a general modern application. President King's book is more suitable for reading than for manual use, due to the fact that its chapters were given as lectures. The teaching of Jesus is therefore discussed rather than presented or interpreted. The volume constitutes rather an introduction to the study of the ethics of Jesus than a systematic exposition of the teaching. There is an index of scripture references, and a subject-index; nevertheless, the book is not easy to consult. The more important principles and precepts of Jesus are made clear, but in scattered portions of the book, due to the critical handling of the material. The summaries at the end of chapters present the more constructive exposition; for example, chap. iii. ends with this excellent characterization of the ethical teaching in Mark:

When one reviews the ethical teaching in Mark, he finds that Jesus' *message* involved the ethical faith in the moral trend of the universe; that his *method* is the contagion of the good life; that his *motive* is love and the sense of

<sup>4</sup> A chapter is appended by Rev. F. J. Rae, entitled "The Church and the Social Teaching of Jesus." With the contents of this chapter the author of the volume withholds any word of agreement, but says: "it is right that the views of fresh and sympathetic minds, trying to understand the message of the Master for our modern conditions, should find expression." Mr. Rae grapples sincerely, bravely, and warmly with the imperfect social conditions that produce poverty, misery, ignorance, incompetence, suffering, crime. He shows how the principles and the example of Jesus should impel the church to remedy these conditions. In comparison with this human chapter, Dr. Stalker's discussion seems remote and abstract.

the need of men; that his *goal* is the establishment of the kingdom of love; that Jesus sees his teaching as plainly *contrasted* with that prevalent in his time with its trend toward externalism, traditionalism, and ceremonialism; and that he has such a sense of the necessity of a mental and spiritual inwardness and independence as makes him certain that none of the old forms are adequate to his new spirit; that Jesus discerns the basic nature of the *childlike qualities*, and states his one all-embracing principle of *love* in the great paradox and the great commandment; and applies this principle—that one is to do always and only what love enjoins—suggestively to the social problems of ambition, wealth, the child, marriage, and the state.

The final chapter of President King's book was not a lecture, but was written as a conclusion to the series of lectures, to give a general viewpoint for the whole of Jesus' ethics. The author's idea may be seen in these sentences:

Jesus' teaching is not put before us in the form of a technically constructed system. On the contrary, there is an apparent lack of all system, and what we seem to have is a collection of miscellaneous sayings called out on various occasions. . . . Nevertheless, no earnest student of the teaching of Jesus can fail to see that there is in that teaching, in point of fact, a marvelously thoroughgoing unity. . . . Jesus' entire ethical and religious teaching springs from one single thought, his faith in God as Father. All that he teaches may be said, thus, to be a direct reflection of his own filial consciousness.

An ethical system, then, in the sense of a modern, ordered discussion of technical theoretic problems, Jesus certainly does not have. But an ethical system, in the sense of thoroughly unified and consistent thinking on life, its end, spirit, motives and means, he as certainly does have. And all this is put with marvelous practical incentive to living.

This inductive investigation of the historical trustworthiness of the gospel accounts of Jesus' teaching, this consideration of the contents and unity of the teaching, this characterization of its principles, and this estimate of its moral worth which President King has given us will prove useful to all students of religion and ethics.

What we further need is a topical presentation of the whole ethical teaching of Jesus, in which the great principles of his message—such as love, righteousness, faith, devotion, self-sacrifice, service—shall be given a full exposition by the use of all the gospel material, and shall be related to our thought, feeling, and conduct as he related or would have related them.<sup>5</sup> Jesus intended to reach the specific everyday living of his hearers,

<sup>5</sup> Dr. Stalker's book sets forth the teaching of Jesus topically, but the presentation of the teaching indicates rather an assembling of ideas in the calm of the study than a grappling with the immediate struggles, sufferings, aspirations, and defeats of actual men and women. It lacks the "human interest," the concreteness, and the vitality of President King's interpretation.



and we have not completed our use of his teaching until we, too, have accomplished this. In addition, we need: (1) an explicit differentiation of ethics and religion, and a disclosure of their intimate relation to one another; (2) the inclusion of the whole ethical teaching of the New Testament in a single treatment, for the ethical message of the Synoptic Gospels is a common one with that of Paul, James, Peter, and John; (3) the construction of the historical background of the primitive-Christian ethics, showing how it arose out of and was directed to the Jews and Gentiles of the Mediterranean world in the first century A.D.; (4) a location of New Testament ethics in the whole ethical development of the race, of the history of which it is a highly important chapter; and (5) a thorough discussion as to the contribution which New Testament ethics can make to modern ethics.

The two books here reviewed, and other good books which present the teaching of Jesus, are valuable precursors of this larger and more definitive treatment of the ethical element in the New Testament.

C. W. VOTAW

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

### ASPECTS OF NEW TESTAMENT STUDY

Some special phases of New Testament study appear in recent publications by J. Weiss,<sup>1</sup> Bultmann,<sup>2</sup> Huck,<sup>3</sup> Souter,<sup>4</sup> and Milligan.<sup>5</sup> Weiss, in a rapid survey of the whole field, classifies the problems of New Testament science under the following headings: textual criticism, language and style, exegesis, introduction, research upon the life of Jesus, the New Testament and the history of religion. The results of

<sup>1</sup> *Die Aufgaben der neutestamentlichen Wissenschaft in der Gegenwart.* Von Johannes Weiss. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1908. 56 pages. M. 1.40.

<sup>2</sup> *Der Stil der Paulinischen Predigt und die kynisch-stoische Diatribe.* (Forschungen zur Religion und Literatur des Alten und Neuen Testaments. 13. Heft.) Von Rud. Bultmann. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1910. 110 pages. M. 3.40.

<sup>3</sup> *Synopse der drei ersten Evangelien.* Von A. Huck. Vierte, durchgesehene und verbesserte Auflage. Tübingen: Mohr, 1910. xl+223 pages. M. 4.40; geb. M. 5.40.

<sup>4</sup> *Novum Testamentum Graece.* Textui a retractatoribus anglis adhibito brevem adnotationem criticam subiecit A. Souter. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1910. xxiv+480 pages. 3s.

<sup>5</sup> *Selections from the Greek Papyri.* Edited with translations and notes. By George Milligan. Cambridge: University Press, 1910. xxxiv+152 pages. 5s.

recent inquiry are sketched very briefly, and phases of the subject calling for further investigation are indicated. The whole treatment is popular in character—it was given as a lecture before a ministers' union—yet it is suggestive throughout. To illustrate, attention is called to the likeness of Paul's style to the current popular philosophical dissertation, the so-called *diatribe*. A case of synthetic parallelism like that of Rom. 4:25:

ὅς παρεδόθη διὰ τὰ παραπτώματα ἡμῶν  
καὶ ἡγέρθη διὰ τὴν δικαίωσιν ἡμῶν,

is thought to have significance for interpretation since it shows that Paul not only regarded forgiveness of sins and justification as two expressions for the same thing, but he also placed together the death and resurrection of Christ as one great saving event. Similarly in I Cor. 10:16:

τὸ ποτήριον τῆς εὐλογίας ὃ εὐλογοῦμεν—  
οὐχὶ κοινωνία τοῦ αἵματος τοῦ Χριστοῦ ἐστίν;  
τὸν ἄρτον ὃν κλῶμεν—  
οὐχὶ κοινωνία τοῦ σώματος τοῦ Χριστοῦ ἐστίν;

he is not so much concerned to differentiate ideas about the blood and the bread as to emphasize the one thought of fellowship with the risen Lord.

Bultmann carries out this line of study in much greater detail, showing how extensively the style of the cynic-stoic discourse is illustrated in the Pauline letters. The common conversational form is seen in the recurrence of such expressions as τί οὖν ἐροῦμεν; ἀλλὰ λέγω, μὴ γένοιτο, and in short sentences with question and exhortation, e.g., I Cor. 7:18:

περιτετμημένος τις ἐκλήθη; μὴ ἐπισπάσθω·  
ἐν ἀκροβυστίᾳ κέκληταί τις; μὴ περιτεμνίσθω.

In fact, Paul's writings abound in examples of the numerous rhetorical devices in common use among the Greek orators of the time, hence we may infer that his public addresses were not unlike theirs in form. In view of this attention to rhetorical form, it may be necessary to interpret Paul's language a little less atomistically than has sometimes been the custom. Possibly first attention should be given to the literary picture rather than to the word-units out of which it is built. For example, I Cor. 9:19–22, printed to bring out the antithetic parallelism and the play on words, is perhaps less difficult to understand as a rhetori-

cal expression of Paul's mental attitude than has been commonly supposed on the basis of the more usual atomistic methods of interpretation:

ἐλεύθερος γὰρ ὢν ἐκ πάντων πᾶσιν ἑμαυτὸν ἐδούλωσα,  
 ἵνα τοὺς πλείονας κερδήσω.  
 καὶ ἐγενόμην τοῖς Ἰουδαίοις ὡς Ἰουδαῖος,  
 ἵνα Ἰουδαίους κερδήσω.  
 τοῖς ὑπὸ νόμον ὡς ὑπὸ νόμον—μὴ ὢν αὐτὸς ὑπὸ νόμον—  
 ἵνα τοὺς ὑπὸ νόμον κερδήσω.  
 τοῖς ἀνόμοις ὡς ἄνομος—μὴ ὢν ἄνομος θεοῦ ἀλλ' ἔννομος  
 Χριστοῦ—  
 ἵνα κερδάνω τοὺς ἀνόμους.  
 ἐγενόμην τοῖς ἀσθενέσιν ἀσθενής,  
 ἵνα τοὺς ἀσθενεῖς κερδήσω.  
 τοῖς πᾶσιν γέγονα πάντα,  
 ἵνα πάντως τινὰς σώσω.

It is one virtue of Bultmann's investigation that he avoids overworking the main idea; not everything in the Pauline epistles is brought under the categories of the *diatribe*. Paul is allowed to express himself according to his own individuality. His preaching is found to resemble that of the philosophers, yet he is first a Hebrew and a Christian; the mantle of the Greek orator hangs about his shoulders, yet he has no fondness for artistic drapery, and the lines of his foreign form are always discernible.

Huck's popular *Synopse*, in a fourth and much improved edition, presents the text of the Synoptic Gospels in an exceptionally convenient form for the student's use. Several errors in the textual apparatus of the third edition are corrected, and this material is given in greater fulness. Among other improvements, the *Prolegomena* has been largely rewritten. More care is taken with the alinement in order to set parallel phrases before the eye more distinctly. This feature, prominent in the second edition and later sacrificed for space considerations, might well have been given more attention. It is a convenience to have the "non-parallel" sections printed more frequently. While, for instance, the genealogical table of Matthew can scarcely be called a parallel to that of Luke, one likes to study them side by side. This need is met by printing Matthew in smaller type beside Luke; but why is not the Lucan section also given by the side of the Matthean? More care than formerly has been taken to arrange the material so that each gospel can be read consecutively if desired. This necessitates the reprinting of a

few more sections but it does not materially increase the bulk of the book—the new edition exceeds the old by only fifteen pages.

From the standpoint of textual criticism the *raison d'être* of Souter's book is not at first sight perfectly evident. The "revisers' text" can scarcely be regarded as superior to that of Westcott and Hort, hence the critical value of the present work must be sought in the *apparatus criticus*. The available sources of textual data are listed quite completely. Gregory's notation is adopted, and the corresponding signs used by von Soden are also given in the *sigla*. Yet the apparatus appended to the text is not always as full as one could wish, nor does it enable one to construct a critical text for himself. Sometimes the listed materials are fairly complete; at other times they need to be largely supplemented. As an example, on the page containing Mark 4:33 ff. the only variants noted are for Γερασσηῶν in 5:1. Yet Souter's text in 4:37 (ἀνέμου μεγάλη instead of μεγάλη ἀνέμου), or in 4:41 (ὑπακούουσιν instead of ὑπακούει), or in 5:10 (αὐτοὺς instead of αὐτά) is more than doubtful. In any tolerably complete apparatus we should expect to find the variants of such important manuscripts as A, B, and C recorded.

Milligan's *Selections* are of more general interest, yet indirectly they are a specific contribution to New Testament study. The book is elementary in character, its aim being "to bring within the reach of those who are interested in the recent discoveries of Greek papyri in Egypt certain typical documents from the principal collections." A brief general introduction is followed by selections—chiefly personal letters and business documents—in the main dating from the third century B.C. to the third century A.D. Each is accompanied by an explanatory preface, an English rendering, and footnotes in which the editor has taken pains to indicate the illustrative significance of this material for New Testament study, particularly on the lexical and grammatical side. Excellent indices are appended. The work is a very convenient handbook for those who may be approaching this field of study for the first time.

SHIRLEY JACKSON CASE

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

A brochure entitled *Nazareth* by Viaud<sup>6</sup> will be rather disappointing to those who do not notice the full title: such a one might anticipate

<sup>6</sup> *Nazareth et ses deux églises de l'annonciation et de Saint Joseph*. D'après les fouilles récentes pratiquées sous la direction du R. P. Prosper Viaud, O.F.M., Missionnaire apostolique, ex-vicaire custodial, gardien du couvent de l'Annonciation. Paris: Picard, 1910. 200 pages. Fr. 6.

that a book by an old resident in Nazareth who had had some opportunities for making excavations might throw some light on the very sad hiatus which exists in the history of Nazareth in the gospels and that of *En-Nāṣira* (the Nazareth of today); there is a very serious break in tradition and practically no help is afforded from archaeology. On this last the book before us gives us no new information. It is a careful study of the remains of two churches; the excavations made have not yet been completed and, partly for this reason, the conclusions arrived at must necessarily be viewed as only tentative.

The writer disarms criticism by his modest confession (p. vii)—“Je n'avais aucune connaissance sérieuse d'archéologie, mais je m'en sentais le goût. Je m'improvisai donc archéologie, et je me mis à l'œuvre,” and further he explains that his publication is not for the professed archeologist but for the pious pilgrim (p. viii)—“Je donne simplement des résultats obtenus. J'ai travaillé surtout pour les pèlerins, et j'écris pour eux.”

When we come to the ecclesiastical traditions it is rather disconcerting to find (p. 9) that his earliest authority for any church at all in Nazareth is Bishop Arculpus who visited the Holy Land no earlier than 690 A.D.

Almost all visitors to Nazareth, Catholic and Protestant alike, visit the Church of the Annunciation with its underground grottoes, the Chapel of the Angels, that of the Annunciation, and of Joseph. Père Viaud has much of interest to say about all these. He clearly shows by his excavations, that the present chapel which runs S. to N., and dates only from 1750, occupies transversely the middle third of a larger “Basilica” which ran W. to E.: the entrance to the court before the present church was once the main entrance to the Basilica, while the three apses have been excavated in a garden to the east of the east wall of the present church. The plans by which these details are illustrated are excellent. The older church was 75 meters long by 30 meters wide. It contains remains of several periods, specially of the Crusades. The author admits that the results obtained are uncertain but he ventures a theory—it cannot be called more—that the original Basilica goes back to the fourth century.

In chap. vii Père Viaud describes the excavations of another ruined church which has recently become annexed (by the purchase of the intervening land) to the Convent of the Annunciation. This is the so-called “House” or “Worship of Joseph.” It has been destroyed almost to the ground level, but the three circular apses, to the east, and sufficient of the walls remain to show the original ground plan. A

grotto with steps was formed. Although the present walls are chiefly of the Crusader period, the author concludes, from indications in the general plan and trace of earlier remains, that there once stood here a Syrian church of the fifth or sixth century, similar to those described by M. de Vogue in *La Syrie centrale*. It is proposed to rebuild this church.

Two interesting appendices are added. Appendix I is on five ornamental capitals found in Nazareth. They are considered to belong to the twelfth century—between 1160 and 1180. The really excellent pictures of these capitals greatly elucidate the description. Appendix II is an account of a mosaic with a Hebrew inscription found at the ruined church of St. Annie at *Seffureyeh*, the ancient Sepphoris. A valuable communication from M. Clermont Ganneau upon the inscription concludes the volume.

The book is clearly written and, except for the practical absence of any binding, is excellently gotten up. The illustrations, of which there are nearly a hundred, are as good as can be desired.

E. W. G. MASTERMAN

JERUSALEM, SYRIA

---

### ASPECTS OF PAULINE THOUGHT

A recent treatise of Dr. Alexander's<sup>1</sup> is a welcome contribution to the study of Pauline ethics. Paul's letters have often been studied as historical and theological documents, but the distinctively ethical side of his work had been neglected in literature. Alexander aims to correct this defect. He would not deny the strong theological, and sometimes polemical, coloring of the epistles, still he holds that no one can read them without feeling that the author was more interested in men than in thoughts and more concerned about character than creed. Edward Caird's remark is cited with approval: "It would be truer to say that the ethical principles of St. Paul begot the theological than that the theological begot the ethical."

This introduction leads us to expect a fresh and stimulating treatment based upon a study of the apostle in action; what we get, however, is an exposition of ethical precepts deduced from an interpretation of the Pauline theology. In its plan the work follows conventional lines. The first part treats of "Sources and Postulates." Paul's Hebrew ancestry, his acquaintance with stoicism, and his personality are found

<sup>1</sup> *The Ethics of St. Paul*. By Archibald B. D. Alexander. Glasgow: Maclehose; New York: Macmillan, 1910. xxiv+377 pages. \$2.

to be the chief factors combined in his thinking to determine his pre-suppositions regarding man's moral nature. Part Second discusses "Ideals and Principles." The three main elements in Paul's ideal are holiness, Christlikeness, and brotherhood; the power enabling believers to realize the ideal is "Christ in us"; the motive of the new life, the highest good which it presents as an inducement to move the will, is the love of God. Paul inculcates the "classical virtues" of wisdom, fortitude, temperance, and justice; the "amiable virtues" of humility, meekness, and forgiveness; and the "theological virtues" of faith, hope, and charity. He also holds to the idea of progressiveness in the new life. Part Third expounds the specific "Duties and Spheres" connected with the Christian ideal of life—duties in relation to self, to others, to the family, to the state, and to God.

Such study certainly has its value. It shows, as the author intended it should, that Paul's ethical precepts are not simply tacked on to, but flow as a natural sequence from, his dogmatic principles, that morality is absolutely vital to his religion, and that he ever seeks to bring the dynamic of the gospel to bear on practical life (p. vi). But it does not show to what extent the demands of practical life controlled Paul's interpretation of the gospel's dynamic, which is, after all, a rather important question. Can we say that we really understand the ethics of Paul when we have elaborated, along the lines of ethical speculation, certain precepts that are to be found directly stated or implied in his writings? To be sure, we are told that he is "the grandest exemplar of his own ethic" (p. 351), but even this phase of the subject is given only a six-line paragraph. What we wish to see is not only that his conduct exemplified his ethical precepts but to what extent the ethical element determined his whole course of life. Some outstanding phases of his life and thought in connection with which this question arises, for example, in his controversy with the legalists and his thought of eschatology, have perhaps little significance for modern ethics but they are vital matters with Paul. Of these we hear practically nothing in the present treatise.

SHIRLEY JACKSON CASE

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

Professor von Dobschütz' Commentary<sup>2</sup> on Thessalonians is a welcome addition to the resources of New Testament study. While Dr. Milligan's excellent English work anticipated it by a year, and, by its special emphasis upon the newer lexicography, made for itself a peculiar and permanent place in the literature of Thessalonians, there is always room for a work so judicial, thoroughgoing, and acute as this of Professor von Dobschütz. Three years ago one looked in vain for a really adequate treatment of Thessalonians; now no book of the New Testament is better equipped with aids to its study.

The authenticity of II Thessalonians is fully discussed by von Dobschütz. Nowhere perhaps is his independent judicial temper better exhibited. Full justice is done the very real difficulties of the problem; but the conclusion is that its authenticity involves fewer historical improbabilities than does any other theory of its origin. I Thessalonians is referred to the autumn of A.D. 52, four or five months after Paul's arrival at Thessalonica. The second letter, understanding it to be genuine, followed within one or two months. Harnack's striking view that II Thessalonians was addressed by Paul to the Jewish congregation at Thessalonica has appeared since the publication of von Dobschütz' Commentary, and is not, of course, anticipated. Von Dobschütz' introduction is well proportioned and adequate. The commentary presents neither Greek nor German text, though both would have added hardly ten pages to the book. In this respect the Macmillan commentaries are certainly more convenient. The Greek is constantly cited, however, and the comment is broken into convenient units. An occasional excursus in smaller type deals compactly with some special problem. There are nearly twenty of these, besides numerous shorter notes. The literature is fully reflected, but is not allowed to encumber the comment, being less in evidence than in most German commentaries. The whole work exhibits the historical method of interpretation at its best.

The publishers have put it forth in a modified German type certainly preferable, for non-German readers, to the taxing, old-fashioned German text, but surely not superior to the historic and elegant Roman character which is, after all, as well adapted to German as to French, Italian, Spanish, and English.

EDGAR J. GOODSPEED

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

<sup>2</sup> *Die Thessalonicher Briefe*. Völlig neu bearbeitet von Ernst von Dobschütz. (Kritisch-exegetischer Kommentar über das Neue Testament, begründet von H. A. W. Meyer.) Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1909. x+320 pages. M. 8.



## THE DEVELOPMENT OF EARLY CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE

In a scholarly and readable publication,<sup>1</sup> Dr. Granbery has tried to present the various types of New Testament Christology in such a manner as to bring out at once their own characteristic features and their relations to one another. For this purpose the New Testament is regarded as only a part of the larger body of Christian literature which can be dated back to the middle of the second century. Thus the chapter which deals with I Peter deals also with the contemporaneous Epistle of Clement. The Epistle of James finds its place between the Epistle of Barnabas and the Shepherd of Hermas. The Johannine Christology is taken in close connection with that which meets us about the same period in the Ignatian literature. By thus widening his survey beyond the strict limits of the New Testament, the author is enabled to break down the false impression which has been left on our minds by the insulation of the New Testament writings. He shows us that in the canonical literature we have merely the first, though the most important, stages of a historical development, which can only be understood in the light of historical method.

The clear and accurate scholarship of the book is well exemplified by the introductory series of charts, in which Dr. Granbery sums up his conclusions as to the date, origin, and mutual relations of the different types of Christology. The second chart, more especially, represents within the compass of a single page an enormous amount of thought and research. New Testament students will find it a true navigator's chart, by means of which they will be able to keep their bearings amidst the manifold cross-currents of early Christian theology and belief.

In the body of the book Dr. Granbery explains and defends the positions which he has set forth graphically in the charts. He deals first with Jewish messianic doctrine anterior to Jesus; then with the messianic teaching of Jesus himself. He proceeds to show how the christological idea was developed in the early Palestinian church, and how it subsequently received a classical form in Paulinism. Chapters follow on the several types of Deutero-Pauline doctrine, as we find it in Acts, in Colossians and Ephesians, in Hebrews, in I Peter, and I Clement. We then pass to the apocalyptical Christology, and finally to the Christology of the Johannine writings, the Ignatian epistles,

<sup>1</sup> *Outline of New Testament Christology. A Study of Genetic Relationships within the Christology of the New Testament Period.* By John Cowper Granbery, Ph.D. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1909. 127 pages. \$0.56.

and the later second-century literature. Throughout the author confines himself to the one subject of christological doctrine. At times we are conscious of the difficulty of isolating this doctrine from the many others by which it was more or less directly influenced. But while the subsidiary doctrines are not discussed, they are sufficiently indicated. A reader who comes to the book with a fair knowledge of the general movement of thought in the Apostolic Age will have little trouble in supplying the necessary background.

Dr. Granbery is widely read in the modern literature of his subject, and fearlessly accepts even the more radical results of criticism in regard to not a few debated questions. At the same time he preserves a sound and independent judgment, and is never carried away by a mere theory, however attractive. Nothing could be better, for instance, than his account of the Pauline Christology, and its affinities with pre-Christian speculation. He does full justice to the views advocated by Wrede and his school, while carefully pointing out their limitations and vindicating the essentially Christian character of the apostle's teaching. The least satisfactory chapter of the book, to our mind, is that which deals with the messianic conceptions of Jesus himself. The subject is admittedly a difficult and obscure one; and Dr. Granbery may be right in his assumption that the available evidence does not warrant us in arriving at anything more than a conjectural result. But one cannot but feel that a more searching investigation ought to have been applied to a question so fundamental to the whole theme of the book. In the messianic ideas of Jesus himself we have probably the key to a great deal that seems arbitrary and inexplicable in the later development; and it would surely have been worth while to have attempted a more thoroughgoing discussion of these germinal ideas.

The book as a whole has a value quite out of proportion to its size and its modest pretensions. It is the work not only of a scholar, but of a man of real historical and theological insight. In his brief chapters of exposition he rarely fails to bring into clear relief the essential features of each type of doctrine, and to assign it its true value in the process of historical growth. Here and there we may differ from his conclusions; but they are never advanced rashly, and we never miss the feeling that we are in the hands of a safe and competent guide. While professing to be only an outline, the book is much more than a bare summary. It can be read with pleasure from beginning to end, and is far more interesting and lucid than many an elaborate treatise on New Testament theology. To the student who desires a general introduction to theo-

logical research, and to the teacher who feels the need of a clear and suggestive epitome, we can recommend no better book.

Dr. Staudt seeks "to trace historically the development of the idea of the resurrection, from its origin in the Old Testament through Jewish and Christian literature, to the end of the first quarter of the fourth century." All students of the earlier patristic writings are aware of the immense importance attached to this doctrine, and of the wide diversity of views regarding it. Dr. Staudt has done a distinct service to theological learning by his careful and able digest of all the available material.<sup>2</sup> Beginning with a brief sketch of the foundations of the doctrine in Jewish and Greek speculation, he proceeds to examine the New Testament teaching on the resurrection generally and more particularly on the resurrection of Christ. He then reviews, in separate chapters, the development of the doctrine in the apostolic Fathers, the Apologists, the Gnostics, and their orthodox opponents, the Alexandrian School, and the later writers prior to the Council of Nicaea. A concluding chapter sums up the results of the discussion.

Dr. Staudt has brought to his task a wide knowledge of the relevant literature, and a considerable power of analysis and criticism. The material with which he has to deal is so vast in extent that it seems hardly fair to suggest that his treatment is occasionally incomplete. But we think he might have found room for some discussion of the influence exercised by the mysteries and the oriental religions on the Christian belief in a future life. This influence, as modern investigation is teaching us, was of first-rate importance, and was quite distinct from that of Greek philosophy and Jewish apocalyptic.

The chapter on the New Testament doctrine would require a good deal of revision and supplementation. Jesus' teaching on the kingdom and the conditions that will obtain in it, cannot immediately be connected with the idea of immortality. The "spiritual body" of Paul is not defined quite accurately—"an organism controlled by the spirit, though other than pure spirit." In his critical judgments, too, Dr. Staudt is apt to be a little too hasty and confident. He refers, with no other authority than Wendt's partition theory, to "a stratum in the Fourth Gospel coming probably from the hand of John himself." He assumes that the lost conclusion of Mark is preserved in Matt. 28:8-10 and 16-19. The reference to Mark, chap. 13, as the "*Great Apocalypse*" is an obvious slip.

<sup>2</sup> *The Idea of the Resurrection in the Ante-Nicene Period.* By Calvin Klopp Staudt, Ph.D. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1909. 90 pages. \$0.54.

For the larger part of his book the author is occupied with the development of the doctrine by the Fathers; and we have found this whole section useful and illuminating. It is shown how the idea of a fleshly resurrection gradually became predominant, and threw the more spiritual conception into the background. The victory of the realistic view is traced to a variety of sources, and chiefly to the endeavor to vindicate the historical fact of the resurrection of Jesus, as against Gnostic rationalism. Dr. Staudt arrives at the conclusion, not a little surprising, though to all appearance historically sound, that the Gnostics "for some reason or other came nearer to the views of Jesus and Paul than did the church at large with its dependence on the gospel writers, and its control of Jesus and Paul by these." This is only one of many suggestive reflections which are thrown out in the course of the book, and which help to make it a real contribution to theology, as well as an admirable work of reference on an important chapter of theological history.

E. F. SCOTT

QUEEN'S COLLEGE  
KINGSTON, ONT.

---

### ASPECTS OF MODERN THEOLOGY

The problem set by the traditional belief in miracle is clearly stated and is considered at length in relation to various allied interests by Wendland's monograph.<sup>1</sup> Starting with the religious view which requires the belief that God introduces new forces into history when desirable, Wendland attempts to show how this religious belief is compatible with our modern cosmic philosophy. After showing that the conception of miracle was fixed in the structure of religious belief in connection with a pre-scientific world-view, he traces the typical ways in which theologians from Augustine down have dealt with the question of harmonizing the traditional religious demands with the presuppositions of a scientific cosmology. The constructive portion of the book consists in a criticism of deterministic theories of nature and of history. Wendland rightly insists that the conception of causality must not be confused with the notion of the identity of cause and effect. There is in the effect a *new* element which did not exist (save as we scientifically picture it as latent) in the cause. The process of evolution, both in nature and in history, involves many developments which could not have been

<sup>1</sup> *Der Wunderglaube im Christentum*. Von Johannes Wendland. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1910. 134 pages. M. 3.

exactly predicted. The future contains constant surprises. The real question is whether these incalculable occurrences are due to chance or to the workings of divine purpose. Religious faith affirms the latter, and thus makes room for actual divine "interventions," which nevertheless do not detach the miraculous events from real historical antecedents. When, however, we consider the narratives of miracles in the past, we are compelled to distrust those alleged events which find no analogies in accredited history. The miraculous, therefore, while real is not irrational nor is it inconsistent with historical continuity.

The monograph is a thoughtful and valuable apologetic for the conception of miracles, and succeeds measurably well in vindicating the right of this religious faith as over against a deterministic philosophy. The weak spot is in concrete application. As a matter of fact do miracles ever occur? Have they ever occurred? In insisting that some accredited analogy in actual human experience is essential if we are to believe in the actuality of a biblical miracle, has the reality of divine interventions been retained with sufficient vigor to warrant the type of faith upon which Wendland insists? To believe that God can intervene is one thing. To establish the objective reality of definite interventions is a different problem. The man who questions miracles at all will demand more cogent evidence of the latter than is furnished by this monograph.

A recognition of the perplexities and difficulties attending modern faith in God has led M. Monod to attempt to disentangle the conflicting interests which confuse the problem.<sup>2</sup> The present volume is a historical sketch, serving to prepare the way for a constructive study which is promised as a sequel. Starting with the Protestant Reformation, we find Luther and Calvin eliminating the scholastic metaphysics and expounding the nature of God exclusively in response to the needs of religious faith. The rejection of the authority of the church made necessary the discovery of a firm basis of assurance, in the strength of which Protestantism could defend itself against ecclesiasticism on the one hand and rationalism on the other. God is thus defined in terms of absolute sovereignty. His will is a sufficient explanation of whatever exists.

The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, however, developed a type of thought which made the conception of unlimited sovereignty

<sup>2</sup> *Le problème de Dieu et la théologie chrétienne depuis la réforme*. I, Étude historique. Foyer Solidariste. Victor Monod. Saint-Blaise près Neuchâtel (Suisse): Roubaix, 1910. 165 pages. Fr. 3.50.

morally unsatisfactory. The nineteenth century has thus seen the attempt to define the nature of God in accordance with the moral and rational demands of man. The result is a vagueness and indefiniteness which contrast strongly with Calvin's vigorous certainty. Kant, Schleiermacher, and Charles Secrétan are taken to illustrate three phrases of the modern quest. The author concludes that the problem of the present is to construct a doctrine of God which shall do justice to both our sense of dependence and our sense of moral freedom.

Within the limits which he has imposed upon himself, M. Monod has given a very suggestive historical analysis. Psychologically there is no question as to the fundamental importance of the sense of dependence and that of freedom. But the most serious aspect of the modern problem has come from the new scientific view of the world, which seems to leave little or no place for a moral personality in control of cosmic processes. It is to be hoped that the forthcoming volume will do justice to this pertinent problem of modern faith. In comparison with it, the determinism-freewill controversy is of minor importance.

GERALD BIRNEY SMITH

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

---

The times were ripe for a representative book setting forth the attitude of Unitarianism toward the problems of life and toward other religious bodies. No one was better adapted to this task than Professor Emerton.<sup>3</sup> Unitarianism is in the blood, for the book is dedicated to "Four Unitarian women of four generations—my grandmother, my mother, my wife, and my daughter." It begins with an introduction in which it is claimed that Unitarianism is not pure intellectualism, but that it fully recognizes the emotional side of human nature; that the church is not a mere ethical society, but that it is a really religious organization; that it is not simply a bundle of negations, but is positive through and through. Then follow ten chapters showing the Unitarian position in respect to ten pivotal problems: The nature of belief; miracle; the nature of man; the Bible; Jesus; redemption; the church; worship; the future life; the thought of God. In all these chapters it appears again and again that Unitarianism is individualistic at the core; that it is impatient of any authority that does not arise out of the sanctions of the individual reason and the individual conscience; and that it eschews absolutely everything that in the least squints toward occultism.

<sup>3</sup> *Unitarian Thought*. By Ephraim Emerton. New York: Macmillan, 1911. 309 pages. \$1.50 net.

The author has some respect for Roman Catholics, for they at least are consistent, but for the amazing stupidity of Protestant Trinitarians he does not conceal his contempt. Those of us who are still in the woods know exactly what the distinguished writer thinks of us.

It would be impossible here to do justice to this strongly and clearly written book. The one who seeks an authoritative exposition of advanced Unitarianism should read it from preface to conclusion. To some Trinitarians much of it will be medicine.

The chapter on Jesus is probably the strategic point in the book. We should like to call attention to its central positions, using as far as possible the author's own words. To the Unitarians, "the indivisibility of the divine and the essential worthiness of the human are the two indispensable foundations for an adequate notion of Jesus and his place in religious thought. From the first follows the inevitable conclusion that Jesus could not have been divine; from the second it follows equally that to call him human is not to take away anything from his dignity or his value." Unitarians believe that all the later orthodox views about the divinity of Jesus have resulted from the mingling with the simple record of "a parallel stream of mythical decoration." "It is not true that the Unitarian regards Jesus simply as a teacher of morality." He was in the old and true sense of the word a "prophet"—one, that is, who uttered forth the ways of righteousness. The peculiar significance of his teaching is found in "a new conception of the relation of morals to the government of the universe as a whole. . . . Right was right because of an essential harmony between God and man as creator and created, as father and child." To be attuned to this greater harmony was "right." The mission of Jesus was "to show to all mankind the way of adjustment to the will of God." The author thinks nothing could be greater than this. His development of the Logos idea is interesting. "It was a wonderful discovery." It is a useful philosophic device. But the humanity of Jesus and the philosophic proposition must be kept apart: "It is only when we think of Jesus as a man . . . that his example and his teaching alike can be borne in upon us with that kind of conviction which can make them fruitful in our own actions." Then was Jesus a man of sin? "Tempted at all points as we are and *not* without sin would seem to be the logical result from the doctrine of the complete humanity of Jesus. . . . In all probability Jesus had his moments of opposition to the divine will which constitute the attitude of sin." This admission, however, should not diminish our reverence for him, because thus "more than ever we

become his younger brothers." Yet Jesus was in some sense "divine," but so is every man that is born into the world. He was a prophet, "one in a long line of revealers to men of the law by which they are called upon to live. He was not the first; he will not be the last . . . he felt himself a link in an endless chain of prophecy. That is precisely Unitarian thought." In the leadership of Jesus, interpreted in their own way, they are satisfied, "for in it they find perfect liberty. It is to them of its very essence that in following it they learn the truth that makes them free."

It is interesting when a historian turns philosopher and theologian—and especially so when he attains to a high degree of efficiency.

J. W. MONCRIEF

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

## RELIGION FROM THE STANDPOINT OF FUNCTIONAL PSYCHOLOGY<sup>1</sup>

Whoever has observed the recent growth of the functional treatment of psychology must have realized that profound problems are arising for the science of religion. It is true that we are already accustomed to the idea of an empirical, evolutionary, and voluntaristic treatment of the facts of religion. But it is also true that the full purport of this tendency cannot appear until psychology has secured firm control of its own relatively new evolutionary-voluntaristic standpoint. At none of the university centers has the reconstruction of psychological categories in this direction gone on more actively than at Chicago. Here, accordingly, is the radiating center of an active reconstruction of the psychological standpoint with respect to religion. Irving King's dissertation on *The Differentiation of the Religious Consciousness*,<sup>2</sup> which has recently been absorbed into his large and mature work on *The Development of Religion*,<sup>3</sup> Professor Ames's annual course in the university on the psychology of religion, and now his *Psychology of Religious Experience*—these all represent a single movement of reconstruction.<sup>4</sup> Or shall we say "construction"? For we are still in the early, formative stages of the psychology of religion. Within the circle of scientific

<sup>1</sup> *The Psychology of Religious Experience*. By Edward Scribner Ames. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1910. xi+428 pages. \$2.50 net.

<sup>2</sup> Chicago, 1905.

<sup>3</sup> New York: Macmillan, 1910.

<sup>4</sup> To this list may be added a recent dissertation on *The Psychology of Ritualism*, by F. G. Henke: The University of Chicago Press, 1910.



psychologists the supreme effort in this field at present is to secure a point of view and to clarify fundamental notions. This preliminary work is arduous beyond the dreams of most students in other branches of research in religion.<sup>5</sup>

The significance of foundation-laying books like this of Ames, therefore, is far greater than ordinary readers will realize. In this work and King's we have the beginnings of an attempt to carry empiricism, voluntarism, evolutionism, and a social view of consciousness to their logical limit with respect to religion. The result is bound to seem revolutionary even to many who are hospitable to all these standpoints.

The starting-point for this radical analysis is the concept of function as applied to mental process. If we conceive function, that is, action, with reference to what is advantageous or the opposite, as the determining principle, immediately the whole ideational factor of mental process assumes an unwonted look. For now ideas not only *have* efficiency, they not only *are* motor, but they arise within, evolve from, the acts that are customarily regarded as their consequences. Moreover, in action with reference to satisfactions, ideas acquire their *meaning*, and this meaning, Ames insists, never transcends its source. Ideas and concepts are for him nothing but "abbreviated shorthand symbols of the longer, more complete systems of motor activities and adjustments." In chap. xvi, from which this statement is quoted, the author has given, in a limpid style that characterizes the whole book, probably the simplest, clearest exposition of this standpoint anywhere to be found.

Reserving for the present certain queries as to the *interpretation* here given to the idea of mental function, let us ask whether the functional approach yields any immediate results. In regions where direct observation is impossible, the test of a scientific formula or method is efficiency as a tool for relating and systematizing facts. Judged by this standard, the new method brilliantly justifies itself. Never has a single key unlocked so many problems connected with early religious practices and ideas. Animism, totemism, taboo, magic, ritualism, sacrifice, myth—every one of these has been a focus of conflicting theories each of which, being built *ad hoc*, harbors uncritical psychological presuppositions. The solving word must come through a re-exam-

<sup>5</sup> Among practical workers in religion there is a serious misconception of the whole method and significance of the psychology of religion. Seizing upon some fragment of science, and swallowing it without chewing or digesting it, various religious writers offer as psychology of religion strange mixtures of dogma, biology, and hearsay psychology. The climax is reached in diagrams of longitudinal or vertical sections of the spiritual life, with vents for the operations of the Holy Spirit duly indicated!

ination of these presuppositions. It is hardly too much to say that we now have this solving word. Conceiving the mental process in each case with reference to the advantage toward which it is directed, we ask what visible act is here performed, and under what circumstances it is performed or omitted or modified; then we note the relation of the act to the occupations and interesting experiences of early man—food-getting, war, marrying, birth, death, etc. Studying the act thus in its whole setting, we can usually discover a relation between it and the common interests of the group, specifically a relation to some advantage that is sought. Ames lays particular stress upon the ceremonial in early religions. When our sophisticated eyes look upon a tribal ceremony, we think that we are gazing upon something highly unpractical, a mere symbol, or dramatic rehearsal of some fantastic belief. But, applying the functional principle, we reverse this judgment. First, the savage is engaged in (to his mind) serious work, and in a direct way. The snake dance, for instance, is as much a part of an agricultural process as is plowing or sowing. Second, this seemingly far-fetched process turns out to be at its origin not a derivative from a belief rooted elsewhere but a spontaneous response to a present situation.

The act, not the idea, then, is the prius. The savage does not first infer the existence of spirits or gods from dreams and natural portents, and then seek to influence these superior powers by sacrifice, prayer, ceremony. Nor, on the other hand, is there a religious instinct or impulse that prompts to any specific religious belief or act. No; "*Im Anfang war die Tat*," and, as the beginning of religion is thus action, so its evolution is primarily a succession of active adjustments called out by the specific features of the environment. Thus the whole evolution of religion is connected with the same vital functions that occupy the attention of the biologist.

We need not be surprised if the earliest statements of this great principle contain something of excess or of defect. The very thing that seems to give us such facility in the explanation of the earlier forms of religion creates difficulty when we attempt a parallel analysis of religion as we know it. Ames has the courage to apply his method without flinching, however. In spite of current opinions to the contrary, the meaning of religion for us, he contends, is exhausted in a description of the particular adjustments that we are now endeavoring to make between ourselves and our fellows, and between ourselves and our physical environment. Accordingly, belief in God performs no function in our lives except as a symbol of our own adjustment reactions.

Let it be remembered that we are not dealing here with the old-fashioned psychology that, contenting itself with a description of the phenomenal order, granted to metaphysics or to faith the further function of ascertaining or reacting to real being. Ames specifically makes functional psychology of religion as he here presents it include and exhaust theology and the philosophy of religion.

Two questions will be sufficient to show just where this particular interpretation of functionalism leads. We may ask, in the first place, whether the facts of the most highly developed religious consciousness are illuminated or obscured by it. Is it true that the idea of God, instead of growing in richness and also vitality, tends to become faded and washed out as the development of society proceeds? Further, how shall we find out what the idea of God means to ourselves? Obviously we are not shut up to the methods of inference that are necessary in our study of the primitive mind. It is, of course, allowable for the psychologist to raise the question whether we really know what we are about. Motives are mixed and more or less obscure. Yet, in the progressive parts of our own population, religion is an ethical self-consciousness that is constantly called upon to make itself definite to itself. It probably knows what it essentially means when it asserts its faith in God. Progressive Christianity, because of neglect of the second great commandment in other days, today lays extreme emphasis upon practical love toward the brother whom we have seen. But it by no means follows that God has become for these Christians a mere symbol for social duties thus conceived. If Leuba claims, as he is supposed to have done, that Christians of today generally do not believe in God, but only use him, then a challenge as to the fact is in order. The fact is that we do not merely use either our God, or our friends, or ourselves. Only at a lower, and for us outgrown, stage of moral development is anything of the kind possible. The progressive Christian consciousness of today does place the stress upon society, but it thinks of society as including the dead as well as the living, and God as well as men; and it is concerned about the attitude that each of these has toward the others.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>6</sup> Confusion often occurs as to what men believe and think and desire because a question is approached from the individualistic direction but answered from the social standpoint or vice versa. It is thus that men whose hearts are set upon the full triumph of the kingdom of God are "no longer interested in heaven," and that those who prize personality (socially conceived) above all else "do not desire immortality for themselves." In the same way the individualistic concept of God has ceased to be "a live issue." But when all such problems are put in a clearly social light, we find that society that reaches beyond the grave, and a God who really cares for men, are still very "live issues."

The reason why the functional view as it is here used obscures facts like these is not far to seek. The idea of function has turned our attention to ends of action, or to environmental stimuli to action, and away from the developing self-consciousness of men and women. Even if the primitive consciousness is wholly absorbed in the things that it seeks to obtain, such as food, it is not true that this is the universal form of conscious functioning. With self-consciousness, wherever and however it enters the evolutionary series, there arise what Professor Lovejoy has happily called "the desires of the self-conscious."<sup>7</sup> "The self-conscious agent," he says, "not only chooses ends, but also contemplates himself as in the act of choosing and of realizing them; . . . he is not merely a desirer of valuable goods to be attained through his action, but also a desirer of approvable qualities of the self to be manifested *in* his action." Society, it may be added—in the stricter sense of the term—first comes into being when such a self-conscious agent includes in his desires other self-conscious agents conceived in the same way. Now, there is no reason why a functional point of view might not fully recognize both the types of desire mentioned by Lovejoy. But "functional," taken as referring to "valuable goods" only, is a very different thing. Because functional psychology has thus far given little recognition to the "desires of the self-conscious," its treatment of the idea of society is often bewildering. It starts with the broadest assertions of the social nature of consciousness; it gets on swimmingly with its analysis of the less self-conscious types of social action; but when it contemplates such a social phenomenon as the effort which Christianity is making to reach a truly ideal social life, then its assumption as to what constitutes a function becomes distinctly cramping.<sup>8</sup>

The distinction just made between two levels or stages of function explains an interesting ambiguity in Ames's use of the term religion. At the outset religion is "the consciousness of the highest social values." Similar formulas appear repeatedly in the book. They seem to recognize "social values" as a genus, and "highest" as the differentia. But

<sup>7</sup> See his article with this title in the *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods*, IV, No. 2 (January 17, 1907), 29-39.

<sup>8</sup> In another place I have endeavored to show that, though religious value is not separate and distinct from social, ethical, aesthetic, and other values, it is nevertheless not simply identical with them. The religious aspect of these values is an immanent critique that requires their unification, organization, completion. The religious standpoint, we may say, is not that of *values*, but of *value*. In other terms, it is the insistence that the self-conscious life shall have meaning. See "Religious Value," *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods*, V, No. 10 (May 7, 1908).

it is hardly too much to say that the differentia, which should be the focus of greatest interest, is much neglected in the progress of the discussion. Religious consciousness appears to be identified with social consciousness as such, and as a consequence one is again and again tempted to wonder why the facts are alluded to as "religious experience." Certainly we are not told what constitutes "high" as distinguished from other social values. This lack of definition accounts also for an apparent inconsistency in the discussion of the religious growth of the individual. For, in spite of the social nature of human consciousness, and in spite of the religiousness of primitive men with their absorption in sensuous details and fragmentary interests, nevertheless "the infant is non-religious, non-moral, and non-personal" and, even in early childhood, "impulsive, sensuous reactions together with absorption in immediate details and fragmentary interests make it impossible for the child under nine years to pass beyond the non-religious and non-moral attitude to any considerable degree." His first spontaneous social interests are assumed to be those of the gang-forming age. But what of the social relations of the child in the family? It would seem that any tendency to identify the religious with the social consciousness must find large religious significance in family affection and in the child's self-identification with the family. A still more curious turn is given to the term religion in the argument that there are among us classes of non-religious persons. On one and the same page (356) we are told that "in primitive groups there could be no non-religious persons" because custom compelled conformity with the group, and also that religion is "participation in the ideal values of the social consciousness." The obvious fact here is that two levels of sociality are recognized without clear recognition of how the fact bears upon the notion of religion.

Since we are dealing with a fundamental question rather than a mere detail, it may not be hypercritical to point out that a parallel ambiguity exists in Ames's most general statement concerning the functional point of view. "Functional psychology views the mental life," he says, "(1) as an instrument of adaptation by which the organism adjusts itself to the environment; . . . (3) this adjustment to the physical or social environment occurs through the psycho-physical organism."<sup>9</sup> A later statement is that this adjustment is "in" the psycho-physical organism.<sup>10</sup> Here the mental life appears both as an instrument whereby the organism adjusts itself, and also as a phase of the same organism; and the adjustment is wrought first by the organism

<sup>9</sup> P. 15.

<sup>10</sup> P. 18.

through the mental life, then through the psycho-physical organism, and finally in the psycho-physical organism. It is doubtful whether this shifting arises through any mere slip of the pen; for the whole set of statements faithfully reflects the difficulties inherent in the situation. When functionalism is taken to mean that mind is a mere instrument, it is as natural as can be that somewhere as we proceed we shall smuggle in the mind, no longer as a mere instrument, but as that which is being adjusted, and eke as an agent that is doing the work!<sup>14</sup>

With reservation of this one critical scruple, however, the book may be said to represent a comprehensive undertaking admirably executed. Here is a splendid conception, doing effective work, but needing to be rounded out on one side. To the idea of function on the biological level (where the teleology is obscure and the ends are pre-moral) is to be added the idea of function on the level of the self-conscious ethical will.<sup>15</sup> Let us frankly acknowledge that functionalism in this sense makes mind more than a mere instrument. But it does not interfere with a thoroughly functional treatment of religious experience. For this reason the value of Ames's numberless analyses of special phenomena is by no means vacated. In addition to his illuminating treatment of ceremonial, magic, etc., as already indicated, he has cast new light upon the respective contributions of man and of woman to the social-religious consciousness; upon the derivation of the idea of spirits; upon the origin of prayer. And these are only samples of obscure matters that he has made less obscure. In respect to the economic factors that condition the general development of religion, the growth of religion in the individual, the phenomena of conversion

<sup>14</sup> That Ames's ambiguity is inherent in the point of view and not merely in his modes of expression is made still more probable from a precisely similar difficulty in King's *Development of Religion*. King derives religion from the "overt" activity of "psycho-physical organisms" responding to environmental conditions. Here the term "psycho-physical organism" conceals a problem that should be faced. For, if mind is merely instrumental, as King and Ames maintain, in what sense is the reacting organism "psycho-physical"? The term "psycho-physical organism" is harmless enough, and it has important uses. It becomes an instrument of confusion, however, when it conceals the contrast between an animal organism instinctively reaching out for food and a person consciously setting ends to himself.

<sup>15</sup> At the moment when biologists show a pronounced tendency to recognize the latent teleology in biological notions, and to inquire whether, after all, the "ends" involved in organic process must not be interpreted in the sense of a determinate guidance—at this moment psychologists are proposing to reduce the clear-cut teleology of the self-conscious mind to the obscurity of a quasi-biological "psycho-physical organism."

and of religious genius, the psychology of sects, and much more, he has given us a simple, clear, and fresh treatment. This is the first book in which the whole territory of the psychology of religion has been traversed. The author proves himself a most agreeable guide through the mountains and valleys of this difficult subject. His style is remarkably simple and direct, and the easy flow of it suggests the presence of an intellect as genial as it is bold and uncompromising.

This review should not close without describing at least one specific instance in which Ames's method and point of view illuminate an obscure problem. Let us take as our example his discussion of the derivation of the idea of spirits. The traditional view is that early men reached this notion by a process of logical inference from dreams, hallucinations, shadows, etc., and that afterward this full-fledged concept was used in an effort to understand the phenomena of external nature. But we have been convinced for some time that animism (in this, Tylor's sense of the term) could be reached only through a long antecedent development. There was an animism before that of Tylor; primitive thought was somehow pervasively anthropomorphic, yet without any notion of spirits. Why was it anthropomorphic, and how did this diffused quality of all early thought become focalized so that a distinction was made between spiritual and other existence? The solution of this problem begins with the fact that subject and object arise together in experience. The assumption that we first know ourselves, and then use this knowledge as an interpretation of objects, is simply a fallacy of the psychologist. It follows that at first objects share in what James describes as the "warmth and intimacy" of what we are accustomed to call our own states. Hence, at first all objects are alive. Even among ourselves emotional thinking tends to become anthropomorphic. This is the base line, so to say, of the whole matter. But objects that attracted particular attention, awakening unusual emotion, were especially alive. Thus at last we have a principle that resolves the old conflict between the theory of a primordial spiritism and the theory that makes nature-worship primary. The mind of early man focalizes its emotional thinking in both directions in accordance with a single law. Automatic seizures on the one hand, and natural portents on the other, betokened a particular spiritual presence primarily because they produced an unusual concentration of attention and of emotional interest.

GEORGE ALBERT COE

UNION THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY  
NEW YORK CITY

## RECENT MISSIONARY LITERATURE

It has become a commonplace already to claim for the Edinburgh Conference that it was the most important religious council since the days of the apostles. This is only an emphatic and picturesque way of saying that it was an extremely significant and widely influential assembly. No one indeed will be disposed to dissent from this conclusion. The little red books embodying the official report<sup>1</sup> contain by far the most important contribution yet made to the extensive literature of the modern missionary movement. In the wide sweep of inquiry, in the industry and sagacity with which an enormous mass of material has been sifted and arranged, in the impartiality, the thoroughness, and the boldness with which the discussion of urgent and vital problems has been conducted, the achievement of the framers of these reports is beyond all praise. Hardly less noteworthy is the form into which the material has been cast. "The reports cease to be reports and become literature." Particularly is this true of the work of the commission on "The Missionary Message in Relation to Non-Christian Religions" of which Professor Cairns of Aberdeen was chairman. It attains in certain passages a singular beauty and impressiveness of style. "The General Conclusions" of Professor Cairns's report, and the little treatise entitled "The Relation of Christian Truth to Indigenous Thought and Feeling" which is embodied in the report of the Commission on Education, Bishop Gore, chairman, must be reckoned henceforth among the classics of missionary literature. The "findings" and recommendations of the commissions dealt with a great variety of subjects and were independently made. Nevertheless the judgments of the Conference, so far as they relate to fundamental questions, are surprisingly harmonious. It appears, for example, to have been by everyone taken for granted as beyond dispute that a *praeparatio evangelica* should be sought and gladly recognized in all non-Christian religions, that these religions must make one day each its special contribution to the church of the future, that it is the task of the missionary not merely to "save souls," but to "plant Christianity" in the soil of heathendom, that all forms of Western denominationalism must by and by disappear in the growth of indigenous national churches. Upon such pre-suppositions as these the missionary enterprise of the twentieth century is building.

But none of the deliverances of the Conference are of more practical and immediate interest to the home constituency than those contained

<sup>1</sup> *World Missionary Conference, 1910. Reports of Commissions with Discussions and Addresses.* Chicago: Revell, 1910. 9 vols.



in the report upon the Preparation of Missionaries. It is axiomatic that a missionary must have not only a knowledge of Christianity, but a knowledge of the country to which and the people to whom he brings Christianity. And this knowledge, too often, he is not getting, partly because the seminaries do not offer it, and partly because the destination of the missionary is not determined (by the board) in time. The missionary needs in particular to be grounded in comparative religion, in sociology, and in pedagogy, studies which can best be pursued at home. It will be a new day for missions when, under the urgency of the moral authority of this commission, candidates are trained with a view to the specific duty and the specific field. Nothing will so certainly attract the best men into the missionary service as the courageous insistence by the boards upon the highest attainable standard of fitness.

The "burning question," however, at Edinburgh was plainly that of "Co-operation and Unity." On the mission field, at least, however it may be at home, men do not speak of the organic union of the churches of Christ as a "dream." It is an achievement, difficult indeed, but one nevertheless to be sought and expected. "Speaking plainly," said a Chinese delegate, "we hope to see in the near future a united Christian church without any denominational distinctions." The Chinese are a sober and practical people. To these and similar utterances the Conference gave hearty approval. The closing words of this most significant report must be quoted: "The divine guidance that has already led us so much farther than we dared anticipate in the direction of co-operation and the promotion of unity will yet lead us farther still if only we continue steadfast in this faith, in this hope, and in this fervent charity." The appointment by the Conference with entire unanimity of a "Continuation Committee" is the strongest possible evidence of its profound conviction that a divine guidance is leading the churches on the mission field through co-operation and federation to a far higher and nobler attainment. In this committee we have the assurance of the "permanent co-operation" of the churches of Christ the world over in the mighty endeavor of world evangelization. "The most important and far-reaching service which the Continuation Committee can render," to quote the language of its secretary, "will be found to lie, not so much in the practical measures which it may promote, as in the creation of a spirit and temper that will make co-operation more possible."

Mr. Mott's preface is dated six days after the close of the Edinburgh

Conference, and the utterances of the Conference echo from his every page.<sup>2</sup> Certain parts of the report of Commission I, "On Carrying the Gospel to All the Non-Christian World," written by himself, are introduced without quotation, and material taken from other reports is freely utilized. The contents of the book are tersely summed up in its title. It is not a reasoned argument; it is an appeal. It summons the church of Christ to gird herself for a more urgent and more strenuous missionary activity in view of "opportunities and crises" which constitute the "Decisive Hour." There is much indeed to sustain this vigorous appeal. The awakening of the East, which Mr. Mott describes in a chapter crammed with picturesque detail, is unquestionably an event without parallel in the history of the missionary enterprise. The church can meet this emergency adequately only by sending recruits at once and by the hundreds into the foreign field. Mr. Mott compels us to go along with him so far. But where are these recruits to be found? The decisive hour is upon us. Where are the men? An instructive chapter discusses the need of enlarging and strengthening educational missions that the force of native workers may be increased. Another chapter entitled "The Superhuman Factor" reminds us of what it would indeed be disastrous to forget, "the necessary connection between the prayers of Christians on the one hand and the raising up of workers and the releasing of the great spiritual forces of the Kingdom on the other hand." Nevertheless, we shall do well to set over against this fervid emergency call the deliberate conclusion of the Edinburgh Conference that never before was it so important as today that missionary candidates should be thoroughly trained specialists. The missionary crisis of the twentieth century cannot be met by incompetent enthusiasts. Surely one need not take Mr. Mott too literally and conclude that it is now or never with the task of world evangelization. Let us send out the men who are ready, and let us make ready the men who ask to be sent. The door of opportunity will not be closed against the church while she is engaged in this twofold task.

Mr. Speer's Duff Lectures,<sup>3</sup> delivered last Spring, deal with many of the themes discussed a few weeks later at the Edinburgh Conference; but his book will hold its own place in missionary literature, nevertheless,

<sup>2</sup> *The Decisive Hour of Christian Missions*. By John R. Mott. New York: Student Volunteer Movement for Foreign Missions, 1910. vi+251 pages. \$1.

<sup>3</sup> *The Duff Lectures for 1910: Christianity and the Nations*. By Robert E. Speer, Secretary of the Board of Foreign Missions of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America. New York: Revell, 1910. 399 pages.

for its broad, thorough, and independent treatment of these great questions. Plainer evidence could not be given of the progress of the missionary enterprise within the last quarter of a century than is offered in the topics with which Mr. Speer deals. What is the relation of missions to the native churches, to the non-Christian religions, to church unity? A generation ago the native churches, or the churches in the mission-field, to use the phrase preferred at Edinburgh, were little companies of converted heathen entirely dependent upon Western instruction and guidance and chiefly important in the annual statistics of the societies. Today, we are told of numerous bodies of Christian disciples which are self-governing, self-supporting, self-propagating, and are asked why these churches should not be set free from the bonds of Western denominationalism to frame their own ecclesiastical policies and doctrinal statements. A generation ago the non-Christian religions were so many variants of one widespread hateful idolatry which it was the missionary's business to combat and overthrow. "Today," says Mr. Speer, "the offer of Christianity to men can only be made effectively by men who have compared it with other religions." "Christianity should joyfully recognize all the good that is in the non-Christian religions and build upon it." A generation ago, missions were beginning cautiously to admit the claims of "comity." Today, Mr. Speer enters upon his discussion of the relation of missions to the unity of the church by the statement that this unity on the mission field "is desirable and necessary." Comity is "hands off." Unity is "hands together." Hindrances, now apparently insuperable, which thwart the fulfilment of this ideal "will soon become intolerable and their removal will be demanded at all costs." These are the well-considered conclusions of one who has had exceptional opportunities for gaining first-hand knowledge of missionary conditions. Mr. Speer possesses a wide and intimate acquaintance with the most recent literature relating to his theme and quotes it freely and appositely.

The addresses made at the Rochester Convention<sup>4</sup> are adequately described by that much overworked word "inspirational." Such a theme for a series of meetings as "The Present Missionary Crisis" assumes indeed that in every address the necessity for prompt action will be set forth: and accordingly one speaker after another recounts

<sup>4</sup>*Students and the Present Missionary Crisis*. Addresses delivered before the Sixth International Convention of the Student Volunteer Movement for Foreign Missions, Rochester, New York, December 29, 1909, to January 2, 1910. New York: Student Volunteer Movement for Foreign Missions, 1910. 614 pages. \$1.50.

the paramount claims of his own field. The situation in Africa, east, west, north, south, is "urgent." China offers "an unparalleled opportunity." India cries aloud for a "prompt, aggressive" evangelization. Forty millions of people in neglected South America are waiting for the gospel. Wherever, in a broad survey of the non-Christian world, one turns his eyes the fields appear ripe for the harvest. To the great congregations of serious-minded and eager young men and women gathered at Rochester these must have been heart-stirring appeals. There are not wanting besides noteworthy addresses which deal with larger aspects of the question, as that of Mr. Bryce upon the "Responsibilities of Christian Nations toward the Backward Races," of Dr. E. C. Moore upon the "Increasing Demand of the Orient upon the Colleges of the Occident"; and the usual conference of theological students and professors discussed the study of missions and the training of missionary candidates. There was not the insistence upon the study of comparative religion as essential to the preparation of candidates which was heard repeatedly at the Edinburgh Conference. Dr. Knox alone speaks plainly and directly upon this question. Dr. Zwemer, it is true, advocates an acquaintance with "the character and present attitude of the non-Christian religions and philosophies," but he appears to regard with suspicion "the science of comparative religion" as though it were necessarily derogatory to the supremacy of the Christian religion. It hardly needs to be said that the Convention did not close without the inevitable explanation and defense of the Volunteer Watchword.

A. K. PARKER

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

## BRIEF MENTION

### OLD TESTAMENT

GUNKEL, H. *Genesis übersetzt und erklärt*. Dritte neugearbeitete Auflage, mit ausführlichen Registern von Paul Schorlemmer. [Handkommentar zum Alten Testament.] Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1910. ciii + 510 pages. M. 11.

This is the only commentary in this series besides the one on the Book of Psalms which has as yet attained a third edition. This fact is conclusive evidence of its popularity among scholars and of its value. In the recently published volume on Genesis in the International Critical Commentary Dr. Skinner recognizes the importance of Gunkel's contribution in these words, "Every student must have felt that Gunkel's work, with its aesthetic appreciation of the genius of the narratives, its wider historical horizons, and its illuminating use of mythological and folk-lore parallels, has breathed a new spirit into the investigation of Genesis, whose influence

no writer on the subject can hope or wish to escape." Gunkel himself declares this third edition to be a new book and emphasizes the fact that a much more extended use has been made of folk-lore and legend in the interpretation. In this new edition Gunkel reckons with the metrical criticism of Sievers and finds it wanting when applied to Genesis at least. He also rejects the new analysis and interpretation of the Genesis stories proposed by Eerdmans. The Pan-Babylonian school meets with little more favor at our author's hands. Hence the general position of the commentary remains unchanged in this new form; the new material for the most part does but reinforce the author's earlier conclusions. Yet there are changes of attitude on some questions. For example, the favorable opinion regarding the existence of Winckler's Arabian Muṣri found in the earlier edition has here given place to a distinctly skeptical state of mind. The view first presented that the story of Jacob at Bethel was of cosmological significance in that Bethel was thought of as the center of the world, located directly under the zenith, and therefore as the place whence easy access might be had to the temple of deity in the heavens, is here abandoned. The new revision has made the work more useful than ever to the student of Genesis.

KAUTZSCH, E. *Die Heilige Schrift des Alten Testaments* in Verbindung mit Prof. BUDDE *et al.*, übersetzt und herausgegeben. Dritte, völlig neu gearbeitete, mit Einleitungen und Erklärungen zu den einzelnen Büchern versehene Auflage. Lieferungen 16-21. 384 pages. M. 1.60.

The second volume of this great work is now well under way. To these parts Kautzsch himself contributed Psalms, Jonah, Nahum, and Ruth; Guthe is responsible for Hosea, Amos, Micah, and Habakkuk; Marti did the work on Joel, Obadiah, Zechariah, and Malachi; Rothstein interprets Zephaniah; Löhr cares for Lamentations; Budde for the Song of Songs; and Steuernagel was given charge of Proverbs and Job. Naturally where so many minds are at work there will be some variety in the output. But the work of the general editor in selecting his assistants and in supervising their labors has been well done and the unity of the results is consequently far more striking than the variety. With each edition the book has become more liberal in spirit, thus faithfully reflecting the progress of modern scholarship. The positions of the various contributors with reference to the books assigned to them are in most cases already known by reason of the fact that they have published commentaries on these books before. Steuernagel's judgment concerning Job is that with the exception of occasional glosses there is no reason for regarding as later additions any other sections than chaps. 28 and 32-37, viz., the Praise of Wisdom and the Elihu Speeches. He finds the most suitable date for the origin of the book to be shortly after Alexander's invasion of Asia, viz., about 300 B.C. The Book of Proverbs is placed by him in its final form about 250 B.C. The individual collections of which the book is composed are assigned to the fourth century and the first half of the third century B.C.

JASTROW, MORRIS, JR. *Die Religion Babyloniens und Assyriens*. 15. Lieferung. Giessen: Töpelmann, 1910. 545-624 pages. M. 1.50.

Jastrow's great work is now near completion. The present instalment contains a section of chap. xx which is devoted to the Babylonian ideas regarding signs and omens and their interpretation. The treatment of this subject, as of all others, is

much more extended in this German work than it was in the original English form. The additions and modifications are so many and great as to render this edition in large measure a new work; it is by no means a mere translation. The thorough working-over of the subject which is involved in the preparation of this German revision makes the progress of publication somewhat slow; but this is one of the things well worth waiting for.

*Die Schriften des Alten Testaments in Auswahl neu übersetzt und für die Gegenwart erklärt* von H. GRESSMANN, H. GUNKEL, M. HALLER, H. SCHMIDT, W. STÄRK, UND P. VOLZ. Lieferungen 3-7. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1910. 690 pp. M. 4.32.

The parts of this work appear in rapid succession. The ones before us complete the presentation of the oldest historical writings and prophecy of Israel, closing with the Book of Hosea. They give us also the text of the Pentateuch as far as Gen., chap. 6. To this text of Genesis is prefixed an introduction to the Pentateuch and a special introduction to the legends of Genesis by Gunkel, of Giessen. We are also given a section of the portion to be devoted to the lyrical literature of the Old Testament. This is edited by Stärk, of Jena. Gressmann, of Berlin, is responsible for the translation and editing of the historical material and the brief introduction that precedes this section. The introductions and comments furnished in this series are of especial value for the general public of Germany. The decision of the editors to eliminate the less valuable portions of the text will also contribute to the success of the enterprise with the general public.

*Die Heilige Schrift des Alten Testaments in Verbindung mit Professoren* BUDDE, GUTHE, HÖLSCHER, HOLZINGER, KAMPHAUSEN, KITTEL, LÖHR, MARTI, ROTHSTEIN, und STEUERNAGEL, übersetzt und herausgegeben von E. KAUTZSCH. Dritte, völlig neu gearbeitete, mit Einleitungen und Erklärungen zu den einzelnen Büchern versehene Auflage. Lieferungen 18-25. Tübingen: Mohr, 1910. 437 pp. M. 5.60.

These parts contain the completion of the Book of Psalms, and also the books of Proverbs, Job, Song of Songs, Lamentations, Ecclesiastes, Esther, Daniel, Ezra, Nehemiah, and Chronicles together with the *Beilagen*. These are distributed among the editors as follows: to Budde, Song of Songs and Ecclesiastes; to Hölscher, Ezra and Nehemiah; to Löhr, Lamentations; to Marti, Daniel; to Steuernagel, Proverbs, Job, Esther; to Kautzsch, Psalms, Ruth, and the introduction to Chronicles, with the first two chapters of the text. At this point, death overtook Dr. Kautzsch and the remainder of the work on Chronicles was undertaken by Rothstein, who has also revised the *Beilagen*. The whole work is now finished and, as the last enterprise to engage the attention of Professor Kautzsch who founded it and saw it through three editions, it possesses a special interest. The work has been exceedingly well done and the high level upon which it has been carried through speaks volumes for the character and extent of the German public to which a work of this sort would naturally appeal. The latest conclusions of scholarship find free course here. It is to be hoped that under successive editors the work may go on from age to age and maintain the standard of excellence stamped upon it by its founder. The total

cost of the work as a whole is M. 20, or bound M. 24. There will shortly appear an Index volume which will make the work much more serviceable.

STRACK, H. L. *Sanhedrin-Makkoth. Die Misnatraktate über Strafrecht und Gerichtsverfahren, nach Handschriften und alten Drucken herausgegeben, übersetzt und erläutert.* [Schriften des Institutum Judaicum in Berlin, No. 38.] Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1910. 116 pages. M. 2.40.

HÖLSCHER, G. *Sanhedrin und Makkot. Die Mischnatraktate "Sanhedrin" und "Makkot" ins Deutsche übersetzt und unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des Verhältnisses zum Neuen Testament mit Anmerkungen versehen.* [Ausgewählte Mischnatraktate in deutscher Uebersetzung unter Mitwirkung von Professoren Beer, Hölscher, Kahle, Krüger, und Rothstein herausgegeben von Paul Fiebig.] Tübingen: Mohr, 1910. viii+148 pages. M. 3.80.

The two foregoing brochures concern themselves with the same subject. Strack gives a critically constituted edition of the Hebrew text of the two tracts of the Mishnah containing the laws regarding legal trials and punishments. The text is accompanied by a literal translation, a vocabulary of the words either not occurring in the Old Testament or found only a few times or having a different significance here, and a brief critical introduction dealing chiefly with the manuscripts upon which Strack based his text.

Hölscher does not print the Hebrew text, but devotes the space thus saved to an introduction, forty pages in length, and to a large number of critical and explanatory footnotes accompanying his translation. In addition to this, the translation differentiates by means of italic type between the early and late elements in the text of the two treatises, which were originally one.

The purpose of these brochures is to make the contents of these treatises accessible to students. They are of importance not only for the history of Judaism but also for the light they shed upon Jewish legal procedure in New Testament times. The work of the editors and translators is of the highest character and deserves hearty appreciation from all scholars.

REICHERT, LIC. O. *D. Martin Luther's Deutsche Bibel.* [Religionsgeschichtliche Volksbücher für die deutsche christliche Gegenwart. IV. Reihe, 13. Heft. Herausgegeben von D. Theol. Friedrich Michael Schiele.] Tübingen: Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1910. 44 pages. M. 0.50.

Luther's equipment for his great translation which we call "Luther's Bible" will always be a matter of dispute. Certain it is that he made extensive use of the Vulgate as current in his day. It is now known that he had at hand in Germany seventy-two independent Bibles or parts of Bibles. There were eighteen prints of the whole Bible; one print of the Old Testament; thirty-one prints of individual books of the Bible. There were two hundred and two manuscripts. Professor Walther of Rostock estimates that there were printed before Luther's day in German at least ten thousand Bibles and parts of Bibles, and that he had available three thousand six hundred manuscripts. Luther's linguistic preparation is somewhat wrapped in obscurity. But the faithfulness of his translations, both out of Hebrew

and Greek, shows that he was not a novice, but that he got right into the life of the languages. The second part of this brochure deals with the revisions which were made by Luther and his helpers, especially between 1539 and 1541. This popular little discussion gives a fascinating glimpse into one of the chief epochs of modern Bible translation.

SCHMIDT, N. *The Messages of the Poets: The Books of Job and Canticles and Some Minor Poems in the Old Testament, with Introductions, Metrical Translations, and Paraphrases.* [The Messages of the Bible, edited by F. K. Sanders and C. F. Kent: Vol. VII.] New York: Scribner, 1911. xxiv+415 pages. \$1.25.

From some points of view this is the most satisfactory volume that has appeared in this useful series. There is more evidence of scholarship here, more independence and vigor of thought, and greater freshness than have been evidenced by preceding volumes. On the other hand, the translation of Job in its attempt to carry over into English the meter of the original poem, has totally missed the dignity, majesty, and beauty that should characterize the rendering of so great a piece of literature. The translation of Canticles is very much more fortunate in this respect; it accords well with the nature of the songs. The introduction to the volume in general and to Job in particular, covering 111 pages in all, is an admirable piece of work. The bibliography is very full, covering 24 pages and including books in Latin, French, German, Dutch, Italian, Swedish, and Spanish, both ancient and modern; its value for the public in general, for whom this series is intended, is open to question. The critical standpoint of the book is that of the advanced wing of Old Testament interpreters. The Elihu-speeches, the praise of Wisdom, and the Jehovah-speeches are all made later additions to the Job poem; and the Song of Songs is declared to be neither a drama, nor an epithalamium, but a collection of songs such as were sung by Hebrew men and maidens in their efforts to express the great love of their lives.

WIENER, HAROLD M. *The Origin of the Pentateuch.* Oberlin, Ohio. Bibliotheca Sacra, 1910. 152 pages.

The author is a Jewish barrister of London and has the faculty of enlarging a minor detail to a plausible argument. The book is partial in treatment and judgment, lacking scientific methods and the historic spirit. The author finds no difficulty in accepting the reading of some isolated and probably inferior manuscript if it accords with a view he is elaborating. No critic would use a text after his sovereign fashion. Words, lines, or sentences are removed as glosses or changed in content at pleasure. The volume will appeal to those who are seeking possibilities for retaining the traditional authorship and unity of the Pentateuch.

CORNELY, R. *Historicae et criticae introductionis in libros sacros compendium.* Paris: Lethielleux, 1909. 712 pages.

CORNELY, R. *Commentarius in Librum Sapientiae.* Paris: Lethielleux, 1910. 614 pages.

KNABENBAUER, I. *Commentarius in Proverbia.* Paris: Lethielleux, 1910. 269 pages.

The new theological literature of catholic scholarship is intended to furnish an apologetic for the ancient faith to modern thought. The "Biblical Commission"



was founded in order that the church through her scholars might give guidance in all that concerns Scripture to those who look to her for the same. The intellectual movement thus stimulated has produced a literature, significant alike for the constructive and destructive forces which are seen to be at work. Several volumes are at hand from the labors of R. Cornely and associates of the Jesuits in Paris. The author (or authors) of these works is positive in treatment and, though his opinions are stated with modesty, yet one cannot but feel that he is conscious of a security which comes from resting on some authority back of him. The volume *Historicae et criticae introductionis in V.T. libros sacros compendium* contains the usual discussions on the canon, text, versions, and authorship. A statement on the apocryphal literature from the viewpoint of the church adds interest to this section. The traditional views are maintained on the basis of appeal to the church councils, fathers, and rabbinical sources. In *Commentarius in librum sapientiae* and *Commentarius in proverbia* we have more frequent appeal to modern authorities. This is in matters pertaining to literary form and text where a degree of liberty seems to be enjoyed, but the general interpretation remains that of the church. The volumes are prepared with extreme care and great labor and nothing is to be desired save more freedom in interpretation.

EERDMANS, B. D. *Alttestamentliche Studien*. III, Das Buch Exodus. Giessen: Töpelmann, 1910. 147 pages. M. 4.

The first Part of Eerdmans' *Studien* was reviewed in this Journal, October, 1908, 637 ff., and Part II in January, 1909, 100 ff. Both of those reviews set forth with sufficient detail the theories and methods of the author, and their defects. Part III, on the Book of Exodus, follows the same general lines as the Part on Genesis. Exodus is a collection of documents, but the key to its solution is not found in the documentary theory. Chaps. 1-11 constitute the continuation of the assumed Jacob-recension of Genesis. In Exodus, chap. 12, the thread is lost. But here the story follows another track and concludes what has been introduced in the preceding eleven chapters on the Plagues in Egypt. These chapters presuppose earlier basal material which was neither theological nor political. Before the promulgation of Deuteronomy this narrative was expanded; even before Jahvistic priests began to explain as historical the old yearly feasts of the Hebrews. Exodus, chap. 12, originally knew nothing of the connection of the Passover with the Exodus. This part was probably not written later than 650 B.C., because after that date Deuteronomic ideas prevailed. In post-exilic times several chapters of the Sinai story were incorporated in the book. The description of the sanctuary was an expansion of a pre-exilic narrative, now seen in Exod., chaps. 25-29 and 35-39. The contents of the tables of stone were also inserted in the Sinai story. Later the Decalogue was taken up, in order to harmonize it in some degree with the Deuteronomic version. In Exod., chaps. 12 and 29, references to post-exilic customs and individual laws were taken up (e.g., Exod. 12:15-20, 43-50; 29:27 ff., 38-41a). The description of the sanctuary cannot be attributed to the first decades of post-exilic times. This insertion must have taken place after the writing of Exod. 34:11-28; for this chapter presupposes the post-exilic calendar, and the separation of the words of the Covenant and the Book of the Covenant (*Mishpatim*).

Eerdmans' methods here are identical with those found in Part II and reveal the same arbitrary manner in the handling of the text.

BAUER, LEONARD. *Das Palästininische Arabisch, die Dialekte des Städtlers und des Fellachen*. Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1910. viii + 256 pages. M. 6.

This second edition of Bauer's book is by far the best work on the subject. Although primarily intended for those who desire to learn the Arabic dialects spoken today in Palestine, the book is especially valuable for the student of comparative Semitic grammar. It is in these living dialects that he is able to trace processes of development or decay which throw light upon many an obscure form in those dialects, Hebrew, Assyrian, etc., which have long since ceased to be spoken. It is to be hoped that the *Wörterbuch* which the author has promised will not be long in appearing.

#### NEW TESTAMENT AND ALLIED SUBJECTS

SCHERMANN, THEODOR. *Der Liturgische Papyrus von Dér Balyzeh*. [Texte und Untersuchungen, XXXVI, 1b.] Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1910. 45 pages. M. 1.50.

This new treatment sheds very welcome additional light on the three leaves of a Greek *Liturgical Papyrus from Dér Balyzeh* which were already known to us in the edition of P. de Puniet (*Fragments inédits d'une liturgie égyptienne écrits sur papyrus*. Report of the nineteenth Eucharistic Congress, held at Westminster from September 9 to 13, 1908. With 14 illustrations. London, 1909, 367-401). These leaves which are in the Bodleian Library at Oxford were accessible to de Puniet only in photographic reproductions. Hence he was not able to determine with any certainty their order or unity. Schermann shows clearly (by noting the direction of the fibers in the papyrus) that, in the edition of de Puniet, the recto and verso were interchanged in the case of two leaves (the first and third in the order of de Puniet). He further shows that de Puniet's second leaf should be number three, because it has a seal indicating the conclusion of the liturgy. The similarity of the script shows that the leaves belong together. The liturgy contains, first a prayer of adoration (first leaf recto), secondly a prayer of thanks (first leaf verso), thirdly the words accompanying the administration of the Lord's Supper (second leaf, recto and verso), fourthly a prayer for the proper fruits of the Communion (third leaf recto), and fifthly as a conclusion the recitation of the Symbol: "I believe in God Father Almighty and in his only-begotten Son our Lord Jesus Christ and in the Holy Spirit and in resurrection of flesh and Holy Catholic church." This papyrus is dated with considerable certainty as early as the third century, perhaps even at the end of the second century.

An occasional misprint is noticeable (e.g., Redpeath for Redpath, note 1, p. 25). But in general the work is carefully and thoroughly done. The comparisons with other early liturgies and parallel texts, especially with the Serapion liturgy, make this an indispensable edition for the study of this papyrus which had proved itself to be one of the fundamental documents in the history of liturgy.

BRÜCKNER, MARTIN. *Das fünfte Evangelium (Das heilige Land)*. [Religionsgeschichtliche Volksbücher, I, 21.] Tübingen: Mohr, 1910. 43 pages. M. 3.50.

Renan<sup>1</sup> once spoke of the Holy Land as a "fifth gospel." Dr. Brückner who, in 1908, spent three months in Palestine gathering what light he could on the gospels

<sup>1</sup> *Vie de Jésus* (ed. Lévy), Introd., p. xcix: "J'eus devant les yeux un cinquième Evangile, lacéré mais lisible encore."

from a first-hand acquaintance with the country and its manners, has given in popular form the result of his study. The book will prove very useful and practical, because it presents such a number of illustrative facts which throw light on the pages of the gospels. He says, for example, that the mention of the image on the coin in Mark 12:16 does not, as Kalthoff asserts, betray an ignorance of the fact that Jewish coins were always minted without an image, but is an evidence rather that Roman coins which did bear an image were in circulation, a fact which is also proved, of course, by the thousands of such coins dug out of the soil of Palestine. Another example is his mention of the prohibition in the Talmud of the presence of roosters in Jerusalem as showing that the reference to cock-crowing at the trial of Jesus must be understood simply as a designation of the time of day.

The author is chiefly interested, however, in a larger matter. He asks whether the local details are sufficiently definite as well as numerous to show a Palestinian origin for the gospels. His answer is that along with much indefiniteness there are sufficiently exact references to clothing, dwellings, occupations, vineyards, animals, social classes, graves, demon-possession, greetings, to warrant an affirmative answer. In a second section the author gives brief descriptive and illuminating glimpses of each of the Palestinian localities mentioned in the gospels, in particular of Capernaum and Jerusalem. The abundance of concrete and graphic details makes this little treatise, notwithstanding occasional errors in reference (e.g., p. 10, Mark 12:35-37 for Mark 12:15-17), a bright and helpful contribution to the always laudable effort to render the gospel story historically realistic.

WEISS, BERNHARD. *Der Hebräerbrief in zeitgeschichtlicher Beleuchtung*. [Texte und Untersuchungen, XXXV, 3.] Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1910. 109 pages. M. 3.50.

MONOD, VICTOR. *De titulo Epistolae vulgo ad Hebraeos inscriptae*. Obtainable of the author, Pontarlier (Doubs), France. 46 pages. Fr. 1.50.

These two treatises concern themselves directly with the question of the destination of Hebrews. M. Monod in this dissertation, which is in candidacy for the degree of licentiate of theology, advances and defends the statement that "Hebrews" must be understood metaphorically ("tropice"). "Hebrews," being derived etymologically from the Hebrew word "cross over" (the Red Sea or the Jordan or the Euphrates), is used by the author of the epistle to designate "those who cross over" into the kingdom of the eternal and unseen. M. Monod's starting-point, though he does not refer to it, seems to be in Eusebius, *Praep. Evang.* vii. 8, xi. 6, where the "Hebrew" people are defined as the race which had crossed from the land of idolatry and immorality to the side of true worship and right living (cf. Philo, *On Abraham*, chap. 40). The thesis here involved is briefly but excellently defended by M. Monod. His discussion also refers at length to the article by Schiele printed in an issue of this Journal for 1905, p. 290.

Professor Weiss gives twice as many pages to the opposite view as to the destination of the epistle, viz., that it was written to a particular community in Palestine. The book is on the one hand a defense of the position which the author takes in his edition of the Meyer Commentary on Hebrews, and on the other, a detailed answer to von Soden's position in his *Handkommentar*. A vital understanding of the epistle can be attained, Weiss thinks, only by asking in every paragraph why the author

discusses just these matters and why he expresses himself in the way he does. We can only understand the letter when we suppose that the readers were interested in just these questions—and not theoretically but practically, for it is in the very essence of religion to be practical. The patristic view that the epistle was addressed to Palestinian Jewish Christians cannot be brushed aside. Professor Weiss goes through the entire epistle—this is the sum total of his book—verse by verse, to show that the epistle must be understood entirely in connection with the concrete situation and problems of Jewish Christianity in Palestine. We must beware, he says, of seeing Jewish Christianity in the light of the polemic which Paul wages against the Judaizers. The Jewish Christians had enough problems and difficulties of their own without concerning themselves with the Gentiles. And the Epistle to the Hebrews is a letter written to a Palestinian community to settle these practical problems. His presentation is persuasive but not conclusive.

REGNAULT, HENRI. *Une Province procuratorienne au début de l'empire romain. Le procès de Jésus-Christ.* Paris: Picard, 1909. 144 pages. Fr. 4.

A careful study of the judicial administration of Palestine in New Testament times, in the light of ancient testimony, forms the background for a temperate and scholarly investigation of the trial of Jesus. While the writer's gospel criticism is sometimes inadequate, his essay is on the whole sound and suggestive. His collection of ancient testimony and modern opinion upon the main points in Jesus' trial is especially valuable.

NAU, F. *Nestorius: le livre d'Héraclide de Damas.* Traduit en français par F. Nau avec le concours du R. P. Bedjan et de M. Brière. Paris: Letouzey, 1910. xxviii+404 pages. Fr. 10.

On the basis of Bedjan's Syriac text, which is directly based on the unique manuscript of this work in Kotchanes in Kurdistan, Nau presents a new translation of the apology of Nestorius, which was written in Greek in A.D. 451, and which has been preserved under the name of the *Treatise* (or Bazaar) of *Heracledes*. Three Greek homilies of Nestorius on the Temptations of our Lord are appended, being published here for the first time, from a Paris manuscript. There is a useful introduction, and appendices with new and valuable Nestorian materials. Nau takes a less favorable view of Nestorius than did Bethune-Baker in his recent book on Nestorius and his teaching.

RESCH, ALFRED. *Das Galiläa bei Jerusalem. Eine biblische Studie. Ein Beitrag zur Palästina-kunde. Mit einer Kartenskizze.* Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1910. 55 pages. M. 1.30.

The fact that the Gospel of Matthew speaks only of Galilee as the scene of Jesus' appearances after his resurrection, while Luke mentions appearances in and about Jerusalem only, has long caused gospel harmonists difficulty. Resch here sets forth anew the theory that this "Galilee" should not be identified with the province bearing that name; but with a place in the vicinity of Jerusalem. Evidence for this opinion is drawn from both the Old and the New Testament and from the literature of post-apostolic times, but the argument is not convincing.

STOSCH, G. *Die apostolischen Sendschreiben nach ihren Gedankengängen dargestellt*. III. Band. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1910. 165 pages.

The argument of the Epistle to the Romans is outlined in this volume. The two previous volumes of the series have treated similarly James, Thessalonians, Galatians, and Corinthians. Romans is analyzed topically, e.g., a world-wide message for faith and life (1:1-17), a sinking world (1:18-32), the escape from the tribunal of God (chap. 2), etc. The comments are mainly theological in interest and critical questions, like the integrity of the last chapters, are not discussed.

UNGNAD, A. UND STAERK, W. *Die Oden Salomos aus dem syrischen übersetzt, mit Anmerkungen*. [Kleine Texte für theologische und philologische Vorlesungen und Uebungen. Herausgegeben von Hans Lietzmann. Nr. 64.] Bonn: Marcus und Weber, 1910. 40 pages. M. o. 80.

This is a new rendering into German of the recently discovered Odes of Solomon. Ungnad is responsible for the translation, which is made to express the meaning of the original as literally as possible. The notes deal only with questions of the text and its proper rendering. Rendel Harris, who owns the Syriac manuscript, has been consulted for the verification of doubtful points regarding the original. Staerk has arranged the translation in metrical form, guided by the analogy of the later Psalms. The first part of the manuscript itself is said to contain signs indicating a rhythmical division of the text for the purposes of liturgical use.

GREGORY, CASPAR RENÉ. *Wellhausen und Johannes*. Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1910. iv+68 pages. M. 1. 50.

This pamphlet, dedicated to the teachers' union of Leipzig, is a somewhat popular criticism of Wellhausen's position on the Fourth Gospel. The writer is not favorable to the partition hypothesis, especially not to Wellhausen's exposition of it. Having examined the main points on the other side, he offers in brief outline his own views on the subject. The tradition that the apostle John, the son of Zebedee, wrote the gospel in Ephesus, is accepted. Being an elderly man he probably dictated the matter to one of his pupils, perhaps to Prochorus, to whom the composition of certain parts may be due. The apostle may have returned to the task at various times and allowed the fancy of old age to wander rather freely, so that the signs of repetition and enlargement which are often taken as evidence of the work of a later redactor may all be due to John himself.

DURELL, J. C. V. *The Self-Revelation of Our Lord*. Edinburgh: Clark, 1910 (imported by Scribner). xxviii+224 pages. \$2.00.

The author defends, along traditional lines, the supernatural character of Christianity. The alleged claims of Jesus in this realm, as well as the interpretation of those claims given by the apostolic band, are taken to be the essential truths of the faith. Granting the writer's premises, his conclusions are, of course, justified; but it is a matter of fact that the older metaphysical theory which supplied the phraseology and the pictures for such an interpretation of Jesus' significance no longer holds undisputed sway in men's minds. It seems unfortunate to endanger the possibility of understanding Jesus' worth for modern times by binding it in so hard and fast a way to a world-view that is fast coming to be discredited.

THOMPSON, J. H. *The Synoptic Gospels Arranged in Parallel Columns*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1910. xxviii+161 pages. \$2.50.

The English Revised Version is the basis of the arrangement. The plan followed is similar to that of Wright's *Synopsis of the Gospels in Greek*. The material is printed in three parts: first, all of Mark with the parallel passages from Matthew and Luke; secondly, the remaining portions of Matthew with the Lukan parallels where there are any; thirdly, the rest of Luke. The minute division of the text into parallel clauses shows the identities and differences of the narratives with great clearness, while material peculiar to each gospel is printed in italics. Such a work is indispensable for a study of the literary relationships of the gospels, but the disadvantage of the present scheme is the utter loss of all sense of the sequence of events in Matthew and Luke.

AUTHOR OF "RESURRECTIO CHRISTI." *The Vision of the Young Man Menelaus. Studies of Pentecost and Easter*. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., 1910. xxvii+211 pages. 2s. 6d.

There is only a remote connection between the main title and the content of this book. The apocryphal legend about Menelaus, put to death and raised again by the Apostle John, is made the point of departure for a psychological explanation of the rise of the primitive resurrection faith. The earliest phases of this belief were subconscious impressions made by God upon certain persons. Under this inspired, yet unconscious, influence a number of disciples, particularly the Twelve and the Five Hundred, assembled at Jerusalem. At Pentecost this "subliminal" experience became "supraliminal"; in the trance utterances, the prophesyings, and the speaking with tongues traces of the previously received heavenly and purely spiritual message came to light. The line of reasoning by which these conclusions are reached seems quite fanciful.

GIRAN, ÉTIENNE. *Le christianisme progressif: Essai sur le christianisme et la conscience moderne*. Deuxième édition. Paris: Nourry, 1909. 139 pages. Fr. 2.50.

The Paris publisher, Emile Nourry, has rendered a public service in the publication of cheap paperback booklets presenting different phases of modern theology. These popular treatises are for French readers what the "Religionsgeschichtliche Volksbücher" are for the German-reading public; yet the "Bibliothèque de critique religieuse" is not up to the standard of the German series, several numbers of which have justly become famous. The French books are of uneven value. But when one sees the name of Étienne Giran he may expect work of an unusual order. He writes with remarkable vigor and enthusiasm.

This book is dedicated to free thinkers and free believers, and the foreword is to effect that free thought and free belief tend to become the two poles of the modern mind, and it is upon the invisible axis which supports them that the future city will be erected. We are disposed to venture one criticism of this fresh and stimulating work: not only does the author handle the traditional orthodox party in a most caustic manner, but in speaking of men of liberal thought who maintain close ecclesiastical relations he manifests a warmth and a bitterness which lead one to suspect that in some way unknown to the reader the personal equation here enters too largely into his judg-

ments and expressions. It is possible for the modern man to retain a firmer hold upon historic Christianity and to maintain a more sympathetic attitude toward his fellow-believers of the past and of the present than our redoubtable author seems to think, without any surrender of freedom and with a positive religious enrichment.

Too much cannot be said in praise of the author's buoyant idealism. The following expression of the author is a key to his thought: "L'esprit est mort. Vive l'esprit."

HAASE, FELIX. *Zur Bardesanischen Gnosis*. ["Texte und Untersuchungen" herausgegeben von HARNACK und SCHMIDT, XXXIV, 4.] Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1910. 98 pages. M. 3.

An excellent re-examination of the controverted questions in regard to Bardesanes, his gnostic teaching, etc. New results are obtained in the careful valuation of the source-material. The view of Bardesanes' ideas and his position in the church and in the world of his day which Haase arrives at, is not entirely new; it approximates closely, indeed, to that set forth by Hort in the *Dictionary of Christian Biography*. Bardesanes is a heretic, but hardly a gnostic. His ideas and mode of expression are influenced by gnosticism, but more by astronomy and astrology. Striking in connection with the newly found Odes of Solomon is Bardesanes' love of the harp and its music, to give a metaphorical expression to his ideas (see pp. 8 and 83). Is Bardesanes (born 154, died 222) in the statement of p. 8 referring to Ode 6? How many known parallels are there outside of the Odes to which he might be referring?

#### CHURCH HISTORY

BARDY, GUSTAVE. *Didyme l'aveugle*. [Études de théologie historique, 1.] Paris: Beauchesne, 1910. xii+279 pages.

In this careful and detailed study of the works and views of Didymus of Alexandria, the last head of the catechetical school, Bardy finds him rather an appropriator and formulator of current views than an original and progressive theologian. Didymus thus appears a somewhat less important figure in fourth-century theology than Leopoldt made him out in his recent work, *Didymus der Blinde von Alexandrien* (1905), but this is perhaps partly due to a disposition on Bardy's part, to harmonize Didymus just as far as possible with other Catholic writers.

KNOTD, EMIL. *Die Bedeutung Calvins und des Calvinismus für die protestantische Welt im Lichte der neueren und neuesten Forschung*. Giessen: Töpelmann, 1910. 70 pages. M. 1.80.

With the customary German thoroughness Professor Knodt has written an extremely favorable appreciation of Calvin and his work. He specifies eleven enduring and blessed fruits of Calvinism in the Protestant world.

BURRAGE, CHAMPLIN. *New Facts concerning John Robinson, Pastor of the Pilgrim Fathers*. With Facsimile Frontispiece. London: University Press; New York: Frowde, 1910. 35 pages. \$0.60.

Important as was John Robinson for the history of Dissent and Congregationalism, very little is known about his early life. In the course of his minute and extensive

investigations in this period of Dissent, Mr. Burrage incidently found a clue which has led to the discovery of many new facts that throw considerable additional light on the subject. These facts are given in this valuable pamphlet.

BROWN, JOHN. *The English Puritans*. Cambridge: University Press, 1910. 160 pages. 1s. net.

For busy people who would like to have the latest opinions regarding the Puritans given in a small space and simple English this is the book. It has been shown "that modern democracy is the child of the Reformation, not of the reformers. For in the Reformation the two levers used to break the authority of the Holy See were free inquiry and the priesthood of all believers; and these two principles contained within them the germs of the political revolution which has come to pass." The subjects are: "The Origin of Puritanism"; "Vestments and Ceremonies"; "The Puritans and the Hierarchy"; "Presbyters and Episcopacy"; "Absolutism and Liberty"; "Puritanism in Its Triumph and Downfall."

SELL, KARL. *Christentum und Weltgeschichte bis zur Reformation*. Die Entstehung des Christentums und seine Entwicklung als Kirche.

*Christentum und Weltgeschichte seit der Reformation*. Das Christentum in seiner Entwicklung über die Kirche hinaus. Leipzig: Teubner, 1910. 118 and 123 pages. M. 2.50.

From a purely historical, not religious, point of view, touching only the mountain tops and in its relations to general history, the author has told in a very few words the story of the Christian religion. The first volume deals with the origin of Christianity and its development as a church—or to the Reformation. The second volume deals with Christianity and its development as churches—or to the present. The undertaking required unusual gifts, and much accurate knowledge, and generalizing power of a high order. But it seems that the requirements have been met and that in two small volumes aggregating 241 pages we have Christian history in its relations to general history in a nutshell. These volumes are in a collection of 297 small volumes *Aus Natur und Geisteswelt*.

ORMANIAN, MALACHIA. *L'église Arminienne, son histoire*. Sa doctrine, son régime, sa discipline, sa liturgie, sa littérature, son présent. Paris: Leroux, 1910. 192 pages. M. 10.

The author begins by assuring us that he is not going to give us a "long-winded" treatise—and he has kept his word. On 192 pages he has given to those of us who are almost totally ignorant of the Arminian church just the things we wanted to know. The chapters are: "The History"; "The Doctrine"; "The Polity"; "The Discipline"; "The Liturgy"; "Literature"; "The Present." Two appendices are added on the chronology of the supreme patriarchs, and the statistics of the Arminian dioceses.

BENSER, HERMAN. *Das moderne Gemeinschaftschristentum*. Tübingen: Mohr, 1910. 48 pages. M. 0.50.

This brochure is the fourteenth *Heft* of the fourth series of popular books in religious history. It describes various revival movements in Germany, and their



influence on life and culture. The impression left upon the reader is that the demands of religion are an essential part of our nature; that they should be recognized; that if they are suppressed for a while by knowledge, culture, rationalism, they will be sure to assert themselves at last, and in ways that are shocking and humiliating.

GRIMLEY, HORATIO. *Saint Bernard, Abbot of Clairveaux: Selections from His Letters, Sermons, Meditations, and Other Writings, Rendered into English.* Cambridge: University Press, 1910. xv+286 pages. 1s. 6d.

The selections have been carefully made by Mr. Grimley. They include excerpts from letters to men high in church and state, to relatives, to inquiring men and women, and to the church at large. To these are added meditations by the saint on such themes as the mystery of the soul, the meaning of the advent, the love of God, consideration, etc. The volume closes with several of the poems of St. Bernard, including those best known to the church. These selections from the writings of the Abbot of Clairveaux reveal something of that commanding character, inflexible will, and monastic severity mingled with deep sympathy and real affection for his coworkers which made him a profoundly influential figure in the religious life of the eleventh century. Mr. Grimley has provided a brief sketch of the abbot's life.

LEBRETON, JULES. *Les origines du dogme de la Trinité.* [Bibliothèque de théologie historique.] Paris: Beauchesne et Cie, 1910. xxvi+569 pages. Fr. 8.

M. Lebreton, professor (at the *Institut Catholique* of Paris) of the history of the origins of Christianity, here presents the first volume of an *Histoire du dogme de la Trinité dès origines à Saint Augustin*. The author says that since Baur no one has treated the subject with the fulness with which it deserves; therefore it need not surprise the reader to find that at the end of this thick tome he is no farther than the close of the New Testament canon. The book falls into three parts: "le milieu hellénique" (pp. 1-88) treats the relevant concepts of God, the Logos, and the Spirit, as they existed outside Judaism and Christianity; "la préparation juive" (pp. 89-205) deals with the analogous forms of thought in the Old Testament and in Palestinian and Alexandrian Judaism; "la révélation chrétienne" (pp. 207-436) discusses the New Testament material. There follow eleven elaborate notes, of which those on Mark 13:32 and I John 5:7 are perhaps the most significant; in the latter the author sides with those Catholic scholars who, in the face of the response of the Holy Office of the 13th of January, 1897, dare to assail the genuineness of the verse about the Three Witnesses. In argumentation, moreover, he does not follow the Vulgate but the original texts. If he thus shows a certain degree of independence in textual criticism, he has also a keen sense of individual differences between the New Testament writers, which he considers significant to the historian, though he remarks "they may legitimately be neglected by a theologian concerned above all to reach the divine verity in the revelation." Conservative as he is on questions of introduction, he cites frequently many of the leading German, English, and American critics, and he subjoins a very comprehensive bibliography. To Protestant scholars the chief interest in the book lies perhaps in the wealth of illustrative classical and patristic quotations offered in the footnotes and made easily accessible through careful indices.

EGLI, EMIL, AND FINSLER, GEORG (editors): *Huldreich Zwinglis sämtliche Werke*. Unter Mitwirkung des Zwingli-Vereins in Zürich herausgegeben von Dr. Emil Egli und Dr. Georg Finsler. I. und II. Bände (=Corpus Reformatorum, Vols. LXXXVIII und LXXXIX). Berlin: C. A. Schwetschke und Sohn; jetzt Leipzig: M. Heinsius, Nachfolger, 1905 und 1908. Erscheint in Lieferungen zu 3 Mark. Bisher 23 Lieferungen.

Seven years ago there was published in the *American Journal of Theology* (Vol. VII [1904], pp. 392 f.) an account of the important undertaking of preparing a critical edition of Zwingli's works. At that time only the first portions of the work had appeared. In the meantime two complete volumes have been published, and a third is in process of preparation. The responsible editors of the first two volumes were Dr. Emil Egli, professor in Zurich, and Dr. Georg Finsler, instructor in religion in the *Gymnasium* in Basel. Dr. Egli died on December 31, 1908. His successor in Zurich, the noted and well-known historian of the Reformation period, Dr. Walther Köhler, has also undertaken to complete Dr. Egli's editorial labors. The two volumes which have already appeared contain the writings of Zwingli up to the year 1523 including the records of the disputation over images, October 26-28, 1523, and the precepts concerning masses and images called forth by this writing, December 10-19, 1523. In response to frequently expressed desires the editors have determined to publish next Zwingli's letters; and the first sections of what will be known as Vol. VII of the work have already appeared. This undertaking which rests upon a sound critical basis, and which demands a large amount of self-sacrificing work upon the part of the editors, deserves the warmest interest of scholars.

HAUSER, HENRI. *Études sur la réforme française*. Paris: Picard et Fils, 1909. xiv+388 pages. Fr. 3.50.

Professor Henri Hauser, of the University of Dijon, has collected into a small volume seven historical essays dealing with various phases of the French Reformation which have been published in various reviews within recent years. The author is a recognized leader of that school of historians who recognize that the Reformation was something more than a religious manifestation, and that its economic and social activities were deep, and profoundly influenced the course of events. This statement is particularly demonstrated in the article entitled "La réforme et les classes populaires en France au XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle," which originally appeared in the *American Historical Review* for January, 1899. This article has been recognized in all quarters as a historical masterpiece, original, illuminating, and thoroughly scientific. The other essays deal more with intellectual than with social history, with "Humanism and the French Reformation"; "A New Text upon Aimé Maigret"; "An Important Source of the Martyrology of Crespin"; "Some Books of the Sixteenth Century," etc. M. Hauser's foreword is an admirable statement of the character and content of the new historical school, so far as it pertains to the history of the Reformation in France.

SCHMOLL, P. POLYKARP. *Die Busslehre der Frühscholastik: Eine dogmengeschichtliche Untersuchung*. München: Leutner, 1909. xvi+163 pages. M. 3.80.

The volume before us is No. 5 of the third series of "Publications from the Munich Church History Seminar" whose editor is Professor Alois Knöpfler. Some years ago

the Munich theological faculty projected a series of monographs on Penance. Two treatises on the *Thomistic Doctrine of Penance* by Buchberger and Göttler dealt with some of the antecedents of the Thomistic doctrine, the teaching of Thomas Aquinas himself, and the further development of the doctrine to the Council of Trent. Another by Königer on the treatment of the doctrine by Burchard of Worms and Caesarius of Arles covered the early Middle Ages. The early scholastic period was left for our author, who gained by his essay a prize offered by the faculty. Besides the printed sources he has had access to a considerable amount of manuscript material which he indicates in his "Verzeichnis der Quellschriften."

After suitable orientation in his "Einleitung," in which he glances at the development of the doctrine and practice of penance from the apostolic time to the beginning of the scholastic age and notices the opposition to the church doctrine and practice by heretical parties like the Albigenses and the Valdenses, he proceeds to expound the penitential views of Anselm and his successors. Of course the great question which the author seeks to answer is how in the period with which he deals those committing sins after baptism were supposed to gain remission of sins and an assurance of reconciliation with the church and with God. The further question has to be considered whether penance was regarded by the teachers of that age as a sacrament. The doctrine of penance is closely related in its development to that of the sacraments. Other questions discussed are, In which of its parts consists the efficacy of penance, in contrition or in confession? Whether the subjective attitude of the sinner or the priestly office produces the effect? The teachings of most of the church writers from Anselm to Thomas Aquinas are considered in order and with due regard to the influence of each upon his successors and of the general trend of ecclesiastical thought and life on each. At the beginning of the period the writer admits that the distinction had not been clearly made between *sacramenta* and *sacramentalia* and that penance was not clearly defined as a sacrament. He is of the opinion that the doctrine was perfectly defined by Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus who identified absolutely God and the church in the bestowal of all spiritual gifts, the priest in absolution being God's mouthpiece.

ARGE, HERMANN. *Frühprotestantisches Gemeindechristentum in Wittenberg und Orlamünde*. Zugleich eine Abwehr gegen Karl Müllers *Luther und Karlstadt*. Leipzig: Heinsius, 1909. xxvi+366 pages. M. 10.

Barge's two-volume work, *Andreas Bodenstein von Karlstadt*, published in 1905, by reason of the highly advantageous light in which he made Karlstadt appear as a reformer and theologian, and as a man of deep religious life and supreme devotion to truth, and the unfavorable light in which Luther appeared as his reviler and persecutor, called forth a large number of sharp polemical writings, the most important of which is Karl Müller's *Luther und Karlstadt*. In the present work Barge carefully reviews what his critics have written against his representation of Luther and Karlstadt, admits some errors, and vindicates with the use of additional materials all that is of much consequence in his great monograph. Besides Karl Müller, he has occasion to deal with Kawerau, Scheel, Hermelink, Cohrs, Nikoläus Müller, Brieger, and von Tiling. These will be recognized as among the foremost students of Reformation history. Barge's review of his critics goes so much into details, pages being frequently devoted to the interpretation of a single sentence from the sources, that it would not be practical to summarize its contents in a brief notice. There are no doubt many

cases where a difference of interpretation is easy and where one's view is likely to be determined by his predilection. It appears to the reviewer that Lutheran scholars are unduly sensitive about disparaging remarks concerning Luther and become unreasonably bitter in their polemics. Barge, while sometimes pretty sharp in his thrusts, seems on the whole more fairminded than most of his critics. His work on Karlstadt supplemented by the rejoinder and review before us may still be regarded as a very important contribution to early Reformation history.

FERET, P. *La faculté de théologie de Paris et ses docteurs les plus célèbres. Époque moderne. Tome VII. XVIII<sup>e</sup> siècle.* Paris: Picard et Fils, 1910. vi+562 pages. Fr. 7.50.

The abbé Feret has at last completed his long labors upon the history of the faculty of theology at Paris and the lives of its more celebrated professors. It is a huge series comprising four volumes pertaining to the Middle Ages and seven to modern times. The value to every phase of the philosophical and theological history of France is very great, while the vast influence of the church upon politics and society, century after century, makes the work of little less value to general history. The volumes are encyclopedic in both method and scope. The present one, dealing with the eighteenth century, is of peculiar interest by reason of its bearing upon the later history of the Jansenists and the expulsion of the Jesuits. Few scholars will care to possess the series, but every great library should certainly have it upon its shelves.

KOENIGER, ALBERT MICHAEL. *Voraussetzungen und Voraussetzungslosigkeit in Geschichte und Kirchengeschichte.* [Veröffentlichungen aus dem kirchenhistorischen Seminar München, III. Reihe, Nr. 9.] München: Leutner, 1910. 50 pages. M. 1.

Can a historian be entirely impartial? The question has been agitated by various writers during the ten years that have elapsed since Mommsen protested against the appointment of Martin Spahn, a Roman Catholic, to a professorship of history at Strassburg. This pamphlet summarizes the Catholic position. After demonstrating over against Mommsen that no historian ever does operate without methodological or philosophical presuppositions, Dr. Koeniger polemizes against that prejudice which ignores unfavorable source material and literature. The verdict must be based on the impartial sifting of all the evidence, and the ecclesiastical historian cannot escape from the secular code of honor by pleading benefit of clergy. Even in regard to occurrences inextricably involved with dogma (*facta dogmatica*) methodical doubt is in place; investigation can but confirm revelation. The attempt to follow out genetic relationships need not lead to a (modernistic) denial of absolute values; for belief in Divine Providence saves one from mere relativism. Certain sources of error must be minimized though they can never be eliminated; such are the physical and social factors of climate, locality, race, family, and party; such are also individual temperament and religion. He who claims to be absolutely unprejudiced may be merely substituting the irreligious for the religious view of the world. The freedom of the Catholic historian is limited only to those regions where historical science, which deals with relativity, is incompetent to reach absolute truth. The natural scientist takes his presuppositions on faith; so too the church historian. Presuppositions there must be: shall they be irreligious or shall they be Catholic? Here we have the fallacious dilemma of Catholic apologetics: *aut Caesar aut nullus*.

MIRBT, CARL. *Mission und Kolonialpolitik in den deutschen Schutzgebieten*. Tübingen: Mohr, 1910. xxii+287 pages. M. 6.

This book gives the first comprehensive account of missionary activity in the German protectorates in Africa, New Guinea, Samoa, and China. It deals with the organization and extent of the missions both Protestant and Catholic, their present state, the religious, moral, and industrial education of the natives, philanthropic endeavor, and the spread of Christianity. The last fifty-three pages are devoted to an important discussion of the relation of missionary work to German colonial policy, a topic which the alert professor of church history at the University of Marburg treats in illuminating fashion.

#### COMPARATIVE RELIGION

HABERT, O. *La religion de la Grèce antique*. Paris: Lethielleux, 1910. xxiii+582 pages. Fr. 4.

This book is one of a series entitled "Bibliothèque d'histoire des religions," published by Lethielleux, Paris. According to the general announcement of the series, the contributions to it "will not be works of simple scholarship but accounts of the development of religions conceived in the spirit of the best works on the subject and in harmony with psychological and social laws." It would appear also that the series is intended primarily for the instruction of members of the Roman Catholic church in religions differing from their own, and the book bears the characteristic "Nihil obstat" of the censor.

Professor Habert has covered pretty thoroughly the available source material for a study of Greek religion. This material he has grouped under three epochs: first, the epoch of naturism; second, that of anthropomorphism; and third, that of purification. Under the first epoch he gives a detailed account of the various religious beliefs and practices connected with the general worship of nature and natural objects, the use of amulets and talismans, the practice of taboo, rites, and ceremonies connected with burial, as these have apparently survived from an earlier state of civilization and have been modified by foreign influences and also by local cults of long standing. Under the second period he treats mainly the Homeric and Hesiodic tradition, and under the third he traces the modification of religion by the work of philosophers, scientists, historians, political leaders, and the Sophists, and also by the development of popular beliefs in the gods and the mystic ceremonies of the religious societies, particularly that of Orphism. His survey is, on the whole, comprehensive and exhibits a pretty faithful following of the material at his command. It does not appear, however, that he has worked out in a manner at all satisfactory the promise of the general program of the series, if the reader is looking for a discussion of Greek religion which will present it in the light of psychological and social laws.

Indeed, the general point of view from which the book is written will appear, to Protestant readers at least, unfavorable to a thoroughly historical treatment of Greek religion. There is, for instance, the suggestion by the author that at the time when we first became acquainted with the religion of Greece the "primitive revelation" has entirely disappeared. While the recognition of this might have opened the way to the author to exhibit Greek religion as "a development of unaided human intelligence"—in fact he regards this religion as the supreme height which such intelligence has attained—the purport of the book appears rather to point to the idea that the

religion of the Greeks was a certain intellectual preparation for the advent of Christianity. "All was not false in their point of view." They developed the beliefs in original sin and divine justice, and paved the way for the harmonizing of those two beliefs in the Christian doctrine of redemption.

In the opinion of the reviewer, therefore, the reader who looks for data and material will find an abundance of it, and well arranged. But if he looks for a thorough philosophical and historical handling of that material, he will be disappointed.

RAND, BENJAMIN. *The Classical Moralists*. Selections Illustrating Ethics from Socrates to Martineau. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1909. 797 pages. \$3.

Dr. Rand's previous work in compiling a source-book of modern philosophy enables him to bring to the present compilation both his own scholarship and the results of experience. He has covered the ground remarkably well, considering the limitations of space, and has furnished characteristic and crucial passages from the important writers on the theory of morals. Teachers of ethics will welcome this means of securing from students an intelligent acquaintance, however slight, with the significant contributions to ethical thought. In view of modern discussions, however, one wonders why Nietzsche and Tolstoi were not included in the list. They may not be "classical," but they are essential factors in much present thinking.

---

#### PRACTICAL THEOLOGY

HAUPT, HANS. *Staat und kirche in den Vereinigten Staaten von Nord America*. Giessen: Töpelmann, 1909. 76 pages. M. 2. 20.

This is one of the "Studies in Practical Theology" edited by Professor Clemen, of Bonn. The author is a pastor at Tonawanda, N.Y. He disclaims any attempt to work up the subject from the original sources. His list of secondary sources might have been considerably improved by omission and addition. He has nevertheless prepared an interesting monograph by grouping his facts in good German fashion and accurately drawing the conclusions which the facts yield. He begins by showing that the separation of church and state was not the result of long and deep speculations, but rather the necessary outcome of circumstances that were fixed. The pamphlet of 76 pages will give his German readers a very good idea of the relation of church and state in America, and the American reader will find it a helpful summary.

MCDOWELL, WILLIAM FRAZER. *In the School of Christ*. New York: Revell, 1910. 303 pages. \$1. 25.

The Cole Lectures delivered at Vanderbilt University in 1910 have been put into permanent form in this book. Bishop McDowell gives to the student body and especially to prospective ministers a vital presentation of the meaning of discipleship and apostleship in the time of Jesus and now.

BISHOP, CHARLES MCTYEIRE. *Jesus the Worker*. New York: Revell, 1910. 240 pages. \$1. 25.

This volume incorporates the 1909 Cole Lectures delivered at Vanderbilt University. The foundation upon which these lectures are given restricts them "to a defense and advocacy of the Christian religion." The lectures, however, are not

sensitively apologetic or polemic and for that reason possess considerable charm along with a firm faith in traditional theology.

COPE, HENRY FREDERICK. *The Efficient Layman*. Philadelphia: The Griffith & Rowland Press, 1911. x+244 pages. \$1.00.

This is a well-written description of the present-day situation within the church as it affects men. The analysis of the masculine mind and of the standard church activities in relation thereto is good, as is also the survey of new forms of activity now emerging from the lay body. The book is to be recommended to pastors and religious readers.

---

#### DOCTRINAL

SNOWDEN, JAMES H. *The World a Spiritual System: an Outline of Metaphysics*. New York: Macmillan, 1910. xiii+316 pages. \$1.50.

This book, written to aid "the plain man" in his desire to know something of metaphysics, presents a frankly idealistic interpretation of the universe. The author admits that there are some problems scarcely touched upon but hopes that his book may still serve as an introduction to the general subject. As a whole the work is well done though any attempt of the sort can hope for only relative lucidity. The argument follows the well-known lines for the subjectivity of sensation, space, and time. He finds in the soul his touchstone of reality. The sympathetic interpretation of phenomena leads to the discovery of other souls and demolishes solipsism. But the argument also leads to the conclusion that "the world is a great soul," "the phenomenon of God," "God's own thought and feeling and deed." The author insists that "Matter is a mode of divine activity," and believes that such a theory has fewer difficulties than any other. His last chapter, "Applications of Idealism," suggests controversy in its conception of pain as implying a "laboring God" and of evil as a necessary condition of the good. Idealism he regards as "the soundest basis and the most genial atmosphere for religion." While he tries to guard against pantheism, yet it would be interesting to hear the plain man's judgment as to the net result of the argument. Perhaps the author has not made sufficiently clear that there are various types of idealism. It would have been desirable if, in the citation of scientific opinion, for instance, that on the subject of spontaneous generation (p. 126), care had been taken to guard the general reader against the confusion of fact and hypothesis. For the guidance of those whom the book has aroused an excellent course of reading is outlined.

## BOOKS RECEIVED

The more important books in this list will be reviewed at length.

### OLD TESTAMENT AND ALLIED SUBJECTS

- Die Schriften des Alten Testaments. 8te Lieferung. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1910. 81-160 pages. M. 0.80.
- Haupt, Paul. The Book of Micah. A New Metrical Translation, with Restoration of the Hebrew Text and Explanatory and Critical Notes. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1910. 252 pages. \$1.
- Haupt, Paul. The Book of Esther. Critical Edition of the Hebrew Text with Notes. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1910. 90 pages. \$1.
- Jastrow, Morris, Jr. Die Religion Babylonien und Assyriens. 16. Lieferung. Giessen: Töpelmann, 1911. 625-704 pages. M. 1.50.
- Kent, C. F. The Great Teachers of Judaism and Christianity. [Modern Sunday School Manuals.] New York: Eaton & Mains, 1911. 166 pages. \$0.75.
- Ramsay, F. P. An Interpretation of Genesis. Including a Translation into Present-Day English. New York: Neale Publishing Co., 1911. 347 pages. \$2.
- Schmidt, Nathaniel. The Messages of the Poets. The Books of Job and Canticles and Some Minor Poems in the Old Testament, with Introductions, Metrical Translations, and Paraphrases. [The Messages of the Bible.] New York: Scribner, 1911. 415 pages. \$1.25.
- Wiener, Harold M. The Origin of the Pentateuch. Oberlin, O.: Bibliotheca Sacra Co., 1910. 152 pages.
- Abbott, Edwin A. Indices to Diate-sarica with a Specimen of Research. London: Black; New York: Macmillan, 1907. lxii+147 pages. \$1.25.
- Bacon, B. W. The Theological and Practical Issues of Biblical Criticism. Reprinted from the Report of the Fifth International Congress for Free Christianity and Religious Progress, Berlin, 1910. London: Williams & Norgate, 1911. 19 pages. 9d.
- Brückner, Martin. Das fünfte Evangelium (Das heilige Land). [Religions-geschichtliche Volksbücher.] Tübingen: Mohr, 1910. 43 pages. M. 0.50.
- Buchanan, E. D. The Four Gospels from the Codex Veronensis (b). Being the First Complete Edition of the Evangelium Purpureum in the Cathedral Library at Verona. With an introduction descriptive of the MS. With two facsimiles. (Old Latin Biblical Texts: No. VI.) Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1911. xxiii+197 pages. 21s.
- Bultmann, Rud. Der Stil der Paulinischen Predigt und die kynisch-stoische Diatribe. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1910. 109 pages. M. 3.40.
- Harnack, Adolf. The Twofold Gospel in the New Testament. London: Williams & Norgate, 1911. 11 pages. 6d.
- Hollmann, G. Welche Religion hatten die Juden, als Jesus auftrat? [Religionsgeschichtliche Volksbücher.] Tübingen: Mohr, 1910. 64 pages. M. 0.50.
- Holtzmann, H. J. Lehrbuch der Neutestamentlichen Theologie. Tübingen: Mohr, 1911. 160 pages. M. 3.50.
- Koch, Heinrich. Die Abfassungszeit des lukanischen Geschichtswerkes. Eine historisch-kritische und exegetische Untersuchung. Leipzig: Deichert, 1911. 102 pages. M. 1.80.
- Pryse, James M. The Apocalypse Unsealed. Being an Esoteric Interpretation of the Initiation of Ioannes, Commonly Called the Revelation of St. John. New York: John M. Pryse, 1910. 222 pages. \$2.
- Robertson, A. T. John the Loyal.

### NEW TESTAMENT

- Abbott, E. A. "The Son of Man," or Contributions to the Study of the Thoughts of Jesus. Cambridge: The University Press; New York: Putnam, 1910. liii+869 pages. 16s.
- Abbott, Edwin A. The Message of the Son of Man. London: Black; New York: Macmillan, 1909. xxii+166 pages. \$1.75.



- Studies in the Ministry of the Baptist. New York: Scribner, 1911. 315 pages. \$1.25.
- Sanday, W. (Editor). Studies in the Synoptic Problem. By Members of the University of Oxford. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1911. xxvii+456 pages. 12s. 6d.
- Sheldon, Henry M. New Testament Theology. New York: Macmillan, 1911. 364 pages. \$1.50.
- von Soden, Freiherr. Does the New Testament Gain or Lose in Significance for Religious Life by Historical Criticism? Reprinted from the Report of the Fifth International Congress for Free Christianity and Religious Progress, Berlin, 1910. London: Williams & Norgate, 1911. 8 pages. 6d.
- Souter, Alexander. Novum Testamentum Graece. The Revisers' Text with a New Apparatus Criticus. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1910. xxiv+480 pages. 3s.
- Stoekius, Hermann. Forschungen zur Lebensordnung der Gesellschaft Jesu im 16. Jahrhundert. Erstes Stück: Ordensangehörige und Externe; Zweites Stück: Das gesellschaftliche Leben im Ordenshause. München: Beck, 1911. viii+57; x+198 pages. M. 7.
- Swete, Henry Barclay. The Ascended Christ. A Study in the Earliest Christian Teaching. New York: Macmillan, 1910. xiv+168 pages. \$0.80.
- Weber, E. Das Problem der Heilsgeschichte nach Röm. 9-11. Ein Beitrag zur historisch-theologischen Würdigung der paulinischen Theodicee. Leipzig: Deichert, 1911. 108 pages. M. 2.40.
- Weiss, Johannes. Der erste Korintherbrief. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1910. xlviii+388 pages. M. 9.
- Westberg, Friedrich. Zur Neutestamentlichen Chronologie und Golgothas Ortslage. Leipzig: Deichert, 1911. 144 pages. M. 3.
- Parmentier, Léon. Theodoret, Kirchengeschichte. [Die griechischen Christlichen Schriftsteller der ersten drei Jahrhunderte.] Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1911. cviii+487 pages. M. 17.
- De Ricci, Seymour, et Winstedt, Eric O. Les quarante-neuf vieillards de sceté. Paris: Klincksieck, 1910. 36 pages. Fr. 1.70.

## CHURCH HISTORY

- Baudot, J. Le martyrologie. Paris: Bloud et Cie, 1910. 64 pages. Fr. 0.60.
- Benser, Hermann. Das moderne Gemeinschaftschristentum. [Religionsgeschichtliche Volksbücher.] Tübingen: Mohr, 1910. 48 pages. M. 0.50.
- Bery, A. Saint Justin. Sa vie et sa doctrine. Paris: Bloud et Cie, 1910. 64 pages. Fr. 0.60.
- Dorner, August. Philosophy and Theology in the Nineteenth Century. London: Williams & Norgate, 1911. 37 pages. 1s.
- Emerton, Ephraim. Unitarian Thought. New York: Macmillan, 1911. 309 pages. \$1.50.
- Gjessing, Marcus. Kirchenkunde des evangelischen Auslandes. II. Norwegische Kirchenkunde. Giessen: Töpelmann, 1911. 50 pages. M. 1.60.
- Grundlinien der Theologie Joh. Christ. K. v. Hofmanns in seiner eigenen Darstellung. Quellenschriften zur Geschichte des Protestantismus. Eine Jubiläumsgabe mitgeteilt von Dr. Johannes Haussleiter. Leipzig: Deichert, 1910. xii+82 pages. M. 1.60.
- Gwatkin, Henry Melvill. Early Church History to A.D. 313. New York: Macmillan, 1909. 2 vols. 310 and 376 pages. \$5.25.
- Hart, J. H. A. The Hope of Catholic Judaism. [Studies in the History and Doctrine of Judaism and Christianity. Edited by A. Lukyn Williams.] Oxford: Parker & Co., 1910. xiv+162 pages. 3s.
- McGiffert, Arthur Cushman. Protestant Thought before Kant. [Studies in Theology.] New York: Scribner, 1911. 261 pages. \$0.75.
- McGlothlin, W. J. Baptist Confessions of Faith. Philadelphia: American Baptist Publication Society, 1911. xii+368 pages. \$2.50.
- Medley, D. J. The Church Universal, Vol. IV. The Church and the Empire.

## PATRISTICS

- Gravin, Émile. Eusèbe: Histoire ecclésiastique, Livres V-VIII. Texte grec et traduction française. Paris: Picard, 1911. 560 pages. Fr. 5.
- Nau, F. Nestorius. Le livre d'Héraclide de Damas. Traduit en français. Paris: Letouzey et Ane, 1910. xxviii+403 pages. Fr. 10.

- Being an Outline of the History of the Church from A.D. 1003 to A.D. 1304. London: Rivingtons; New York: Macmillan, 1910. xii+300 pages. \$1.40.
- Petitot, H. Pascal. Sa vie religieuse et son apologie du Christianisme. Paris: Beauchesne, 1911. 427 pages. Fr. 6.
- Slicer, Thomas. A Survey of Liberal Religion in the United States. London: Williams & Norgate, 1911. 15 pages. 6d.
- Thomas, Jules. Le concordat de 1615, ses origines, son histoire au XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle. Deuxième partie. Les Documents Concordataires. Paris: Picard, 1910. 414 pages. Fr. 0.50.
- Tucker, T. G. Life in the Roman World of Nero and St. Paul. New York: Macmillan, 1910. xix+453 pages. \$2.50.
- McDonald, Walter. The Principles of Moral Science. Second edition, revised and enlarged. Dublin: M. H. Gill & Son, 1910. xvi+277 pages. 7s. 6d.
- Mains, George P. Modern Thought and Traditional Faith. New York: Eaton & Mains, 1911. xxi+279 pages. \$1.50.
- Murat, Louis et Paul. L'argument classique de la finalité. Les merveilles de l'œil. Paris: Bloud et Cie, 1911. 70 pages. Fr. 0.60.
- Schwalm, R. P. L'acte de foi est-il raisonnable? Paris: Bloud et Cie, 1911. 63 pages. Fr. 0.60.
- Snowden, James H. The Basal Beliefs of Christianity. New York: Macmillan, 1911. 252 pages. \$1.50.
- Womer, P. P. The Coming Creed. Boston: Sherman, French & Co., 1911. 88 pages. \$0.80.

## DOCTRINAL

- Berthé, L. La Sainte Trinité. Lectures Théologiques. Paris: Bloud et Cie, 1911. 218 pages. Fr. 5.
- Bossuet. Exposition de la doctrine de l'église catholique. Paris: Bloud et Cie, 1911. 211 pages. Fr. 3.
- Bousset, Wilhelm. The Significance of the Personality of Jesus for Belief. Reprinted from the Report of the Fifth International Congress for Free Christianity and Religious Progress, Berlin, 1910. London: Williams & Norgate, 1911. 16 pages. 6d.
- Charles, P. Questions théologiques. Le Dogme. Paris: Bloud et Cie, 1911. 63 pages. Fr. 0.60.
- Eppens, Edward H. The Dilemma of the Modern Christian. How Much Can We Accept of Traditional Christianity? Boston: Sherman, French & Co., 1911. 181 pages. \$1.20.
- Falco, Mario. Le disposizioni "Pro Anima." Fondamenti dottrinali e forme giuridiche. Torino: Fratelli Bocca, 1911. 205 pages.
- Franque, V. Bible et protestantisme. Paris: Bloud et Cie, 1910. 133 pages. Fr. 2.
- Hurtaud, F. J. La vocation au Sacerdoce. Paris: Lecoffre, 1911. 453 pages. Fr. 4.
- Kinsley, William W. Man's Tomorrow. Boston: Sherman, French & Co., 1911. 190 pages. \$1.20.
- Labauche, L. Leçons de théologie dogmatique. Paris: Bloud et Cie, 1911. 388 pages. Fr. 5.

## PRACTICAL RELIGION

- Anizan, Félix. Qu'est-ce donc que le Sacré Cœur? Paris: Lethiellieux, 1910. 124 pages. Fr. 0.75.
- Ballard, Addison. From Talk to Text. Boston: Sherman, French & Co., 1911. 190 pages.
- Baumgarten, Otto. Religious Education in Germany. Reprinted from the Report of the Fifth Universal Congress for Free Christianity and Religious Progress.
- Curtis, Olin Alfred. Personal Submission to Jesus Christ. Its Supreme Importance in the Christian Life and Theology. New York: Eaton & Mains, 1910. 35 pages. \$0.25.
- Fiebig, Paul. Weltanschauungsfragen. Das geschichtliche Material zum Verständnis Jesu. Konfessionskunde für die Schüler und Schülerinnen höherer Lehranstalten. Tübingen: Mohr, 1911. 39 pages. M. 0.50.
- Fiebig, Paul. Die Gleichnisse Jesu und die Bergpredigt in Verbindung mit rabbinischen Parallelen erläutert für die Schüler und Schülerinnen höherer Lehranstalten. Tübingen: Mohr, 1911. 27 pages. M. 0.50.
- Hoopes, W. L. The Code of the Spirit. An Interpretation of the Decalogue. Boston: Sherman, French & Co., 1911. 154 pages. \$1.20.
- Kern, John A. A Study of Christianity as Organized. Its Ideas and Forms. Nashville, Tenn.: Methodist Episco-

- pal Church South, 1910. xxxi+572 pages.
- Schieler, C. S. *Ecclesiastical Liberalism and the Free Religious Communities*. Reprinted from the Report of the Fifth International Congress for Free Christianity and Religious Progress, Berlin, 1910. London: Williams & Norgate, 1911. 10 pages. 6d.
- Schrempf, Christof. *What We Want, a Confession, No Programme*. London: Williams & Norgate, 1911. 13 pages. 6d.
- Weinel, Heinrich. *Theological Study and the Church*. Reprinted from the Report of the Fifth Universal Congress for Free Christianity and Religious Progress, Berlin, 1910. 10 pages. 6d.
- COMPARATIVE RELIGION**
- Brooke, Mrs. A. Amy. *The Eucharist: A Study*. London: David Nutt, 1910. 24 pages. 6s.
- Lhotzky, Heinrich. *God and the Religions*. London: Williams & Norgate, 1911. 13 pages. 6d.
- The Unity of Religions. A Popular Discussion of Ancient and Modern Beliefs*. Edited by J. Herman Randall and J. Gardner Smith. New York: Crowell & Co., 1911. 362 pages. \$2.
- von Orelli, Conrad. *Allgemeine religionsgeschichte*. Zweite Auflage in zwei Bänden. Bonn: Marcus & Weber, 1911. 96 pages.
- MISCELLANEOUS**
- Boudinhon, A. *La question de Lorette. A propos d'un livre récent*. Paris: Letouzey et Ane, 1910. 48 pages.
- Cushman, Herbert Ernest. *A Beginner's History of Philosophy*. Vol. II. *Modern Philosophy*. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin Co., 1911. xvii+377 pages. \$1.60.
- Essays in Modern Theology and Related Subjects*. Gathered and Published as a Testimonial to Charles Augustus Briggs, D.D., D.Litt., on the completion of his seventieth year, by a few of his Pupils, Colleagues, and Friends. New York: Scribner, 1911. xvi+347 pages. \$2.50.
- Fite, Warner. *Individualism. Four Lectures on the Significance of Consciousness for Social Relations*. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1911. xix+301 pages. \$1.80.
- Franklin, Charles. *What Nature Is. An Outline of Scientific Naturalism*. Boston: Sherman, French & Co., 1911. 74 pages. \$0.75.
- Fünfter Weltkongress für freies Christentum und religiösen Fortschritt*. Protokoll der Verhandlungen. Erster Band. Herausgegeben von Max Fischer und Friedrich Michael Schiele. Berlin: Protestantischer Schriftenvertrieb, 1910. 349 pages. M. 7.50.
- Hastings, James (Editor). *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*. Vol. III. *Burial-Confessions*. New York: Scribner, 1911. 901 pages. \$5.
- Lewis, Abram H. *Spiritual Sabbathism*. Plainfield, N.J.: American Sabbath Tract Soc., 1910. xvi+223 pages.
- Patten, Simon N. *The Social Basis of Religion*. American Social Progress Series. New York: Macmillan, 1911. xviii+247 pages. \$1.25.
- Perriollat, Ch. *Chrétien et philosophe. Essai de philosophie religieuse*. Paris: Bloud et Cie, 1910. 515 pages.
- Podmore, Frank. *The Newer Spiritualism*. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1911. 320 pages.
- Religious Progress*, Berlin, 1910. London: Williams & Norgate, 1911. 9 pages. 6d.
- The Methodist Year Book*, 1911. New York: Eaton & Mains, 1911. 256 pages. \$0.20.
- Theologische Studien VI*. Utrecht: Kemink & Zoon, 1910. 415-67 pages.

# THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY

Volume XV

JULY, 1911

Number 3

## THE "TWO NATURES" AND RECENT CHRISTOLOGICAL SPECULATION

### I. THE CHRISTOLOGY OF THE NEW TESTAMENT WRITINGS

---

BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD

Princeton Theological Seminary, Princeton, N.J.

---

One of the most portentous symptoms of the decay of vital sympathy with historical Christianity which is observable in present-day academic circles is the widespread tendency in recent Christological discussion to revolt from the doctrine of the Two Natures in the Person of Christ. The significance of this revolt becomes at once apparent, when we reflect that the doctrine of the Two Natures is only another way of stating the doctrine of the Incarnation; and the doctrine of the Incarnation is the hinge on which the Christian system turns. No Two Natures, no Incarnation; no Incarnation, no Christianity in any distinctive sense. Nevertheless, voices are raised all about us declaring the conception of two natures in Christ no longer admissible; and that very often with full appreciation of the significance of the declaration.

Thus, for example, Johannes Weiss tells us that it is unthinkable that Godhood and manhood should be united in a single person walking upon the earth; that, while no doubt men of ancient time could conceive "that a man might really be an incarnate deity," modern men feel much too strongly the impassable barrier which separates the divine and the human to entertain such a

notion.<sup>1</sup> And Paul Wilhelm Schmiedel pronounces it "simply impossible," now that they have awakened to inquire "what is psychologically possible and impossible," for men to submit any longer to a demand that does such violence at once to their intelligence and to their religious experience as the demand "that they should embrace the idea of a perfect God and a perfect Man as united in the one and indivisible Person of a Savior whom they are longing to revere." Accordingly, since the divine and human nature cannot be united in Jesus, and since "Jesus was undoubtedly man," he continues, we have simply to regard him as man and nothing more.<sup>2</sup> Coming nearer home, William Adams Brown declares that men are no longer to be satisfied with "the old conception of Christ as a being of two natures, one divine and one human, dwelling in a mysterious union, incapable of description, within the confines of a single personality." Such a conception, he thinks, fails to "do justice to the genuine humanity of Jesus," who "shares our limitations"; and supposes "an impassable gulf between God and man" which requires "a miracle" to bridge it. The only "incarnation" which is real, he asserts, concerns not "a single instance," but the eternal entrance of God "into humanity."<sup>3</sup> These are but examples of numerous deliverances which may differ from one another in the clearness with which they announce the consequences, but do not differ in the decisiveness with which they reject the doctrine of the Two Natures.<sup>4</sup>

The violence of the revolution which is thus attempted is somewhat obscured by the bad habit, which is becoming common, of speaking of the doctrine of the Two Natures as in some sense the creation of the Chalcedonian fathers. Even Albert Schweitzer permits himself to write:

When at Chalcedon the West overcame the East, its doctrine of the two Natures dissolved the unity of the Person and thereby cast off the last possibility of a return to the historical Jesus. The self-contradiction was elevated

<sup>1</sup> *Christus: Die Anfänge des Dogmas* (1909), 88.

<sup>2</sup> *Jesus or Christ?* Being the *Hibbert Journal* Supplement for 1909, p. 66.

<sup>3</sup> *Methodist Quarterly Review*, Nashville, Tenn., 1911, p. 44.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. how the subject is dealt with in such widely read dogmatic treatises as Julius Kaftan's *Dogmatik*<sup>1</sup>, 4. (1901), §§ 42, 44 ff.; and F. A. B. Nitzsch's *Lehrbuch der evangelischen Dogmatik* (1892), §§ 43 ff.

into a law. . . . This dogma had first to be shattered before men could once more go out in quest of the historical Jesus, before they could even grasp the thought of his existence.<sup>5</sup>

By "the historical Jesus" is here meant the merely human Jesus; and it is quite true that the doctrine of the Two Natures interposes an insuperable obstacle to the recognition of such a Jesus as the real Jesus. There is a sense also in which it may be truly said that at Chalcedon the West impressed on the East its long-established doctrine of the Two Natures—a doctrine which had been fully formulated in the West from at least the time of Tertullian. But by this very token it is clear that the doctrine decreed at Chalcedon was nothing new; and if, as is often the case,<sup>6</sup> the further suggestion is conveyed that what was new in it was the "Two Natures" itself, the perversion becomes monstrous.

It was no part of the task of the fathers at Chalcedon to invent a new doctrine, and the doctrine which they formulated had no single new element in it. Least of all was the doctrine of the Two Natures itself new. No one of the disputants in the long series of controversies which led up to Chalcedon, any more than in the equally long series of controversies which led down from it, cherished the least doubt of this doctrine—not even Arius, and certainly not Apollinaris, or Nestorius, or Eutyches, or any of the great Monophysite or Monothelite leaders, or any of their opponents. The doctrine of the Two Natures formed the common basis on which all alike stood; their differences concerned only the quality or integrity of the two natures united in the one person, or the character or effects of the union by which they were brought together. It was the adjustment of these points of difference alone with which the council was concerned, or rather, to speak more precisely, the authoritative determination of the range within which such attempted adjustments might be tolerated in a church calling itself Christian.

It was not to the fourth-century fathers alone, however, that

<sup>5</sup> *The Quest of the Historical Jesus*, E.T., 1910, p. 3.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. J. Weiss, *Christus*, usw. (1909), 88: "A series of inexpressibly complicated and supremely unhappy controversies attached itself to this, until the famous compromise formula [*Beschwichtigungsformel*] of one person in two natures was discovered, which no matter how acutely it may be elaborated can never give satisfaction."

the doctrine of the Two Natures was "given." There never was a time when it was not the universal presupposition of the whole attitude, intellectual and devotional alike, of Christians to their Lord. The term *δύο οὐσῆαι* may first occur in extant writings in a fragment of Melito's of Sardis<sup>7</sup> (Tertullian, *duae substantiae*; Origen and later writers generally, *δύο φύσεις*). But the thing goes back to the beginning.<sup>8</sup> When we read, for example, in Clement of Rome's Letter to the Corinthians, in a passage (xvi) containing echoes of Heb. 1:8 and Phil. 2:6, that "the Scepter of the Majesty of God, our Lord Jesus Christ, came not in the pomp of arrogance or pride—though he could well have done that—but in lowliness of mind," or in a passage (xxxii) manifestly reminiscent of Rom. 9:5, that "the Lord Jesus," . . . that Lord Jesus to whom the highest predicates are ascribed (as e.g. in xxxvi)—is "according to the flesh," "of Jacob," the two natures are as plainly presupposed as they are openly asserted in such Ignatian passages as: "There is one only Healer, fleshly and spiritual, generate and ingenerate, God in man, true life in death, both of man and of God, first passible and then impassible, Jesus Christ our Lord" (Eph. 7:2), or: "For our God, Jesus Christ, was borne in the womb of Mary, according to a dispensation, of the seed of David, indeed, but also of the Holy Spirit" (18:2). Adolf Harnack, it is true, has made a brilliant attempt to distinguish "adoptionist" as well as "pneumatic" Christologies underlying the Christian tradition. But he has felt himself compelled notably to qualify his original representation;<sup>9</sup> while F. Loofs has quite properly permitted the whole notion to drop out of sight;<sup>10</sup> and R. Seeberg has solidly refuted it.<sup>11</sup> To discover a one-natured Christ, we must turn to the outlawed sects of the Docetists on the one hand, and the Ebionites with their successors, the Dynamistic Montanists, on the other. Whatever else the church brought with it out of the apostolic age, it emerged from that, its formative, epoch with so firm a faith in

<sup>7</sup> Fragment VI, Otto, IX, p. 416.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. F. Loofs, *Herzog*<sup>3</sup>, IV, 36, 37: "Melito spoke of *δύο οὐσῆαι* in Christ. The tradition of Asia Minor supplied to him the materials for this: the formula was not derived from it by Melito."

<sup>9</sup> *Grundriss*<sup>4</sup>, 44, note.

<sup>10</sup> *Herzog*<sup>3</sup>, IV, 23 ff.

<sup>11</sup> *Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte*<sup>2</sup> (1908), I, 104 ff.

the Two Natures of its Lord as to be incapable of wavering. "Perfect man"<sup>12</sup> it knew him to be. But the exhortation of Christians to one another ran in such strains as we find in the opening words of the earliest Christian homily that has come down to us: "Brethren, thus ought we to think of Jesus Christ—as of God, as of Judge of quick and dead";<sup>13</sup> and so exhorting one another, they naturally were known to their heathen observers precisely as worshipers of Christ.<sup>14</sup> So fixed in the Christian consciousness was the conception of the Two Natures of the Savior, that nothing could dislodge it. We shall have to come down to the radical outbreak which accompanied the Reformation—Trancendental or Socinian—for the first important defection from it after the early Dynamistic Monarchianism; and it was not until the rise in the eighteenth century of the naturalistic movement known as the Enlightenment that there was inaugurated any widespread revolt from it. It is under the influence of this revolt, which has not yet spent its force, that so many "moderns" have turned away from the doctrine as "impossible."

The constancy with which the church has confessed the doctrine of the Two Natures finds its explanation in the fact that this doctrine is intrenched in the teaching of the New Testament. The Chalcedonian Christology, indeed, in its complete development is only a very perfect synthesis of the biblical data. It takes its starting-point from the New Testament as a whole, thoroughly trusted in all its declarations, and seeks to find a comprehensive statement of the scriptural doctrine of the Person of Christ, which will do full justice to all the elements of its representation. The eminent success which it achieves in this difficult undertaking is due to the circumstance that it is not the product of a single mind working under a "scientific" impulse, that is to say, with purely theoretical intent, but of the mind, or rather the heart, of the church at large searching for an adequate formulation of its vital faith, that is to say, of a large body of earnest men distributed through a long stretch of time, and living under very

<sup>12</sup> Ignatius, *ad Symrn.* IV, 2, *ad fin.*; Zahn compares the fragment of Melito's alluded to above (n. 7): *θεός γὰρ ὢν ὁμοῦ τε καὶ ἀνθρώπος τέλειος ὁ αὐτός.*

<sup>13</sup> 2 Clem. Rom. I, 1.

<sup>14</sup> Plin., *Ep.* x. 96: "carmenque Christo quasi deo dicere secum invicem."



varied conditions, each passionately asserting, and seeking to have justice accorded to, elements of the biblical representation which particularly "found" him. The final statement is not a product of the study, therefore, but of life; and was arrived at, externally considered, through protracted and violent controversies, during the course of which every conceivable construction of the biblical data had been exploited, weighed, and its elements of truth sifted out and preserved, while the elements of error which deformed it were burned up as chaff in the fires of the strife. To the onlooker from this distance of time, the main line of the progress of the debate takes on an odd appearance of a steady zigzag advance. Arising out of the embers of the Arian controversy, there is first vigorously asserted, over against the reduction of our Lord to the dimensions of a creature, the pure deity of his spiritual nature (Apollinarianism); by this there is at once provoked, in the interests of the integrity of our Lord's humanity, the equally vigorous assertion of the completeness of his human nature as the bearer of his deity (Nestorianism); this in turn provokes, in the interests of the oneness of his Person, an equally vigorous assertion of the conjunction of these two natures in a single individuum (Eutychianism): from all of which there gradually emerges at last, by a series of corrections, the balanced statement of Chalcedon, recognizing at once in its "without confusion, without conversion, eternally and inseparably" the union in the Person of Christ of a complete deity and a complete humanity, constituting a single person without prejudice to the continued integrity of either nature. The pendulum of thought had swung back and forth in ever-decreasing arcs, until at last it found rest along the line of action of the fundamental force. Out of the continuous controversy of a century there issued a balanced statement in which all the elements of the biblical representation were taken up and combined. Work so done is done for all time; and it is capable of ever-repeated demonstration that in the developed doctrine of the Two Natures (as it is worked out with marvelous insight and delicate precision in such a presentation of it as is given, say, in the *Admonitio Christiana*, 1581, written chiefly by Zacharias Ursinus and published in his works) and in it alone, all the biblical data are brought

together in a harmonious statement, in which each receives full recognition, and out of which each may derive its sympathetic exposition. This key unlocks the treasures of the biblical instruction on the Person of Christ as none other can, and enables the reader as he currently scans the sacred pages to take up their declarations as they meet him, one after the other, into an intelligently consistent conception of his Lord.

The key which unlocks so complicated a lock can scarcely fail to be its true key. And the argument may be turned around. That all the varied representations concerning our Lord's Person contained in the New Testament fall into harmony under the ordering influence of so simple a hypothesis as that of the Two Natures, authenticates these varying representations as each a fragment of a real whole. It were inconceivable that so large a body of different and sometimes apparently divergent data could synthesize in so simple a unifying conception, were they not component elements of a unitary reality. And this consideration is greatly strengthened by the manner in which these differing or sometimes even apparently divergent data are distributed through the New Testament. They are not parceled out severally to the separate books, the composition of different writers, so that one set of them is peculiar to one writer or to one set of writers, and a set of different import peculiar to another writer or set of writers. They are, rather, pretty evenly distributed over the face of the New Testament, and the most different or apparently divergent data are found side by side in the writings of the same author or even in the same writing. The doctrine of the Two Natures is not merely a synthesis of all the data concerning the Person of Christ found in the New Testament; it is the doctrine of each of the New Testament books in severalty. There is but one doctrine of the Person of Christ inculcated or presupposed by all the New Testament writers without exception. In this respect the New Testament is all of a piece. Book may differ from book in the terms in which it gives expression to the common doctrine, or in the fulness with which it develops its details, or with which it draws out its implications. But all are at one in the inculcation or presupposition of the common doctrine of the Two Natures.

It has no doubt required some time for the critical study of the New Testament writings to arrive solidly at this conclusion. But it is at this conclusion, it may fairly be said, that the critical study of the New Testament has at length arrived. The day is gone by in which a number of mutually exclusive Christologies could be ascribed to the writers of the New Testament and set over against one another in crass contradiction. Nowadays, the New Testament is admitted to be Christologically much on a level, and though we still hear of a pre-Pauline, a Pauline, and a post-Pauline Christology, this very phraseology shows the dominance of a single type, and the boundary lines which separate even the varieties which are thus suggested are very indistinct. There are in fact next to no pre-Pauline writings in the New Testament, and therefore no pre-Pauline Christologies are taught in it; and though there are writings in the New Testament which in point of chronological sequence are post-Pauline, it is only with much ado that a post-Pauline Christology in the proper sense of the term can be even plausibly discovered in it. F. C. Baur discriminated three sharply divergent types of Christology among the New Testament writers. To the Synoptists Christ was a mere man, endowed with the Holy Spirit as Messiah; to Paul he was still a man but a deified man; to John he was a God incarnated in a human body. We have to travel far from this before we reach, say, Johannes Weiss. To Weiss the whole New Testament is written under the influence of Paul who introduced the Logos Christology. Before Paul, men indeed thought of Christ as a deified man; but no New Testament book is written from this standpoint. After Paul, some explication of what is already implicit in Paul took place; but the general lines laid down by Paul are only deepened, not departed from. The Christologies of Peter, Paul, and John are still distinguished; but the distinctions are posited on little or no differences in recorded utterances.

The difficulty in discovering a substantial difference between the Christologies of Paul and John, for example, is fairly illustrated by the straits to which so acute a writer as Johannes Weiss is brought in the effort to establish one. The only such difference he is able to suggest is that the superhuman Being whose incarnation

constituted the Two-Natured Christ believed in by both writers alike, is, with Paul, though divine in his nature, yet of subordinate rank to the supreme God, while with John he is the supreme God himself. Unfortunately, however (or, rather, fortunately), when Paul speaks of the superhuman element in the person of his Lord, he does not hesitate to declare him the supreme God in the most exalted sense, and that in language which, for clearness and emphasis, leaves nothing for John to add to it.

He does this, for example, in Rom. 9:5, where he describes Christ as to his higher nature in these great words: *ὁ ὢν ἐπὶ πάντων θεὸς εὐλογητὸς εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας, ἀμήν*. It is instructive to observe how Johannes Weiss deals with such a passage. He is arguing that Paul carefully avoids calling Christ by the high name of "God," although he places Him as "Lord" by the side of God (I Cor. 3:23, 8:6); and he adds:<sup>15</sup>

It is, then, very remarkable that in the present text of Rom. 9:5 there stands the following doxology, which can be referred only to Christ: "He who is God over all, be blessed for ever." If *κύριος* had stood here we should not have been surprised; that the text should, however, ascribe to Him here a predicate which puts Him altogether in God's place—without any indication of subordination—is inconceivable. Accordingly it has been rightly assumed that there is a textual corruption here. It is undoubtedly genuine, however, when, in John 20:28, Thomas exclaims to the resurrected Christ: "My Lord and my God." So also Christ is called God in I John 5:20 and Titus 2:13. This is accordant with the dominant Hellenistic mode of thought in these late New Testament writings. The strictly Jewish foundation of the oldest Christianity is no longer so strong; feeling is no longer shocked by the appearance by the side of God of a second Godhead.

Needless to say, however, there is not a scintilla of evidence of textual corruption in Rom. 9:5; corruption is assumed solely because the assertion of the passage does not fit in with the lowered Christology which Weiss would fain assign to Paul. The allusion to previous writers who have assumed corruption is doubtless to the recent attempt<sup>16</sup> to revive an old emendation proposed by the Socinian controversialists, J. Schlichting and J. Crell. The suggestion is that the words *ὁ ὢν* be transposed, so as to read

<sup>15</sup> *Christus* (1909), 29.

<sup>16</sup> J. Lepsius, *Das Reich Christi* (1904); Strömann, ZNTW (1907), 319; (1908), 80 (A. Bischoff).

ὦν ὁ (Hoekstra would be satisfied with the simple omission of the ὁ).<sup>17</sup> Thus it is thought the last clause of the passage would be brought into parallelism with its predecessors, and the whole would rise to its climax in the assertion that not only do the fathers belong to the Jews, and not only has the Christ (as regards the flesh) sprung from them, but to them belongs also the supreme God himself who is blessed forevermore, Amen. The mere statement of the proposal surely is its sufficient refutation. The variation of the construction in the instance of the Christ from ὦν to ἐξ ὦν, and the limitation of even this assertion with respect to him to his flesh (τὸ κατὰ σάρκα) render the adjunction of such a clause as the reconstructed form gives us simply incredible. Should Paul, after refusing to declare their own Messiah to belong distinctively to the Jews and carefully limiting his relation to them to merely that of issuing from them—and that, only “according to the flesh”—immediately assert with climactic emphasis that the supreme and eternal God himself is their peculiar possession? “Is he the God of the Jews only and not also of the Gentiles?” Paul asks in the same broad context (Rom. 3:29), and answers with emphasis, “Yes, of the Gentiles also”; and by that answer advertises to us that he could not have written here, in his enumeration of the distinctive privileges of the Jews, that “theirs is the God over all, blessed forever.” The resort to textual emendation to ease the pressure of the passage fails, thus, as dismally as, according to Weiss’s own confession, the more common resort to artificial exegesis of it fails—whether this follows the older methods of varying merely the punctuation so as to throw the obnoxious clause into innocuous isolation as an interjected doxology to God, or the new suggestion of F. C. Burkitt which would take the ὁ ὦν as the Tetragrammaton itself, and read the whole passage as not “description but ascription”—a protestation, calling the Eternal to witness the sincerity of Paul’s great asseveration.<sup>18</sup> It is at least a healthful sign of the times

<sup>17</sup> Cf. W. C. van Manen, *Conjecturaal-kritiek* toegepast op den Tekst van de Schriften des Nieuwen Testaments (1880), 262. Van Manen wonders that no one, instead of *θεὸς* has read *ὁ* after the analogy of I Tim. 3:16; but that would scarcely (here any more than at I Tim. 3:16) mend the matter. Christ would remain *ὁ ἐκ πάντων* and be *εὐλογητὸς εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας*; and these predicates import deity at its height.

<sup>18</sup> JTS, V, 451-55.

when Weiss discards all such artificial exegesis; we may even hope that the day has dawned when it is no longer possible.<sup>19</sup> It is mere matter of fact that Paul, speaking distinctly οὐ κατὰ τιμήν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ φύσιν, as the contrast with τὸ κατὰ σάρκα shows, designates Christ here "God over all, blessed forever." It were well for us to adjust our theories to this plain fact and cease to endeavor to brush the fact out of the way of our theories.

Why so much zeal and ingenuity should be expended in attempting to vacate this declaration of its plain meaning, it is meanwhile a little difficult to comprehend. If it stood alone among Paul's utterances<sup>20</sup> it might be natural for those who wish to attribute

<sup>19</sup> C. Clemen, *Religionsgeschichtliche Erklärung des N.T.* (1909), 262-63, writes: "If even Jesus himself already exalted himself above the measure of other men by his proclamation of his return to judgment, and this happened to a still greater extent in the primitive Christian community, yet it was Paul who first designates him as the Lord in whom all things consist, and not only sets him side by side with God, but—according to the much more probable interpretation of Rom. 9:5—even gives him the very name." Even when the reference to Christ is denied, it is frequently admitted that the exegetical considerations favor it. Thus, M. Brückner, *Die Entstehung der paulinischen Christologie* (1903), 67, allows that "exegetically the reference to Christ is almost necessary," though, pleading that "grammatical exegesis cannot always be permitted to give the decision," he decides against it, on the strange ground that it is "precisely here out of place to emphasize the divine nature of Christ," as if the fact that the possession of divine nature by the Messiah who issued from them was not the Jews' supreme glory! Similarly, Robert B. Drummond writes (*The Academy*, March 30, 1895, No. 1195, p. 273): "I must confess that I feel very strongly the grammatical difficulty of the Unitarian interpretation, but, on the other hand, the improbability of Paul attributing not only deity, but supreme deity (ἐν παντί θεός) to Christ, seems to me so great as to outweigh all other considerations." Why, however, it should be thought "improbable" that Paul should attribute to Christ in terms the supreme deity he everywhere accords him in fact does not appear; had Paul held Drummond's views concerning Christ it would have been a different matter. On Rom. 9:5 in general, see Dwight, *Journal of the Exegetical Society* (1881), 22, and Sanday-Headlam, Gifford, and Zahn, *in loco*.

<sup>20</sup> That it does stand alone in Paul's writings is, of course, the implication of Weiss, and is often explicitly asserted. Thus, for example, E. P. Gould, *The Biblical Theology of the New Testament* (1900), 93-94, reasons as follows: "All that can be said in favor of this interpretation, according to which Jesus is here called God, is that it is a natural interpretation, probably the natural explanation of the passage as it stands, supposing there is nothing against it. But on the other side is the fact that it stands absolutely alone in the Apostle's writings." Phil. 2:6 Gould interprets as implying that equality with God was something the preincarnate Christ did not possess but might conceivably aspire to (ἀρπαγμός, active). Colossians he denies to Paul.

another doctrine to him to seek to set it in some way aside. But so far from standing alone, it is but one of many declarations running through his epistles, to the same effect. There is Phil. 2:6, for example, where, beyond question, Christ Jesus is asserted to be "on an equality with God"<sup>21</sup>—an assertion, one would think, not easy to reconcile with the notion that he was a being definitely lower than God. Lietzmann seems therefore to speak very sensibly when he writes in his comment on Rom. 9:5: "Since Paul represents Christ in Phil. 2:6 as *ἴσα θεῷ* there is no reason why he should not, on occasion, call him directly *θεός*."<sup>22</sup> When he goes on, however, to say: "The decision here, as often, if we are not acting under dogmatic prejudices, is a matter of pure feeling; to me it seems that *ὁ ὢν ἐπὶ πάντων θεός* is more suitable for the 'Almighty God' the Father of Jesus," he seems to forget that his former remark forbids him to say this feeling could be operative with Paul—which is the only matter *ad rem*. That the writer of Phil. 2:6 might very well "on occasion" call Christ directly God is made even more clear by the circumstance that he does this very thing in this very passage, and that in the most emphatic manner possible. For that the representation of Christ Jesus as *ἐν μορφῇ θεοῦ ὑπάρχων* is precisely to call him God is evidenced not merely by the intimation which is immediately given that he who is "in the form of God" is "on an equality with God," but by the connotation of the phraseology itself. It is undeniable that in the philosophico-popular mode of speech here employed, "form" means just that body of characterizing qualities which makes anything the particular thing it is—in a word, its specific character.<sup>23</sup> To say that

<sup>21</sup> The interpretation (represented by E. P. Gould; see above n. 20; cf. also M. Brückner, *op. cit.*, 66 ff., who thinks the thing lacking to make Christ "equal with God" was only "the name and position of 'Lord'") which first insists on the active form of *ἀπραγμός* and then represents Christ's example as consisting on the negative side in a refusal to aspire to equality with God (Brückner even draws a parallel with Gen. 3:5-9) is certainly wrong. If *ἀπραγμός* is to be taken actively the only tolerable sense is something like that given it by J. Ross, JTS (1909), 573-74: Christ "did not think that to be on an equality with God spelled rapacity, plundering, self-aggrandizement," that is to say, did not treat the equality which he had with God as an opportunity for self-aggrandizement but made nothing of himself.

<sup>22</sup> *Handbuch zum N.T.*, in *loc.*

<sup>23</sup> Cf. J. B. Lightfoot, in *loc.*: "*μορφή* implies not the external accidents but the essential attributes"; "*μορφή* must apply to the attributes of the Godhead; in

Christ Jesus is<sup>24</sup> "in the form of God" is then to say not less but more than to say shortly that he is "God": for it is to emphasize the fact that he has in full possession and use all those characterizing qualities which make God the particular Being we call "God"; and this mode of expression, rather than the simple term "God," is employed here precisely because it was of the essence of the Apostle's purpose to keep his reader's mind on all that Christ was as God rather than merely on the abstract fact that he was God.

By the side of Phil. 2:6 there stands also Col. 2:9, where it is declared that in Christ "there dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead bodily," that is to say, in plain words, that Christ is an incarnation of the Godhead in all its fulness, which again is a statement rather difficult to harmonize with the notion that its author believed it was something less than God which was incarnated in Christ. And by the side of the whole series of such passages there stands the immense number of instances in which Christ is designated "Lord." For *κύριος* is not with Paul of lower connotation than *θεός*. Johannes Weiss does, indeed, in the passage we have quoted from him above,<sup>25</sup> suggest that if only it were *κύριος* instead of *θεός* which we found in Rom. 9:5 we should experience no surprise at the declaration and, presumably, feel no inclination to correct the text; the implication being that Paul might very well call Christ "Lord over all" but not "God over all." "Lord over all" would have meant, however, precisely what "God over all" means;<sup>26</sup> and it is singularly infelicitous other words, it is used in a sense substantially the same which it bears in Greek philosophy"; "this sense of *μορφή* as the specific character."

<sup>24</sup> This is the right tense: for *ὑπάρχων* is not a past participle; and hence already involves that continuance of Jesus "in the form of God" after as well as before he had assumed "the form of a servant," which is one of the chief implications of the whole passage. There is here, in other words, as often in Paul, an explicit assertion of the Two Natures. Cf. E. H. Gifford, *The Incarnation*, 1897.

<sup>25</sup> P. 345.

<sup>26</sup> Peter is reported in Acts 10:36 as declaring that Jesus Christ is "Lord of all" and this high designation is sustained by the further announcement in 10:42 that he has been "ordained of God to be the judge of quick and dead," a purely divine function. How, then, can it be said, as is often said, as, e.g., by Schmiedel (*Jesus or Christ?* 62), that in Acts 10:38, lying between these two statements of express deity, there "is expressed with noteworthy clearness" the notion that Jesus "had been a man who differed from others merely by reason of being endowed with divine power"? On the



tous to give the impression that Paul in currently speaking of Christ as "Lord" placed him on a lower plane than God. Paul's intention was precisely the opposite, viz., to put him on the same plane with God; and accordingly it is as "Lord" that all divine attributes and activities are ascribed to Christ and all religious emotions and worship are directed to him. In effect, the Old Testament divine names, Elohim on the one hand, and Jehovah and Adhonai on the other, are in the New Testament distributed between God the Father and God the Son with as little implication of difference in rank here as there. "Lord," in a word, is Paul's divine name for Christ; is treated by him as Christ's proper name—as, in fact, what can scarcely be called anything else than his inter-trinitarian name and, in this technical sense, his "personal" name. Accordingly Paul does not enumerate the Persons of the Trinity as our Lord is reported as doing (Matt. 28:19), according to their relations to one another, "Father, Son, and Spirit," but according to his own relation to each in turn, as God, the Lord, the Spirit: "the grace of the Lord Jesus Christ, and the love of God, and the communion of the Holy Spirit be with you all" (II Cor. 13:13). The only distinction which can be discerned between "God" and "Lord" in his usage of the terms is a distinction not in relative dignity, but in emphasis on active sovereignty. "God" is, so to speak, a term of pure exaltation; "Lord" carries with it more expressly the idea of sovereign rulership in actual exercise. It is probable that Paul's appropriation specifically of the divine designation "Lord" to Christ was in part at least occasioned by his conviction that he, as God-man, has become the God of providence in whose hand is the kingdom, to "reign until he hath put

meaning of "Lord of all" compare G. Dalman, *Der Gottesname Adonai* (1889), 83. Referring to the use of the term "Lord" by Luke to characterize Christ, he writes: "It is the same that Paul uses in Phil. 2:11 where Jesus appears as the Lord to be recognized in heaven and earth and beneath the earth in a position in which the Old Testament knows God alone. Jesus is here the *ἀδωναι κύριος* of Acts 10:36 (cf. *קִרְיָ אֲדֹנָי* of God, Talm. Nedarim, 22b) which does not lie far from the *ἐνι ἀδωναι θεός* of Rom. 9:5." Dalman goes on, to be sure, to say that "the Apostles would have shrunk from designating Jesus by the Hebrew *אֲדֹנָי* or *יְהוָה*, since these expressions too closely recalled the *θεός ἀπάτος*, and that only Thomas' confession (John 20:28) 'treads on the boundary line here'; but these remarks are only the unauthorized expressions of Dalman's own prejudices.

all his enemies under his feet" (I Cor. 15:24, etc.; cf. Phil. 2:9 ff.), or, as it is expressed with great point and fulness in Eph. 1:20-23, He has been seated on the right hand of God, far above any conceivable power and made head over all things for his church. In a word, the term "Lord" seems to have been specifically appropriated to Christ not because it is a term of function rather than of dignity, but because along with the dignity it emphasizes also function.

All this is, of course, well known to Johannes Weiss. He writes:<sup>27</sup>

To expound the religious significance which the use of the name "Lord" had for the early Christians, the whole New Testament would need to be transcribed. For in the formula "our Lord Jesus Christ" the essence of the primitive religion is contained. Obedient subjection, reverence, and holy dread of offending him, a complete sense of dependence on him for all things ("if the Lord will," I Cor. 4:19), gratitude and love and trust—in short, everything that man can feel in the presence of God—comes to expression in this term. We can best perceive this in the benedictions at the opening of the epistles. Here "grace and peace" are invoked or desired "from God the Father and the Lord Jesus Christ." What is looked for from God can also be granted by the Lord. This inclusion of God and Christ in a single view which corresponds precisely with their coenthronement is characteristic of the piety of primitive Christianity. As Christians cry "Abba Father" and pray to him, so there can be no doubt that they also "prayed" in the strict sense of the word to Christ, not only in loyal adoration, but also in the form of petition. We have particular instances of this "calling on the Lord" (Rom. 10:12) in Paul (II Cor. 12:8) and in Stephen (Acts 7:60). But such prayers were certainly made infinitely more often. Christians stand, therefore, in point of fact, over against Christ, as over against God (cf. 2 Clem. 1:1).

And again, from Phil. 2:9 ff. as a starting-point:<sup>28</sup>

Now not only is this word (*κύριος*) known in the general language of Hellenisticism, but it has a special history in the peculiar region of Jewish Hellenisticism. The Jews were taught to substitute for the proper name of God, Jahwe, in the sacred text the expression Adonai (Lord). The Greek translators of the Old Testament were acting in the correct Jewish fashion when they replaced the name יְהוָה by *κύριος*, the frequently occurring combination יְהוָה הָאֱלֹהִים by *κύριος ὁ θεός* that is, exactly, "Lord, the God" (so also, Luke 1:32, 68, etc.). The *κύριος* without an article is felt almost as a proper name. When Luther represents it by "God, the Lord," it is on the contrary "God" that he feels as a proper name. It is from this that the passage in the Epistle to the Philippians may be understood—all the more that there

<sup>27</sup> *Christus*, usw. (1909), 24-25.

<sup>28</sup> *Christus*, usw. (1909), 27.

is a reminiscence here of passages like Isa. 42:8, 45:23: "I am κύριος ὁ θεός, this is my name, my honor will I not give to another"; "to me shall every knee bow and every tongue confess God." This name which God jealously guards as his own prerogative, he has now ceded to Christ, and has thereby publicly proclaimed that all beings shall bow to him and acknowledge him Lord. The transference of the name signifies, according to ancient usage, endowment with the power which the name designates. This passage is only another declaration of the transference to him by God of sovereignty over the world, of His constitution as "Lord of Lords and King of Kings." Thus the content of this passage coalesces in substance with what is said in Acts 2:36 and intimated in I Cor. 8:5. But whereas it is there to be understood that Christ alone rightly bears the name of κύριος, there is this much more intimated here—that κύριος is not merely a general designation of honor but the name of God become almost Christ's proper name. By this Christ is not merely elevated into a generally divine region; He takes the very place of the omnipotent God. Here, accordingly, κύριος cannot in any case have a weaker meaning than θεός.

Despite, however, such a clear perception of the high connotation of κύριος in the case of Paul (and the whole primitive Christian community), Johannes Weiss endeavors to interpret it, on Paul's lips, as expressive of something short of "God." He asserts (quite in the teeth of the facts, as we have seen) that Paul carefully avoids using the term "God" to denote Christ. Forgetting that with Paul, Christ (because—as nobody doubts—he is a two-natured person) is not only all that God is, but also all that man is, he appeals to I Cor. 3:23 to prove that Christ is dependent on God specifically with respect to his divine nature. He even points to I Cor. 8:6 as implying this manner of subordination. Let us, however, hear him fully on this latter passage. He writes:⁹

What Paul understands by the term "Lord" may be seen from I Cor. 8:5. When he here grants that there are, in point of fact, many (certainly only so-called) "Gods and Lords," he means to say that there exist many (in his view demonic) beings to whom men render worship and adoration, calling upon them as God or Lord. In contrast with these many "lords," particularly perhaps to emperor worship, Christians acknowledge and venerate only the *one* κύριος, Jesus Christ (cf. Deissmann, *Licht von Osten*, 233 ff.). It would not be impossible—though there is no way certainly to prove it—that in Paul's sense the predicate "Lords" stands a grade lower than "Gods," that he would recognize it as applied only to deified men, heroes, and gods of lower degree. In any event, speaking from the point of view of style, to the word "Gods" in

⁹ *Christus*, usw., 26.

vs. 5 the "God the Father" of vs. 6 corresponds; and to the word "Lords" the "Lord Jesus Christ." Now there can be no doubt (and precisely our passage gives a distinct proof of it) that what Paul seeks to do is, in spite of Christ's position by God's side, to subordinate him again to God (so, e.g., II Cor. 1:3 when he calls God not only the Father but also "the God of our Lord Jesus Christ": cf. Eph. 1:17; John 20:17). And thus it were possible that he took over all the more readily the name *κύριος* derived by him from the primitive community, because he could express by it, no doubt, the divine position of Christ and the divine veneration due to him, and yet draw a line by means of which the interval between Christ and God should remain protected.

It certainly is surprising to find Weiss suggesting here that Paul may be using the term "Lord" after a heathen fashion to designate only gods of lower degree; we have just seen him solidly proving that, in its application to Christ, at least, Paul employs it in a sense in which it is not capable of discrimination from "God." For the same reason it is surprising to find him suggesting here that one of Paul's motives in applying to Christ the term "Lord" may perhaps have been to avoid confounding him with God. And in view of Paul's doctrine of the Two Natures (which Weiss does not in the least question) it is still further surprising to find him adducing here the circumstance that Paul sometimes speaks of God as the "God," as well as the Father, "of our Lord Jesus Christ" as throwing doubt on his ascription of proper deity to Christ's divine nature—a procedure which one would think would have been rendered impossible by the circumstance (to which Weiss himself calls attention) that the same mode of speech occurs in John, where, at least, Weiss does not doubt Christ is simply God. Finally, how little I Cor. 8:5, 6 itself can be supposed to suggest the subordination of the "Lord" Jesus Christ as to His deity to "God" the Father, becomes evident at once on our noting that the two—the one Lord Jesus Christ and the one God the Father—are represented here as together constituting that God of which it is emphatically declared there is but one. For it is precisely in exposition of his energetic assertion in verse 4, in contradiction of all polytheistic points of view, that "there is no God, except *one*," that Paul declares that Christians recognize that there is only "one God the Father and one Lord Jesus Christ." By as much as it is certain that he did not intend to represent the

Christians themselves as polytheists, worshiping, like the rest, deity in grades, but, in contrast with all polytheists, as worshipers of but one Deity, it is clear that he did not intend to assign to Christ the position of a secondary deity. Obviously to him the "one God the Father" and "the one Lord Jesus Christ" were in some high and true sense alike included in that one God who alone is recognized as existing.

This energetic assertion of monotheism by Paul, combined with a provision within it for at least some kind of dualism, leads us to revert for a moment to the closing clauses of the first extract we quoted from Johannes Weiss.<sup>30</sup> There Weiss, having recognized for the Johannine writings and the Pastoral Epistles<sup>31</sup>—what he would not recognize for Paul—that in them Christ is directly called "God" with the fullest meaning, seeks to account for this by suggesting that these "late New Testament writings" may have lapsed from the strictness of Jewish monotheism under the influence of Hellenistic modes of thought, and thus have been enabled to place a second God by the side of God the Father in a sense still impossible to Paul. On the face of it, however, it certainly does not appear that there has been any falling away from the highest monotheism in their case; monotheism is rather the presupposition of all their teaching (John 5:44; 17:3; I Tim. 1:17, 25; 6:15). It is Weiss's method which is again at fault. Whatever con-

<sup>30</sup> Above, p. 345.

<sup>31</sup> For Weiss treats the Pastoral Epistles together as the work of one author, described as "a pupil of Paul." Even in their case, however, though admitting their high Christology, Weiss throws out a gratuitous expression of doubt as to the integrity of the text in which this high Christology finds its most precise expression. He writes (*Christus*, usw., 68-69; Schiele's *Religion* usw., I, col. 1733): "Although, therefore, the author energetically emphasizes that Jesus was *man*, he holds at the same time fast to his divine origin—yes (if we have the right text), he calls him (Tit. 2:13) precisely 'our great God and Savior, Jesus Christ.' But even if we must read or explain this text otherwise, there is *one* expression, which our author uses with predilection, that will give us light. He speaks (II Tim. 1:10) of the 'epiphany' of the Savior. Every Greek reader must have understood this well-known term in the sense that Jesus Christ is a God appearing in human form on earth. It was thus that the epiphany of a God was spoken of, when he appeared to men to command perhaps the building of a temple, or the establishment of a festival, or to confer benefactions: thus Antiochus IV of Syria was called 'Epiphanes' as a God walking on the earth; and so the expression on the lips of our author means just *the incarnation of a God*."

clusions may seem valid to him he obtrudes without more ado upon the New Testament writers, although their point of view obviously differs from his by a whole diameter. On his frankly Socinian postulates,<sup>32</sup> it may seem clear that where two are God there cannot be one God only. He therefore at once declares that the monotheism of John and the author of the Pastoral Epistles, who recognize at least two as God, is clearly falling into decay. But the Socinian postulates, dear to Weiss, have not determined the point of view of these writers! Their ascription of proper deity to Christ, therefore, in no wise imperils the purity of their monotheism; no monotheism, however strict, could inhibit the fullest recognition of the proper deity of Christ with writers whose fundamental thought runs on the lines on which their thought runs, and the ascription of a purer monotheism than theirs to Paul, on the ground that they look upon the deity of Christ as proper and supreme, is nothing but a gratuitous prejudicing of the case. In point of fact, Paul stands precisely on the same level with them as with respect to the doctrine of God, so with respect to the doctrine of Christ. Every line of his epistles is vocal with the cry of Thomas, "My Lord and my God"; for the Epistle to the Romans as truly as for the Epistle to Titus, Christ is "our great God and Savior"; to the Epistle to the Philippians as fully as to the First Epistle of John, Christ is "the true God," that is to say, he fills out and perfectly satisfies the whole idea of God—for that is as distinctly the connotation of *ὑπάρχων ἐν μορφῇ θεοῦ* as it is of *ὁ ἀληθινὸς θεός*.

The attempt to separate Paul's doctrine of Christ from John's as something essentially different, therefore, utterly fails. It is much more plausible to expound John's doctrine as a mere copy of Paul's. There is considerable appearance of reasonableness, for example, in P. Wernle's representation that the significance of

<sup>32</sup> Cf. his *Paulus und Jesus* (1909), 4-5, where, describing two forms of "Christianity," one of which is "Christ-religion" and worships Christ, and the other is "God-religion" and worships God alone, only permitting itself to be led by Jesus of Nazareth "to the Father," he adds: "I make no secret of my profession, in company with the majority of recent theologians, of the second of these views. . . . But as a historian I must declare it widely different from the dominant view of primitive Christianity, from the Pauline view."

John's Gospel consists merely in its "bridging the chasm between Jesus and Paul and transferring the Pauline gospel back into the discourses and life-delineation of Jesus."<sup>33</sup> Was it not precisely through this transposition, indeed, he asks, that Paulinism first attained to dominance in the church? The trouble with this representation, however, is twofold: it ascribes distinctively to Paul what was the common doctrine of the whole church; and it credits particularly to John a service which had already been rendered—if it needed to be rendered—by the Synoptics. For the difficulty of construing Paul's Christology in lower terms than that of John is fairly matched by the difficulty of construing the Christology of the other writers of the New Testament in lower terms than that of Paul. The attempt has most frequently been made with respect to the Synoptic Gospels, and among them probably most persistently with respect to Mark. We have often been told that in that "oldest of the Gospels"—the first attempt to sketch a narrative "life of Christ"—we have a portrait of the human Christ, unfalsified as yet by "dogmatic elements." From this ineptitude, it is to be hoped, we have now been conclusively delivered, more especially through its trenchant exposure by Wrede, who, whatever else he did, certainly made it abundantly clear that what we have in the Gospel of Mark is far from what has been called a "primitive document" presenting a "primitive" view of the Person of Christ.<sup>34</sup> The highest astonishment is accordingly being now expressed from every quarter that it could

<sup>33</sup> *Die Anfänge unserer Religion* (1904), 446-48. Wernle, of course, does not deny that certain "modifications" were made in Paul's doctrine when it was taken over by John. While the groundwork remains the same, yet in John the *life* of Christ among men comes more to its rights, alongside of his death, and is filled with a positive content of divine revelation. The sole *deviation* from Paul's point of view which he finds in John, however, is that the earthly life of Jesus is conceived by John more under the category of exaltation than of humiliation—and this came to John from the Synoptics. He is constrained to add, however: "It must be said, nevertheless, that the Pauline Christology harmonizes admirably with the Johannine supplement, and acquires by it its convincing power." Cf. the sound criticism of Wernle by Jules Lebreton, *Origines du dogme de la Trinité* (1910), 376: "There is, no doubt, between John and Paul, a basis of identical doctrine which has become the common doctrine of the church; but there are also in the case of each of them doctrinal aspects which are purely individual, and by which they are profoundly distinguished from one another."

<sup>34</sup> Wrede, *Das Messiasgeheimnis in den Evangelien* (1901).

ever have been imagined that documents written in "the sixties," or at least in "the fifties," could fail to reflect the high Christology which, as we know from Paul's letters, was at that time the established faith of the whole Christian community.<sup>35</sup> In any event the Christology of the Synoptic Gospels is indistinguishable from that of Paul, and this is as true of the Christology of Mark as of that of Matthew or of Luke. We do not ourselves look upon Mark as "the primitive Gospel";<sup>36</sup> we do not even subscribe to the now almost universal opinion that it is the earliest of our three Synoptics; we agree with Johannes Weiss in assigning it to 64-68 A.D., but for reasons of our own we place it quite at the end of this period; we agree with Harnack in thinking Luke certainly as old as this and much more likely as old as 63 A.D., or even as 58-60 A.D.; and Matthew, we are sure, is as old as Mark and may very well be as old as Luke; we should find no serious difficulty, indeed, in placing both Matthew and Luke early in the "fifties."

<sup>35</sup> So far, at least, agreement is perfect among writers otherwise of polar divergence. H. Bavinck (*Gereformeerde Dogmatiek*, III, 284) remarks: "It is the same Christ who meets us throughout the whole New Testament. How could it be otherwise? The Synoptic Gospels are just as truly apostolic writings as the letters of Paul and were written even later than Paul's letters; there is nowhere any suggestion of a controversy among the apostles over the Person of Christ." J. Weiss says of Mark's Gospel particularly (*Christus*, usw., 14): "That the evangelist takes his start from a distinct Christology is certain—how could it be otherwise with a writer who presupposes the work of Paul and is writing down after the death of the first apostolic generation the 'Gospel of Jesus Christ' for the practical use of the mission to the heathen?" And then of the Synoptics at large (p. 73): "None of their authors was an eye-witness and all belong to the second generation, whose care it was to preserve the precious possession which had been intrusted to it"; "they all start, with respect to the dogmatic-christological positions, no longer at the standpoint of the first community: the exaltation-Chistology has long [this in the fifties or sixties!] been transcended, and in its place there has stepped, as with Paul, the Incarnation-Chistology."

<sup>36</sup> Cf. J. Weiss, *Jesus von Nazareth* (1910), 135: "Mark is anything but a first draftsman of the tradition; he is rather an eclectic reworker of old traditions; his book is not a source but a receptacle (*Sammelbecken*)"; also, *Das älteste Evangelium* (1903), 1-4: "As firmly as I am convinced that we have in Mark the oldest Gospel, I can as little agree that it presents the first and original cast (*Niederschlag*) of the evangelical tradition. So far as I can judge, Mark is already a station on the road which ends in John's Gospel, not the commencement of that road. It is no longer a source but a receptacle (*Sammelbecken*). The tradition which precedes it and which has received literary form in it was no longer fluid and unfixed but had reached already a relatively fixed shape."



But the brevity, and, so to say, relative externality, of Mark naturally suggest it as the particular one of the Synoptics in which the Christology common to them all is likely to be expressed in, if not its lowest, yet at least its least-elaborated terms; and it is not unnatural, therefore, that it has been scrutinized with especial care with a view to determining the real nature of the synoptic conception of Christ. The result has been to make it perfectly plain that the Synoptic conception of the Person of Christ is just that doctrine of the Two Natures which, as we have seen, is given expression in Paul's epistles and is everywhere presupposed in them as the established faith of the Christians of the middle of the first century, and of any earlier date to which the retrospective testimony of this body of Epistles may be allowed to extend.

The Christology of the Gospel of Mark [writes Johannes Weiss]<sup>37</sup> is already given expression in the title: his gospel treats of Jesus Christ (the Son of God, in case these last words are genuine). . . . The particularly designating names of Jesus are for him "the Son of God" and "the Son of Man." When the evangelist so frequently places the latter of these in the mouth of Jesus as a self-designation, he thus betrays that he no longer possesses any sense of the suitability of this name exclusively for the heavenly Messiah, whether as pre-existent or as exalted. For him it is precisely the Jesus who walks the earth who is no other than the "heavenly Man," who came down from heaven, and has been again exalted to heaven (15:62), whence he is to come again in the clouds with great power and glory (13:26). Accordingly he makes Jesus call himself the Son of Man even when he is speaking of his earthly activity (2:10, 28; 10:45), of his sufferings (e.g., 8:31), and of his resurrection (9:9). He was in this already preceded by the Discourses-source (Matt. 11:9=Luke 7:34) and Matthew carried still farther this replacement of an "I" in the mouth of Jesus by "the Son of Man" (cf. Matt. 16:13 with Mark 8:27). This use of the name is an altogether sufficient proof that, just like Paul, Mark looked upon Jesus as the "Man" who came from heaven. Similarly it cannot be doubted that this post-Pauline writer understood, as Paul understood it, the name "Son of God," which stood perhaps in the title of his gospel as the most significant name of dignity—that is to say, not in the theocratic sense, examined above (pp. 19 ff.), of him who has been chosen and called to the messianic kingship, but (p. 34) of him who was the sole one among men that, of his nature, bears in himself the essence (*Wesen*) of God.

<sup>37</sup> *Christus*, usw., 75-76, and Schiele's *Religion* usw., I, coll. 1734-35; cf. the further discussion in *Das älteste Evangelium* (1903), 45 ff., 96 ff., where he particularly shows that from the christological doctrine of John "our Gospel of Mark does not stand far"; that "the Christology of Mark stands much nearer that of John than is commonly allowed," etc.

Of course Weiss would distinguish shades of view among the several writers—the authors of the Gospels severally and Paul—but his testimony to the main matter is quite distinct; that, in a word, to the author of Mark, as to all the others of these writers, Christ was, as he himself puts it, "a divine being 'incarnated'—we must already make use of this expression—in a man."<sup>38</sup> And it will be found impossible to make this divine being, with Mark any more than with Paul, anything less than the supreme God himself. When Mark records our Lord himself as testifying that he is, in the hierarchy of being, above even the angels, he places him outside the category of created beings; and there is no reason to doubt that with him as truly as with all his Jewish compatriots the Son of God which he repeatedly calls Jesus connoted, as John defines the phrase for us (5:18), just "equality with God."

It is not necessary to labor the point. It is undeniable that the Christ of the whole body of New Testament writers, without exception, is a Two-Natured Person—divine and human; and indeed this is scarcely any longer denied. Whatever attempts are still made to discriminate between the Christologies of the New Testament writers fall within the limits of this common doctrine. Wilhelm von Schnehen does not go one whit beyond the facts of the case when he declares,<sup>39</sup> no doubt after a fashion and with implications derived from his own point of view:

Go back into the history of Christianity as far as you will, you will nowhere find the least support for the notion that Jesus was revered on the ground of his purely human activity and attributes, say as the founder of a religion, as teacher of morals, or even only as religious-ethical example. Understand the content of the word "gospel" as you may, never has it to do with a mere "man" Jesus, never does it give to this the central place in Christian worship. For the glad-tidings of the Rabbi of Nazareth, even the adorers of his human personality will not in the end deny this. That it is valid also for the Gospel-writings of the New Testament is equally indubitable. The Jesus of which these writings tell us is through and through not a man but at the very least a super-man. Yes, he is more than that; he is the unique Son of God; the Christ, the coming God-man of the orthodox church. For the Fourth Gospel this is, of course, universally recognized; the Johannine Jesus is an incarnate creative word, the human manifestation of the "Logos," who from

<sup>38</sup> *Christus*, usw., 77.

<sup>39</sup> *Der moderne Jesuskultus* (1907), 10-11.

the beginning was with God and himself was God, whose divine glory was continuously apparent to his disciples, beneath its earthly shell. But the other Gospels also think of nothing so little as telling us of a mere "man" Jesus, and demanding a believing reverence for such a one. No, the miraculously begotten Son of the Virgin with Luke and Matthew, the Jesus who rose from the dead and ascended into heaven of the First and Third Gospels, is just as little a mere "natural man" as the Johannine Christ. And as regards finally the Gospel of Mark, Professor Bousset, for example, remarks: "It is already from the standpoint of faith that the oldest Gospel is written; already for Mark Jesus is not only the Messiah of the Jewish people but" (in consequence of the communication of the Spirit at the baptism!) "the miraculous, eternal Son of God whose glory shines into this world. And it has been rightly emphasized that in this respect our three first Gospels differ from the Fourth only in degree."

The comment which is made on this and similar utterances of recent radicalism, by Richard Grützmacher<sup>40</sup> is eminently justified:

The immense significance of this acknowledgment can be measured only by one who knows the unnumbered theological and extra-theological attempts of the last century and a half from the extremest left to far into the circle of the mediating theology to obtain from the New Testament itself, or at least from the three first Gospels, a purely human portrait of Jesus, and to eliminate all metaphysical and supernatural content from their expressions. The "modern" and the church interpretation of the New Testament at the beginning of the twentieth century—to which also in very large measure the later "Liberalism" gives its adhesion—is in complete accord in this result: that the church-doctrine of the God-man Christ can appeal with full right to the New Testament in its entire compass, and any development beyond that which has taken place is only formal. The allegorizing-dogmatic exegesis of the last hundred and fifty years has been transcended.<sup>41</sup>

That is to say, the doctrine of the Two Natures of Christ is not merely the synthesis of the teaching of the New Testament, but the conception which underlies every one of the New Testament writings severally; it is not only the teaching of the New Testament

<sup>40</sup> *Ist das liberale Jesusbild modern?* (1907), 29, 30.

<sup>41</sup> Grützmacher very properly, in a note (p. 30), cries out on "the marvelous anachronism and self-deception" of which Julius Kaftan is guilty when he represents that in the portrait of the God-man, "it is the unhistorical interpretation of the New Testament, dominated by ecclesiastical dogma, that is working" (*Jesus und Paulus*, 59). Over against this he sets A. Kalthoff (*Entstehung*, usw., 9): "From the ecclesiastical God-man there leads a straight line backward through the epistles and gospels of the New Testament to the Apocalypse of Daniel in which the ecclesiastical type of the portrait of Jesus took its beginning."

as a whole but of the whole of the New Testament, part by part. Historically, this means that not only has the doctrine of the Two Natures been the invariable presupposition of the whole teaching of the church from the apostolic age down, but all the teaching of the apostolic age rests on it as its universal presupposition. When Christian literature begins, this is already the common assumption of the entire church. If we wish to translate this into the terms of positive chronology, what must be said is that before the opening of the sixth decade of the first century (for we suppose that I Thess. must be dated somewhere about 52 A.D.), the doctrine of the Two Natures already is firmly established in the church as the universal foundation of all Christian thinking concerning Christ. Such a mere chronological statement, however, hardly does justice to the case. What needs to be emphasized is that there is no Christian literature in existence which does not base itself, as upon an already firmly laid foundation, on the doctrine of the Two Natures. So far as Christian literature can bear testimony, there never has been any other doctrine recognized in the church. This literature itself goes back to within twenty years or so of the death of Christ; and of course—since it did not create but reflects this faith—has a retrospective value as testimony to the faith of Christians.

Nevertheless, men still seek to posit an "earlier," "more primitive," "simpler" view of the Person of Christ, behind this oldest attested doctrine. In another article we shall ask whether it is possible thus to go back of the doctrine of the New Testament writings to a more "primitive" view of the Person of Christ.

## IS BELIEF IN THE HISTORICITY OF JESUS INDISPENSABLE TO CHRISTIAN FAITH?

DOUGLAS C. MACINTOSH  
Yale Divinity School, New Haven, Conn.

Inasmuch as the aim of the present paper is to defend the negative answer to the above question, it may be advisable to indicate that this position is neither dictated by a negative answer to the question of the historicity of Jesus nor by an abandonment of the Christocentric principle in theology. It will be permissible also for the same reason to state briefly the positive standpoint taken here with reference to the historicity of Jesus as a question of fact. It is not maintained that our gospel narratives are without their inaccuracies and legendary accretions; on the contrary it would be claimed that the service being rendered at this point by the application of the methods of modern historical and literary criticism is most important. But, on the other hand, in spite of recent denials (which do not even begin to be disproofs) the view that Jesus, the prophet of Galilee, actually existed seems to be a proposition so highly defensible as scarcely to need to be defended.<sup>1</sup> The position also seems tenable that Jesus was essentially what the scholarship and devotion of Christianity unite in taking him to have been, viz., a man of such perfection of spirit as makes him our best and sufficient concrete embodiment of the moral ideal and at the same time our one satisfactory norm of all that claims to be revelation of the character and attitude of God. On this point one may refer to the recent "Jesus or Christ?" controversy in the *Hibbert Journal* for 1909 and in the supplement thereto for the same year. In his much-discussed article Mr. Roberts, on the basis of a very superficial analysis, claims that he finds certain

<sup>1</sup> For a summary and criticism of the negative argument, see S. J. Case, "The Historicity of Jesus," *American Journal of Theology*, January, 1911. For a statement of the evidence for an affirmative opinion, see article by the same author, same journal, April, 1911. See also article by B. W. Bacon in *Hibbert Journal* for July, 1911.

limitations of a serious ethical and religious character in the spirit of Jesus.<sup>2</sup> Schmiedel takes up and discusses in a cautious and somewhat agnostic spirit the question of the sinlessness of Jesus.<sup>3</sup> Of course it is easy in the discussion of this question to be unduly dogmatic, but after historical criticism has done its worst—or its best—we come to Schmiedel's assertion that it was the person of the historical Jesus which supplied the essential features for the Christ-ideal,<sup>4</sup> and we find in this minimum statement enough to establish our present point, viz., the ideal quality of the spirit and life of the historic Jesus. As a third element in the historicity of Jesus it will be assumed here that he was the chief and indispensable factor in the historic genesis of Christianity. His historicity is historically indispensable. This may fairly be taken as the outcome of the "Jesus or Paul?" controversy of a few years ago in Germany.<sup>5</sup>

Granted, then, the historicity of Jesus in this threefold sense, what is the relation of essential Christianity to his person?

First, because his ministry was not only an essential but the central factor in the genesis of the Christian religion, the religious experience of the Christian community is mainly referable to the historic Jesus as its cause. On account of this unique spiritual function of being the originator of this supremely valuable spiritual experience, Jesus is rightly regarded as being in an altogether unique sense the Savior of men. And at the present day when one responds actively, affirmatively, and decisively to the appeal to one's moral and religious nature which comes, directly or indirectly, from the Jesus of history, one experiences what is worthy, in comparison with all other experiences, to be called salvation. Hence Jesus is rightly called *the* Savior, the redeemer from sin and guilt, and ultimately from all evil.

Second, Jesus being rightly recognized by the Christian consciousness as giving us in his own person our highest revelation of God, and as being as a consequence the Savior of men, the

<sup>2</sup> *Hibbert Journal*, VII (January, 1909), 2, 363 ff.

<sup>3</sup> *Hibbert Journal*, supplement for 1909, 68 ff.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, 78.

<sup>5</sup> v. Jülicher, *Jesus or Paul?* J. Weiss, *Jesus or Paul?* etc.

affirmations of faith concerning the historic Jesus come to include either explicitly or implicitly the essential religious content of Christianity. The religious kernel of the doctrine of the divinity of Christ is the attitude of trust toward Jesus as the revealer of God, or in "the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ," the God who is like Jesus and who is ever active for man's true welfare. In other words, belief in the divinity of Christ properly arrived at, that is, arrived at in a religious way, is at once the fruit and the seed of Christian theology. It is based upon the religious interpretation of the Christian religious experience as flowing from the ministry of Christ, and is the basis of the Christian doctrine of God with all its implications. Thus the essence of Christianity is expressible in terms by the religious appreciation of the person and work of the historic Jesus.

Third, it follows from the above that in Christian theology the Christocentric principle not only may but ought to be employed. That is to be included in our theology which is implied in the view that we find the character and attitude of God toward men revealed to us in the character and attitude of Christ; that is to be excluded from our theology which is inconsistent with this principle.

Coming now to the question of the necessity for Christian faith of belief in the historicity of Jesus, it is natural to ask what has been the state of the case in the past. Here we may distinguish three radically different situations, in each of which the assumption of the historicity of Jesus was logically indispensable to Christian faith in view of certain other presuppositions in the minds of the believers.

In the case of the early disciples of Jesus and the converts to Christianity from Judaism generally, not only must it be said that the life and ministry of Jesus constituted an indispensable factor in their conversion, but, in view of the definiteness and strength of their presuppositions as to the Messiah and the Kingdom of God, it may be maintained that without a knowledge of Jesus and certain beliefs about him as a historical personage, they would not have changed these presuppositions to the extent required of them in becoming Christians. And, of course, after they had

become Christians and had framed from that new standpoint their interpretation of the historical events which had been forced upon their attention, that Christian messianic interpretation necessarily involved the historicity of those events as a presupposition.

Coming to a consideration of the Greek Christian development we find the historicity of the divinely sent deliverer not as a datum to be interpreted but as a postulate dictated by religious needs. The presuppositions of the Greek mind were to the effect that human nature is essentially mortal and only the divine nature essentially immortal, and that the only way in which men could possibly partake of eternal life was for God to become man and in some historic personality to infuse humanity with the incorruptibility of divinity. The real historicity of a thoroughly divine and yet thoroughly human person was thus logically required by the Greek mind, if there was to be any basis for assurance of salvation.

In the case of the theology of western Christendom, while the situation was radically changed from that which confronted the Greek fathers, the historicity of Jesus Christ, the God-man, was equally indispensable. Man, through his sin against God, an Infinite Being, had become involved in infinite guilt, and justice demanded an infinite punishment. This meant the suffering of the finite individual—the sinner—for an infinite time, or else, as a substitute, the suffering of an Infinite Being for a finite time. As the only Infinite Being is God, and as the sufferer for man's sin must in justice be man, the only possible substitute for the sinner is the God-man, a veritable incarnation of God in a historic personality. Thus the real divinity of a historical human being who bore the infinite punishment due to man's sin is an indispensable presupposition of Christian faith in its mediaeval form, whether Romanist or Protestant.

But now we come to the question, Is belief in the historicity of Jesus indispensable to Christian faith today? If so, faith has again become dependent upon external authority; it has escaped from the priest only to fall into the hands of the critic. Now, doubtless those of us who are not specialists in the historical criticism of the New Testament are, or ought to be, content to



supplement our lack of first-hand information by having recourse to the expert authority of New Testament critics, so far as matters of history are concerned, but when it comes to accepting their dictum as to whether we may or may not exercise Christian faith—that is another matter.

Still, let us raise the question fairly and without prejudice. The question to ask is, Since Christianity with all its ideas and experiences is a fact in the world today, what difference would it make to practical religion if we were compelled to conclude on critical grounds against the historicity of Jesus? Would there be any real loss? Undoubtedly one would have to abandon the idea of personal communion with the once crucified but now risen and exalted Christ. But can that idea be maintained in modern theology, even granting the historicity of Jesus? Neither personal religious experience, however intimate and mystical, nor the Christocentric principle, nor philosophical considerations make the view a necessary one. If we have communion with the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, we have all that is essential, and the loss involved in giving up the Christ-mysticism is mainly if not entirely sentimental. And even so, the loss would not be one to be charged against the abandonment of belief in the historicity of Jesus. There would, however, be a loss that would follow from having to adopt the negative answer to the historical question, a loss that cannot be dismissed as trivial because it, too, may be denominated sentimental. This is the loss which would be felt if humanity had to conclude that there had never arisen within it a real Jesus of Nazareth. Humanity in its self-consciousness would be the poorer for its loss of that presence which above any other dignifies the race and raises our estimate of the value of every human life.

It should also be noted that there would be a serious pedagogical loss in the case supposed. The readiest way of imparting a vital conception of Christianity has generally been to point to the concrete exemplification of the Christian idea and ideal in the life of some person, and hitherto the supreme historic exemplar has been Jesus himself, as when the Ritschlians say, The essence of Christianity is Jesus Christ himself. Moreover, liberal Chris-

tianity has come to depend in a special way upon this reference to the historic Jesus as a source of religious appreciations. Where the older method of propagating the faith was first to indoctrinate the disciple with Christology and soteriology on the authority of church or Bible, and then to exhort him to trust in Christ, the newer method has commonly aimed to present a picture of Jesus in the beauty and power of his life and spirit, and thereby to lead the individual to an attitude of loyalty to him and to his ideals, trusting that adequate doctrinal beliefs will be evolved in due time as a result of the enlarged experience. With the loss of the historical Jesus a new pedagogical method would have to be employed, but inasmuch as it would still be possible to set forth the essential ideas of the Christian religion and to bear testimony to the value of guiding one's life by means of them, the pedagogical loss would not be altogether irreparable.

So far as the content of Christianity is concerned, our religion would remain essentially the same, whatever judgment might be rendered upon questions of historical fact. It would still remain a living, working power through its ideas and ideals. Of course the old doctrine of the Second Person of the Trinity in its old polytheistic form would have to go, but the content of the Christian view of God, as the holy and loving fatherly God, would remain, and with it the Christian belief in providence, immortality, sin and its forgiveness, the saving value of voluntary vicarious suffering, faith and repentance, regeneration and sanctification, the Holy Spirit and a divine humanity. Even the idea of revelation would not be essentially altered; the Christlike everywhere would be interpreted as revelation. It is not incorrect to say that the essence of Christianity is Jesus Christ, if it be recognized that it is also possible to set forth the essence of Christianity without reference to the historic Jesus. In the words of George Burman Foster, "Nothing which is in the past alone and not also in the present can be of the essence of Christianity." Dr. K. C. Anderson complains in the *Hibbert Journal*<sup>6</sup> that liberal Christianity substitutes what it calls the "religion of Jesus" for the "gospel of Christ"; but the religion of Jesus and the gospel of Christ are at

<sup>6</sup> VIII, 314.

heart the same. Jesus or Paul—it makes very little difference, in the end, which we learn from, so long as we get at the essential thing in either. Both aim to lead men to the same filial relation to the same fatherly God. Principal Garvie declares that without the Jesus of history “Christian experience is deceptive, for its present content assumes such a past cause.” This is a mistaken analysis; Christian experience as such is not deceptive if God manifesting himself somehow at some time somewhere within the life of man be its ultimate cause; it is not the religious explanation but only the historical-causal explanation that is involved in the question before us, and it is entirely possible that he whose religion is true may, in matters of historical explanations, be greatly deceived.

Our conclusion so far then is as follows: The disproof or rendering seriously doubtful of the historicity of Jesus would not mean the disappearance of any essential content from the Christian religion. As a religion it would remain what it was, discharging the same function as before in human life. The losses of a sentimental and pedagogical sort, while serious enough, would not be such as to render impossible the exercise of a Christian faith in God. It remains, however, to ask one further question, viz., What would be the effect upon Christian certainty if the historicity of Jesus had to be given up? It is here, as we shall see, that the negative position would make the most serious inroads, at least temporarily, upon Christian faith.

The chief tests of religious truth, and so the chief bases of religious certainty, are four, viz., the inwardly religious or more or less mystical, the pragmatic (which is mainly ethical), the historical, and the rational or philosophical. These divisions are not quite mutually exclusive, and especially is the distinction between the historical and the pragmatic largely one of convenience. The historical test is the pragmatic test applied to the past; the pragmatic test is a continuation of the historical test into the present and future. Now with reference to the present subject of discussion, it is not the “mystical” or subjective religious test that is on trial, for that is present in either case and is not affected by the question of the historicity of Jesus. The issue with which we

<sup>1</sup> *Hibbert Journal*, supplement (1909), 176.

are here concerned is as to whether a particular historic testing of the Christian religion, viz., the testing in the life of Jesus of Nazareth, is essential to the necessary degree of certainty as to the essentials of Christian faith, or whether other historical tests together with the pragmatic and philosophical tests can give enough objective reinforcement to the inner certainty of Christian feeling to make Christian faith in all its essentials still possible to the critically minded, even if belief in the historicity of Jesus should have to be given up.

Some seek objective support for the subjective certitude of personal religious feeling in history, to the exclusion of philosophy, while others seek this objectivity in philosophy alone. Of the former the Ritschlians furnish the best example, and the older members of the school make the appeal to history practically the appeal to one historical personage, viz., Jesus. A few sentences from Herrmann's *Communion with God*<sup>8</sup> will serve as an illustration:

God makes Himself known to us, so that we may recognize Him, through a *fact*, on the strength of which we can believe on Him. No doctrine of any kind can do more than tell us how we ought to conceive of God. No doctrine can bring it about that there shall arise in our hearts the full certainty that God exists for us; only a fact can inspire such confidence within us. Now, we Christians hold that we know only one fact in the whole world which can give us that confidence, viz., the appearance of Jesus in history, the story of which appearance has been preserved for us in the New Testament. Our certainty of God has its root in the fact that within the realm of history to which we ourselves belong, we encounter the man Jesus as an undoubted reality. Inasmuch as Jesus raises us into fellowship with God, He is to us the Christ. The true Christian confession is that Jesus is the Christ. Rightly understood, however, it means nothing else than this: that through the man Jesus we are first lifted into fellowship with God.

The neo-Ritschlians (if they may be called by that name) or religio-historical school of Germany still seek objectivity mainly, if not wholly, in history; only it holds that the appeal must be to all religious history, and not to that of Christ and Christianity alone.

The recent critics of those who appeal for objectivity to history alone and to the historic Jesus in particular make the charge that this appeal to history is bound to meet with disappointment because of the unsatisfactory or highly uncertain character of the

<sup>8</sup> Eng. tr. of 1895, pp. 51, 52.

results of historical criticism. Professor Lovejoy in his article on "The Entangling Alliance between Religion and History"<sup>9</sup> protests against the supposition "that the interests of a body of truth professedly cosmic in its import, and needful for every man to know," are inextricably involved in the minute and highly technical inquiries of historical criticism. Speaking of the theory advanced by W. B. Smith in *Der vorchristliche Jesus*, Professor Lovejoy goes on to say: "New Testament historians are under obligations in some measure to suspend their judgments, but religious believers are not under obligations to suspend their religion, until this and any other such new historical theory can be duly examined by experts." Dr. Anderson maintains that the "simple Jesus" to which liberal Christianity appeals is no more historical than the Christ of the church.<sup>10</sup> Professor Drews protests against being asked to believe in God, freedom, and immortality on the authority of the unique personality of the two-thousand-years-dead Jesus, of whom we know next to nothing with certainty.<sup>11</sup>

All of these, Lovejoy, Anderson, and Drews, like many other less recent writers, are content, it would seem, to seek objectivity for religious belief in philosophy alone. Dr. Anderson stands for a neo-Hegelian idealism of the type advocated by Edward Caird, while Drews frankly advocates a pantheistic view. The most obvious trouble with this appeal to philosophy alone is that it is scarcely more accessible or intelligible to the average believer than are the details of historical criticism. In addition to this it must be urged that the proffered proof is very far from being a complete demonstration, and that in most cases the reasoning, such as it is, leads to conclusions in flat contradiction to many of the most essential elements of the religion it started out to prove.

The truth is that in the search for objectivity of religious belief neither history nor philosophy can say to the other, "I have no need of thee." The mystical and pragmatic Christianity of the Pauline Epistles was followed by the appeal to history which found expression in the Synoptic Gospels, and this in turn was followed by the introduction, in the interests of objectivity, of the philo-

<sup>9</sup> *Hibbert Journal* (January, 1907).

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.* (January, 1910), 305-6.

<sup>11</sup> *Die Christusmythe* (8th and 9th thousand), 237.

sophical element found in the Johannine literature. The same double movement from the same motive is found in the transition from the subjective religiosity of Schleiermacher's *Reden* to the Ritschlian emphasis upon historic revelation, which is now being followed by an increasing demand for a rational, philosophical statement of the content of vital religion.<sup>12</sup>

But the point of central interest here is that while the abandonment of the historicity of Jesus would leave the mystical, the pragmatic, and the philosophical tests of religious truth intact, the historical test would be left, at least temporarily, less convincing. It is a distinct support to our faith to know that the God in whom we need to believe, if we are to live at our best, is the God in whom Jesus, whose life was the best, needed to believe, in order to sustain that life at its high level of moral devotion. The career of Jesus, if historical, gives us our best single empirical verification of the moral and general human value of that religious faith which is essentially "Christian." If we were to lose the historic Jesus, we should thereby lose the supreme historic example of the reality of the ideal and of the triumph of the good even in and through its temporary defeat,<sup>13</sup> and so we should be without one of the most important encouragements to "faith in the realizability of the ideal." Professor Lovejoy is far from being justified in contending that it would be a gain for faith if we were obliged to conclude that the essential Jesus was not a historical reality, but an unrealized ideal of an obscure group of men.<sup>14</sup>

Still, Jesus is not the whole of history, and while it is emphatically true, as Dr. Garvie asserts,<sup>15</sup> that "faith needs facts," it is also true that there are many facts which support faith, besides the fact of Jesus. We may agree with Garvie's claim that "a reality must be revealed which guarantees that the ideal is realizable," for if we believe that God is good, we must believe that he is working for man's good, and faith has an interest in seeing that

<sup>12</sup> On the subject of this paragraph, compare reference in Professor B. W. Bacon's article, "Myth and Philosophy, Legend and History in Religion," *Hibbert Journal* (July, 1911).

<sup>13</sup> Cf. Arnold Meyer, *Was uns Jesus heute ist*, 33-35.

<sup>14</sup> *Hibbert Journal*, V, 273.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.* (supplement, 1909), 166 f.; cf. 172 ff.

God is getting something done. But when the same author goes on to say, in the spirit of Herrmann, that the Jesus of history is the only fact that can meet the needs of faith, while one would not wish to discount the unique value of that fact, it must be remembered that there was some very exalted faith in the world before that fact existed, and it should also be said that faith will not receive *full* satisfaction until all shall know God from the least even unto the greatest, and his kingdom shall have fully come. Without the historic Jesus greater emphasis would have to be placed upon the other numerous though individually less striking historical verifications of faith, and there would be in the interests of religious certainty an increased demand for further pragmatic testing of the faith as a substitute for that supreme historic verification. Without the historic Jesus we should find ourselves with less verification of our faith than we had thought. But in view of the possibility of further future verification, it cannot be said that even for the sake of Christian certainty belief in the historicity of Jesus is altogether indispensable.

Our conclusion, then, is that while the historicity of Jesus was indispensable to the rise of the Christian religion, and so to the Christian experience and faith of today, a continued belief in that historicity is not indispensable, though very valuable, to the Christian religion. Without belief in the historical Jesus, would Christianity have arisen? No. Without continued belief in the historical Jesus would Christianity collapse? No. Granted the historicity of Jesus as above defined, is belief in his unique divinity an expression of essential Christian faith? Yes. And yet this is not a return to the assertion that belief in the historicity of Jesus is religiously indispensable; saving faith is not dependent upon the outcome of the higher criticism. The upshot of all this, then, is that Christianity, while enjoying the advantage of historical verification, has this qualification for being the "absolute" and universal religion, that its fate is not bound up with the actuality of any one reputed fact of history, even when that "fact" is the one which surpasses any other fact in its value to humanity.

## THE RESURRECTION IN PRIMITIVE TRADITION AND OBSERVANCE

BENJAMIN WISNER BACON  
Yale Divinity School, New Haven, Conn.

It is generally recognized among critical students of the New Testament that that form of the Resurrection narrative which, through the preponderant influence of Mark in records of fact, has become fundamental to the gospels must be admitted to be secondary, and even relatively late, as compared to the form exhibited in the brief recapitulation of the common and accepted tradition made by Paul in I Cor. 15:3-8.

The contrast is striking. Paul expressly states in I Cor. 15:11 that the tradition which he summarizes is that not of a part, but of the whole church. It is the common tradition, and yet in a sense deserves to be called Petrine, because in it the foundation of everything is the manifestation "to Cephas." Paul's visit to "Cephas" only three years after his own conversion<sup>1</sup> places its authenticity beyond cavil or dispute. But in this tradition the experiences of the women and others in the vicinity of the sepulcher are totally ignored. In the story of Mark, variously modified in Matthew, Luke, and John, on the other hand, the sepulcher stories are fundamental; whereas, the manifestation "to Cephas" has left but a few half-obliterated traces, as alien as erratic blocks to the context wherein they stand.

To this historico-critical problem the present writer believes it possible to apply a method which, if not altogether new in principle, is at least new in mode and measure of application, and may prove fruitful of important and trustworthy results. This method is already applied to the Gospel of Mark in the volume entitled *Beginnings of Gospel Story*.<sup>2</sup> In a subsequent article entitled "The Purpose of Mark's Gospel"<sup>3</sup> I endeavored to set

<sup>1</sup> Gal. 1:18.

<sup>2</sup> Yale University Press, 1909.

<sup>3</sup> *Jour. of Bibl. Lit.*, XXIX (1910).



forth the principle of what I have ventured to designate the "Method of Pragmatic Values," and I am glad to say that it has since won the hearty endorsement of Professor Harnack of Berlin.<sup>4</sup> The method proposed rests upon the principle that the evangelic writings were compiled not so much for historical as for apologetic and aetiological purposes, and that their contents must consequently be studied in the light of the beliefs and practises their authors, and the authors and expounders of the traditional material they embody and apply, were aiming to explain and defend. We must go to the sources which exhibit the actual usages and beliefs of the primitive church, as it were in action—we must go primarily to the Pauline epistles, to understand why the church preserved just what it did preserve of primitive story, and why its present form is what it is.

Among other illustrations of the evidences afforded in Mark, the oldest of our gospels, of the effects of the adaptation of the tradition to local usage, I instanced particularly the notorious discord between synoptic and Johannine tradition regarding the dates of the final tragedy with relation to the Passover. Mark and its satellites determine chronologically with great care certain crises of the story; and these are found to correspond to certain known observances of the Roman church in its commemoration of Jesus' death and resurrection, which we may call hebdomadal because, however heightened at the appropriate season of the year, it was fundamentally an observance of certain days of the *week*. The Fourth Gospel, on the contrary, which is certainly oriental in origin, is found in its dating of events with relation to the (lunar) month, to conform to oriental practice. This practice was called "Quartodeciman" because it commemorated the death and resurrection of Jesus *annually* on a single day identical with the Passover day of the Jews. This day was always the fourteenth of Nisan, or the full-moon of the first month, irrespective of the incidence of the day of the week, though regard was also paid to certain days of the week at all seasons. Certain sects of Quartodecimans, it is true, notably one in Cappadocia, had so far broken

<sup>4</sup> In a private communication Professor Harnack writes regarding this article, "Sie haben in ihr einen Gedanken zum Leitstern gemacht der gewiss richtig ist."

away from Jewish usage as to employ for their observance of the resurrection the Roman vernal equinox (March 25), just as we employ the Roman winter solstice (December 25) for the celebration of the complementary mystery of the incarnation. This solar date was more convenient and more acceptable than a lunar date because for the determination of the latter the church would be dependent on the hated Synagogue. On the essential point, however, viz., denial of the Roman hebdomadal system, which contended that it was not proper "to terminate the fast on any other than the Lord's day," the Cappadocians were in agreement with other Quartodecimans,<sup>5</sup> and with Asiatic practice generally. They disregarded the day of the week in their annual celebration of "the mystery of the Lord's resurrection,"<sup>6</sup> and this practice was stoutly maintained as an unbroken tradition since the time of the apostles themselves. It can scarcely be doubted that the divergence of East and West on this point dates from well within the first century.

I shall not repeat here the arguments adduced in my volume entitled *The Fourth Gospel in Research and Debate*,<sup>7</sup> in the chapter headed "Johannine Quartodecimanism," to prove that the datings of the Fourth Gospel correspond with its Asiatic derivation. Not only the three great feasts, Passover, Pentecost, and Tabernacles, are all distinguished in this gospel by visits of Jesus to Jerusalem at which both discourse and action are suited to the occasion, but Unleavened Bread and Dedication come in as well. This gospel dates the anointing in Bethany "six days before the Passover" (not "two days" as in Mark), because the tenth Nisan (*six* days, according to ancient reckoning, before Nisan 15, the "great day" of the feast) was the day set in Exod. 12:3 ff. for the choosing and setting apart of the lamb. Epiphanius explicitly informs us that Quartodecimans observed this day in memory of Christ's being set apart and designated our Passover.<sup>8</sup> Instances need not be multiplied, as

<sup>5</sup> A sub-group referred to by Preuschen in the article hereinafter cited kept April 7. The equation followed is easily perceived. March 25 (Julian equinox) = Nisan 1 (Jewish New Year's Day). Hence Nisan 14 (Passover) = April 7.

<sup>6</sup> Eusebius, *H.E.* V. xxiii. 1, 2.

<sup>7</sup> Moffat, Yard & Co., New York, 1910.

<sup>8</sup> "We take the sheep from the tenth day, recognizing the name of Jesus on account of the iota" (*Haer.* 1. 3).

everyone knows the Fourth Gospel exhibits a tacit but very patent correction of the Markan date for the crucifixion, so that Jesus' death in it coincides even to the hour with the slaughtering of the Passover lambs. Jesus instead of celebrating the Passover with his disciples, joins with them in a last supper which is not a passover meal at all, and whose distinctive rite formally instituted in perpetuity is—foot-washing! In fact, the whole institution of the sacrament is transferred by the fourth evangelist to the Passover of the preceding year, on occasion of the miracle of the Loaves in Galilee. For the significance of all this extraordinary divergence of the Johannine from synoptic tradition I must content myself here with a bare reference to the volumes cited, merely recalling the evidence adduced from the narrative of Mark itself that the discrepancy is due to the Roman, not to the Asiatic writer. The Markan narrative has been changed for the purpose of adapting its form of the story to Western observance and the hebdomadal system, and Matthew and Luke have followed suit. Sufficient traces remain, however, in all three Synoptics to prove that in its precanonical form this narrative agreed with the Johannine and with the immemorial practice of the churches of the East with respect to the date of Jesus' death. The crucifixion *did* take place, as the conspirators planned it should, "before the feast" with its attendant danger of "a tumult of the people." On this point, as well as on the probable motive for the change, I am glad to cite the emphatic endorsement of two such eminent authorities as Burkitt at Cambridge,<sup>9</sup> and Loisy in Paris.<sup>10</sup> Mark's narrative still plainly shows the effects of a recasting in the interest of the hebdomadal system of the western churches. Every element in the redactor's dating of what we still call "Passion Week" is determined by the pivotal Lord's Day after Passover. The crucifixion fast-day (cf. the proleptic reference in 2:20) is exactly subdivided into its four watches of three hours each: from dawn till 9 A.M. the trial and mockery; from 9 till 12 crucifixion; from 12 till 3 P.M. darkness; at 3 P.M. the expiring cry; at sunset the burial. So with the preceding two days. The second day before

<sup>9</sup> *Earliest Sources for the Life of Jesus*, 1910, p. 93 f.

<sup>10</sup> *Revue d'histoire et de littérature religieuses*, I, 4 (1910), p. 375.

the Passover (Mk. 14:1) is the day of the Anointing. The day before the Passover (14:12) is that of the Preparation. "At evening" (14:17), the legal date for the Passover Supper, we have the institution of the Eucharist; thereafter the night of watching in Gethsemane, corresponding to the Passover "night of watching unto Yahweh" (Exod. 13:42), an observance perpetuated in the Easter vigil of the primitive Church. Perhaps the evangelist even intends to mark the close of each watch before the last in this night of vigil by the three-fold coming of Jesus to rouse the sleeping disciples. This is open to doubt. It cannot possibly be accidental, however, that when we bring the narrative thus minutely dated—and be it remembered that no other gospel narratives are dated at all save these pertaining to the death and resurrection—into comparison with the known observances by which the early church commemorated the great tragedy of Redemption, they are found to be in exact chronological coincidence. Moreover, in the synoptic tradition, the Western, or hebdomadal system, in which the first day of the week as commemorating the resurrection is pivotal, has progressively and almost completely triumphed over the luni-solar, or annual, in which the pivotal date is the annual Passover of the new Redemption. For Quartodecimans observed only a single day, coincident with "that on which the people (of the Jews) put away the leaven," i.e., Nisan 14. This was to them the day in which the Redeemer "through death overcame him that had the power of Death, and liberated us who through fear of Death were all our life-time subject to bondage."<sup>11</sup>

A recapitulation of these facts already established regarding the recasting in the synoptic record of the ancient Petrine story of Calvary to conform to Western ritual was necessary as a preliminary to the further question whether and to what extent the more fundamental disagreement of the records regarding the resurrection were involved in this process.

As already stated there still remain in Mark many traces that the Western or hebdomadal system of commemoration of the resurrection has been forced upon the older Petrine narrative. For most of these traces I must refer to the volume already cited.

<sup>11</sup> Heb. 2:15.

One I will recall. Notoriously the Gospel of Mark has suffered mutilation at the end, and that almost certainly at a date anterior to its employment by Matthew and Luke. The account of the "manifestation to Cephas" implied in Mark 14:28 and 16:7 as about to take place "in Galilee," a manifestation both foretold in Luke 22:32 and subsequently referred to in Luke 22:34, has disappeared. We can indeed reconstruct it with considerable confidence from the fragmentary end of the *Gospel of Peter*, in combination with the chapter appended to the Gospel of John. According to these authorities Peter and his companions remained in hiding in Jerusalem, paralyzed with fear and grief, *until the seven days of the feast* (Passover and Unleavened Bread) *were over.*<sup>12</sup> Then a smaller group, Peter at the head, returned heartbroken to their fishing at the Lake of Galilee. It was there, *some ten days at least after the crucifixion*, that "the Lord appeared unto Simon" and he "turned again and rallied his brethren."<sup>13</sup> This earlier form of the narrative, a form surely guaranteed by the statement of Paul, is absolutely unaffected by that whose cardinal point is the discovery of the empty tomb "on the third day." Paul refers indeed to "the third day," but his chronology, as we shall see, has no relation to the hebdomadal system, and his tradition takes no cognizance whatever of any of the group of Sepulcher stories. His statement that Jesus rose "on the third day" is not even based upon any of these, but explicitly upon "Scripture." Just what is here implied we must inquire hereafter. The expression "the third day" may have affected our form of the Sepulcher traditions; it certainly has not been itself affected by them. For the Synop- tists themselves have not yet fully adjusted this "third-day" date to their chronology. The practical difficulties of bringing in so early an appearance to Peter "in Galilee" are in fact almost insuperable. Luke, as we know, overcomes them by excluding the flight to Galilee altogether; but with such obvious violence to his sources as to leave no choice on the point of originality. And this fundamental date itself is vacillating. In Mark we still have uniformly "after three days," a phrase corresponding to the Jonah

<sup>12</sup> *Ev. Petri* vii. 26 f., xiv. 58 f.; Preuschen, *Antileg.*

<sup>13</sup> *Ev. Petri* xiv. 58 to end.

prophecy applied to the Resurrection in Mark 12:40, and to certain forms of observance in the resurrection cults, but so manifestly discordant with the story, that the dependent gospels change to "the third day,"<sup>14</sup> while other primitive documents make curious and ingenious attempts at harmonization.<sup>15</sup>

Nor is this by any means the only evidence of the secondary and relatively late origin of the synoptic as against the Pauline tradition. In Mark, its earliest form, it winds up with a statement calculated to obviate the objection inevitably suggested by the parallel tradition that the disciples departed some four days later to Galilee, still "weeping and mourning."<sup>16</sup> The women, we are told, "said nothing to any man because they were afraid." Without some such explanation the Markan story could not have found room alongside that of the apostolic manifestations. Later forms of the story introduce various devices to account for the lack of communication between the women and the disciples. Matthew, among other readjustments, introduces *two* parallel explanations: (1) The women *did* carry the message (28:8); (2) Jesus himself by special intervention prevented its miscarriage (28:9 f.). Still, however, the manifestations to the eleven are "in Galilee." According to Luke the Twelve were indeed told, they even verified the women's account to the extent of investigating the tomb, but they "disbelieved." This leaves room for independent manifestations to the eleven. The needless removal to Galilee is cancelled. The fourth evangelist reduces the number of those who receive the message to two, and attributes the disbelief only to Peter. The Beloved Disciple "saw and believed"; but he, too, like the women, "said nothing to any man," which is the more surprising because it does not appear that he "was afraid." After this treatment of the harmonized tradition of Luke 24:12, 22-24, the fourth evangelist adds a development of the equally secondary elements of Matt. 28:9 f. and 17, dominated as they are by a different harmonistic theory. The motives of message and disbelief are thus repeated in John 20:11-29. A

<sup>14</sup> In one instance (Matt. 27:64) our first evangelist fails to make the change.

<sup>15</sup> See below p. 387.

<sup>16</sup> *Ev. Petri* vii. 26 f.; xiv. 59.

still later hand in an appendix (chap. 21) reannexes the Galilean appearances excluded by John 20:20-23.

The interaction of the two conflicting forms of the resurrection tradition has thus left its indelible traces in the gospels themselves. The question for us to consider is whether the method of pragmatic values cannot throw some light upon this most astonishing of all the contradictions of primitive church tradition. We have seen that no narratives are so intimately bound up with primitive ritual observance as those of Mark. No observances of the primitive church are more copiously or surely attested than the two which commemorate the great events these chapters relate. In the East we have Quartodeciman observance of "the true Passover of the Lord," an *annual* celebration of a single night and day, regardless of its weekly incidence; in the West we find a *weekly* celebration of the "first day of the week," heightened at the Passover season (at least in later times) into an annual commemoration. Is it not possible to determine which of these two modes of commemoration is primitive, and which derived? I believe that it surely is, and that we shall find the comparison to throw a welcome, though probably very unexpected, light upon the problem of the origins of the church and the true significance of its early observance of "the first day of the week" as "the Lord's day."

At the outset I find the substance of my convictions ably set forth by so eminent a scholar as E. Preuschen, while I am at the same time compelled to withhold assent from certain statements which seem to me to exaggerate the facts. Preuschen thus explains the "Easter"-controversy in his article *s.v.* in the *New Schaff-Herzog Encyclopaedia* (Vol. IV, 1910):

Eusebius says that it was decided on the basis of numerous conferences of bishops that the mystery of the resurrection of the Lord from the dead should be celebrated on no other day than on the Lord's day, and on that day the Easter fast should be broken (*H.E.* V. xxiii. 2). Hence it is evident that the party who were opposed in the conferences, who were undoubtedly the Christians of Asia Minor, must have celebrated the mystery of the resurrection on the day on which the fast was broken, and that this day was not Sunday but the 14th of Nisan, around which the controversy revolved. This conclusion is justified by the account of Epiphanius concerning the Quarto-

decimans . . . in which he relates that fasting and the celebration of the resurrection took place on the same day. It is hardly conceivable that a bitter and protracted controversy should have originated on a mere matter of fasting; the real reason for the differences lay deeper. The Christians of Asia Minor appealed to an old apostolic tradition according to which Jesus rose on the evening of the day of his death, and the opposition of the Occidentals was directed mainly against the commemoration of death and resurrection on the same day.

With most of this statement I find myself in complete accord. Had earlier writers on Quartodecimanism expressed themselves as clearly and accurately, much useless controversy and much darkening of counsel on the Johannine problem might have been spared us. It is not exact, however, to say that the Asiatics "appealed to an old apostolic tradition according to which *Jesus rose on the evening of the day of his death.*" On the contrary, ignorance as to the precise time when Jesus "rose" was freely acknowledged by Quartodecimans in many regions. We need only cite from Drummond's admirable discussion of "The Paschal Controversy" in his *Character and Authorship of the Fourth Gospel*:<sup>77</sup>

That the fast terminated, at the latest, very early on Easter morning we know from express testimony. The first part of a letter addressed by Dionysius of Alexandria to his "beloved son and brother Basilides" relates to this question. Basilides, who, as we learn from Eusebius, was bishop of the parishes in Pentapolis, had consulted Dionysius about the hour for concluding the fast. He did so owing to a difference of opinion among the brethren, some thinking that they should do it at cock-crow, others "from the evening" (that is, the evening before Easter Sunday), the brethren in Rome, as was alleged, following the former practice, "those here" (in Egypt, or perhaps the East generally) closing the fast sooner. He was at a loss how to fix an exact hour; for while it would be "acknowledged by all alike" that they ought to begin their festivities after the time of the resurrection of our Lord, and to humble their souls with fasts up to that time, the Gospels contained *no exact statement of the hour at which he rose.* Dionysius in reply considers the accounts in the Gospels, and then pronounces his opinion for the guidance of those who inquire at what hour or half hour or quarter of an hour they ought "to begin the rejoicing at the resurrection of our Lord from the dead."

The reason why it was a matter of free difference of opinion and even of professed ignorance and indifference in many quarters in the East so late as the time of Dionysius at what precise hour

<sup>77</sup>P. 471.



Jesus "rose," is that it was not the Lord's "rising" in the strict sense of the word, i.e., his manifestation of himself on earth, whether at the sepulcher or elsewhere, which the earlier Asiatics celebrated in their annual festival; nor did they profess to have any special apostolic tradition on this subject. What they celebrated was not a terrestrial but a sub-terrestrial event. Their feast was the Christian counterpart of the Jewish Redemption feast. It celebrated Christ's *conquest of the power of the underworld and release of its prisoners*. It was almost as easy to connect commemoration of this kind with the various mystery cults which celebrated a similar victory of the sun-hero over Hades, and employed similar mythological symbolism, as with Jewish ritual; for vernal equinox (March 25) was celebrated in many forms of oriental religion as the anniversary of the triumph of the god of light and life, just as the Jews were holding their annual commemoration of the Redemption out of the darkness and bondage of Egypt. If we wish with Preuschen to use the word "resurrection" and its cognates to designate this event of immemorial and central significance in all the great oriental religions, we must be careful to distinguish it from the event which the occidental commemorated, and still commemorates. For the occidental employs the word "resurrection" to designate the self-manifestation of Jesus to the women and others *after his return* from the underworld. The oriental (at least in earlier times) meant by the "resurrection" the breaking of the gates of Sheol and deliverance of its prisoners. This is evidenced among other proofs by many of the newly discovered *Odes of Solomon*.<sup>18</sup> For these, whether Jewish or Christian, are true Redemption odes, in that they celebrate the victory of Yahweh's Servant (Christ?) over the gates and bars of Hades in the vein of Isa. 26:19, 27:1, Ezek. 37:1-14, and *Shemoneh Esreh* II. In fact, we can point to a progressive transition in Jewish and early Christian literature from the Hebrew figure of national restoration, often compared in the later poetry to a redemption from the power of Sheol, down to the mediaeval doctrine of the Harrowing of Hell.<sup>19</sup>

<sup>18</sup> See especially *Odes* 17, 21, 22, 25, 28, 29, 31, 42.

<sup>19</sup> In this chain of literary remains we must not omit the "Scripture" quoted no less than five times by Justin Martyr and Irenaeus, sometimes attributing it to "Jeremiah" and sometimes to "Isaiah." "The Lord God remembered his dead people which slept in their graves and He descended to proclaim to them His own salvation."

In this transition oriental myths of the descent and victory of the sun-hero mingle with biblical imagery based on the deliverance from bondage by the smiting of the Red Sea. The oriental Christian in his celebration of what he called in distinction from the Jewish "the true passover of the Lord" was not thinking of the institution of the Lord's Supper, nor of the overcoming of the unbelief of this or that disciple by miraculous manifestations. He was thinking of the victory of his Lord over the powers of death and darkness. To him the fabled victories of demi-gods over the same powers, and the real victory of Moses in the redemption of Israel, were mere foreshadowings of this. Therefore he celebrated death and "resurrection" together. If he made any attempt to fix the exact moment of the great encounter he did not conceive it as deferred until the ensuing "Lord's day." It was on the day of the crucifixion itself, at the moment of the earthquake and rending of the rocks of Matt. 27:52. These were the visible tokens of the death-conqueror's victory, and the bursting of "the gates of Sheol." *On that same day*, therefore, "many bodies of the saints that had fallen asleep were raised and came forth out of the tombs." It is a very characteristic westernizing of this truly oriental trait in Matthew's material, when the evangelist, more anxious to avoid the indecorum of an anticipation by these "saints" of the resurrection of the Lord, than considerate of their shelterless condition during the ensuing 36 hours, postpones their entering into the city and appearing to many until "after his resurrection." The original author of the tradition thought of the "resurrection" like a true Quartodeciman. The "resurrection" day that the Quartodeciman celebrated was not the "Lord's day," nor "the first day of the week"; it was an anniversary, the anniversary of the greater Redemption. This is apparent in every line of the defense made by their great champion Apollinaris of Hierapolis:

The fourteenth [of Nisan] is the true Passover of the Lord, the great sacrifice, the Servant of God instead of the lamb, he who, himself fettered, bound the Strong Man, himself under judgment, became Judge of quick and dead. Delivered into the hands of sinners for crucifixion, exalted on the horns of the unicorn, and pierced in his holy side, he poured out from his side the two elements of purification, water and blood, word and spirit, and was buried on Passover day (14th Nisan) the stone having been laid upon his tomb.<sup>20</sup>

<sup>20</sup> *Paschal Chronicle*.

What the hard-headed occidental thought of and commemorated as the "resurrection" may well have been the re-emergence of Jesus from the rock-hewn sepulcher of Joseph of Arimathea, an event which he finally concluded must be dated "on the third day" just before dawn. In his hebdomadal system this made "the first day of the week" sacred as a memorial of the "resurrection," and his "Easter" was a mere heightening at the appropriate season of the year of the weekly festival. The oriental, on the contrary, commemorated conflict and victory in a single day annually recurrent. In the *Gospel of Peter* even the ascension is included in its span of twelve hours. His conception of the "resurrection" is voiced in the redemption songs designated the *Odes of Solomon*. The coming forth of the triumphant Redeemer is not from Joseph's tomb, but from "the gates of Sheol." Paul's statement shows that in the earliest times this "rising" was thought of as occurring—it may even, in the earliest times, have been separately celebrated—"on the third day," but it is certain that second-century Quartodecimans celebrated "a single day" in commemoration both of crucifixion and resurrection. The later divergence is explicable from the fact that it was not the "rising" so much as the bursting of "the gates of Sheol" which was commemorated. That such was the thought is already evidenced in Matt. 27:51-53. Ode 42 of the *Odes of Solomon*, speaking in the name of the Redeemer, gives dramatic expression to the scene:

I was not rejected though it appeared to be so,  
I did not perish, though men imagined it.  
Sheol saw me and fainted,  
Death vomited me out and many with me.  
I became to him gall and poison  
I went down with him to the utmost of his depth.  
His head and his feet became palsied;  
For my countenance he could not endure.  
I made a congregation of living men among his dead  
And spoke to them with living lips,  
That my word might not be in vain.  
Those who had died hastened to me, and cried out and said:  
"Have pity upon us, Son of God!  
Do to us according to thy mercy!  
Bring us out from the bonds of darkness,

Open the gate, that we may go out of it with thee.  
 For we see that Death has not touched thee.  
 Let us also be redeemed with thee; for thou art our Redeemer."  
 And I heard their voice, and sealed their heads with my name;  
 For they are free men, and belong unto me. Hallelujah.<sup>21</sup>

The real significance of Quartodecimanism is placed finally beyond doubt by the survivals of the practice in Gaul and Rome; for even in the West it survived so late as the sixth century! At Rome, where the death and resurrection of Attis had been officially celebrated on the twenty-fourth and twenty-fifth of March, the latter being regarded as the spring equinox,<sup>22</sup> ancient Martyrologies give March 25 and March 27 as the dates of the Crucifixion and Resurrection. This doubtless rests upon the chronology of Hippolytus, who in his Paschal Table marks the Passion of Christ in 29 A.D., a date astronomically impossible, but widely accepted in the second century, and at least in Rome explicitly based (Tertullian, Augustine) on the fact that in this year Friday fell on March 25 and was coincident with the fourteenth Nisan. In his commentary on Daniel Hippolytus expressly indicates Friday, March 25, in the consulship of the two Gemini (29 A.D.) as the true date, and the Philocalien Catalogue of the Popes gives the same. Both chronologies according to Duchesne<sup>23</sup> "are derived from official documents, and may be cited as evidence of the [primitive] Roman ecclesiastical usage."

The dating of the Resurrection on March 27 is probably a mere inference from the ancient celebration of March 25 as in Cappadocia. We cannot properly infer an existing ritual observance of March 27 besides March 25 from the chronologies. Frazer gives no evidence to show that any such existed at Rome, and if in Gaul, this does not appear from the authorities cited. On the contrary the passage cited from S. Martinus Dumiensis (Migne, *Pal. Lat.* lxxii. 50) is as follows:

A plerisque Gallicanis episcopis usque ante non multum tempus custoditum est, ut semper VIII. Kal. April. diem Paschae celebrent, in quo facta Christi *resurrectio* traditur.

<sup>21</sup> Translation of J. Rendel Harris, *Odes of Solomon* (1910), 137, with emendations of Gunkel, *Zfñl. W.*, XI, 4 (1910).

<sup>22</sup> Frazer, *Adonis, Attis, Osiris* (1906), 199. <sup>23</sup> *Origines du Culte Chretien*<sup>3</sup>, 262.

How curious that the very points of chief significance should have been rejected by the discoverer of this interesting testimony! It shows that Irenaeus in pleading with Victor for toleration of the "ancient" practice was speaking not for Asia only but for "observers" in his own region also. As Frazer remarks:

According to this last testimony, it was the resurrection, not the crucifixion, of Christ that was celebrated on the twenty-fifth of March; but Mgr. Duchesne attributes the statement to a mistake [!] of the writer.<sup>24</sup>

Preuschen's statement that "the Christians of Asia Minor appealed to an old apostolic tradition according to which Jesus *rose* on the evening of the day of his death" must, therefore, if accepted, be qualified by a recognition that the word "rose" is here used in a non-occidental sense.

We have still to inquire to what extent the Asiatics may justly be said to have possessed an "apostolic tradition" to this effect. Before proceeding to this, however, Preuschen's further statement of his view should be heard. He continues as follows:

The Syriac Didascalia makes an attempt to harmonize the tradition of the canonical Gospels and that of the Christians of Asia Minor. On the morning of Friday Jesus was led before Pilate and crucified on the same day. He suffered six hours and those are counted as one day. Then there was a darkness, lasting three hours, and that is counted as a night, and further, from the ninth hour until evening three hours—another day, and then followed the night of the Sabbath. In the Gospel of Matthew we read, "Now late on the Sabbath day, as it began to dawn toward the first day of the week, came Mary Magdalene," etc. (Matt. 28:1, R.V.). The calculation is strange, but its purpose is easily seen. The author believed that Jesus rose on the evening of the Friday on which he suffered death. In order to reconcile this tradition with the other which assumed a resurrection on the third day, he calculated (as above) in such a way that Jesus really rose after two days and two nights although only one day had passed. It is not known whether Friday of every week was celebrated by fasts *and the mysteries of resurrection* [!], or the 14th of each month [!], or the 14th of Nisan in each year. In the Orient Sunday was not known as the day of resurrection, *and hence there was no weekly celebration of this day* [!], but in the Occident Wednesday and Friday were regular fast days, and Sunday was celebrated as the day of resurrection. It is doubtful whether the Occident possessed in addition a special day in the year for the commemoration of the death and the resurrection of the Lord.

<sup>24</sup> I am indebted to Professor Morris Jastrow, Jr., for the important data above given as to occidental Quartodecimanism from Frazer, *Adonis, Aulis, Osiris*, p. 199, where references are given to the sources cited.

Of the curious evidences adduced from the *Syriac Didascalia* and Matt. 28:1 to show how the process of harmonization was applied even down to a late period to the conflicting traditions regarding "the third day" we need say but little. These, like the perplexities of Basilides of Pentapolis, are mere consequences of the impartation of the Western idea of the "rising." It was pointed out above<sup>25</sup> that the process of adjustment was still incomplete when the Gospel of Mark took its present form. Only Matthew and Luke go to the full length of logical consistency by substituting "on the third day" for Mark's "after three days." This is of minor importance, and merely confirms our previous statements regarding the slow adjustment of the "third day" datum in the synoptic tradition. In the latter part of the above extract, on the other hand, we have italicized certain statements concerning weekly and annual commemoration of the resurrection in the churches of the Orient, which at least require substantiation, if indeed they are not altogether misleading.

If we go far enough back in time it is probable that Preuschen is right in his statement of the purely hebdomadal character of occidental fasts and feasts. The addition in the West of "a special day in the year for the commemoration of the death and [another of] the resurrection of the Lord" may have been later and due to oriental influence. But nothing known to the present writer warrants the converse statement as to oriental practice. It would surely be difficult to substantiate the statement that "in the Orient there was no weekly celebration of this [the Lord's] day." On the contrary, the earliest sources that we possess for the observance of "the first day of the week" as "the Lord's day" (ἡ κυριακὴ ἡμέρα) are distinctly oriental, including the Pauline epistles,<sup>26</sup> the contemporary "We"-document of Acts,<sup>27</sup> and the Ephesian apocalypse called the Revelation of John.<sup>28</sup> Moreover it is the *Didaché*, a document attributed by most critics to northern Syria, and almost certainly of oriental origin, which shows the Church to be still maintaining the Synagogue practice of fasting twice in the week (Luke 18:12), distinguishing its ritual from that

<sup>25</sup> P. 379.

<sup>27</sup> Acts 20:7.

<sup>26</sup> I Cor. 16:2.

<sup>28</sup> Rev. 1:10.

of "the hypocrites" (Jews) by fasting on "the fourth day of the week and the Preparation" (Friday) instead of "the second and fifth."<sup>29</sup> Such evidence as the Gospel of Mark affords<sup>30</sup> of occidental practice, early as it is, can scarcely be said to evince even an equal degree of attention to the hebdomadal system. Mark seems to know but one fast-day in the week—Friday. Lacking further evidence it can hardly then appear otherwise than a decided exaggeration to declare that in the Orient "there was no weekly celebration of this (the Lord's) day." Jewish as it was in origin, we should expect the hebdomadal system to take greater prominence among the oriental churches than among the occidental; and, so far as the present writer's knowledge extends, such is in reality the case. The true point of contrast is that whereas in the West the weekly Lord's day served as a mode of commemorating (and possibly at the very first even as the *only* mode of commemorating) the death and resurrection of Jesus, in the Orient the death and resurrection of Jesus were commemorated by the *annual* feast of the new Redemption on Nisan fourteenth, the *weekly* fasts and feast having (originally) a different occasion and application. "Fasts and celebrations of the mysteries of the resurrection" on "the fourteenth of *each month*" would seem to be nothing less than figments of Preuschen's imagination, and we have yet to hear of evidence looking to "celebration of the mysteries of the resurrection" on "*Friday* of every week." The semi-weekly fasts of *Didaché* viii, as the context itself indicates, are simply taken over from the Synagogue. Why the days were changed from "the second and fifth" to "the fourth and the Preparation" would not be hard to guess even if we had not the express statement of *Apost. Const.* v. 15, 18, and the parallel occidental phenomenon of Mark 2:20 (ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ, not ἡμέραις, as in Luke, or τότε, as in Matthew). But this mere shifting of the semi-weekly fasts is a very different thing from instituting a weekly observance (on Friday!) of Jesus' death and resurrection. Why, indeed, should it be weekly? We miss the

<sup>29</sup> *Didaché* viii. In *Apost. Const.* v. 15, 18 the placing of the facts of passion week on Wednesday and Friday is said to be on account of the Betrayal and the Crucifixion.

<sup>30</sup> Mark 2:20, 16:2.

whole point of the Quartodeciman's plea in his great struggle against the overmastering domination of Roman practice, if we fail to see that in his view the commemoration of the death and resurrection of Jesus is completely independent of the hebdomadal system, and should be mainly, if not exclusively, annual.

Here, then, is the really striking and important truth of the extract we have cited. It is not true (unless all our knowledge be at fault) that in the oriental churches "there was no weekly celebration of this day" (Sunday). It is, however, true—and a truth of no small significance, that—if we go back far enough—"in the Orient Sunday was not known *as the day of resurrection*."

The final step in our problem is one which involves again the application in our exegesis of the method of pragmatic values. It calls upon us to go back in the history of the Asiatic and oriental churches and determine, as well as we are able, what ground existed for their claim in the matter of commemoration of the Lord's death and resurrection to be better representatives than the church at Rome of the true and authentic apostolic tradition. It calls upon us also to explain the prevalence in both East and West of the hebdomadal system with festal observance of "the first day of the week" as "the Lord's day." For certainly after admitting the weekly observance of this day throughout Christendom, if we deny its origin to have been what the modern world supposes, we shall be called upon to explain both its real origin and the occasion of the misapprehension.

First of all we must determine a little more exactly what sort of "old apostolic tradition" the Quartodeciman Asiatic churches really appealed to. In making his statement in the form above quoted<sup>31</sup> Preuschen doubtless does not wish to be understood as maintaining that these churches quoted definite statements attributed to the apostles "according to which Jesus rose on the evening of the day of his death." Such statements are hardly conceivable in view of the relatively uniform tradition regarding "the third day," and would certainly have provoked appeal to the definitely contrary statements of the apostle Paul in one of the best known and most widely circulated of his epistles,<sup>32</sup> to

<sup>31</sup> P. 381.

<sup>32</sup> I Cor. 15:4.



say nothing of the Gospels. We are to understand, no doubt, that the churches of Asia, mainly through Polycarp, their most venerable authority, who suffered martyrdom in 155 A.D. as "the father of the Christians of Asia" at 86 years of age,<sup>33</sup> maintained that the Quartodeciman annual commemoration of the Lord's death and resurrection, and not the Roman hebdomadal (or hebdomadal-annual), was the authentic practice of the very apostles themselves. At Rome in 154 A.D. Polycarp had in fact resisted all the attempts of Anicetus to persuade him "not to observe what he had always observed with John the disciple of our Lord, and the other apostles with whom he had associated," i.e., the annual rite on the fourteenth. As in later forms of the controversy so also at the earliest the distinction is between "observers" (*τηροῦντες*) and "non-observers." The Roman bishop makes the definite attempt to dissuade his venerable guest from a practice which he no doubt regarded as a survival of Judaism. And Irenaeus expressly testifies that Victor's predecessors before Soter back to Sixtus (115-25 A.D.) were "non-observers," though tolerant of those who observed. Irenaeus in his reference of Victor<sup>34</sup> to the observance of Polycarp "with John" has of course John the Apostle in mind. Polycarp, on the other hand, who never refers in his extant letter to John, but always to Paul, as his apostolic authority, is more likely to have had in mind John the Presbyter of Jerusalem, referred to as a leading member of the apostolic community in Palestine down to 117 A.D. by Papias, Eusebius, and Epiphanius. But this scarcely diminishes the value of his testimony. For Polycarp had been a Christian from infancy,<sup>35</sup> and had been brought to Smyrna from Syria as a youth.<sup>36</sup> He may very well, therefore, have had substantially the experience claimed, and in any event his testimony as to apostolic practice on such a point would be well-nigh conclusive. Moreover, no modern historian would question for a moment the historicity of this view of apostolic practice. It is substantially certain that at least the apostolic community in Jerusalem continued to observe the

<sup>33</sup> *Martyrdom* ix. 3.

<sup>34</sup> Eusebius, *H.E.* V. xxiv. 16.

<sup>35</sup> *Martyrdom* ix. 3.

<sup>36</sup> *Vita*, beginning.

annual rite of the Passover, however different and larger the Christian significance they probably attached to it.

But we may go farther still. The oldest and most authentic documents we possess, when studied from the viewpoint of historic ritual, make it well-nigh certain that at least in Ephesus and among the churches of Asia Quartodeciman observance was sanctioned and approved by the apostle Paul himself.

Whatever objection might be drawn from Paul's rebuke of the Galatians and Colossians for a *Judaizing and legalistic* observance of "days and months and (sacred) seasons and years"<sup>37</sup> is more than offset by his clear approval elsewhere of Christianized, non-legalistic observance<sup>38</sup> and the indisputable evidence of the "We"-document of Acts as to the keeping of "the days of Unleavened Bread" at Philippi.<sup>39</sup> But to come directly to the ancient headquarters of Quartodeciman observance, Ephesus. It is generally recognized that the First Epistle to the Corinthians was written from Ephesus at about the season of Passover (I Cor. 16:8) and that it contains more than one allusion to observances connected with the ritual. The exhortation, "Purge out the old leaven, that ye may be a new lump, even as ye are unleavened; for our passover also hath been sacrificed, even Christ: wherefore let us keep the feast not with old leaven . . . but with the unleavened bread of sincerity and truth"<sup>40</sup> certainly implies sanction and approval of the keeping of a Christian Passover, and is universally recognized as alluding to the Jewish ceremony on Nisan 13 of the "putting away of the leaven." But the clew should have been followed up. Not only in chap. 5, but throughout the epistle figures recur which are suggested by the Passover ritual. That of the defiling "old leaven" returns perhaps in 15:33. "This bread," referred to in 11:26 as consecrated by Jesus and made a perpetual memorial, is the new, unleavened bread of the new (Jewish) year. The story of the redemption out of Egypt, when Israel passed through the Red Sea, a distinctively Passover theme, is employed as a figure of baptism in 10:1. But all these are merely

<sup>37</sup> Gal. 4:10; Col. 2:16.

<sup>39</sup> Acts 20:6.

<sup>38</sup> Rom. 14:5.

<sup>40</sup> I Cor. 5:7 f.

subsidiary. We are concerned with the commemoration of the resurrection, and particularly with the allusion to "the third day" as having some special significance in Christian tradition. It is vital to any historical understanding of the great resurrection chapter in I Cor., chap. 15, to realize that the entire argument, from its allusion to the fate of the seed-corn buried in the earth through the winter but raised again in the new body which God has given it at the beginning of the new year, down to its reference to Christ as the "firstfruits of them that slept," is not only suggested by, but frankly based upon, the Jewish ritual of the feast of Unleavened Bread. "Firstfruits," with its ritual of the lifting up before God of the first sheaf of the new crop marked the beginning, as Pentecost marked the close, of the seven festal weeks of wheat-harvest. It is true the phrase "on the morrow after the Sabbath" in the calendar law of Lev. 23:11, 15 was variously interpreted, orthodox Jews counting from 16th Nisan to 6th Sivan. But Samaritans and Karaites made every Firstfruits and every Pentecost a first day of the week. In the year of the crucifixion all must have been in agreement if the crucifixion was, as we have reason to believe, on Nisan 14; for Firstfruits fell of course on "the third day" from the Friday of the great tragedy. It becomes obvious at once, therefore, why Paul mentions the burial of Jesus and his rising "on the third day," however indifferent he might be to the sepulcher traditions, or ignorant of them. Jesus' burial is mentioned because it corresponds to the dropping of the kernel of wheat into the ground. His rising "on the third day" (whatever the "Scripture" on which Paul based his conviction of the fact) is affirmed because of the ritual of the ἀπαρχή; "for now is Christ risen from the dead and become the ἀπαρχή of them that slept."

We have a precisely parallel case in the passage from Clement of Alexandria excerpted no doubt from his work on the Quarto-deciman controversy by the author of the *Paschal Chronicle* (630 A.D.):

The resurrection also testifies to it (the fourteenth Nisan as the true Pass-over); at least he rose on the third day, which was the first of the weeks of the harvest, in which it had been enacted (Lev. 22:11) that the priest should offer the (wave)-sheaf.

Epiphanius, too, though opposed to the Quartodecimans, shows many traces of acquaintance with their views and practices. In his opinion (*Haer.* li. 26 f.) Jesus was crucified on the 14th Nisan and rose on the 16th, which in that year was the equinox. "It was on the 16th that the sheaf was presented at the annual festival,"<sup>41</sup> and thus it prefigured the resurrection of Him who was the Firstfruits of the dead."

To Clement and Epiphanius, as to Paul, the fact (however established) that Jesus "rose on the third day" is of interest not because in the particular year of the crucifixion this happened to be a Sunday, but because it coincided with the day of the lifting of the sheaf.

But First Corinthians, written as it was from Ephesus at Passover season, is not the only Pauline epistle which testifies to primitive observance of this season among the churches of this region. Ephesians from end to end is echoing with Passover songs of redemption. Its opening paean is based upon the Redemption of a people for an "own possession." In 1:15—2:6 this theme passes over into the kindred one of deliverance from the bondage and darkness of death; in 4:8—10 it takes almost the mythological form of an avatar doctrine, employing the same scriptural passages and figures as the perhaps contemporary *Odes of Solomon*; in 5:7—14 we have the Isaian figure of Yahweh's triumph over the power of darkness and the underworld, while in 6:10—17 the armor of the conflict is (as in Isaiah) the full panoply of the sun-hero who overcomes the chaos-monster. In 5:14 we have even the explicit citation of a redemption ode of the character described and now so well exemplified, together with an encouragement in 5:18 f. to the use of such "spiritual odes" in the festal assembly. Finally, unless Origen be wrong, we have in the exhortation to "stand, having your feet shod with the readiness of the gospel of peace" (Eph. 6:14 f.) a distinct allusion to the ritual of Passover itself, which was to be eaten "with your loins girded, your shoes on your feet, and your staff in your hand"<sup>42</sup>

<sup>41</sup> This is correct. See above, p. 392.

<sup>42</sup> Ex. 12:11. See the quotation from Aphraates, "And if he says: 'Eat it as men who hasten away' this is fulfilled in the church of God in this wise, that they eat the lamb 'as men who hasten away' standing on their feet," in Drummond, *Authorship*, etc., p. 461.

in "readiness" (ἐτοιμασία) to go forth from "the house of bondage."

We need not adduce further evidence of the influence of Christianized Jewish ritual upon the epistles of Paul. Enough has been set forth to make the hypothesis of influence from contemporary observance almost a certainty. To attempt in view of this an explanation of the coincidence of dates in the comparison of Jesus' crucifixion to the slaughtering of the passover lamb, and his resurrection to the lifting of the "firstfruits" of wheat-harvest as merely accidental would be irrational. It follows that Quarto-deciman commemoration of the resurrection by anniversary is not only Ephesian and "Johannine." It is Pauline. The hebdomadal system which through the Roman Gospel of Mark has become dominant in the synoptic Gospels was at least as prevalent in the East as in the West. But unlike the West the East did not base it on the events of Passion Week. Its origin then cannot have been the desire to commemorate the discovery of the empty tomb, if indeed it were a priori possible to imagine a conclave of the apostolic brotherhood inferring from this event and accompanying manifestations that the "resurrection" must have taken place on the first day of the week and enacting in consequence a weekly (why weekly?) observance of the day.

We are thus brought at last face to face with the question: What was the historic origin of the Lord's day; and how could a hebdomadal system of Synagogue origin in the East become transformed in the West into a weekly commemoration of Jesus' passion and resurrection?

We have seen above<sup>43</sup> that the transfer in *Didaché* of the semi-weekly fast-days of "the hypocrites" from "the second and fifth days of the week" to "the fourth and the Preparation" must be due to the great tragedy of Calvary. So long as the resurrection was not understood to be commemorated (or at least not primarily commemorated) by festal observance of the first day of the week as "the Lord's day," but had its own far more splendid commemoration in the annual observance of "the new Passover" on Nisan 14, the transfer would have but little effect on the resurrec-

<sup>43</sup> P. 387.

tion tradition and observance. Such were the conditions in Asia so long as the ancient Quartodeciman rite could maintain itself against the more and more intolerant anti-semitism of the West. In the West two generally prevalent tendencies brought about a quite different result. These were: (1) the substitution of more crudely concrete and external conceptions for more internal and mystical in interpreting the doctrine of the resurrection; (2) the rapid disappearance of the Jewish element from the church and simultaneous growth of an intense antipathy to practices regarded as "Judaizing," especially the observance of (Jewish) "times and seasons and days and years."

(1) We need not dwell upon the first of these tendencies. The trend of orthodox apologetic is only too apparent in the Chiliastic writers of the second century with their dogma of a "resurrection of the *flesh*" (τῆς σαρκός), and their insistence on the palpable nature of the resurrection body of Jesus,<sup>44</sup> in opposition even to the direct and explicit statements of Paul. They even insist that the Gnostics who quoted his saying "flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God" were perverting his meaning<sup>45</sup> and quoted Rev. 20:6 and sayings of "the Elders" in Jerusalem in proof of the material nature of the Kingdom. To believe that "when we die our souls are taken to heaven" became an intolerable heresy.<sup>46</sup> It was considered a "denial of the resurrection."<sup>47</sup> As respects the resurrection body a crudely materialistic reanimation doctrine prevailed, widely at variance with the Pauline, equally at variance, as we may perhaps infer from I Cor., chap. 15, with the primitive apostolic. Paul's doctrine posits a spiritual body wherewith we are "clothed upon," a "house from heaven," to which this earthly frame is only as the "tabernacle" to the temple. It rested upon visions of the glorified Lord. Our bodies were to be "transformed into the likeness of his glory-body." But it does not differ from the doctrine of the glorified resurrection body of *Apoc. Bar.* li. 3-11 save in the establishment of this pre-

<sup>44</sup> Luke 24:36-43; cf. Ignatius, *ad Smyrn.* iii.

<sup>45</sup> II Pet. 3:16; cf. Irenaeus, *Haer.* V. ix. 1.

<sup>46</sup> Justin, *Dial.* lxxx.

<sup>47</sup> Polycarp, *Ep.* vii; cf. Just. M., *On The Resurrection.*

cedent of the "firstfruits." A believer of the Pauline stamp would therefore have no thought of seeking the body of Jesus in the sepulcher after he had had the vision of the body which it pleased God to give him—the "body of glory." Such inquiry was probably known to be impracticable. It would have seemed at least unnecessary, if not impious. It would be as if the husbandman, after having reaped his "firstfruits," should seek again beneath the soil the seed he had placed there the season before. The Paulinist might expect to find, were such a needless inquiry to be made, either that the material body of the Lord had been "changed in a moment, in the twinkling of an eye"; or that it had suffered the normal fate of the "sinful flesh" to which it was "like." Neither alternative would affect the assurance on which he rested. To the believer of the post-apostolic age, who held a more concrete and materialistic type of doctrine, a doctrine of the *reanimation of the flesh*, investigation of the sepulcher would be the very first thought. To him it was incredible that some at least of the apostolic company should not have made it. To him almost any tale of a tomb found empty near Calvary within a brief time after the crucifixion would be credible and welcome. Through the preponderant influence of the Gospel of Mark the particular story which has become dominant in evangelic tradition is the shrine-story (to give it its true name) of the sepulcher of Joseph. It has indeed supplanted the older Petrine narrative in all but a few traces; but as we have seen, it bears the marks of its later origin upon its face. It has not been admitted without a struggle, the evidences of change and adaptation are everywhere. Relics of piecing, readjusting, and amending abound. Gradually the sepulcher traditions gain the upper hand over the Pauline. We can trace their steady advance from (Deutero-) Mark to Matthew, from these to Luke-Acts, from these to "John," to Ignatius, and to the *Gospel of Peter*. Mere manifestations of the risen Christ *in* Peter, or *in* Paul, no longer satisfy. It is not enough that God "energized in" Peter and ten other disciples in Galilee ten days or so after the crucifixion, or later (in Jerusalem?) in great "manifestations of the Spirit" to "James and all the apostles," and even to "above five hundred

brethren at once." Mere *spiritual* experiences like these could prove nothing on the great question, "With what *body* do they come?" There must be testimony that the sepulcher was empty, that the resurrection body was palpable, had "flesh and bones," that the disciples "ate and drank with him after that he rose from the dead." A decade after Paul's death it must have been already a hopeless task to resist the pressure of traditions of this type from which the gospel of Paul in I Cor., chap. 15, is still completely free. And down to our own time its main buttress is the supposed fact that the observance of Sunday commemorates the finding of the empty tomb.

(2) It is upon this supposed fact of the origin of Sunday observance in the discovery of the empty tomb that our inquiry into primitive differences between East and West may be expected to throw light. Preuschen, as we have seen, denies altogether the primitive observance of Sunday in the East; but this seems to be a misapprehension. The "resurrection" was otherwise commemorated, though it was believed to have happened on "the third day" (from the fatal Passover), and the first day of the week was observed as "the Lord's day," but without relation (primitively) to the sepulcher traditions. How came the "resurrection" to be dated (not without traces of vacillation) on "the third day," and all the West to make this "Lord's day" fundamental in its resurrection observance?

It is to be explained, unless we are misled, by the growing antipathy to the Jewish system of *annual* feasts and fasts, still observed in the time of Paul and the Travel document, and not only by the earlier apostles and the Palestinian churches but by Paul himself and the churches of Asia. Unlike the hebdomadal system, the annual system of Passover, Pentecost and "the Fast," could be kept only on the basis of the Jewish luni-solar year, the determination of which was an exclusive prerogative of the Jewish authorities. It is a marvel that such traces as still remain of this luni-solar system in our ecclesiastical year should have been able to maintain front against the Julian calendar. Before the end of the first century a new hebdomadal system was rapidly superseding the Jewish fasts and Sabbaths throughout the Christian



world. Everywhere "the Lord's day" was finding more observers than the seventh, though for a time both continued side by side, even at Rome.<sup>48</sup> But "fasting the world" and "sabbatizing (i.e., discontinuing) the Sabbath" were soon decreed to be conditions sine qua non of "inheriting the kingdom" and "beholding the Father."<sup>49</sup> The Gospel of Mark will have no more either of these or of Passovers. The weekly Lord's Supper was instituted according to this evangelist at the very time of the Passover feast, and for the express purpose of displacing it.<sup>50</sup> Western sentiment will have been at least equally hostile to the observance of Pentecost; whereas in the Orient the seven weeks of wheat-harvest continued to be among Christians as it had been among Jews, a period of uninterrupted festivity, commemorating, as it did, not merely "the joy of harvest," but the restoration of the "corn of wheat," the period when Jesus "ate and drank with the disciples, after that he was risen from the dead." We have only to go back to the "Travel-document" of Acts to find Paul and his company even more careful about the observance of Pentecost in Jerusalem, than of Passover at Philippi.

But in the West the system of Jewish *annual* feasts and fasts is violently repudiated. After Acts 27:9, we hear no more of "the (annual) Fast." When in its place the Easter fast and feast come in, especial pains are taken to avoid all appearance of dependence on, or imitation of, "the most hateful mob of the Jews . . . the slayers of the Lord."<sup>51</sup> The calendar is ultimately so arranged that there shall be the least possible degree of coincidence between Passover and Easter,<sup>52</sup> and none whatever between Pentecost (Sunday) and Ascension day, while in the East in 100-130 Christians were still celebrating "the eighth day" (Sunday) as that on which

<sup>48</sup> Rom. 14:5 f.

<sup>49</sup> *Oxyrhynchus Logia*, Log. ii.

<sup>50</sup> Mark 14:25. See comment in *Beginnings of Gospel Story*, *ad loc.*, and cf. Eusebius, *Pasch. Frgts.* §7.

<sup>51</sup> See the references to Socrates, Sozomen, and Eusebius in Drummond, *Authorship*, etc., p. 463. Drummond justly observes that the only thing which was objected to as Jewish in Quartodeciman practice was the time fixed for the observance.

<sup>52</sup> The writer of the *Paschal Chronicle* admits that "the apostles handed it down to the churches to keep the fourteenth of the first lunar month," but adds as a reason for putting off the celebration till the following Sunday "that we may not feast with the Jews."

"Jesus both rose again from the dead, and having been manifested ascended also into the heavens."<sup>53</sup>

The hebdomadal system of Mark distinctly aims to displace the Jewish,<sup>54</sup> and for this purpose opposes both fasts and Sabbaths with an explicit claim that the new faith shall determine its own ordinances (Mark 2:18—3:6). The fasts "on the second and fifth days of the week" are reduced to a single fast "on that day on which the Bridegroom was taken away" (2:20).<sup>55</sup> The Jewish Sabbaths are repudiated. In due time the evangelist will bring in "the first day of the week" as a memorial of the resurrection (16:1 ff.). Here, then, is a system which, while still fundamentally hebdomadal, is intensely and intentionally anti-Judaistic. The single weekly fast and weekly feast are intended to supersede both the hebdomadal and the annual system of the Synagogue. Two data, and two only, it has retained, both from the hebdomadal system, making one commemorate the death, the other the resurrection, of the Lord. The fourth evangelist, on the contrary, abandons the Markan outline of the ministry for one that is fundamentally based on Jesus' observance of the system of annual "feasts of the Jews."

But a *weekly* celebration of the passion and resurrection cannot be accounted for as original, especially in view of the better attested *annual* commemoration of Asia. It can only be accounted for as an effort to give new and altered application to practices already too deeply rooted for eradication. That these ancient practices were of Jewish origin might almost go without saying. The fact that they are *weekly* observances is absolutely conclusive. The sabbatic system is distinctive of Judaism. How, then, did "the Lord's day," in Paul's time, still on equal terms with the Sabbath, come gradually to increase in relative importance until post-Reformation divines could imagine some apostolic decree formally substituting the first for the seventh day of the week in Mosaic commandment?

<sup>53</sup> *Ep. Barn.* xv. 9.

<sup>54</sup> Cf. Eusebius, *On the Passover*, §7. Whereas the Jews killed the sheep of the Passover only once a year "we of the new covenant on each Lord's day celebrate our own Passover."

<sup>55</sup> Matthew characteristically alters *ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ* to the plural.

The place to look when seeking the occasion of change in the hebdomadal system is the law of the hebdomadal system itself, the law of the Feast of *Weeks*. The starting-point for the seven weeks of wheat-harvest is "the morrow after the Sabbath" of Passover, Paul's "third day" from the crucifixion. It is signalized, as already noted, by the offering of "firstfruits." The system is completed by the great Day of Pentecost, on the fiftieth day.

Now it is true that only Samaritans and other heretical sects interpreted "the morrow after the Sabbath" in Lev. 23:11 as fixing Firstfruits (and consequently Pentecost also) invariably on the first day of the week. Orthodox synagogue practice, it would seem, has always adopted Sivan 6 as Pentecost, counting 50 days from Nisan 16, whatever the day of the week. But not only is it apparent from a comparison of I Cor. 15:20 with the passages already cited from Clement of Alexandria and Epiphanius, that the point of coincidence aimed at by Paul in his reference to the resurrection "on the third day" was the offering of the "firstfruits" in the temple, and not the visit of the women to the sepulcher, but we are able now to establish on astronomical grounds that there is no year of Pilate's administration in which Nisan 15 can have fallen on a Friday.<sup>56</sup> This really removes the Synoptic date from consideration and establishes the Johannine tradition of the crucifixion as having occurred on the 14th. It follows that Firstfruits (Nisan 16th) *in that year* will have been a Sunday by *all* reckonings, whether orthodox or sectarian. Pentecost also fell upon a "first day of the week." If, then, we can point to any peculiarly significant and memorable event signalizing to the primitive church this terminus ad quem of the seven weeks period we need not be at a loss for the determination of the terminus a quo on "the third day" even without a reference to the visit of the women to the sepulcher. The hebdomadal system would stand alongside the annual once Pentecost, its fiftieth day, were fixed on a given day of the week. If it was a "Lord's day" Firstfruits also was a "Lord's day," that "third day" on which "according to the Scriptures" Christ must rise from the dead.

<sup>56</sup> See J. K. Fotheringham on "Astronomical Evidence for the date of the Crucifixion" in *Journ. of Theol. Studies*, XII, 45 (October, 1910), 123. Professor Fotheringham kindly refers to my own attempts in this direction on p. 124: "I am pleased to find that Dr. Bacon's date, 30 A.D., April 7, is now confirmed astronomically."

But surely it is superfluous to ask whether the Day of Pentecost had been made memorable to the primitive Church by any peculiarly significant occurrence. Whether we identify the manifestation to "above five hundred brethren at once," which in Paul's summary follows that "to Cephas" and that "to the twelve," with the Lukan story of the church's endowment with the Spirit or not, this "first day of the week" at Pentecost had peculiar right to the name "the Lord's day" (*ἡ κυριακὴ ἡμέρα*); for Peter's exposition of the significance of the event, as Luke, with his characteristic rhetorical skill, reports it, is this: "God hath made this same Jesus whom ye crucified both Lord (*κύριον*) and Christ."

Pentecost was the birthday of the church. For centuries the phenomena whose origin it witnessed remained the supreme evidence to which the church pointed for its sanction, the "demonstration of the Spirit and of power." Luke and Paul are at one in resting their assurance of the message of resurrection and adoption upon the fact that God had "poured forth this which ye see and hear." Surely if the ancient oriental church shifted its two weekly fasts from the second and fifth to the fourth and sixth days of the week through the influence of the Passover tragedy, it would not be surprising that it should—not indeed displace the weekly festival of the Sabbath, but—add a "first day of the week" with more or less kindred observances.

Paul is our witness that so early as our First Corinthians the other terminus of the seven festal weeks of wheat harvest, "the third day," which in the year of the crucifixion had been coincident with Firstfruits, was already taken to coincide with Jesus' becoming the "Firstfruits of them that slept." He based the belief on Scripture, not on any reported experience of man or woman in the church. His "Scripture" may have been Hos. 6:2; it may have been Lev. 23:11 ff., or the two in combination. All we can know for certain is that the hebdomadal system had thus received baptism into the church, and that the great Lord's day, fifty days from the morrow after the Sabbath of the Passover of the Crucifixion, was its pivotal point.

Occidental opposition to the feasts and fasts of the Synagogue would do the rest. Suppression of the annual system of commemo-

ration would throw the whole burden upon the weekly, and Friday and Sunday would be correspondingly emphasized as *weekly* commemorations of the death and resurrection of Jesus, leading to the whole series of divergences from oriental practice, and (indirectly) from tradition as well. The manifestations related in the later documents combine with their heightened emphasis upon the physical tangibleness of the body, an exact dating upon "the first day of the week." These are the two distinctive marks of the later evangelic as against the Pauline tradition. The Pauline manifestations are not dated, either as to time or place; and they are not physical, but spiritual experiences.

One curious date remains embedded in synoptic narrative, but singularly out of joint with all its context. Acts 1:3 limits the period of Jesus' post-resurrection intercourse with his disciples not, as we should expect, to fifty, but to "*forty* days." We almost unavoidably think of Pentecost as the inferior limit; for there is no occurrence of any kind to mark an earlier day. But if Pentecost be the term originally in mind when the tradition of the 40 days of intercourse took form, from what occurrence were they reckoned? Clearly it can only be the manifestation to Cephas, the first of the series, nearly obliterated elsewhere, as we have seen, from the synoptic record, but certainly an element of primitive tradition, and certainly located in Galilee. *Forty* days before Pentecost, or ten days after "the morrow after the Sabbath" of the crucifixion, is a date exactly accordant with all that is required in the still remaining traces for the date of that fundamental experience in the history of the church, the "turning again" of Simon.

But our main contention is independent of this. However the Lukan datum of the 40 days be accounted for, it is apparent that the primitive system of *weekly* fasts and Lord's days in the apostolic church was not based upon our synoptic tradition of the resurrection. The true relation of the two is more nearly the reverse. The weekly hebdomadal system East and West was based upon the Jewish. In the East the deflection caused by a desire to commemorate the Passion and Resurrection was relatively slight,

a shifting of the semi-weekly fasts, and the addition of a "Lord's day" to the Sabbath. In the West a less mystical conception of the "resurrection," and a stronger antipathy to the Jewish system of annual feasts led to much greater divergence. The observances of the church were made at first exclusively hebdomadal. The single weekly fast and weekly feast were perhaps the *only* commemoration of the crucifixion and resurrection. The tradition took on a form corresponding to these ideas. When the effort at unification of observance was made which culminated in the great Council of Nicaea, Roman practice, exemplified in synoptic tradition, was combined as well as might be with Asiatic, exemplified in John. Harmonization of the written tradition still remains an unfinished if not a hopeless task. But comparison is instructive.

DOSITHEUS, THE SAMARITAN HERESIARCH, AND HIS  
RELATIONS TO JEWISH AND CHRISTIAN  
DOCTRINES AND SECTS<sup>1</sup>

(A STUDY OF PROFESSOR SCHECHTER'S RECENT  
PUBLICATION)

---

DR. K. KOHLER  
Hebrew Union College, Cincinnati, O.

---

Since the discovery of the Hebrew Ben Sira by Professor Schechter in 1897, then Lector of Talmud at Cambridge, England, the Cairo Genizah treasures have yielded a number of documents which cast new light upon entire periods of Jewish history. The first part of the "Documents of Jewish Sectaries" just published by the Cambridge Press, edited, translated, and accompanied with copious notes and an Introduction by Professor Schechter under the special title *Fragments of a Zadokite Work*, will in all likelihood, as was stated by Professor Margoliouth in the *London Athenaeum* of November 26, "outrank his other publications in general importance and interest." Not because, as the latter thinks, it has anything to do with the early Judaic phase of Christianity. There is absolutely nothing in the document to support this conjecture except the fact that the Messiah is represented as "the teacher of righteousness" and that his followers are spoken of as "those who entered the new covenant" at Damascus. There is no reference whatsoever to either baptism or any other Christian practice or doctrine. On the contrary, the whole sacrificial system with all the Levitical laws of purity connected therewith, the most rigid observance of the Sabbath and the dietary laws are insisted upon throughout the messianic manifesto so as to offer no ground whatsoever to ascribe it either to followers of the Nazarene teacher who with such scathing language condemned all this ritualism, or of John the Baptist who wanted the cleansing of man from sin by the water of repentance, not by blood. Still more far-fetched is

<sup>1</sup> This article had been finished several weeks before the letter of E. N. Adler in the *London Athenaeum* of February 4 came to the notice of the writer, affording him great satisfaction to find a number of points brought out that accord with the results of his own study, particularly the allusion of the document to Simeon ben Shetaḥ and to Pompey.

the idea of identifying "the man of scoffing," "filled with the spirit of Belial," with St. Paul, as the foe of the sect in question is charged with having seduced the people to crimes such as polygamy and other crimes of a sacrilegious and socio-political nature that can have no reference to the austere and world-despising apostle of the heathen.

In one respect, however, Professor Margoliouth's criticism is correct. Professor Schechter's interpretation and conception of the document failed to take account of "the personal note" that runs through it and finds its expression in "the frequent use of the well-known Hebrew form of 'Hearken ye unto me!' which seems to prove that the document was composed at the time of the religious events it treats of." On reading it we cannot help being impressed by the powerful appeal with which the leader, or rather leaders, of the movement address themselves to the adherents of the sect, while denouncing in vehement language their mighty adversaries who obviously are under the leadership of a politically strong and influential personality. In the form of a ringing, fierce protest, which tells of the presence of the dreaded powerful personality, they lay down the principles of belief and practice they are bound to maintain by the oath of their "new covenant" in opposition to those of their antagonists.

The learned editor correctly assumes that the work of which the Genizah harbored the fragments of two recensions, one of small extent assigned by him to the tenth, the other of more extensive length pointing to the twelfth century, and which must have been much in circulation at the time in circles sympathizing with the views therein expressed, was identical with the one the early Karaites speak of as Zadokite in character and origin and as known to Anan, the founder of Karaism, who made good use thereof. Nor is it merely accidental that a mutilated fragment of Anan's main work, *Sefer ha Mizwoth*, which forms the contents of Professor Schechter's Second Document, was found in the Genizah alongside of the other. Unfortunately, however, Professor Schechter allowed himself to be misled by Kirkisani and other writers of the tenth century<sup>2</sup> to make of Zadok, after the old unhistorical method, a heresiarch and—in opposition to Geiger's well-known theory accepted by Wellhausen, Schürer, and other eminent historians—construe a history of the Zadokites, the Dositheans, and the Falashas full of glaring contradictions and based upon opinions held by Beer, Frankel, and Wreschner which do not bear closer scrutiny, as will be seen in the course of this article. This attitude appears all the more strange as in his *Intro-*

<sup>2</sup> See Harkavy's article in Graetz, *Gesch. d. J.*, V<sup>3</sup>, 413 ff.



*duction to Ben Sira* (p. 35) Professor Schechter called attention to the fact that the mention of the priestly house of Zadok in the prayer fully corroborated Geiger's theory as to the character of the Sadducees in the pre-Pharisaic period to which Ben Sira belongs.

Indeed, eight years ago Professor Schechter was far nearer the truth, when, in a conversation with the writer, he spoke of the Dosithean character and origin of the manuscript he had brought from Cambridge. The very opening words of the document show it to have been the messianic pronunciamiento of the Samaritan heresiarch, as, in direct opposition to the messiahship of David, the king of Judah, it announces "the sprouting forth of a Messiah from Israel and Aaron," elsewhere "from Aaron and Israel" (see pp. 1, 12, 19); that is, from the Samaritan line of the priestly house of *Zadok*—a phrase strangely misunderstood by the editor (*Introduction*, xiii, note 6). No less clearly is the Samaritan character of the messianic pronunciamiento brought out at the very outset when it speaks of "the End of the Wrath" having arrived at the close of the 490 years (so correctly emended by the editor with reference to the 70 weeks of years in Dan. 9:2, 24) after Nebuchadnezzar's overthrow of the nation (586 B.C.). For not only do the Samaritans divide their history into an era of divine favor and one of divine wrath,<sup>3</sup> but they alone could look upon the second temple period as a continuation of the era of wrath. Only when in the year 63 B.C. Samaria was for a short while liberated from the dominion of Judea by Pompey, could an era of divine favor have been looked for, one to be brought about by a Messiah from their own midst. And exactly as John Hyrcanus had been declared the priest-king of a higher order predicted in Scripture,<sup>4</sup> so could the messianic claim be raised by a priest of the more legitimate house of Zadok. Of course, we must not expect messianic calculations to be based upon exact chronology. Suffice it to know that we are brought down to the former half of the first pre-Christian century which witnessed the rise of the Pharisean party to power under the leadership of Simeon ben Shetah, the brother of Queen Alexandria Salome, "the man of hot hands," the unrelenting, uncompromising foe of the Sadducees,<sup>5</sup> and, no doubt, dreaded and cursed by the opposing party as no other leader. And, while we have no date even approximately to place Dositheus, the founder of the new Samaritan sect, we have every reason to believe that his being known as the first heresiarch, who

<sup>3</sup> See Abul-Fath—37; Heidenheim's *Sam. Bibl.*, *passim*, and *J.Q.R.*, VIII, 572.

<sup>4</sup> Ps. 110; Targ. Jer. Deut. 33:10, and in the Testament of Levi.

<sup>5</sup> Jer. Sanh., vi, 4, p. 23b.

had some relationship to the mythical founder of Sadduceism, indicates that it is just this turbulent period in Jewish history in which he appeared on the scene as the antagonist of the Pharisees and their powerful leader.

Before analyzing our document, let us consider the meaning of the epithet used to designate the party assailed in the book: *bone hayiz* (pp. 4 and 8). The word cannot mean "builders of a fence," as translated and explained with reference to Aboth I, 1: *ššā šəyag la Torah*, "Build a fence around the Law," as our document also insists upon having a fence around the Sabbath (p. 10). Compare our further remarks on the passage. Taken from Ezek. 13:10, the word signifies "builders of a hollow partition wall," and is an apt nickname for the Pharisees whose separatism is declared to be pretentious and hollow.<sup>6</sup> Against these separatists and their leader, Simeon ben Shetaḥ, called "the scoffer who pours forth water of deceitfulness," who "filled with the spirit of Belial drags the people by his teaching into the threefold snare of fornication, of greed, and of desecration of the sanctuary," is directed the fierce arraignment (pp. 4, 8, and 20). Particularly is the latter charged with having fomented discord and strife and caused the people to transgress the laws concerning sexual purity, the Sabbath and festivals, and those of righteousness. Nay more. He made them enter an alliance with the pagan rulers "concerning whom God said: 'Their wine is the poison of dragons and the head of asps that is cruel.'" This head, says the document, refers to the "head of the kings of Javan who came to execute vengeance upon them." A glance at the history of the time and at the Psalms of Solomon<sup>8</sup> leaves no room for doubt that this refers to the dearly-bought Roman friendship which ended in the submission of Judea to the rule of Pompey, who could well be called the "head of all the kings of the Macedonian empire."

Here we have then the historical background for the messianic movement also among the Samaritans, who saw one pretender after the other rise, especially after Herod had brought Samaria again under Judean dominion.<sup>9</sup> We can also understand that, since Damascus formed the headquarters of Pompey during his invasion of Judea, the Samaritans who fled from their capital should have found a safe refuge in the vicinity of the northern city.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Ephes. 2:14.

<sup>7</sup> Deut. 32:33.

<sup>8</sup> 2; 8; 17; see Ryle and James' *Introduction*, xl ff.

<sup>9</sup> See Josephus, *Ant.*, XVIII, iv, 1; Schürer, *G.V.I.*, I, 358; II, 151.

## THE SAMARITAN MESSIAH

The Samaritan literature as well as the Samaritan creed has scarcely received the attention it deserves at the hands of Jewish scholars, owing to the national prejudice voiced in many parts of the Talmud against them, just as the Karaites labored under the same difficulty. Both sects, like all heresies, simply represent an arrested growth; and it can easily be shown that the Samaritans retained Haggadic and apocalyptic views as well as Halakic doctrines which were afterward rejected by the Pharisees, or rabbis, in the course of their historical progress. Their oldest literature, their liturgy, and their folklore are saturated with the same ideas and views as are the Pseudepigrapha and the later rabbinical Midrash or Targum literature. Their apotheosis of Moses had its parallel among the Essenes and is simply pre-Talmudic and Hellenistic. Concerning the messianic hope we only know that they saw in Deut. 18:15 the prediction of a Moses-like prophet to come and be the teacher and law-giver of the people. So we are told by Origen with reference to John 6:14-15.<sup>10</sup> He is their Taëb, "the one who comes back."<sup>11</sup> But he is also called "the Star" (*op. cit.*, 35) with reference to the prophecies in Num. 24:11-18, the messianic character of which is emphasized both by Josephus<sup>12</sup> and Philo.<sup>13</sup>

The appearance, however, or rather the recognition of the Messiah when he appeared, depended in those times chiefly upon a chronological calculation.<sup>14</sup> This is the reason why the chronological and calendar system with its Jubilees plays so great a rôle in eschatology, and it was held to be a "secret lore."<sup>15</sup> Following the Persian system of belief, the apocalyptic writers placed the messianic era at the end, or the middle of the sixth millennium so as to have the *seventh* as the world-Sabbath.<sup>16</sup> As a prominent feature of the approaching advent of the Messiah is mentioned also the increasing power of the spirit of the Evil One, called

<sup>10</sup> Cf. *Contra Celsum*, I, 57; Philo de Monarchia, 9; Gfroerer, *Jahrh. d. Heils*, I, 2, 324-42; Josephus, *Ant.*, XX, v, 1; viii, 6.

<sup>11</sup> Merx, *Der Messias or Taëb der Samaritaner*, 42.

<sup>12</sup> *Ant.*, IV, vi, 4-6.

<sup>13</sup> *Vita Mosis*, I, 52-53.

<sup>14</sup> Cf. Sanhedrin 92b; 97b; Abod. Zara 9ab; Luke 17:20: *Merà parapropheteis*; Heidenheim, *Bibl. Samarit.*, III, Introd., xxix.

<sup>15</sup> Ketub. 112a; W. B. Levy, s.v. "Sod"; cf. Ezek. 13:9; Samarit. Chronicle at the close.

<sup>16</sup> R. Hash. 31a; Tamid 6:4; Assumptio Mosis 10:12; Testam. Levi, chap. 17; Slavonic Enoch, chaps. 32, 33; cf. Roensch, *B. d. Jubileen*, 385; Merx, *op. cit.*, 23; Bousset, *Relig. d. Judenth.*, II, 282 f.

Belial, Satan, or Angramainyus (Armillus) whom the Messiah is to "slay with the breath of his lips."<sup>17</sup> The great world-drama ends with the final triumph of the Messiah over Belial and his Satanic hosts.<sup>18</sup>

#### THE MESSIAH OF THE DOSITHEAN SECT

We are now prepared to listen to the claims put forth in our document for its "Messiah from the house of Aaron and Israel," and to see whether we are justified in identifying him with the Samaritan heresiarch. As stated above, we have before us a messianic pronunciamiento in the form of a personal appeal but incomplete, owing partly to the defective state in which it was found, partly also to unskillful copyists who, either through carelessness or because they desired to make only an excerpt of the whole work, omitted a great deal and disarranged it so as to put it into disorder. The beginning, however, and also the end of the work seem to have been preserved. Regarding the latter, the editor failed to see that pp. 19 and 20, though containing matter presented in the former part, form the conclusion of the work and do not belong before p. 9, as the translation (pp. xxxix-xliv) has it. The appeal begins:

Hearken unto me, all ye who know righteousness, and meditate on the doings of God. For He will have strife with all flesh and execute judgment upon all who despise Him. Because of their faithlessness with which they forsook Him He hid His face from Israel and His sanctuary, and delivered them to the sword. But remembering the covenant with the former generations He left a remnant to Israel, and did not exterminate them. And now at the end of the wrath, 490 years after He had delivered them into the hand of Nebuchadnezzar, the King of Babylon, He remembered them and caused the root of His planting to sprout forth from Israel and Aaron to take possession of His land and to rejoice in the good of His soil. And they meditated over their sin and knew that they were guilty men, and for twenty years they were like blind groping in the way. Then God considered their deeds, for they sought Him with a perfect heart, and He raised for them a teacher of righteousness to make them walk in the way of His heart. And He had made known to former generations [read *ha rishonim*] what He shall do [read *Yaaseh*] "in the last generation" (Deut. 29:21) to an assembly of treacherous men who turn away from the path. Indeed, this is the time concerning which it has been written: "As a backsliding heifer, so did Israel slide back" (Hos. 4:16), since has risen the Man of scoffing who has poured forth unto Israel waters of deceitfulness, and caused them to wander about in the pathless wilderness, to bring low the heights from of old, and to turn away from the paths of righteousness, and to

<sup>17</sup> Isa. 11:4; Targum, cf. Bousset, *op. cit.*, 588 f.; III Sibyl, 63; see "Belial" and "Eschatology," *J.E.*, II, 659; IV, 212.

<sup>18</sup> Cf. Luke 10:17; Didache 16:3.

remove the boundaries which former generations set to their inheritance so as to make cleave to them the curses of His covenant (Deut. 29:20) and deliver them to the sword that is to execute the vengeance of the covenant (Lev. 26:25).

It is to Pompey's invasion into Judea which brought defeat upon the Pharisees that these strong words allude. But the appeal continues (p. 2), addressing "those who entered the covenant" in truly apocalyptic style, pointing to the great cosmic battle fought between the powers of evil "which ever ensnared men since the days of the oldest generations [read *doroth Kedem*], that is Cain and his line of descendants, and the Watchers before the Flood" and those "who are written down in God's book as His friends and the men of His covenant to whom the years of the End and the secrets of the Sabbath and the seasons were revealed." It is the same point of view which is taken by the Books of Enoch, the Jubilees, the Book of Adam in its pre-Christian form, and similar works that find expression in the rather obscure text which requires emendation now and then in order to be intelligible. Just as Moses found in Jannes and Jambres—see the art. in *J.E.*—the workers of magic, plotters of mischief, so does the "teacher of righteousness" encounter the evil powers of Belial in the dreaded Pharisean leader. This is the leading thought pervading the introductory part. The concluding part likewise is apocalyptic in its nature. It dwells on the great day of Judgment when God will, as is described by the last of the prophets (Mal. 3:16 ff.), "let His glory shine upon the righteous who remained steadfast to the Law and the covenant which they renewed at Damascus" and "are written in His book of remembrance as fearing Him and thinking upon His name," but deliver the wicked and those that have broken the covenant which they have entered anew to destruction through the hand of Belial, and pour out his wrath upon the princes of Judah. All those who have been faithless to the new covenant and have no share in the house of the Teacher (read *Beth ha Moreh*, p. 20, l. 13), whose names are not counted in the council of the people and not inscribed in the book, will not come safely out of the fiery ordeal.

In accordance with this apocalyptic system which Samaritan writers of the fourth and the twelfth centuries, in common with the authors of the Books of Enoch and the Jubilees and all the Essene writers, believed to have come down from the patriarchs as tradition from Noah, Shem, and Adam, our Manifesto endeavors to establish the messianic claims of its Moses-like teacher upon Scriptural texts in contrast to those held forth by believers in a Messiah from the house of David. Not David,

who in having many wives did not observe the law (Deut. 17:17) nor even read it, as it remained hidden away in the ark from the time of Joshua until a (son of) Zadok rose (II Kings 20:22), and, as it was disclosed, there were also disclosed (read *we nigalu*) the evil deeds of David (p. 5, ll. 2-5). No. In Zadok God built up for the sin-laden

a faithful house in Israel the like of which never arose before and hitherto, they who hold fast to Him for the life of eternity and all glory of man is theirs, as God confirmed it to them through the prophet Ezekiel when He said (44:15): "The priests and the Levites and the sons of Zadok that kept the guardianship of My sanctuary when the children of Israel went astray from Me they shall offer Me fat and blood." The priests are those of Israel who have returned of those who departed from the land of Judah; the Levites are those who "joined" them, and the sons of Zadok are the chosen ones of Israel called by name who rise up at the end of days. Behold, their names are distinctly given after their genealogy together with the end of their rising up and the number of their sufferings and the years of their wanderings and an exposition of their doings until to the end [read *ad kēz ha shanim*] when they will have no longer any share in the house of Judah (pp. 3-4).

Omitting the rest, which is given in defective form, we learn from these lines that the sect laid great stress upon a genealogy of the house of Zadok, and that their followers kept a book containing their traditions as to the messianic hope and their chronological system, exactly like the one frequently referred to in the various Samaritan chronicles in our possession. This book our Manifesto mentions in its concluding part (p. 19, last line) with reference to Ezek. 13:9—a verse connected also by rabbinical tradition with the *secret lore* of the calendar and the *ordination* of the teachers of the Law.<sup>19</sup> It is the following verse, by the way, which suggested to the writers of the Manifesto the name "Builders of the hollow partition wall" for their Pharisean antagonists given them in the lines that follow. That the priestly families kept genealogical lists tracing their pedigree back to the remotest time is a fact attested to by Josephus (*Contra Apionem*, I, 7).

In contradistinction to "the law-giver from Judah" (Gen. 49:10) which forms the basis for the Pharisaic claim, our Manifesto points to Num. 21:18, where "the law-giver" is mentioned in connection with the well which the princes of Israel have digged, the passage also being referred to "the Interpreter of the Law and those of Israel who, having returned, departed from Judah and settled in the land of Damascus, remaining true to his teachings, waiting until he, the teacher of righteous-

<sup>19</sup> Ket. 112a; Yer. R. H. II, 58b; Sanh. I, 18c.

ness, will again appear at the end of the days" (p. 6). Many prophetic passages containing a rebuke or condemnation of the people of Judah and of Israel, such as Isa. 7:15; 8:15, and particularly Hosea, are profusely quoted, or utilized, in the Manifesto. But one passage in Amos 5:26-27, in which "God saith: I will lead you as exiles beyond Damascus," furnished an especially opportune text on which to base the doctrines of the sect: "Ye shall carry the protection of your King"—this is the Torah—"Your King"—this is the people (cf. Prov. 8:15); "the pointing out of their idol-worship"—this refers to the books of the prophets whose words ancient Israel had held in contempt; and "the Star"—this is the Interpreter of the Law who has come to Damascus, the one of whom Scripture (Num. 24:17) says: "A star will come forth from Jacob and a scepter from Israel"—that is the prince of the whole congregation who, when he appears again, "shall smite all the sons of Sheth." We have here the exact traditional messianic interpretation of the verse adopted by the Samaritans.<sup>20</sup> In all probability the original Manifesto contained more explicit allusions to the personality of the "Star," the "Messiah," and "Teacher," whose line of ancestry went back to Zadok, the high priest, and to Aaron. All that we now learn is that he was also given the name "Yaḥid," "the only one," or "the only one teacher" (p. 20, ll. 1, 14, 32), that he died in the vicinity of Damascus, and that his followers waited for his return (7, 20; 12, 24; 19-20). Whether the peculiar name *ha Yaḥid* was given him in view of his martyrdom with reference to Zechariah 12:10, "the mourning for the only one," is difficult to say.

Now as to the use and recognition of the prophetic books by a Samaritan sect, we will have to modify the accepted view of this. The writers of our Manifesto regarded them, in common with the ancient rabbis, as "words of tradition"<sup>21</sup> alongside of the Torah exactly as they did all non-canonical books. It is the doctrinal side that gives us a true insight into the messianic movement. As a restorer of the law, "the teacher of righteousness," no doubt with a view to the name *Zadokite* which was interpreted "follower of righteousness,"<sup>22</sup> the Messiah of our Document, shows all the unyielding rigor which characterized only one heresiarch known to Jewish and Samaritan history, namely Dositheus. However much the various Patristic and Samaritan writers may differ in regard to the chronological date and other matters per-

<sup>20</sup> See Merx, *op. cit.*

<sup>21</sup> Dibre Kabbalah; see W. B. Levy, s.v. "Kabbalah."

<sup>22</sup> See Josephus, *Ant.*, XII, x, 5-6; Epiphanius *Haeres.*, i. 14.

taining to the life of this "first of the heresiarch," as he is called, they agree as to his teachings relative to the Sabbath, the purity, the dietary and marriage laws having been extremely rigorous and inimical to all contact with the heathen world; so that there can scarcely be room for doubt that we have his teachings before us. The name *Ilfan*, which, as Shahaṛastani tells us,<sup>23</sup> Dositheus bore, besides that of "the Star" and the Prophet predicted by Moses (Deut. 23:15), is the Aramaic word for "teacher." Shahaṛastani places him at about the century preceding Christ. This is confirmed by Origen (*op. cit.*) who also tells us that his adherents who preserved his books believed that he "did not taste death but continued to live in some form." According to Epiphanius (*Haeres.* i. 13) he was a learned Jew who from disappointment went over to the Samaritans, and that at the end of his career he retired into a cave where he died of voluntary starvation. The best information about the Dosithean doctrines have been preserved by the Samaritan historian Abul-Faṭḥ, in which, while making allowance for inaccuracies due to hearsay reports, we cannot fail to recognize as in the main identical with the laws contained in our Document.<sup>24</sup> More will

<sup>23</sup> P. 258, Haarbr. transl.

<sup>24</sup> See Montgomery, *The Samaritans*, 253 ff.; Kirchheim, *Karme Shomron*, 25 f.; Jost, *Gesch. d. Judenth.*, I, 65 f.; Herzfeld, *G.V.I.*, II, 600, and Schechter's *Introduction*. We are told that the "Dositheans had a different mode of reckoning the period of purification." In regard to this difference between the Samaritans and the Pharisees see Nidda, 66a, 33a, and later on: "they declared the fountain into which dead vermin had fallen to be impure." This also is found to be Samaritan; see Mas. Kuthim (ed. Kirchheim), I, 33, n. 6; that "he upon whom the shadow of a grave has fallen is unclean for seven days." This should read: "he who had come beneath the shadow, that is, beneath the roof of the projecting enclosure of a grave, is unclean in accordance with Num. 19:14; see Sifre, *ad loc.*: they "forbade the eating of eggs of fowl as unfit for sacrifice." This is, as Schechter has shown, similar to a statute given in our Document: "they rejected the formula: 'Blessed be our God forever!'" This probably refers to the Pharisaic formula: "Blessed be our God from one world to the other," which was to accentuate the belief in resurrection, which the Samaritans denied (see Jost, *G. d. J.*, I, 65 f., and Berak. 9:4): "they did not pronounce the Tetragram but used Elohim instead." This also is Samaritan; see farther on: "they counted Pentecost from the day after Passover, as do the Jews." This is scarcely a correct statement. See farther on: "They taught that a priest might enter an infected house, as long as he did not speak forth." It is also rabbinic Halaka that the house becomes unclean only by the priest's express declaration (Neg'aim 12:5): "That the question whether the tenement adjoining the impure house is also unclean should be decided by watching whether a clean or unclean bird first alights upon the former." For this strange statement see Kirchheim, *op. cit.*, 26. "On Sabbath they ate and drank only from earthen vessels, not from those of metal." The reason for this statute is that the latter might be, when unclean, purified on Sabbath, which is



be said later anent his changing the festivals by introducing the solar calendar with 30 days a month.

Reminiscences of the name *Yahdu*, to which Schechter refers,<sup>25</sup> and of his writings have been preserved in later legends which represent Dositheus as having been compelled to flee for some offense and as having carried his books with him to Suweika near Jerusalem, which seems to be a confusion with the town Kokaba near Damascus. Sources hostile to the Dositheans represent him as "a descendant of the mixed multitude that went with Israel out of Egypt,"<sup>26</sup> or as a son of Palti (Palpul—Balaam?), the chief magician in Pharaoh's time who plotted harm against Moses.<sup>27</sup> Kokaba as the seat of the Dosithean sect is mentioned in the Midrash in connection with a dispute R. Meir had with a Dosithean of Kokaba.<sup>28</sup> The name Dositheus corresponding to Nathaniel or Mattan-yah is frequent in pre-Christian times. Possibly the name of the village Kokaba has some connection with the settlement there of Dositheus, "the Star" (*Kokab*), and it is scarcely a mere incident that the mythical founder of the Ebionite sect was also supposed to have lived there.<sup>29</sup> Julius Africanus<sup>30</sup> speaks of Kokaba near Damascus as one of the Jewish villages whither the relatives of Jesus had fled. The majority of writers maintain that the Dositheans denied resurrection, just as did the Sadducees, the mythical founder of whose sect, Zadok, is brought into historical connection with Dositheus.<sup>31</sup> The belief in his reappearance has, in fact, nothing to do with the belief in resurrection; it must be regarded rather as the characteristic feature of the Messiah who is supposed to disappear and to reappear,<sup>32</sup> which is also a Samaritan doctrine.<sup>33</sup>

forbidden, whereas clay vessels cannot be purified. "They insisted on providing food and water for the cattle on the day before the Sabbath, forbidding to do so on the Sabbath day." This also is Samaritan law. "In the code of their prophet it was stated that God was worshiped in the land of *Havilah* (the text has *Sueilah*) until Mount Gerizim took its place." This seems to be intended to contradict the statement of the Book of Jubilees (4:25-26) and the Book of Adam that the Mount of the east side of Eden (*har ha Kedem*) as the place of worship for the Protoplastes was afterward substituted by Mount Zion. A book containing the history of the leaders of men (Imams) since Adam is ascribed to him by Abul-Fath as well as by Eulogius. This is probably the Zadokite genealogy.

<sup>25</sup> *Introd.*, xxiv, n. 52.

<sup>26</sup> *Chronique Samaritaine*, ed. Neubauer, 58.

<sup>27</sup> Cf. Heidenheim, *Vierteljahrschr.*, IV, 369.

<sup>28</sup> See art. "Dosethai" in *J.E.*, IV, 643.

<sup>29</sup> See Ewald, *G.V.I.*, VII, 221, n. 3, and cf. Hilgenfeld, *op. cit.*, 137, 428, 433.

<sup>30</sup> See Eusebius, *Church History*, I, 7, 14.

<sup>31</sup> See Pesik. 49; Pesik. Rab. xv.

<sup>32</sup> See Montgomery, 255-59.

<sup>33</sup> See Cowley in *J.Q.R.*, VIII, 572.

## THE CONSTITUTION OF THE SECT

On investigating the constitution mapped out in our Document, we cannot be in doubt that we have before us the social conditions of the first pre-Christian century as they then prevailed in Judea. The community was composed of four classes, viz., priests, Levites, common Israelites, and proselytes. The last ones, to whom the Psalms (115:13; 118:4) and the Liturgy (the Eighteen Benedictions) accorded a special rank in the pre-Christian time, were not represented in the administrative body of Ten, which consisted of 4 priests and Levites and 6 common Israelites selected as Judges of the community (*ḥ-dah*). They were to be familiar with the "Book of Public Reading" (*Sefer-ha-Hagah*), that is the Torah scroll written in the ancient Samaritan letters, the loud reading of which, especially with regard to the ineffable Name, required an expert,<sup>34</sup> "and also with the fundamental principles of the Covenant" (that is the Interpretation of the Law adopted by the sect at Damascus as forming "the New Covenant"). They had to be between the ages of 25 and 60 years, not older, as, says the Document with reference to Jubilees 23:11, pointed out by the editor, "Owing to God's wrath against the generations after the flood the human intellect fails in old age."<sup>35</sup> These judges had the power to inflict capital punishment, or banishment, on the members of the sect, but only in conjunction with the two heads of the community (p. 10).

The community being divided into smaller settlements, camps, or towns, two men were to be placed at the head of each containing a congregation of ten members of the sect (cf. Sanh. 2a), the one a priest who likewise had to be familiar with the "Book of Public Reading," the acknowledged authentic Torah scroll, and of the age between 25 and 60. In case no priest possessing the required knowledge was found, a Levite was to take his place.<sup>36</sup> His function was to keep the genealogical records of the members of the settlement and to pronounce the final decision of the Law, especially also to declare the uncleanness of the person or house infected with leprosy (Lev., chap. 13). The other one called *Mebakker*,

<sup>34</sup> As to the meaning of *Hagah* see Sanhed. 10:1 and W. B. Levy, s.v. Ordinary Samaritan Pentateuch scrolls often had *Shema*, שְׁמָע ("the name") written in place of the Tetragram (see Heidenheim, *Bibliot. Samarit.*, III, 182). According to Tosifta Sanhedrin 4:7, the king's Torah scroll was not to be used by anyone else but was subject to revision by the three judicial courts, that of the priests, the Levites, and the common Israelites.

<sup>35</sup> Cf., however, the rabbinical interpretation of Gen. 24:1 in B. Mez., 87a.

<sup>36</sup> P. 13. Cf. Yoma, 26a, and art. "Levi" in *J.E.*

"inspector" (that is "examiner" or "overseer," not "censor," as Professor Schechter translates it),<sup>37</sup> held the more important office of instructor and supervisor. He had to be consulted even by his colleague, the priest, in all matters pertaining to Levitical purity;<sup>38</sup> he had to examine the status of each member as to his fitness and proper position, and had to administer oaths; he had the power to impose penalties for offenses, or to condone them and readmit the penitents; also, in conjunction with the general Board of Administrators, to assess the members as to their dues for the support of the poor or the priests. Exactly like the *Episcopos* ("overseer") of the Essene, afterward the Christian "Congregation of God" (Didascalia, II, 20, 24), he is "to show compassion for all as a father for his children and tend to their needs as the shepherd of his flock rescuing from the hand of the insolent the oppressed and the crushed." "Without the inspector's permission no member of the camp is allowed to bring anyone into the congregation, nor shall anyone have commercial dealings with the [sons of the] merchants [read *b'ne ha Sohërim* or *Ba'alë ha Shorah*], if this be by a pledge from hand to hand, nor shall he establish a partnership [read *heber*; cf. Job 40:30] for mercantile purposes, unless he inform the inspector of the camp that he may establish the mercantile league [read *heber ha miknah*]." The entire paragraph, the meaning of which escaped the translator, receives its light from the statutes, concerning the oath to be administered by the inspector, preserved only in fragmentary form (pp. 13-15).

At the head of the entire community was to be placed a higher duumvirate consisting of a priest equipped with greater knowledge and ability as well as authority to bind all together, and a chief inspector "familiar with every form of secret discourse of men and every language, symbolic or plain." He has the final decision in every dispute, and he superintends, in conjunction with the Board of Judges, the charity, "receiving from the well-to-do a share of their monthly earnings and distributing the same among the poor, the aged, the homeless, and those who are without protection" (p. 14).

Presumably the ten judges and the two chief magistrates resided in what is called "the City of the Sanctuary," a place set apart as most

<sup>37</sup> *Bakker* occurs in the Bible only as a verb signifying "to examine," particularly for the shepherd, and also for the priest or sage. Accordingly *Mebakker* is the examiner or overseer—*Episcopos* in the sense of the rabbinical *Parnas* from *πρωτοφειν*, "care-taker." In earlier times the affairs of the community were in charge of the *Amarkol* or *Catholicus*. See Schürer, II<sup>3</sup>, 271.

<sup>38</sup> Cf. for the plagues the rabbinical law concerning the *hakam* (Sifra Tazria 1; Bekoroth iv, 3-5).

holy and containing an altar for the regular sacrifices.<sup>39</sup> In this sacrosanct place sexual intercourse was prohibited.<sup>40</sup> Each camp or town, however, had a house of worship of its own into which none but the Levitically pure were permitted to enter (p. 11; cf. *Die Canones Jacob's von Edessa*, ed. Kayser, Leipzig, 1886, 11, 80).<sup>41</sup>

Now it is to be noticed that the institution of a duumvirate ruling over the community is found only during the first and the second pre-Christian century in Judea and was, as is shown in Geiger's *Urschrift*, (115-19), originally Sadducean and only afterward transformed, or adopted, by the Pharisees in the well-known Pairs (*Zuggoth*).

#### CIVIL AND CRIMINAL JURISDICTION

Likewise the civil and criminal laws point almost with certainty to the Jewish and Samaritan conditions and practices of the pre-Christian century. Owing to the lamentably defective state in which the Document is found (14-15), we can make out only the following part of the statute: "No one shall take an oath either by the four-lettered Name, or by any other name such as Elohim or Adonai. Instead, the oath at the court, or when new members are to be admitted into the community, should be administered by the inspector as "an oath of the covenant which Moses established with Israel" and sworn to "by the curses of the covenant" (Deut., chaps. 29, 30; cf. Sanhed. 39a), and the violation of such an oath was avenged by death. Similarly the Essenes, who otherwise refrained from swearing, administered "oaths of an awful character upon any new member to be admitted into their community," and like the Samaritans and Dositheans<sup>42</sup> they well-nigh apotheosized Moses.<sup>43</sup> The passage in Jer., Sanh. 10:28b, quoted by Schechter referring to the Samaritans does not say that they were in the habit of taking an oath by the Tetragram; on the contrary, as is amply evidenced by Geiger,<sup>44</sup> R. Mana points to them as avoiding the Tetragram and using

<sup>39</sup> Cf. Mekilta Yithro, at the close.

<sup>40</sup> P. 12. Cf. Exod. 19:15; Deut. 23:15; I Sam. 21:5-6.

<sup>41</sup> The term *beth ha Hishtahavoth*, "the house of prostration," whence the Syriac *Be Masgedo*, the Arabic Masged, formed after Zech. 14:16-17, is decidedly Jewish; see Midrash to I Sam. 1:3. So is the term *serek*, "order," which, as Professor Margolis of the Dropsie College has pointed out to the writer, is found twice in the Hebrew Testament of Levi, *J.Q.R.*, XIX, 574, where the Greek has *τάξις*.

<sup>42</sup> See Schechter, *liv*, n. 15.

<sup>43</sup> Josephus, *B.J.*, II, viii, 7-10.

<sup>44</sup> Nachgel, *Schr.*, III, 261; *Urschrift*, 266.

*ha Shem* or *Shema* ("the Name") instead.<sup>45</sup> The Pharisaic courts insisted, however, on an oath by God's name.<sup>46</sup>

It is exactly in the time of Simeon ben Shetaḥ that we are placed by the law "on the recovery of lost goods" [read *al hashabath Abedah*, 9, l. 8]: "He hath said 'Thine own hand shall not help thee.'" <sup>47</sup> "Therefore he who administers an oath [of proclamation] in the open field and not in the presence of the judges or their by-standers [read *M'aamadam*] his hand has helped him"—that is, he cannot by right keep the goods he found. This obviously refers to the institution recorded in Jer. *To'an.*, III, 66*d*, and Babli, *B.M.*, 28*b*, in connection with an utterance of Simeon ben Shetaḥ concerning the "Stone of the Litigant," *Eben ha To'en*,<sup>48</sup> a stone in the midst of the city of Jerusalem upon which lost goods were deposited by the finder to be handed over to the owner after due proof of his claim, or after an oath had been taken by him. The statute continues: "If anyone has lost a thing, and it is not known who stole it from the storehouse [read *M'od*] of the camp, the owner shall administer an oath of proclamation by way of a curse, and whosoever hears the same and, knowing the matter, will not tell, he shall be guilty [Lev. 5:1-6]. And if the lost goods have no claimants, all goes to the priests who keep it until the owner is found" (p. 9).

Another interesting point is that "a man who has been seen by a single witness and then by another one committing a certain sacrilegious act, he is by the decision of the inspector expelled from what is called the 'sphere of purity.'" In similar manner the *Episcopos* in the Didascalia II, 16, is told to "cast out the offender with severity, just as Miriam was shut out of the camp seven days for her offense, God having said to Moses: "If her father had but spit her in her face, should she not be ashamed?" This is what the rabbis termed a divine "rebuke" (*Nesi-phah*) with reference to this very passage in Num. 12:14.<sup>49</sup> The camp in which God's majesty dwelt was not to tolerate in its midst any<sup>50</sup> of those unclean by sin.<sup>50</sup> But like the *Episcopos* of the Didascalia, the inspector can readmit the offender after he has shown sincere repentance.

<sup>45</sup> Cf. Lev. 24:11, 16; *Urschr.*, 273 f.

<sup>46</sup> Sheb. 38*b* f.

<sup>47</sup> Schechter refers to I Sam. 25:26, 31, 33; but it is probably a quotation from some lost apocryphal work; cf. Tosefta, *B.K.*, X, 38; but altogether foreign to rabbinical law, *B.K.*, 27*b*.

<sup>48</sup> See Kohut *Aruk s.v.*; scarcely *Eben ha To'im*, "Stone of the Erring."

<sup>49</sup> Cf. *Sifre* and *M.K.* 16*ab*.

<sup>50</sup> Num. 5:2-3; *Sifre*; Deut. 23:15; Kel., I, 7; Tos. Kel., I, 13. Targ. J. to Exod. 18:8 and cf. Josephus, *J.W.*, I, viii, 8, regarding the Essene practice.

"No one," says another statute, however (p. 9), "shall hand over as excommunicated a man from his brethren [read *mēzhar*], to have him put to death after the statutes of the Gentiles, for concerning him it is said [Lev. 19:18]: 'Thou shalt not avenge, nor hold over any wrath against the children of thy people'"—which verse is taken in the sense of a prohibition against handing over for punishment any Israelitish man to non-Israelites. This prohibition against recognition of the jurisdiction of Gentile courts (*arkaoth shel goyim* or *Agoraoth shel nokrim*; note the Greek terms ἀρχαι and ἀγοραι) is derived by the rabbis from Exod. 21:1,<sup>51</sup> and likewise is found in Didascalia, II, 45, whence also I Cor. 6:1 ff. The warning not to resort to self-revenge, but to leave the vengeance to God—which is based in the Epistle to the Romans upon Deut. 32:35, a passage read differently by the Samaritans—is founded in our Document on Nahum 1:2; and Lev. 19:17 is pointed to as forbidding to give vent to fierce wrath instead of offering kind rebuke. Throughout the Document the lesson of brotherly love, of fostering peace by open rebuke, and of helpful support to the needy is voiced with reference to Lev., chap. 19, a chapter which formed the basis of Jewish ethics and of the Jewish propaganda literature.<sup>52</sup>

#### THE LEVITICAL LAWS OF PURITY AND SANCTITY

On the other hand, there is the spirit of inexorable austerity displayed in all the laws concerning Levitical purity and sanctity as well as of the Sabbath that are so characteristic of Sadduceeism and Samaritanism. Ewald, already,<sup>53</sup> when speaking of the Dositheans, called attention to the name *La Misas* ("Touch me not!") given to the Samaritans, which gave rise to the legend of Samiri who as the maker of the Golden Calf was cursed, another Wandering Jew.<sup>54</sup> The Samaritans were not less, but a great deal more, scrupulous than the Pharisees in regard to these and other Mosaic laws, as was admitted by the early rabbis.<sup>55</sup> Consequently the statutes concerning the purificatory bath, "the waters of which should not be drawn from a vessel and must be sufficient to envelop man's whole body,"<sup>56</sup> or that "they should not come

<sup>51</sup> Mekilta and Gittin 88b; also from Ps. 148:19, Tanh. Shofetim.

<sup>52</sup> See Bernays, *Ges.*, Abh. 1, 192 f., and cf. the thirty Noahidic Commandments (Hul. 92a) and *Jew. G. R.*, VI, 259.

<sup>53</sup> *G.V.I.*, VII, 139.

<sup>54</sup> Koran Sura, XX, 97; cf. Albiruni, tr. Sachau, 25, 374; Targ. Yer. to Exod. 32:5.

<sup>55</sup> Tos., Pesah i, 15; Hul. 4a.

<sup>56</sup> *Mar'il* from *ra'al*, "to envelop," p. 10, l. 11, is correct and a better term than *Matbil* suggested by Schechter. For *shemo* (p. 12, l. 16), read *b'saro*.

in direct or indirect contact with impure things (10); as well as the law declaring that vessels may serve as conductors of uncleanness in the house where a dead body lies (12); or that the projecting part of a tomb makes him who stands beneath it unclean—this seems to be the meaning of the obscure sentence in Abul-Fath concerning the “shadow of a grave”—are all derived from temple practice and of Sadducean origin.<sup>57</sup>

Also in regard to woman in her menstruation or after her confinement, the Dositheans, like the rest of the Samaritans, represent the rigorous Sadducean view;<sup>58</sup> and so they accuse the Pharisees who considered the principles of human dignity and of domestic happiness to be of greater importance than Levitical purity which concerns only the priesthood,<sup>59</sup> of “polluting the sanctuary” (p. 5, l. 7). In this connection it is interesting to notice that the Book of Jubilees<sup>60</sup> lays great stress on this very law in Lev. 12:1, of woman’s purification in connection with Eve’s entrance into Eden’s sanctuary, thus echoing the ancient Sadducean, not merely Samaritan, view. Of course, the later Mishnah authorities judge, or misjudge, the Samaritans from their partisan point of view concerning whom all sorts of slanderous reports were then circulated,<sup>61</sup> which the believer in the Talmudic Halakah is of course bound to accept as true.

#### LAWS CONCERNING HEATHEN

Quite significant is the attitude taken by the Dosithean law toward the heathen. The Pharisean teachers, in their endeavor to broaden the Torah into a great universal truth, wanted to have the temple at Jerusalem, in the spirit of the prophets and the Psalms, rendered a center of worship provided for, and accessible also to the nations of the world, as may be learned from Suk. 55b.<sup>62</sup> Accordingly they teach against the letter of the Law (Lev. 22:18–25) that vow-offerings brought by a heathen or a wicked Israelite may be sacrificed upon the altar in order to win the one *over*, and the other *back*, to God;<sup>63</sup> only those of apos-

<sup>57</sup> See Erub. 14ab; Tos. Negaim vi, 2; Sifre to Num. 19:14; Yadayim iv, 7; cf. Tos. Yoma i, 12; iv, 20.

<sup>58</sup> Nid. iv, 1–2; cf. Munagga in Wreschner’s *Sam. Traditionen*, 30 ff.; Geiger, *He Haluz*, v, 29; vi, 28; *W. Ztschr.*, I, 51; II, 27; Nachgel., *Schr.*, III, 315 f.; Schorr, *He Haluz*, VIII, 51.

<sup>59</sup> See *Sifra Mezora* at the close; Shab. 64b.

<sup>60</sup> III, 9–14; see Charles’ notes and Beer, *op. cit.*, 40.

<sup>61</sup> See Hul. 6a; Nid. 33a; Kirchheim, *K. Schomron*, 21 ff., and Mas. Kuthim.

<sup>62</sup> Cf. Philo, ed. Mangey, I, 239, 240, and elsewhere.

<sup>63</sup> Sifra Emor, VII, 98a; cf. 99a; Tem. 2; cf. 7a; Men. 73b; Hul. 13b; cf. 5a.

tates would they exclude with reference to Prov. 15:9: "The sacrifice of the wicked is an abomination."<sup>64</sup> Our Document (p. 11, l. 18) points to the same verse while declaring: "No man shall send to the altar burnt-offering, or meat-offering, or frankincense, or wood, through the hand of any man made unclean by any of the uncleannesses to allow him to make the altar unclean." The same verse is quoted in the Talmud<sup>65</sup> with the view to prohibit prayer in an unclean spot, or with an unclean body, or after a nocturnal pollution, which last prohibition formed the chief motive for the custom of the Hemero-baptists and Essenes. Accordingly also our Document continues: "And whosoever enters a house of worship shall not enter it when he is unclean without<sup>66</sup> washing."

Of historical interest are the following statutes (p. 12, ll. 2 ff.): "Any man over whom the spirits of Belial<sup>67</sup> have dominion, and he speaks rebelliously, he shall be dealt with by the court like an *Ob* and *Yiddeoni*."<sup>68</sup> (Is this the same as "speaking in tongues," I Cor., chaps. 12-14?) "If, however, he wants to seduce others to profane the Sabbath and the Feasts [espousing the Pharisaic doctrines?] he shall not be forthwith put to death, but watched whether he may be cured. After seven years he may re-enter the Congregation." This implies that he remains thus long excommunicated.

"No man shall stretch forth his arm to shed the blood of any one of the Gentiles for the sake of wealth or gain, nor shall he carry off anything in their possession so as not to lead to blasphemy" [this is the same as the rabbinical *Ḥillul ha Shem*],<sup>69</sup> "unless it be done by the counsel of the confederation of Israel"—that is, in a state of warfare.

"No one shall sell clean cattle or fowl to Gentiles, lest they may sacrifice them" (to their idols; cf. Abod. Zar. i, 5). "Nor shall he sell anything from his threshing-floor or his wine-press at any of their feasts [read *bēkol Mo'e'ehem*, and cf. Ab. Zar. i, 1]. Nor shall he sell them his male slave or female slave who have entered the covenant of Abraham with him."<sup>70</sup>

<sup>64</sup> Sifra Wayikra II, 4c; cf. *M.K.* 15b.

<sup>65</sup> Berak. 20b; 22b.

<sup>66</sup> The word *wēlō* of the line below belongs here.

<sup>67</sup> A term for Satan found only in the pre-Talmudic literature, corresponding with the rabbinical *Ruah ha Tumah*, "spirit of impurity," as all idolatry is contaminating; see Sanh. 65b; Shab. ix, 1; Tos. Zabim v, 6.

<sup>68</sup> Deut. 18:10; Sanh. *loc. cit.*

<sup>69</sup> See art. "Kiddush ha Shem" in the *J.E.*

<sup>70</sup> Cf. Lev. 25:46; Sifre to Deut. 23:16; Gittin, iv, 6.



## THE LAWS CONCERNING THE SABBATH

Most instructive for the study of the entire process of development of the Mosaic law is the chapter devoted in our document to the Sabbath, of the desecration of which the Pharisees are again and again accused. Geiger, whose well-known researches have cast new light upon the historical process of Judaism by showing the close relationship of Samaritanism and Karaism to Sadduceeism, calls special attention to a remarkable passage in the Mishnah, Hag. 1:8,<sup>71</sup> which reads as follows: "The rules concerning the annulment of vows float in the air and have nothing to support them; the rules concerning the Sabbath, the pilgrimage sacrifice [*Hagigah*] and sin-offerings for breach of faith are like mountains suspended by a hair, having but few scriptural, and all the more numerous Halakic expositions!" The former part of these rather perplexing strictures will be discussed later on. The remark about the Pharisaic Sabbath laws, however, concerns us here, as it is a rather naïve criticism of the artificial system of the Pharisaic Sabbath legislation, which has a list of thirty-nine chief kinds of work prohibited on that day. These are based upon the analogy of specific works required for the tabernacle,<sup>72</sup> without even taking due cognizance of express Scriptural prohibitions such as buying and selling.<sup>73</sup> Neither trading nor riding on horseback is regarded as work forbidden by the Law; both are merely forbidden by the rabbis for the reason that they may eventually lead to a direct transgression of the Law, the one to do some writing, the other to cut a branch off the tree for the sake of obtaining a whip.<sup>74</sup> There is ample evidence, however, that during the Maccabean time a far more rigorous view of the Sabbath prevailed, as is learned not only from the books of the Maccabees, but also from a record preserved in the Talmud,<sup>75</sup> showing that riding on horseback was punished by the court with stoning to death. In fact, the older Halakah represented by the rigorous Shammaites<sup>76</sup> insisted on the same principle adhered to by the Samaritans, that no work should be begun on Sabbath eve which is not entirely finished at the entrance of the Sabbath, whereas the liberal school of Hillel made ever new concessions for the sake of "rendering the Sabbath

<sup>71</sup> See his *Lesestücke aus der Mishnah*, 91.

<sup>72</sup> Mek. to. Exod. 35:1; Shab. 70a.

<sup>73</sup> Jer. 18:21 f.; Neh. 10:32; 14:15; cf. Amos 8:5.

<sup>74</sup> See Maim., *H. Shab.*, xxiii, 12; xxi, 9.

<sup>75</sup> Yeb. 90b; Sanh. 46a.

<sup>76</sup> Shab. i, 5-8; cf. Tos. Shab. i, 21; and see Geiger, *Nachgel. Schr.*, III, 288; He *Haluz* vi, 15-19.

a delight,"<sup>77</sup> laying down the principle that "the Sabbath is given over to you, not you to the Sabbath."<sup>78</sup>

Against these Pharisaic innovations, which created the fiction of the *Erub*<sup>79a</sup>, the duty of kindling the Sabbath light<sup>79</sup> and similar things (*B.K.* 82a) and permitting work to be done by Gentiles in cases of need, there came the protestations of the exponents of the old Sadducean law as voiced in the Book of Jubilees, according to which it is forbidden under the penalty of death "to prepare anything to be eaten or drunk that had not been prepared the day before, to draw water, to bring in, or take out any burden through the gate, or to have any intercourse with one's wife,<sup>80</sup> to set out on a journey, to transact any business; also to ride on a beast, or to travel by ship on the sea, to strike or kill anything, to catch an animal, or to fast, or to make war on the Sabbath."<sup>81</sup> These same prohibitions are stated in "the Sabbath Commandments of the Falashas,"<sup>82</sup> and there is added thereto "to have a quarrel with, or to pronounce a curse against, anyone on Sabbath, or to rise from the seat and turn aside to ease nature."<sup>83</sup> It is accordingly the old Sadducean standpoint from which the Sabbath laws in our Document are written (pp. 10-11). We give them here in full, while at the same time endeavoring to elucidate some of the obscure points:

"No one shall do any work on the sixth day from the time when the sun's disk is still at a distance from the gate of its entering [read *Mebool*]; for He hath said: 'Guard the Sabbath day'" [Deut. 5:12]. This interpretation of the term *shamor*, "guard," in the sense of making a fence around the law in order to prevent its transgression is not only accepted by the Karaites, but based upon ancient tradition (see *M.K.* 5a; *Yebam.* 21a; W. B. Levy, s.v. "*Mishmereth*"). In fact, it was a long-established priestly practice to have signals given by trumpets from the temple hilltops at the beginning of twilight to stop the people from work (Josephus, *J.B.*, IV, ix, 12; *Sukk.* V, 5). Accordingly a misplaced paragraph in our Document at the close of p. 11 (found "obscure" by the editor) reads: "When the trumpets of the Congregation are sounded, whether earlier or later, the people shall cease from work, for it is Sabbath altogether holy."

<sup>77</sup> Isa. 58:13; *Shab.* 118ab.

<sup>78</sup> Mek. Ki Tissa; Yoma 85b; cf. Mark 2:27: "The Sabbath was made for man, not man for the Sabbath."

<sup>79a</sup> See Schürer, II, 414, 491 f.

<sup>80</sup> Cf. *He Haluk*, vi, 30 ff.

<sup>79</sup> Schürer, III<sup>4</sup>, 166.

<sup>81</sup> Jub. 2:29 f.; 1:8-13.

<sup>82</sup> *Tezasa Sanbat.*, tr. by Halévy, Paris, 1902.

<sup>83</sup> Halévy, 142, seemingly misunderstood the words; but cf. "Essenes," *J.E.*, V, 229, col. ii.

Our Document continues: "No one shall speak vile and idle speech on the Sabbath day." This is based upon Isa. 58:13 (cf. Shab. 150a). This statute is also found in the Falasha Commandments quoted above and has its striking parallel in the Essene Sabbath prayer preserved in the Apostolic Constitutions (cf. art. "Didascalia," *J.E.*, IV, 594, col. i) in which occurs the sentence: "No one should utter forth one word in anger on the Sabbath day, for the Sabbath is given for the study of the Law" (cf. *Pesik. Rab.*, XXIII, p. 121).

"No one shall demand any debt of his neighbor, nor shall he bring a suit in court for any property or gain. Neither shall he discuss matters of business, or work to be done for the following morning. Nor shall anyone walk into the field to watch [?] the work of his affairs on the Sabbath, nor go out of his city beyond the limit of [two] thousand cubits." This Halakah based on Num. 35:5 (Erub. 50b) is very old (see Josephus, *Ant.*, XIII, viii, 4; Acts 1:12; cf. Schürer, I, 246; II, 475).

"One shall not eat or drink anything on the Sabbath unless it has been prepared and brought into the camp before." This is based on Exod. 16:5. "If one is on the road and goes into the water to bathe, he may drink while standing, but he shall not draw into the vessel." This is based on Exod. 16:26.

"No man shall send the son of a stranger to do his affairs on the Sabbath day." Compare the rabbinical view according to which this is not forbidden by the Law (Maim., *H. Sch.*, VI, 1).

"A man shall not put upon himself filthy garments, or such as are brought in . . . unless they are washed in water, or daubed with frankincense." The meaning seems to be that working-day garments which are either dirty or have an offensive odor should not be worn on the Sabbath (cf. Shab. 113a). Schechter's reading *bēgoy*, by a Gentile, and his interpretation of the statute hardly seems acceptable, as the Levitical impurity ascribed to the stranger (*Introd.*, xv) cannot be removed by rubbing the garment which he brought or touched, with drugs.

"No man shall fast of his own free will on the Sabbath." Cf. besides Jubilees and *Falasha Comm.* quoted above, Judith 8:6, and Maim., *H. Sh.*, XXX, 12. Read *Yithra'ab*.

"No man shall walk behind the cattle to make it browse outside of the city beyond the two-thousand cubits." The idea is that like himself his cattle should not pass the Sabbath limit.

"He shall not lift his hand to beat it with his fist, nor remove it with force if it be stubborn."

"No man shall carry anything out of the house or into the house, and standing at the entrance, he shall neither take anything out, nor bring anything in."

"No man shall carry about him drugs when going out or in, on the Sabbath." This is also prohibited in the Mishnah, Shab. vi, 5.

"He shall not open a glued vessel on Sabbath." According to the rabbis this does not fall under the category of work, whereas the Karaites also forbid it (see Schechter, notes). "No one shall move about rock or earth in the

house on Sabbath." "The nurse shall not carry the suckling child while going out or coming in on Sabbath." So also Mishnah, Shab. xviii, 2.

"No man shall deliver a beast giving birth to her young on the Sabbath day." So also Mishnah xviii, 3. "And if one falls into a pit or a ditch, he shall not raise it on Sabbath." Here the rabbinic law, in view of the animal's suffering, is much milder. (See Shab. xviii, 2; Talmud Shab. 128b; Maim., *H. Sh.*, XXV, 26, and cf. Matt. 12:11.) "And if any person falls into a gathering of water, or into a ravine [read *ma'amak*], one shall not bring him up on a ladder and with a rope or any other instrument." Here the Pharisaic law differs, declaring the *saving of life* to be the paramount duty (Yoma 84b; Tos. Shab. xv, 16-17; Mekilta Ki Tissa 110).

"No man shall scold his man-servant or maid-servant, or his hireling on the Sabbath day." So also the Falasha law and Didascalia, II, 47; V, 10, and the Sabbath prayer quoted above.

"No one shall take his Sabbath rest in a place near the Gentiles, staying there over Sabbath." This law is derived, according to Munagga, the Samaritan writer, from Lev. 23:3: "It is a Sabbath unto the Lord in all your dwellings," which is taken to signify that the Israelites should not dwell in a place where one lives who violates the Sabbath (see Wreschner, *op. cit.*, 13). This law was adopted also by Anan (see Harkavy, *Likute Kadmonioth*, 6-7). Wreschner's point of view is a misconstruction of the facts. "No one shall violate the Sabbath on account of wealth and gain." This refers to the preceding paragraph, urging the man of business not to spend his Sabbath among the Gentiles in order to obtain material advantages. "No one shall bring upon the altar [any free will offerings] save the regular burnt-offering of the Sabbath, for it says: Besides the Sabbaths of the Lord [and besides your gifts and all of your vows and all your free will offerings] (Lev. 23:38). That is to say: the latter are not to be offered on the Sabbath of the Lord.

#### THE LAWS CONCERNING VOWS

Just as our Document protests against the Pharisaic innovations concerning the Sabbath observance, so it deprecates the laxity with which the Pharisean teachers would annul vows, thereby infringing upon things pertaining to the sanctuary. No doubt, these vows, made rashly in moments of distress and anxiety, which in the early biblical times brought doom on the people, as seen in the story of Jephtha's daughter, and which are deprecated by the author of Koheleth v, 1-5, became matters of serious consideration to the sages who saw the welfare of the people frequently undermined by them.<sup>84</sup> In view of this the Pharisees boldly declared by way of analogy that, just as the Law in Num. 30:1 f. empowers father and husband to annul the woman's

<sup>84</sup> Cf. Shab. 32b; Nedar. 20a.

vow, so shall "the heads of the tribes," or the sages, by the power and authority of their wisdom and knowledge, be empowered to annul the vow made by persons with due consideration of the circumstances involved.<sup>65</sup> This power of "binding and loosing"<sup>66</sup> was naturally enough contested by the Sadducees, and so our Document reads (p. 16): "And since the Law says: That which has gone out of thy mouth thou shalt keep [Deut. 23:25] to fulfil it, any binding oath which a man puts upon himself to perform a commandment of the Law, he cannot make it void not even at the price of death; and if a man takes a vow upon himself to depart from the Law, even at the price of death he shall not fulfil it. And as regards the oath of a woman of which Moses says that her oath may be annulled [Num. 30:3-9], let no one annul an oath of which he [the husband] does not know whether [read *im* instead of *dm*] it should be confirmed or annulled: If it be for transgressing the covenant, he shall annul it, and not confirm it. And so is the law also for the father."<sup>67</sup>

#### THE DIETARY LAWS

The chapter on the Dietary Laws has only two paragraphs in our Document (p. 12); the rest seems to have been omitted by the copyist partly through carelessness, partly for other reasons. They read as follows: "None shall contaminate himself by any [forbidden] wild beast and creeping thing by eating therefrom—from beehives to the soul of any living thing that moves in the water. Fish shall not be eaten unless they were split alive and their blood shed; and all the locusts after their kinds shall be put into fire or water while alive, for this is the manner of their creation." As to their forbidding honey, Schechter (*Introd.*, xxiv) thinks that they regarded it as a part taken from a living animal which falls under the category of the law: "Thou shalt not eat the soul with the flesh" (Deut. 12:23), which is binding upon the half-proselyte or Noahide as well (Hul. 101b f.); for which reason they forbade, according to Abul-Fatḥ, also the eating of eggs except those found in a slaughtered animal. In n. 20, p. li, Schechter ascribed the reason for the prohibition to a possible mixture of the honey with particles of the bee, considered also by the Karaites in their observation of the law.

<sup>65</sup> Jer. Hag. i, 76c; cf. Bereshit R. 60, 4.

<sup>66</sup> Josephus, *B.J.*, i, 52; cf. art. in *J.E.*

<sup>67</sup> The rest of the defective text I would translate as follows: "As regards vow-offerings no one shall vow unto the altar a thing obtained by force. Nor shall the priests take anything from Israel by mere force. Neither shall a man devote the food which belongs to a Gentile [read *legoy*] for this is what He said: They capture each other by a ban" [*herem* is taken in the sense of ban in Micah 7:2].

That the Samaritans were stricter in their dietary laws than the Pharisees is expressly stated in the ancient Baraita.<sup>88</sup> As to the prohibition against eating fish and locusts, unless they were killed in the manner prescribed, Munagga, the Samaritan writer,<sup>89</sup> confirms this law as being Samaritan, while pointing to the fact that Scripture calls both fish and locusts which have died of themselves "carcasses" (*Nebelak*) which contaminate the eater. Wreschner's attempt to represent the Samaritans as imitators of Harranian, or Hindoo, practices is dictated by his Halakic view, and is not justified by the facts. It is also to be noticed that Jub. 6:12 does not include the blood of fish and locusts among the prohibitions mentioned there—a fact which disproves Schechter's theory concerning the relation of the Dositheans to this "heretical" book.

#### THE LAWS ON FORBIDDEN MARRIAGES

The laws concerning forbidden marriages are no longer preserved in our Document. The importance assigned to them, however, by the authors of the Manifesto is shown in the introductory part (4-5) in which the charge of "fornication" is brought against the Pharisees in view of the following facts:<sup>90</sup>

"They marry two wives while both of them are alive, whereas the fundamental law of creation is expressed in the Scripture: 'God created man male and female' [Gen. 1:27], and, going into the ark, 'they went in two and two, male and female' [7:9]; also regarding the prince it is written: 'He shall not have many wives' [Deut. 17:20]—a law which David did not read in the Book of the Law, it having remained hidden away in the ark, as it remained unopened in Israel from the day of the death of Eleazer and Joshua and the elders all the while the people worshiped the Astarte idols until a Zadok[ite] [II Kings 20:22] rose and revealed what was hidden and then became known [read *wayegalleh hatamun we niggalu*] the deeds of David aside from the murder of Uriah, and God left them to him." (The line following, concerning the Pharisæic treatment of the wife in her menstruation was spoken of above.) "And they marry the daughter of their brother or sister, whereas the law of Moses which forbids the man to marry the sister of his mother, declaring her to be the mother's near kin, applies also to woman and con-

<sup>88</sup> *Mas. Kuthim*, ed. Kirchheim, 33-34.

<sup>89</sup> Wreschner, *op. cit.*, 51.

<sup>90</sup> The text (p. 4, l. 19) reads: "The builders of the hollow partition wall (Separatists) who walk after empty talk." *Zav* in Hos. 5:11 means emitting sounds; cf. Mic. 12:6, 11; see also Cheney in Haupt's *Bible*, p. 153, on *Zav le Zav*.

sequently forbids also the brother's daughter to marry her father's brother, he being her father's kin."

Now as to the prohibition of marrying two wives while they are both alive—of which, by the way, the Book of Jubilees makes no mention—it is to this very day observed by the Samaritans except in the case of the childlessness of the first wife when the husband has to divorce her.<sup>91</sup> The rabbis also found polygamy to be contrary to the law of humanity.<sup>92</sup> Nor is it merely the Karaites who adopted the prohibition of polygamy,<sup>93</sup> but the early church also prohibited bigamy to the bishop and the deacon<sup>94</sup> "because it is said (Gen. 2:24), 'and he shall cleave to his wife,' and not 'wives.'"

How far back the prohibition against marrying the niece goes, which Anan and the early Karaites adopted, while using the same argument as stated in our Document<sup>94</sup> cannot be stated for the present. Estor ha Parhi's view indorsed by Zunz<sup>95</sup> and Steinschneider<sup>96</sup> that the Karaites adopted it from the Samaritans and the latter from the Koran (Surah iv, 27) must now be discarded as false. Not only was the prohibition known to be in force among certain sectaries (*Minim*) in the Geonic time<sup>97</sup> but also the early Christian church had in the Apostolic Canons (Par. xix) the following statute: "He who has married two sisters (one after the other) or his brother's or sister's daughter cannot be a clergyman."<sup>98</sup> On the other hand, it is the Book of Jubilees which sets up the rule that each pious man should marry the daughter of his brother or sister,<sup>99</sup> exactly as does the Talmud,<sup>100</sup> another proof of the fallacy of Beer's and Schechter's theory concerning the relationship of the Book of Jubilees to the Dosithean sect.

<sup>91</sup> Peterman, *Reisen im Orient*, I, 279.

<sup>92</sup> See Aboth d. R., Nathan ed., Schechter 5a; Sifre and Tanh. to Deut. 21:5; Pesik. R. xliii; Beresh. R. xxiii, 3.

<sup>93</sup> Lekah Tob to Deut. 21:5, to which Schechter refers.

<sup>94</sup> Didascalia ii, 2, 2; I Tim. 3:12; and *Canones Jacobs von Edessa*, ed. Kayser, 160-62.

<sup>95</sup> See Harkavy's *Lik. Kadm.*, 97, 100; Hadassi, 117c, and Graetz, *Gesch.*, V<sup>1</sup>, 449.

<sup>96</sup> *Gesammelte Schriften*, II, 303.

<sup>96</sup> *Polem. Lit.*, 398.

<sup>97</sup> See Poznanski in the *Kaufmann Gedenkbuch*, 173.

<sup>98</sup> Didascalia, ed. Funk, 568. So also the Syrian church. See Kayser's *Canones Jacobs von Edessa*, loc. cit.

<sup>99</sup> See 4:15-33; 8:5, 6; 9:7.

<sup>100</sup> Yebam 62b; Sanh. 76b; Beresh. R. xviii, 5; cf. *Jewish Q.R.*, V, 406, note.

## THE CALENDAR SYSTEM AND THE BOOK OF JUBILEES

We now come to the one point which seems to support this theory, all the more so as our Document directly refers to the Book of Jubilees under the name of "the Book of the Divisions of the Seasons according to Their Jubilees and Their [Year] Weeks" (p. 16);<sup>101</sup> while at the same time the Document teems with verbal quotations from Jubilees, as Schechter's notes sufficiently show. It is the calendar system of the Pharisees which the Manifesto in its introductory part (p. 3, l. 14; p. 6, l. 18) condemns, while declaring "its own Sabbaths and festivals to be the revelation of hidden things concerning which all Israel have gone astray." Exactly so, the Book of Jubilees (1:29; 6:22-37; 1:5) has its own system of reckoning the years, the festivals, and the Sabbath dictated from the heavenly tablets by the angel of God's presence to Moses and to Noah with the contention that "the order of the years and feasts of the people is one of error and of ignorance." Now, our Document in its present defective state offers no information about the calendar system which it declares to be divinely revealed. All the more light is furnished on the subject by what the Samaritan, the Karaite, and the Jewish sources tell us of the sect called Dosithean by the one and Zadokite by the other. All these agree that the calendar was a solar, instead of a lunar, one, and the months were fixed at thirty days each. This system is presented at length in the Book of Jubilees in connection with the covenant of God made with Noah after the flood where, with reference to Gen. 7:11 and 8:3, 4, 14, 22, the reckoning is made after the solar year and months of thirty days. It assigns 364 days to the year, that is, twelve months each of thirty days, with four intercalary days at the end of the four seasons, and altogether 52 weeks, so as to have each year begin on the first day of the week and all the festivals of each year fall on the same day; hence also the Feast of the Weeks in accord with the letter of the Law (Lev. 23:15-16), "on the morrow of the Sabbath." Only thus, says the Book of Jubilees, "will the seasons not be disturbed and the feasts of the year not be

<sup>101</sup> The passage strangely interrupts the context and seems to be a marginal note suggested by the term *Malak Mastema*, for Satan, found exclusively in the Book of Jubilees for Satan. Speaking of the readmission of the penitent (proselyte?) "who returns to the Law of Moses," the Document continues: "And on the day on which the man sincerely returns to the Law of Moses, 'the angel of hostility' will turn away from him, if he shall but fulfil his promise. For this reason was Abraham circumcised on the day he learned of it"—that is of the Law of the Covenant (Jubil. 15:26-34). Here the marginal note reads: "For this is stated clearly . . . in the Book of the Divisions of the Seasons according to Their Jubilees and Their Weeks."



dislodged."<sup>102</sup> In order fully to appreciate the spirit which prompted this seemingly arbitrary system, cognizance must be taken of the fact that the Mosaic law in the case of the Jubilee year actually counts the new year from the day following the Atonement Day, that is the 11th of the 7th month, and not from the first day. It thus reckons the year after the solar calendar as was done by Ezek. 40:1.<sup>103</sup> On the other hand, Sadducean tradition insisted upon having the Pentecost feast always on Sunday in conformity with Lev. 23:15-16, which, according to modern historico-critical exegesis,<sup>104</sup> has no other meaning than "the day following the weekly Sabbath."<sup>105</sup> It was undoubtedly on account of their opposition to the Pharisean authorities in Jerusalem, who fixed the calendar by observation of the moon and in accordance with their interpretation of the term "the morrow after the Sabbath" as signifying the sixteenth day of Sivan, that the Samaritans and the Boethusians, the successors of the Sadducean party, contrived by false signals to mislead the Jewish people in their reckoning of the months. Now the best way of emancipating themselves from the Pharisaic authorities was the introduction of the solar calendar as presented by the Book of Jubilees. Here the Feast of Weeks (*Ḥag ha Shabuoth*) seems to have been taken in the sense of "the Feast of the Covenant-Oaths," being the day on which God concluded the Covenant with Noah, with the patriarchs, and with the people of Israel,<sup>106</sup> and, instead of the fifth or

<sup>102</sup> See the instructive notes of Charles to Jubilees 6:29-36.

<sup>103</sup> Cf. Klostermann, *Der Pentateuch*, 421 f.

<sup>104</sup> See Berthelot, Dillmann-Ryssel, and Driver.

<sup>105</sup> Originally the seven harvest weeks were not all, or only loosely, connected with the Passover, or Mazzot festival (see Deut. 15:9 and cf. Josh. 5:11). There are also indications in Scripture (see I Sam. 20:5, 18 ff.) that the month consisted originally in the pre-exilic time of four weeks with the seventh day as the Sabbath and two days celebrated as new moon festivals, so that practically each new moon and each full moon began on the first day of the week. A dim remembrance of this fact may underlie the tradition of the Sadducees and Samaritans as well as the calendar system of the Book of Jubilees. (Cf. Hitzig, *Ostern u. Pfingsten*, 4 f., where attention is called to the Pentecost festival mentioned by Josephus [*Ant.*, XIII, viii, 4] as having been celebrated in the time of John Hyrcanus on the day after Sabbath.) However, the Septuagint translates Lev. 23:11, "the morrow of the first day," in accordance with the Pharisean doctrine. So also Josephus (*Ant.*, III, x, 5) and Philo (*De Septennario*, 20); neither of them knows of the Feast of Weeks being celebrated as the Memorial Day of the Giving of the Law (Exod. 19:1 f.) as found in the Synagogue liturgy which must have been known to the author of the Book of Jubilees 1:1; 6:17; 15:1 (see Charles' notes), as well as to the Therapeutae (see art. in *J.E.*, XII, 139) and to the early Christians (see Spitta, *Apstelgesch.*, 27, to Acts 2:1 ff.).

<sup>106</sup> See Charles' note on Jub. 1:1.

sixth of Sivan,<sup>107</sup> the fifteenth of the third month is given as the festival day.

Now, far from being shunned as one of the "heretical" books condemned by R. Akiba, Sanh. x, 1, as Professor Schechter represents it in his *Introduction*, the Book of Jubilees was greatly used by the authors of *Seder Olam* ascribed to R. Jose of the second century,<sup>108</sup> as well as by other Midrash works,<sup>109</sup> and was still in use in Geonic times.<sup>110</sup> In all probability it had a determining influence on the Falashas in Abyssinia, as is especially pointed out by Eppstein in his book *Eldad Ha Dani*; but this is by no means the case in regard to the Dosithean sect whose views concerning the marriage and the dietary laws differ from the teachings of the Book of Jubilees, as has been shown above in contradiction to the assumption of Beer and Schechter.

#### THE ZADOKITES AND KARAITES

After having thus examined our Document in its entirety, we can only arrive at the one conclusion that the messianic pronouncement and the constitution we have before us in fragmentary form emanated from the immediate followers of Dositheus, the Samaritan heresiarch, who claimed to be the Messiah from the Samaritan line of the Zadokite priesthood and was declared to be "the only teacher of righteousness" (*Zedek*), as he wanted to have the law restored in full conformity with the view and tradition of the Zadokite priesthood. While in accord with the Samaritan views in the main, he differs from them particularly in regard to the prophetic books, which he recognizes as more or less inspired, rejecting merely the Judaic hopes founded on the Davidic dynasty, while at the same time he makes ample use of the pseudepigraphic literature that seems then to have been widely read, but was lost sight of thereafter in the rabbinic schools. The whole forms an important link in the development of the pre-Talmudic lore, Halakic or Haggadic. It strongly confirms the theory of Abraham Geiger as to the relationship of Samaritanism and Karaism to Sadduceeism, which, far from being a mere heresy or sectarianism, represents rather the legal and doctrinal system of the Zadokite priesthood in its unbending adherence to temple tradition and ancient practice, in contrast to the progressive and democratic views of the Pharisees. In attempting to define Sadduceeism as "a sort of countertradition or an interpretation

<sup>107</sup> Shab. 86b, where a difference of opinion between R. Jose and others is expressed.

<sup>108</sup> See Ratner, *Mabo le Sed. s, Olam*. 109, and Pirke d. R. Eliezer, chap. 8.

<sup>109</sup> See Jellinek *Beth ha Midrash*, iii.

<sup>110</sup> Ratner 110, and *J.Q.R.*, II, 190.

claiming to go back to primitive Judaism" (*Introd.*, xxi, n. 35), Professor Schechter seemingly has altogether forgotten that in his *Ben Sira Introd.*, 35, he called attention to the prominence given to the priestly house of Zadok of which Simon the Just was so fine a type, and that he thereby offered the best possible corroboration of Geiger's view of the Sadducees, indorsed by Wellhausen, Schürer, and others.<sup>141</sup> The story in *Aboth d. R. Nathan*, v,<sup>142</sup> of Zadok and Boethus does not represent these two disciples of Antigonos of Soko themselves as founders of the Sadducean and Boethusian sects, but states that their disciples' disciples founded these sects. Only the patristic and rabbinical literature speaks of them as heresiarchs. In the tenth century we are boldly told by Saadia<sup>143</sup> that, in opposition to Zadok and Boethus who wanted to change the Jewish calendar system, Antigonos of Soko and his court of justice instituted the regulation of the festivals by observation of the moon. This is denied by Hasan b. Mashiah, the Karaite, who says the writings of Zadok "which are generally known" contain nothing on that point. Kirkisani, however, the Karaite who lived also in the middle of the tenth century, dwells at great length on the works of Zadok, which must then have been widely circulated, and Professor Schechter's scholarly introduction has made it reasonably clear that it was our Document, probably in a more complete form, which passed as the work of Zadok.

Professor Schechter has made it highly probable, if not certain, that the Document brought to light by him formed the very source of Anan's system, or of early Karaism, which, as Kirkisani relates, was founded upon the books of Zadok. The very argument with which Anan in his "Book of the Commandments" bases the prohibition of marrying the niece upon the Scripture is to the very letter identical with that given in our Document, and thus the whole system of early Karaism of which the amplification of forbidden marriages forms the most prominent part, rests upon the Dosithean work. We thus possess in this Document the connecting link between the ancient Sadducean and Samaritan lore

<sup>141</sup> From the Halakic point of view Ben Sira had as little right to be placed among the Ketubim ("the holy writings") in the Baraitha quoted Baba Kamma 92b, as the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs had in Sifre Num. 12; Sota 7b, where, notwithstanding Schechter's emendation (*Introd.*, xxvii, n. 65), the passage must have well-known written "words of the Haggadah" in view. See Sanh. 100b; Yer. Sanh. x, 28b; Koh. R. xii, 13, and cf. Joel, *Blicke in d. Religionsgesch.*, I, 68-76, where it is shown that the words "external books" refer to works of heretics and not to non-canonical or pseudepigraphical works. The entire apocalyptic literature also of the rabbis consists of pseudepigrapha.

<sup>142</sup> Ed. Schechter, 26.

<sup>143</sup> Quoted in Geiger's *Urschrift*, 106, note.

and the doctrines of the Karaites in a far more direct form than Geiger and Harkavy could expect. We now understand better how in pointing to "Zadokite" books the Karaites could call themselves "followers of Zadok" and why they were identified by mediaeval Jewish writers, Saadia, Juda Ha Levi, Ibn Ezra, Maimonides, and others, with the old Zadokites.<sup>114</sup>

But we must go a step farther. The Dosithean work alone passing under the name of Zadok could not well have exerted that great influence upon the Karaites in their reaction against Talmudism, had not a remnant of the Dosithean sect kept alive the Sadducean tradition and directly assumed the more familiar name of Zadokite. According to Photius, the Dositheans in about 600 C.E. held a dispute with the Alexandrian bishop Eulogius, with the result that they were expelled from Egypt. Scattered over the entire East, then, they may have assumed the name of Zadokites and kindled the messianic hopes which finally led to the creation of the sect that called itself "Mourners for Zion" before it became known as that of the Karaites. The name of Dositheus was forgotten and was preserved only in the quaint legend found in Tanh. Wayesheb and Pirke d. R. Eliezer xxxviii, telling of Rabbi Dosethai and Rabbi Sabuya, the representatives of the two Samaritan sects, as having been the instigators of the Samaritan schism in the time of King Senaherib and then solemnly put under the ban.

#### DOSITHEAN INFLUENCE UPON JEWISH AND CHRISTIAN DOCTRINES AND SECTS

There is nothing in the teachings of the Falashas or in their history to support Schechter's opinion that they had anything in common with the Dosithean sect. Their system, if not altogether founded upon, is at least identical with, that proposed in the Book of Jubilees which, as has been shown, differs in many essential points from the Dosithean Document and looks to Jerusalem as the holy city. The prayers of the Falashas are, in particular, Essene in character and have both Jerusalem and the house of David as the central objects of their hope for the future.

On the other hand there are a number of points in our Document that suggest a relationship to the early Christian church. The Didascalia has been referred to several times in this article, but this was shown by the writer in the *Jewish Encyclopedia* (s.v.) to have been originally an Essene work. Nor must any stress be laid upon the name New Covenant given to the Dosithean system of Mosaism as accepted by the sect in

<sup>114</sup> See Harkavy in *Graetz. Gesch.*, V<sup>3</sup>, 413 ff.

the land of Damascus. It by no means signifies a new dispensation in the sense the term is used in the New Testament with reference to Jer. 31:31.<sup>115</sup> Another question is whether the term "New Covenant" did not become known to Judaeo-Christians who, as Julianus Africanus tells us,<sup>116</sup> settled in the vicinity of Damascus and thus may have had some influence upon the Paulinian church.

There is certainly a striking resemblance between our Document (p. 19, ll. 7 f.) and the New Testament passage, Matt. 26:31 and parallels, in regard to the use of the prophetic utterance in Zech. 12:7. In describing the messianic end of the visitation our Document quotes: "O sword, awake against my shepherd and against the man that is my fellow, says God, smite the shepherd, and the sheep shall be scattered," and then continues with reference to Zech. 11:7 and Ezek. 9:4 to describe the day of judgment when "the ones will be marked for life and escape, and the others delivered to the avenging sword." This same passage is quoted by Jesus during the great night of trial at the Mount of Olives in a rather puzzling manner, and the explanation offered<sup>117</sup> is that the dispersion of the followers of Jesus and their flight to the North of Judea is here alluded to. We are here referred directly to the story of Africanus and Hegesippus concerning the men who fled to Galilee and Damascus.<sup>118</sup> But there are other indications that the Judaeo-Christian sects had come under the influence of the Dositheans. Ebion, the mythical founder of the Ebionite sect, is said to have lived in Kokaba, "in the Decapolis" where, according to Epiphanius<sup>119</sup> the early Christians, called Nazarenes, lived (see Hilgenfeld, *Ketzergesch.*, 428).<sup>120</sup> How far the story of the star at Bethlehem in Matt. 2:2 was influenced by the star in Num. 24:17 is rather difficult to say, as the story has many parallels pointing to Persian and Babylonian origins.

More directly the messianic title, "the Star" in our Manifesto,

<sup>115</sup> Cf. Heb. 8:8-12.

<sup>116</sup> See Eusebius, *H.E.*, I, 7, 14.

<sup>117</sup> See Weizsacker, *Apostol. Zeitalter*, I.

<sup>118</sup> Eusebius, *H.E.*, I, 7, 14; III, 20.

<sup>119</sup> *Haeres.*, xxix, 7; xxx, 2.

<sup>120</sup> According to Epiphanius, *Haeres.*, xxx, 2, the Ebionites observed the Levitical purity laws as strictly as did the Samaritans and, as we have seen, the Dositheans. They, however, rejected sacrificial worship (Epiphanius, xxx, 16), which, strange to say, was retained by some oriental churches, the Syrian, Armenian, and Abyssinian, down to modern times (see Kayser, *op. cit.*, 171; Petermann, *op. cit.*, I, 227; Prot. R. E., *Syrische Kirche*, XIX, 302; Ritter, *Erdkunde*, X, 617), and this cannot be due to Jewish influence, as has been asserted.

seems to have influenced that of *Bar Kokba*, the pseudo-Messiah and hero of the Hadrianic war. Opinions differ as to whether his real name was Bar Kokeba ("Son of the town Kokaba"),<sup>121</sup> or Bar Koziba ("Son of Koziba"); all we know is that R. Akiba, the great teacher of Israel, proclaimed him the Messiah, applying to him the messianic verse of Num. 24:17. Hence he was called "the Son of the Star" until his star declined, and, when defeat came, his name was changed into that Bar Koziba ("Son of Falsehood").<sup>122</sup> It is strange, however, that both terms Kokab and Ish ha Kazab ("Man of Falsehood") occur in our Manifesto.<sup>123</sup> More striking still is the fact that according to Syncellus (quoted in the *J.E.* article) Bar Kokba was also called "the only one," *Μονογενής*, which corresponds with the name given to Dositheus in our Manifesto. The history of Bar Kokba is by no means fully cleared up as yet.

Altogether our Document shows points of contact with many movements in Jewish and Judaeo-Christian history, and both historians and theologians will do well to study more closely the important publication of Professor Schechter. It is to be hoped that the missing parts of the fragment or the more complete work will some day be found and cast further light upon a period which may be called one of the most fruitful in the religious history of the world.

<sup>121</sup> There are several villages by that name in northern Palestine; one near Beth Shemesh has the name of Kaukab el Hama ("Star of the Sun"). See Schwarz, *D. heilige Land*, 133; Neubauer, *La géographie du Talmud*, 269; Noeldeke, *Z.D.M.G.*, 1868, 521, who mentions two villages Kaukab in Galilee; cf. *Land Anecdota Syr.*, I, 106, 191; Zahn, *Forschungen*, II, 333 f.

<sup>122</sup> See article "Bar Kokba" in *J.E.*

<sup>123</sup> For the latter name see p. 20, l. 15, where it refers to Simeon ben Shetaḥ.

A WORD OF PROTEST  
MUST CHRISTIANS ABANDON THEIR HISTORIC FAITH?

JOHN ALFRED FAULKNER  
Drew Theological Seminary, Madison, N.J.

Within the last three or four years the *American Journal of Theology* has published several articles in the interest of liberal theology (I use the words "liberal" and "conservative" in their technical or artificial use, which will be understood as I proceed), in which conservatives have been treated without gloves as "obscurantists," "unscientific," as adherents of a dying or dead faith, a faith that is left behind or outworn in the progress of "science." They have even been challenged either to come out and ally themselves with the Roman Catholics, where they belong, or to embrace the new semi-Unitarianism which is so popular just now. I have read these articles with great interest and with admiration for the aggressiveness of the liberals, who propagate their new faith with all the zeal of converts, though with a little wincing now and then at the superior tone and bold frankness with which I and my brethren who still cling to the substance of the faith of our fathers are characterized. I have been waiting for some one in the systematic theology chairs to send to the editors a statement on the other side, but these professors seem to be dumb, so far as this *Journal* is concerned. I therefore for the moment leave my *Fach*, and modestly offer a few thoughts necessarily brief and imperfect in extenuation of the fault of still holding to the main lines of the faith once for all delivered to the saints.

What is that faith? You might call it the common faith of all Christian churches till within the last score of years or less. It is the faith of the New Testament, or to be more explicit, briefly that of the Apostles' Creed, or more fully that of the Nicene Creed (325), or substantially let us say the Congregational Creed of 1883, or the Creed of the Presbyterian church of England of 1889, or the parts of those creeds held when they were drawn up by all Christians, or better still the new creed proposed for the organic union of the Presbyterian, Congregational and Methodist churches of Canada, and adopted by the representatives of those churches in 1908. It would include such doctrines as the Unity of God, the Trinity, the Deity of Christ, the fact of sin,

the atonement, salvation through faith in Christ, the inspiration of Scripture, and rewards and punishments after death. It is the common doctrinal denominator of all Protestant churches and partly of Catholic. It is held against us as a reproach that some things for which we stand are believed by Catholics, but we would feel it a harder lot still if we were compelled to reject a truth because they also receive it. Sometimes in a spirit of complacency or exultation "modern" is placed over against "mediaeval" (for instance, it is said that Luther was essentially a mediaevalist); but I hold that all centuries and all lands are truth's fatherland, and I hail with joy a witness of the fourth century or the fourteenth who saw the truth and bore testimony to it. The things for which we stand as Christians are not matters of almanacs, and we must not fear to reject an error because it was published yesterday or receive a truth because Thomas Aquinas uttered it. I wish our liberal friends would keep to the main issue, and save our feelings in the matter of "modern" and "mediaeval."

In regard to the doctrine of the Trinity when did science discover it to be false? What new principle promulgated under that august auspices has relegated the Trinity to the lumber-room? It is no longer possible to believe that the personality of God is a rich and complex one, existing in a social organism of deep and varied life, which in the terms of revelation is expressed—for lack of better words—as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit (called "Persons," again for lack of a better word, but not at all persons in the ordinary sense, Christianity not being responsible for inadequate words), this richness of nature thus expressed being not simply a figure or an attribute, but a part of the eternal substance of the Infinite One—is it, I say, no longer "scientific" to believe this with Christianity, or must we say with Mohammedanism that God is one only in a non-Trinitarian sense? Has not science been inclined to push back the boundaries of mystery in the dim regions of personality? Is there not a larger field of investigation than hitherto, and a more perplexing one? What about those strange phenomena, duplex and triple personalities? When, I repeat, did science find out that there can be no Trinity in God? I do not speak of the fact that the Trinity is inwoven in the Christian revelation, that in some form it has been the faith of Christians from the beginning till now, that it and it only both satisfies and explains their deepest experience, that it is the ever-living spring of their activities as Christians. I do not speak of all this, though all this is a part of the facts with which science will have to deal when it comes to touch this field.



Now remember that the church is not responsible for the explanations of individual thinkers. She is only responsible for the fact revealed in her Book and in her life that in Father, Son, and Spirit she has Lord, Savior, and Lifegiver. The explanations may help or they may hinder, but faith in the Trinity does not stand or fall with them. She may say with Augustine that the "Holy Spirit is the love wherewith the Father loves the Son and the Son loves the Father" (*De Trin.* 6:5), it being understood that the love of the Father for the Son is really also the love of the Father for the objects of his own thought, that is, for his creatures. We are not tritheists. "A word conceived in the mind," says Thomas Aquinas (*Summa Theol.* I, qu. 34, art. 3), "is representative of everything which is understood in that act. Whence in us there are different words, according as we understand different things. But because God understands himself and everything else in one act, his one Word is expressive not alone of the Father but even of his creatures." We may express the so-called Persons of the Trinity as the Power of God, the Wisdom of God, the Will or Love of God, understanding by these not simply qualities, much less appearances or modes which can be assumed one after the other (Sabellianism), but essential elements or subsistences existing in a large rich social unity and diversity in the life of the Eternal. Historically we might express it this way: There was the revelation of God according to personal and national appetencies in pre-Christian times; there was his revelation by the incarnation in Jesus in and through and for his Son, and there was and is his revelation in the onward progress of truth and love by the Spirit. The church is not bound to formulas, like Trinity, Generation, Procession, but only to the truth which they express. When the formula has had its day and has served its purpose and can no longer be understood ("the most subtle philosopher and the most profound theologian," said von Dörlinger, "cannot explain the difference between 'generation' and 'procession' in the 'generation of the Son' and the 'procession of the Spirit,'" [*Exp.* 1890, 425-26]), let it pass. But the truth does not pass. And it is important that we should not let it pass—what God did and said by his Son and what he is doing and saying today by his Spirit.

As to the divinity of Christ, when has science discovered that he is less divine than he was in 1883 when the Congregational Creed declared: "And [we believe] in Jesus Christ, his only Son, our Lord, who is of one substance with the Father; by whom were all things made" (Schaff, *Creeds*, 4th ed., III, 911)? Have any new facts been found showing any defects in his character or teaching, or any possible

points on which we could get hold and say, Ah, now I know that he was not divine, but a man only? If so, what are they, and who discovered them? Is it more "modern" to think of him as a mere man, a *χουνός* or *ψιλός άνθρωπος*? But that is an ancient trick (*Hip., Phil.* 10:23 al. 19). Or as a man endowed with divine power? The accomplished courtier and minister of the fair Zenobia made that a commonplace with some. Has the criticism of the gospels destroyed the Christian view? But he is as divine in all essential things in Mark as he is in John, and President Mullins in his remarkable article on "The Modern Issue as to the Person of Christ" in *Rev. and Exp.* (Louisville, January, 1911, 15-16) says that in the supposed document Q, which some think lies back of Matthew, we find him fully portrayed in this transcendental garb. Did Paul invent the doctrine? He found it. He differed with the older Christians on some points, but not on this. They threw some things in his face, but not this. His Christology he never had to defend. What, then, has modern science found which makes Christ less Redeemer, Savior, and Lord? Does he not still save from sin? Ask the Salvation Army. They are bringing the hardest cases to him—yes, to him, not simply to God the Father, all the time. Is he not still casting the demons out? Ask the Water Street Mission, or Callanan on the Bowery. Is he not still mediating with absolute certainty all the fulness of the Godhead to men, all the fulness they can stand? Not only so, do not all Christians—speaking generally—find in him their perfect and their only ideal of God, so that if they were asked to define God they could not do it except in the terms of Christ? All the time consciously or unconsciously the majestic personality of Christ would be coming into their thoughts, filling the whole horizon of their knowledge, and exhausting the content of the God with whom they have to do, the only God of whom they know or care. How is that? Does Wesley do that? Edwards? Has any new knowledge come to us which makes it not still a scientific induction that Christ has his roots in the eternal God, that his life flows out of that fountain with fulness marred and checked only by the merciful and necessary limitations of incarnation? As long as Christ is showing men the Father, as long as believing in him they have eternal life and know that they have it, as long as he is their life and light, their joy and hope and consolation, their first and last, their all and in all, as long as Christian experience finds him the sure and perfect Mediator and Savior, will it not be a fair inference still scientific and modern to hold him divine?

Then there is the question of miracles. What a stumbling-block

to the "modern" man, this petted child of nineteen centuries of Christian progress! He does not need miracles. To him they are almost an impertinence. Well, let it be so. He does not need the chair on which he sat when a child. It would be a stumbling-block now. But should he despise it therefore? Were not his parents wise in furnishing it? What if in certain stages of civilization in the child life of the race, God thought it wise in order to awaken and stimulate dull and crude minds to faith and holiness to provide these lowly helps, these striking manifestations of his presence, of his love and righteousness? Has modern science proved that that is unreasonable, that that is not in conformity with true ideas of God as a loving Father and a wise pedagogue? When no longer needed the special manifestations pass, as kindergarten implements are left behind. "But miracles have never happened and can never happen. Science shows that every thing is held within the rigid bonds of law." Since when? Has science shown that there is no Personality behind the law, working in it and through it and beyond it? And if a Personality, can He not control law, or supersede it, or touch it to higher issues, or bring in another? Personality is *the* miracle. Having that you have the possibility of all things. And then, is not the ordinary and the extraordinary event, a manifestation of the one supreme Force, the one transcendent and immanent Power, who works all things, who is over all and in all? And if so, is not miracle just as natural in this larger view as the commonplace thing? When did science prove the contrary, so that I as a modern man must throw overboard miracles?

Besides, the supernatural is the very essence of the Christian religion—the incursion of a Higher Power into the ordinary sequences of our daily living, without which we could not attain salvation. That being conceded, all the miracles of Scripture follow as a matter of course: that is, if they are fitting, if they are historically congruous and necessary, if they show forth divine love, righteousness, and truth, if they are manifestations of a holy and beneficent purpose, revelation, and Person, and if they are organically related to a progressive economy of redemption. Speaking generally, the miracles of Scripture stand these tests. If not, they are worthless. Because always the purpose, the revelation, the Person, the truth are greater, are far more important than the mere earthly manifestation, whether miraculous or otherwise. For this reason all miracles conceivable could not convince us of the supreme truth, for instance, of Mohammedanism, and it would require no miracle to convince us of certain relative truths in it. But it is

the glory of our religion that its miracles come in certain historical junctures, serve necessary pedagogical ends, and are so fitting and so religiously and ethically worthy, that—though in themselves unimportant as external events alone—they have formed at the right time a unique demonstration of a unique Power at hand to save, to warn, to help, to serve now the cause of righteousness, now the cause of love. When the special form of the extraordinary event was no longer needed it lapsed of itself. But the Power, the supernatural Force for which Christianity stands, did not lapse.

It is sometimes said that conservatives are not consistent, and are self-stultifying in holding to New Testament miracles but not to later ones. Even if they did so hold, they would not be necessarily inconsistent with their principle that miracles serve a historic purpose in a historic order, and after that purpose and order have been served in the founding of Christianity, its supernatural sanctions manifest themselves in other ways. But as a matter of fact the charge is a mistake. Christians do not deny post-apostolic miracles. There is evidence that even these external events kept up for three or four hundred years more or less, and the greater miracles of conversion, of religious power and sanctity were going forward all the time. A chief element in miracles is the faith of the recipient; when you have that a miracle is possible at almost any time. For this reason hundreds if not thousands of miracles took place around the shrine of Thomas Becket in Canterbury, whose genuineness that stanch liberal Dr. Edwin A. Abbott freely acknowledges. Not only so, he says that even at a distance from Canterbury the mere "vision or thought [of St. Thomas slain before the altar] resulted in a multitude of mighty works of healing, rescue from agony, restoration to peace and health" (*St. Thomas of Canterbury. His Death and Miracles* [London, 1898], II, 305). Who can tell the power of faith? Who can tell the power of a human—not to say divine—person, or of even a great thought, to stir to more potent issues the sluggish physical forces which ordinarily bind this inestimable spirit! I read the other day an opinion of Sir Oliver Lodge that there was nothing in modern science to discredit miracles, or words to that effect. It may be God's nemesis on our materialism, what Carlyle called our Dirt Philosophy, that he allows such a portentous imposture as Mary Eddyism, with its half truth, half error, to win thousands of people from the church by its perverted appeal to the all-conquering power of the spiritual.

As to the atonement, it is only the fact for which the church stands, not theories. If the latter help to explain the fact, well and good,

and perhaps all of them do more or less. But if some Christians have no theories, but are simply content with the primitive church to say that "Christ died for our sins, according to the Scriptures," they cannot be blamed. But pray, has science made this faith untenable for the modern man? Who is the scientist, and where is his demonstration? The atonement is founded on these two facts: (1) sin and salvation from it, (2) the justice, holiness, and love of God. It is God's way to find a middle united channel for these two things. He found it in the life, death, resurrection, ascension, and mediatorial activity of his Son. Has science shown the contrary? But God can forgive without atonement. Can he? If he could, would he not have done so? Can anyone forgive without atonement? Absolutely not one. For these Christian laws and facts and doctrines are not arbitrary, but are part of the universe, part of the nature of things. The universe is not founded on love alone, apart from righteousness, and that truth is voiced in the inmost consciousness of the race. Therefore no righteous man or woman ever forgives a transgressor, or ever can forgive a transgressor, without such a man or woman consciously or unconsciously offering up an atonement in the soul by love to justice, truth, and holiness. In some cases it is a *via dolorosa*, a cross, a miniature Calvary. The Christian atonement is only that same fact expressed from the divine side, historically and so to speak racially. Has the "modern" man found another way? Has science?

The inspiration and authority of the Scriptures is also a burden to certain liberals. Here again the church stands only for the facts, not theological opinions. Have facts shown that the church's belief that in the Scriptures she has the word of God pre-eminently is an unfounded one? (That does not mean that there are not other words of God in nature, history, literature, etc.) In any sacred books has God spoken so purely, with such ethical and religious depth, largeness, variety, beauty, truth, as in the Scriptures? Has science gotten hold of such books? Does any other so "find" us, search us, shame us, cast us down, lift us up, ennoble us, purify us, and make us at once both more human and more divine? Has any other book so true, complete, and rational a revelation as to man, sin, God, salvation, life, death, and the hereafter? Is any other book the product of so unique a historical evolution bound up with redemption, preparatory in the Old Testament, flowering out in the New? Is any other book connected with a religion which is of course greater than it because it produced it, a religion which saves the sinner and sanctifies the saint, which comforts the

troubled, and inspires the strong, which purifies society, humanizes law, and directs governments to beneficent ends? Has the modern man found another which is not separated by a wide gulf both in kind and degree from these Scriptures and this religion? These are the facts for which the church stands, not theories. And these facts make the authority of Scripture; these facts make it as a book a divine rule of faith and practice, make it that over against other books, other rules (if men in their low estate need a rule), over against tradition, ecclesiasticism, popes, bishops, councils, conferences, creeds. Has modern enlightenment discredited this claim of the church?

As to salvation through faith in Christ what new light of science has rejected it? Who has discovered that the sinner who repents of his sins and believes on Christ for salvation is not a saved man? "Do you wish to see his monument? Look around." The witnesses to this salvation are more than two or three. This faith and salvation may be mediated or helped by sacraments, by preaching, by fidelity to moral ideals, by education, by many things, or by nothing except

Nothing in my hands I bring  
Simply to thy cross I cling,

but I think that the "modern man" will find, if he seeks by a sufficiently wide induction, that this Christian doctrine of salvation works with the certainty of the law of gravitation.

Finally, future rewards and punishments. The only difficulty here is their eternal duration. But this does not apply to the reward, to which no one objects because eternal. As to punishments, the church stands only for the fact, not for theories of theologians, in whose defense it must be said, however, that for the last twenty years or more they have been remarkably guarded and modest. But here again we must remark that we have to do with something more stubborn than Christian teaching, viz., with the eternal laws of life. Sin brings deterioration of character, and that is its own hell. This deterioration tends to permanency, or if there is any change, nature tends to a still worse deterioration. So there you have life hand in hand with revelation saying to the sinner: "If today you hear his voice, harden not your hearts"! Now with these facts, it strikes me that the church is not to be blamed if she refuses to paint the future of the transgressor in too rosy-colored hues. Years ago individual preachers used to try to pull some hardened souls out of the fire by too dramatic and overwrought descriptions, but considering the fearful words of Christ and apostles

the church in all utterances that might be considered official has been reticent on this subject, if not entirely silent.

The above are the main doctrines believed in substance by the universal church from apostolic times till today against which the "modern" man and the so-called liberal trains his guns. I hold that they are not only true, but that modern knowledge has not abated one jot or tittle of their appeal to him who loves truth more than words. Deeply imbedded in Scripture, revealed in Christian souls, verified by Christian experience, witnessed to by history, the spring of all kinds of Christian activity, rational, vital, they have proved themselves as true as any non-mathematical truth can prove itself. Scientific men say that science has nothing against them. Whether it has or not, if they are not true our Christian religion with its records is a huge imposture, to be rejected by every self-respecting man. So it seems to me. "Our partial knowledge," says an eminent geologist, Professor William North Rice, of Wesleyan University, in his learned, candid, and progressive-conservative book, *Christian Faith in an Age of Science* [New York, 1903], 411-12, "justifies the prophetic hope that no scientific discovery will contradict the essence of Christianity, and that the end of all questioning will be the re-establishing of faith. For the scientific questions of our age and all ages touch not the central truth of Christianity that God was in Christ reconciling the world to himself. The inarticulate cry of universal humanity—

An infant crying in the night,

finds its interpretation and answer in Him through whom we see the Father. And to Him—'the same yesterday and today and forever'—the laboring and heavy-laden bring their burdens of doubt and question, as of sorrow and sin, and find rest unto their souls."

## CRITICAL NOTES

### THE TEXT OF THE TORONTO GOSPELS

The character of the text of the Toronto Gospels makes it desirable to follow the description of the manuscript<sup>1</sup> with a full collation of it. My especial thanks are due Dean R. Wickes and Ernest W. Parsons, New Testament Fellows in the University of Chicago, for help in carrying through and verifying the collation, in preparing which I have myself gone through the whole manuscript minutely twice. Martin Sprengling, formerly New Testament Fellow in the University, has aided in the reading of the following late and faulty subscription at the end of the manuscript, fol. 260 b.

τέλος ἤληφεν ἐνταῦ(θα) τὸ παρὸν βιβλίον εἰς τὸ ἔτος  
τρέχοντος ἐξαδὼν χιλιάδας συν τρια-  
κοστο ἅμα τε καὶ τὴν πρώτην ἐν μηνὶ ἐρχομένο(?) φ[εβ(ρουαρίῳ) ?]  
εἰς τὰς ιε ἡμέρ(ας) σαββάτω τε τῆς ἀπόκρε[ω ?]  
διὰ χειρὸς τοῦ ταπεινοῦ θεῖτου καὶ  
ιερῆως διογ[ένους ?] ὅς τε τοῦνομα  
ἐπὶ κλην τὴν μαρκίνας ἐν πόλ(ει)  
πανιθαυμάστι ἅμα τε καὶ μεγά-  
λῃ λεγόμενῃ(?) τε τοῦνομα τῆς  
κωνσταντινουπόλ[εως ?] ὑμεῖς δὲ  
ὅσοι τείχεται σὺν καὶ ἀναγνώσταις  
μὴ μέμφεσθαι παρακαλῶ μὴ δὲ  
κατ' ἰγνώσθαι μᾶλλον δὲ συγνώσθαι  
καὶ μετὰ τῶν πολλῶν σφαλμάτων διότι  
ἄπειρος ἡμεῖς τῆς τέχνης τῶν  
γραμμάτων.

This subscription must have been copied from an earlier manuscript. It is badly written, in a hand unlike any other in the manuscript, and is full of itacisms. The date it seems to give, 6301 (= A.D. 793), is much too early for any part of the manuscript, and probably the colophon has nothing to do with the text of the gospels, or their exemplar.

<sup>1</sup> Published in this *Journal*, XV, 268-71.



Professor Gregory in a recent letter proposes the number 2321 to designate the Toronto manuscript in his lists.

The collation is based on Estienne's edition of 1550, as reprinted by Lloyd and Sanday (Oxford, 1889), this being taken as a fixed text, widely accessible. It will be understood that *tr* means "transpose so as to read." All spellings have been taken account of, but not all matters of accent, aspiration, or capitalization. In several instances a marginal capital has been left to be supplied by the hand which supplied such letters in red and gold, but has been omitted where it belonged, and sometimes even supplied where it did not (Matt. 9:17; Mark 6:27; Luke 9:9; 23:15; John 6:3, 63; 10:41, etc.; cf. Luke 2:13). The chief marginal corrections—Luke 7:6 (*εἰσέλθης*); 19:30 (*ἀνθρώπων*); John 5:12 (*ἠρώτησαν . . . περιπάτει*), the pericope, John 7:53—8:11, and John 21:2—are in different hands. In general, where the text departs significantly from the Received Text, it is to agree with the better manuscripts; that is, the manuscript is decidedly better than the generality of cursives.

In an illuminated border: † τὸ κατὰ ματθαῖον ἀγ(ιον) εὐαγγέλιον. Below, κατὰ ματθαῖον ἀγ(ιον) εὐαγγέλ(ιον).

Matt. 1:3 γέ *pro* δέ<sup>1</sup> 4 νασσών *pro* Ναασσών *bis* 6 σολομώνα *pro* Σολομώντα 11 μετοικησίας *pro* μετοικεσίας 12 μετοικησίαν *pro* μετοικεσίαν 14 ἀχίμ *pro* Ἀχείμ *bis* 15 ματθάτ *pro* Ματθάν *bis* 16 Μαρίας: *corr suprl* M 17 μετοικησίας *pro* μετοικεσίας *bis* 20 μαρίαν *pro* Μαριάμ.

2:5 οὕτως *pro* οὕτω 22 *om* ἐπὶ ἀντὶ τῆς Ἰουδαίας.

3:5 *om* ἡ ἀντὶ Ἰουδαία 6 *add* ποταμῷ *post* Ἰορδάνη 8 καρπὸν ἀξίον *pro* καρποὺς ἀξίους 11 *om* καὶ πυρί.

4:3 αὐτοὶ *pro* οὗτοι *man prim*; οὗτοι *corr* 18 *om* ὁ Ἰησοῦς 22 *om* εὐθέως.

5:12 οὕτως *pro* οὕτω 16 οὕτως *pro* οὕτω | ἴδωσι *pro* ἴδωσιν | *tr* τὰ καλὰ ἔργα ὑμῶν 19 οὗτος *pro* οὕτω 23 καὶ ἐκεῖ *pro* καέκει 27 ἐρρήθη *pro* ἐρρέθη | *om* τοῖς ἀρχαίοις 31 ἐρρήθη *pro* ἐρρέθη | *om* δέ 33 ἐρρήθη *pro* ἐρρέθη 38 ἐρρήθη *pro* ἐρρέθη 39 *om* σου 43 ἐρρήθη *pro* ἐρρέθη 44 τοῖς μισοῦσιν *pro* τοὺς μισοῦντας 45 *add* τοῖς ἀντὶ οὐρανοῖς 47 φίλους *pro* ἀδελφοὺς | οὕτως *pro* οὕτω 48 *add* καὶ ἀντὶ ὁ πατήρ | οὐράνιος *pro* ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς.

6:5 *om* ἂν 14 *om* ὑμῶν 18 *om* ἐν τῷ φανερώ 24 μαμωνᾶ *pro* μαμμωνᾶ 25 ἐνδύσεσθε *pro* ἐνδύσησθε | πλείων *pro* πλείον 26 *add* τὰς ἀντὶ ἀποθήκας.

7:2 μετρηθήσεται *pro* ἀντιμετρηθήσεται 10 *add* ἡ *anle* καὶ 12 οὕτως *pro* οὕτω | οὕτως *pro* οὕτος 14 τί *pro* ὅτι 17 οὕτως *pro* οὕτω 21 *add* τοῖς *anle* οὐρανοῖς 22 ἐπροφητεύσαμεν *pro* προεφητεύσαμεν 28 ἐτέλεσεν *pro* συνετέλεσεν.

8:4 ἀλλ' *pro* ἀλλὰ 5 αὐτῷ *pro* τῷ Ἰησοῦ 8 λόγῳ *pro* λόγον 13 ἐκατοντάρχη *pro* ἐκατοντάρχῳ | *tr* ἐκείνῃ τῇ ὥρᾳ 15 αὐτῷ *pro* αὐτοῖς 25 *om* αὐτοῦ.

9:4 εἰδὼς *pro* ἰδὼν 5 *add* σου *post* ἁμαρτίαι | ἔγειρε *pro* Ἐγειραι *man prim*; ἔγειραι *corr rubr* 13 ἀλλὰ *pro* ἀλλ' | *om* εἰς μετάνοιαν 17 ἄσκούς: ἁ- *surpl corr* | ἀμφότεροι *pro* ἀμφοτέρα 18 *add* εἰς *post* ἄρχων 27 υἱὸς *pro* υἱὲ 33 *om* Ὅτι 35 *om* πάσας 36 ἐσकुλμένοι *pro* ἐκκελυμένοι.

10:2 Ταῦτα *corr rubr*? 8 *om* νεκροὺς ἐγείρετε 10 ῥάβδους *pro* ῥάβδον 15 γομόρρας *pro* Γομόρρων 19 λαλήσετε *pro* λαλήσητε (-ε *corr*?) 25 δεσπότην *pro* οἰκοδεσπότην | ἐπεκάλεσαν *pro* ἐκάλεσαν | οἰκειακοὺς *pro* οἰκιακοὺς 28 Φοβεῖσθε *pro* φοβηθῆτε | ἀποκτενόντων *pro* ἀποκτεινόντων 36 οἰκειακοὶ *pro* οἰκιακοὶ 42 ψυχροῦν *pro* ψυχροῦ.

11:8 βασιλειῶν *pro* βασιλέων 13 ἐπροφήτευσαν *pro* προεφήτευσαν 16 παιδίοις *pro* παιδαρίοις | ἀγορᾶ *pro* ἀγοραῖς 21 χωραζίν *pro* Χοραζίν 23 ἡ . . . . ὑψώθης *pro* ἡ . . . . ὑψωθείσα.

12:3 ἐπέινασε *pro* ἐπέινασεν | *om* αὐτὸς 6 μείζον *pro* μείζων 8 *om* καὶ 21 *om* ἐν 25 ἐαυτὴν *pro* ἐαυτῆς *bis* 29 διαρπάσῃ *pro* διαρπάσει 32 ἐὰν *pro* ἂν<sup>1</sup> | τῷ νῦν *pro* τούτῳ τῷ 35 *om* τῆς καρδίας | *om* τὰ 37 κατακριθῆσῃ *pro* καταδικασθῆσῃ 40 καὶ *add* *anle* ὁ υἱὸς 42 σολομῶνος *pro* Σολομῶντος *bis*.

13:14 *om* ἐπ' 19 τὸν *pro* τὸ *anle* ἐσπαρμένον 24 σπείραντι *pro* σπείροντι 27 *om* τὰ 28 συλλέξομεν *pro* συλλέξωμεν 30 *om* τῷ 32 *add* πάντων *anle* τῶν λαχάνων 33 ἔκρυψεν *pro* ἐνέκρυψεν 40 Καλεῖται *pro* κατακαλεῖται.

14:5 ἐφοβεῖτο *pro* ἐφοβήθη 14 αὐτοῖς *pro* αὐτοῦς 19 *om* καὶ *anle* λαβὼν 34 γεννησαρέτ *pro* Γεννησαρέτ 36 ἐσώθησαν *pro* διεσώθησαν.

15:1 *om* οἱ 4 *om* σου 7 ἐπροφήτευσεν *pro* προεφήτευσεν 20 κοινούντα *pro* κοινούντα *man prim*; κοινούντα *corr* 25 προσεκύνησεν *pro* προσεκύνει 36 *om* ἐπτά.

16:8 εἶπε *pro* εἶπεν | *om* αὐτοῖς 11 ἄρτων *pro* ἄρτου | *add* προσέ-

χετε δὲ *post* προσέχειν 12 ἀλλὰ *pro* ἀλλ' *corr* 17 *add* ὁ ἀντε  
'Ιησοῦς 20 *om* 'Ιησοῦς.

17:4 μωσεί *pro* Μωσῇ 9 ἐκ *pro* ἀπὸ 12 ἀλλὰ *pro* ἀλλ' |  
οὕτως *pro* οὕτω 14 αὐτὸν *pro* αὐτῷ *post* γονυπετῶν 27 *om* τὴν |  
ἀναβαλίνοντα *pro* ἀναβάντα.

18:4 ταπεινώσει *pro* ταπεινώσῃ 5 *om* ἐν 6 εἰς *pro* ἐπὶ 12,  
13 ἐνενηκονταενέα *pro* ἐννενηκονταενέα *bis* 15 ἁμαρτήσῃ *pro*  
ἁμαρτήσῃ 19 *add* ἀμὴν *ante* λέγω 28 εἴ τι *pro* ὃ τι 29 *om*  
πάντα 31 ἐαυτῶν *pro* αὐτῶν 35 οὕτως *pro* οὕτω.

19:3 *om* αὐτῷ *post* λέγοντες 8 οὕτως *pro* οὕτω 9 *om* εἰ 12  
οὕτως *pro* οὕτω 19 ἐαυτόν *pro* σεαυτόν 24 εἰσελθεῖν *pro* διελθεῖν  
26 *om* ἐστι *post* δυνατὰ 28 ὃ|μείς *man prim; rubr* ὃ|'Τμείς  
29 *om* ἡ *ante* ἀδελφάς *man prim; suprl corr*.

20:3 *om* τὴν 4 καὶ ἐκείνοις *pro* κἀκεῖνοις | *add* μου *post* ἀμπε-  
λῶνα 5 ἐνάτην *pro* ἐννάτην 21 *add* σου *post* εὐωνύμων 22 ἡ  
*pro* καὶ 23 *om* μου *post* εὐωνύμων 26 ἔσται *pro* ἔστω 27 ἔσται  
*pro* ἔστω 31 ἐπετίμων *pro* ἐπετίμησεν 34 *om* αὐτῶν οἱ ὀφθαλμοί.

21:1 Βηθσαφαγὴν *pro* Βηθθαγῇ 3 ἀποστέλλει *pro* ἀποστελεῖ  
14 *tr* χωλοὶ καὶ τυφλοὶ 15 *om* οἱ *ante* γραμματεῖς 16 *om* ὅτι  
22 ἐὰν *pro* ἂν 25 *om* οὖν 27 *tr* ὑμῖν λέγω 30 ἐτέρῳ *pro*  
δευτέρῳ.

22:7 καὶ ἀκούσας *pro* ἀκούσας δὲ | *add* ἐκεῖνος *post* βασιλεῖς  
9 ἐὰν *pro* ἂν 13 *tr* χεῖρας καὶ πόδας 16 μέλλει *pro* μέλει 23 *om*  
οἱ 37 ἔφη *pro* εἶπεν 46 *tr* ἀποκριθῆναι αὐτῷ.

23:3 ἐὰν *pro* ἂν 6 δὲ *pro* τε 8 διδάσκαλος *pro* καθηγητῆς | *om*  
πάντες . . . ἐστε 9 *add* πάντες δὲ ὑμεῖς ἀδελφοί ἐστε *post*  
οὐρανοῖς 10 *tr* ἐστὶν ὑμῶν 18 ἂν *pro* ἐὰν 21 κατοικήσαντι *pro*  
κατοικοῦντι 25 ἀδικίας *pro* ἀκрасίας 28 οὕτως *pro* οὕτω 36 *add*  
ὅτι *ante* ἤξει 37 ἀποκτένουσα *pro* ἀποκτείνουσα.

24:2 *om* οὐ *ante* βλέπετε | *tr* ταῦτα πάντα | *om* μὴ *ante* καταλυ-  
θῇσεται 15 ἐστὼς *pro* ἐστὸς 17 καταβάτω *pro* καταβαινέτω | τὰ  
*pro* τι 20 *om* ἐν *ante* σαββάτῳ 21 οὐδε *pro* οὐδ' οὐ 27 *om* καὶ  
*post* ἔσται 33 *tr* ταῦτα πάντα 36 *om* τῆς *ante* ὥρας 40 *om* ὃ  
*bis* 49 τέ *pro* δὲ.

25:3 αὐτῶν *pro* ἐαυτῶν *post* λαμπάδας 9 *om* οὐκ : οὐ μὴ *suprl*  
*corr mg post* μήποτε 21 *om* δὲ 24 διεσκόρπισα *pro* διεσκόρπισας

παν *prim?* διεσκόρπισας *corr?* 26 *add* εἰ *anle* ἦδεις 30 ἐκβάλετε *pro* ἐκβάλλετε 32 συναχθήσονται *pro* συναχθήσεται 44 *om* αὐτῷ.

26:4 *tr* δόλω κρατήσωσι | ἀπολέσωσιν *pro* ἀποκτείνωσιν 9 *add* τοῖς *anle* πτωχοῖς 10 λέγει *pro* εἶπεν 17 ἐτοιμάσομεν *pro* ἐτοιμάσωμεν 18 ἐστι *pro* ἐστίν 26 εὐχαριστήσας *pro* εὐλογήσας 27 *om* τὸ 29 γεννήματος *pro* γεννήματος 33 *om* καὶ 35 ἀπαρνήσωμαι *pro* ἀπαρνήσομαι | *add* δὲ *post* ὁμοίως 36 *add* αὐτοῦ *post* μαθηταῖς 50 δ *pro* ᾧ 52 ἀποθανοῦνται *pro* ἀπολούνται 54 οὕτως *pro* οὕτω 59 *tr* θανατώσωσιν αὐτὸν 63 ὀρκίζω *pro* ἐξορκίζω 71 αὐτοῖς *pro* τοῖς 74 καταθεματίζειν *pro* καταναθεματίζειν.

27:15 *tr* τῷ ὄχλῳ ἓνα δέσμιον 33 γολγοθᾶν *pro* Γολγοθὰ 35 *om* ἵνα πληρωθῇ . . . ἔβαλον κλῆρον 41 *add* καὶ φαρισαίων *post* πρεσβυτέρων 42 *add* ἐπ' *anle* αὐτῷ 45 ἐνάτης *pro* ἐννάτης 46 ἐνάτην *pro* ἐννάτην | λιμὰ *pro* λαμὰ 47 *om* ἀκούσαντες 53 ἀνάστασιν *pro* ἔγερσιν 58 *om* ὁ: *suprl* *corr* 63 *tr* ὁ πλάνος ἐκείνος 65 *om* δὲ.

28:2 *add* τοῦ μνημείου *post* θύρας 6 *om* γὰρ 9 *om* καὶ *anle* ἰδοὺ 18 *om* οὖν.

In an illuminated border: † τὸ κατὰ μαρκον ἄγιον καὶ σεπτὸν ἐυαγγέλιον.—Below, τὸ κατὰ μάρκον ἄγ(ιον) ἐυαγγέλ(ιον).

Mark 1:6 *add* ὁ *anle* Ἰωάννης 16 *add* τοῦ σίμωνος *post* αὐτοῦ | ἀμφίβληστρα *pro* ἀμφίβληστρον 27 ἑαυτοὺς *pro* αὐτοὺς 37 *tr* σὲ ζητοῦσι 38 καὶ ἐκεῖ *pro* κακεῖ 42 *tr* ἡ λέπρα ἀπ' αὐτοῦ 45 πάντοθεν *pro* πανταχόθεν.

2:1 *tr* εἰσῆλθε πάλιν 4 κράβαττον *pro* κράββατον 7 οὕτως *pro* οὕτω 8 *add* αὐτοὶ *anle* διζυγοῦνται 9 σου *pro* σοι | κράβαττον *pro* κράββατον 11 κράβαττόν *pro* κράββατόν 12 κράβαττον *pro* κράββατον 21 *om* καὶ<sup>1</sup> 23 *om* ἐν 26 *om* τοῦ *anle* ἀρχιερέως.

3:1, 3 ἐξηραμένην *pro* ἐξηραμμένην 4 ἀπολέσαι *pro* ἀποκτεῖναι 8 *om* ἀπὸ *anle* Ἱεροσολύμων 11 προσέπιπτον *pro* προσέπιπτεν 12 *tr* φανερόν αὐτὸν 27 οὐδεὶς δύναται *pro* οὐ δύναται οὐδεὶς | διαρπάση *pro* διαρπάσει 33 καὶ *pro* ἡ 35 ἐστίν *pro* ἐστί.

4:4 *om* τοῦ οὐρανοῦ 7 ἐπὶ *pro* εἰς 9 *om* αὐτοῖς 12 παραπτώματα *pro* ἁμαρτήματα 18 *om* οὗτοί εἰσιν<sup>2</sup> 30 ὁμοιώσομεν *pro* ὁμοιώσωμεν 31 κόκκον *pro* κόκκῳ 33 ἐδύναντο *pro* ἠδύναντο 37 ἐπέβαλεν *pro*

ἐπέβαλλεν 38 μέλλει *pro* μέλει 39 *om* τῇ θαλάσῃ 40 οὕτως *pro* οὕτω.

5:3 μνήμασι *pro* μνημείοις | ἐδύνατο *pro* ἡδύνατο 11 τῷ ὄρει *pro* τὰ ὄρη 13 εἰσῆλθεν *pro* εἰσῆλθον 16 διηγῆσαντο δὲ *pro* καὶ διηγῆσαντο 19 πεποίηκε *pro* ἐποίησε 23 ζήσεται *pro* ζήσεται 26 αὐτῆς *pro* ἐαυτῆς 37 *add* τοῦ ἀντὶ Ἰακώβου 40 πάντας *pro* ἅπαντας.

6:2 ἴνα . . . γίνονται *pro* ὅτι . . . γίνονται 5 ἐδύνατο *pro* ἡδύνατο 9 ἐνδύσασθαι *pro* ἐνδύσθητε 11 *om* τὸν ἀντὶ ὑποκάτω 15 *om* ἡ 17 *om* τῇ 27 ἀπο|τείλας *pro* ἀποστείλας *man prim; cap mg suprl corr* 28 ἀπεκεφάλισε τὸν ἰωάννην *pro* ἀπεκεφάλισεν αὐτὸν 29 *om* τῷ 33 *om* οἱ ὄχλοι 34 *tr* ὁ ἰησοῦς εἶδε 37 ἀγοράσωμεν *pro* ἀγοράσωμεν | *tr* δηναρίων διακοσίων 44 *om* ὥσει 45 ἀπολύσει *pro* ἀπολύσῃ 52 *tr* αὐτῶν ἡ καρδία 55 κραβάττοις *pro* κραββάτοις.

7:6 ἐπροφήτευσεν *pro* προεφήτευσεν 18 οὕτως *pro* οὕτω 24 ἐλθὼν *pro* εἰσελθὼν 26 συροφοινίκισσα *pro* Συροφοίνισσα | ἐκβάλλῃ *pro* ἐκβάλλῃ 31 *add* ὁ ἰησοῦς *post* ἐξελθὼν 32 μογιγιάλον *pro* μογιλάλον.

8:3 ἤκουσι *pro* ἤκασι 6 *add* καὶ ἀντὶ εὐχαριστήσας 21 λέγει *pro* ἔλεγεν 26 *om* τὸν 29 *om* ὁ ἀντὶ Πέτρος 31 *add* τῶν ἀντὶ ἀρχιερέων | *add* τῶν ἀντὶ γραμματέων 35 ἐαυτοῦ ψυχὴν *pro* ψυχὴν αὐτοῦ 36 *add* τὸν ἀντὶ ἄνθρωπον 38 *om* ἂν; *suprl corr*.

9:4 μωϋσῇ *pro* Μωσεί 6 λαλήσει *pro* λαλήσῃ 7 *om* λέγουσα 20 ἰδὼν *pro* ἰδὼν 23 *om* τὸ 25 *add* ὁ ἀντὶ ὄχλος 28 διατί *pro* Ὅτι 30 ἐξελθόντες ἐκείθεν 35 ἔστω *pro* ἔσται 38 *om* ὁ ἀντὶ Ἰωάννης 41 *om* τῷ ἀντὶ ὀνόματί 42 ἐὰν *pro* ἂν | μύλος ὀνικὸς *pro* λίθος μυλικὸς 45 *add* γὰρ *post* καλὸν | σε *pro* σοι.

10:2 *om* οἱ 3, 4 μωϋσῆς *pro* Μωσῆς | τούτου *pro* τοῦ αὐτοῦ 16 εὐλόγει *pro* ἡυλόγει 17 ἰδοὺ τίς πλούσιος προσδραμὼν *pro* προσδραμὼν εἰς 21 *om* τοῖς ἀντὶ πτωχοῖς 24 *om* τοῖς ἀντὶ χρήμασιν 27 *om* τῷ ἀντὶ θεῷ<sup>1</sup> 28 *om* καὶ<sup>1</sup> 29 *add* ἔνεκεν ἀντὶ τοῦ εὐαγγελίου 30 πατέρα καὶ μητέρα *pro* μητέρας 31 *om* οἱ 33 *om* τοῖς<sup>2</sup> 40 *om* μου<sup>2</sup> 43 οὕτως *pro* οὕτω | *tr* ὑμῶν διάκονος 44 ἐὰν *pro* ἂν 51 ῥαββουνί *pro* Ῥαββονί | ἀνεβλέψω *pro* ἀναβλέψω.

11:1 βηθσφαγὴ *pro* Βηθσφαγὴ 3 ἀποστέλλει αὐτὸν *pro* αὐτὸν ἀποστελεῖ 4 *om* τὸν 11 *om* καὶ<sup>2</sup> 20 ἐξηραμένην *pro* ἐξηραμένην 21 ἐξήραται *pro* ἐξήρανται 22 *add* ὁ ἀντὶ Ἰησοῦς 23 πιστεύσει

προ πιστεύσῃ 24 αἰτήσθε προ αἰτείσθε 29 *om* Ἰησοῦς *man prim*;  
*syrrh corr* 32 εἵπομεν προ ἐὰν εἴπωμεν.

12:5 ἀποκτείνοντες προ ἀποκτείνοντες 14 μέλλει προ μέλει  
 22 ἔσχατον προ ἔσχάτη 23 *om* οὖν 25 *om* οἱ 26 τοῦ προ τῆς *anle*  
 βάτου 27 *om* Θεὸς *anle* ζώντων 28 πάντων προ πασῶν 29 πάντων  
 ἐντολὴ προ πασῶν τῶν ἐντολῶν 32 *om* θεὸς 36 πνεύματι προ τῷ  
 πνεύματι τῷ | λέγει προ εἶπεν 38 *add* φιλοῦντων *anle* ἀσπασμούς  
 41 ἔβαλον προ ἔβαλλον 43 εἶπεν προ λέγει | βαλλόντων προ  
 βαλόντων.

13:8 ἀρχὴ προ ἀρχαὶ 11 λαλήσετε προ λαλήσητε 14 *om* τὸ  
 ῥηθὲν ὑπὸ Δανιὴλ τοῦ προφήτου | ἐστὼς προ ἐστὸς 23 ἅπαντα προ  
 πάντα 26 *it* καὶ δόξης πολλῆς 27 *add* τῆς *anle* γῆς | *add* τοῦ *anle*  
 οὐρανοῦ 28 *om* ἐστίν 29 οὕτως προ οὕτω 30 *it* ταῦτα πάντα  
 31 παρελεύσεται προ παρελεύσονται.

14:2 γένηται προ ἔσται 5 ἐδύνατο προ ἡδύνατο 6 ἐν ἐμοὶ προ εἰς  
 ἐμέ 8 ἔσχεν προ εἶχεν 9 ἐὰν προ ἂν 10 *om* ὁ *anle* Ἰούδας 12  
 ἐτοιμάσομεν προ ἐτοιμάσωμεν 14 ὁ *anle* διδάσκαλος *om* *man prim*;  
*syrrh corr mg* 15 ἀνώγειν προ ἀνώγειν 21 *om* ὁ *anle* υἱὸς | ἐγενήθη  
 προ ἐγενήθη 23 *om* τὸ *anle* ποτήριον 25 *add* δὲ *post* ἅμην | γενή-  
 ματος προ γεννήματος 27 *om* ἐν ἐμοὶ ἐν τῇ νυκτὶ ταύτῃ 30 *add* σὺ  
*anle* σήμερον 31 ἀπαρνήσωμαι προ ἀπαρνήσομαι 32 προσεύξομαι  
 προ προσεύξωμαι 33 *om* τὸν *anle* Ἰάκωβον 41 *om* τὸ *anle* λοιπὸν  
 43 *add* ὁ ἰσκαριώτης *post* Ἰούδας 51 Ἠκολούθησεν προ ἡκολούθει  
 60 *om* τὸ 61 ἀπεκρίνετο προ ἀπεκρίνατο 62 *it* ἐκ δεξιῶν καθήμενον  
 71 ὁμνῦναι προ ὁμνύειν 72 τὸ ῥῆμα δ *pro* τοῦ ῥήματος οὐ.

15:14 περισσότερον προ περισσοτέρως | ἔκραζον προ ἔκραξαν  
 19 τιθέντας προ τιθέντες 22 *add* τὸν *anle* Γολγοθᾶ 24 διμερίζοντο  
 προ διμερίζουν 31 *om* δὲ 33 ἐνάτης προ ἐννάτης 34 ἐνάτῃ προ  
 ἐννάτῃ | λιμὰ προ λαμμᾶ 35 *add* ὅτι *anle* Ἰδοὺ 39 οὕτως προ  
 οὕτω 43 ἐλθὼν προ ἦλθεν.

16:1 *om* ἡ τοῦ 8 *om* ταχὺ 9 σαββάτων προ σαββάτου 18  
 βλάβῃ προ βλάβῃ.

‡ τέλος τοῦ κατὰ μάρκον εὐαγγελίου ‡

τὸ κατὰ λουκᾶν ἄγιον εὐαγγέλιον

Luke 1:7 *om* ἡ 8 ἐναντίον προ ἔναντι 10 *it* ἦν τοῦ λαοῦ 12 *om*  
 ἐπ' 25 οὕτως προ οὕτω 36 συγγενὲς προ συγγενῆς | γήρει προ γήρα

44 *tr* ἐσκίρτησε τὸ βρέφος ἐν ἀγαλλιάσει 67 ἐπροφήτευσε *pro* προεφήτευσε 73 ὄρκω *pro* ὄρκον.

2:11 *om* Κύριος 12 *om* τῇ 13 ἀγ|Λφ *pro* ἀγγέλφ *man prim*: ἀγγέλφ *compr* *rubr* 20 ὑπέστρεψαν *pro* ἐπέστρεψαν 21 αὐτὸν *pro* τὸ παιδίον 25 *tr* ἦν ἅγιον 37 αὐτὴ *pro* αὕτη 39 ἑαυτῶν *pro* αὐτῶν 40 αὐτῶι *pro* αὐτό.

3:2 ἐπὶ ἀρχιερέως *pro* ἐπ' ἀρχιερέων | *om* τοῦ *ante* Ζαχαρίου 4 ρήμφ *ex err* *pro* ἐρήμφ : *ca* *mg* *om* 18 *om* οὖν 19 *om* Φιλίππου 22 εὐδόκησα *pro* ἠδόκησα 23 ἤλει *pro* Ἥλι 26 σεμεεὶ *pro* Σεμεὶ 27 ἰωαννάν *pro* Ἰωαννᾶ 28 κοσάμ *pro* Κωσάμ 30 ἰωαννάν *pro* Ἰωανν 32 ναασών *pro* Ναασσών 33 *add* τοῦ ἰώραμ *post* Ἀράμ 34 θάρρα *pro* Θάρα 35 σερούχ *pro* Σαρούχ.

4:4 *om* ὁ 7 πᾶσα *pro* πάντα 8 *tr* εἶπεν αὐτῷ | *om* γὰρ 9 *om* ὁ 14 *om* ὁ 18 εἵνεκεν *pro* ἔνεκεν | εὐαγγελίσασθαι *pro* εὐαγγελίζεσθαι 23 *om* τῇ *ante* Καπερναοὺμ 26 σαρεφθὰ *pro* Σάρεπτα 28 ἀκούσαντες *pro* ἀκούοντες 29 *om* τῆς *ante* ὀφρύος 35 *om* τὸ *ante* μέσον 38 *om* ἡ 42 ἐπεζήτουν *pro* ἐζήτουν.

5:1 γεννησαρέτ *pro* Γεννησαρέτ 2 ἀπέπλυνον *pro* ἀπέπλυναν 5 χαλάσομεν *pro* χαλάσω 6 *tr* πλήθος ἰχθύων 8 γόνασιν ἰησοῦ *pro* γόνασι τοῦ Ἰησοῦ 19 *om* διὰ *ante* ποίας 26 ἔλαβε πάντας *pro* ἔλαβεν ἅπαντας 29 *om* ὁ *ante* Λευῖς 36 *om* ἐπίβλημα<sup>2</sup> 39 *tr* νέον θέλει.

6:3 *tr* ὁ ἰησοῦς εἶπε πρὸς αὐτούς 7 *om* αὐτὸν 9 ἀποκτείνει *pro* ἀπολέσαι 10 εἶπεν αὐτῷ *pro* εἶπε τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ | ἐποίησε *pro* ἐποίησεν οὕτω 18 ἀπὸ *pro* ὑπὸ 23 χάρητε *pro* χαίρετε 26 *om* ὑμῖν *ante* ὅταν | εἰπωσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι : *om* πάντες 27 ἀλλὰ *pro* ἀλλ' 28 *om* καὶ 31 *om* καὶ *ante* καθὼς 34 *om* οἱ 35 *om* τοῦ 37 *add* καὶ *post* κριθήτε 44 *om* ἰδίου.

7:2 ἔμελλε *pro* ἡμελλε 6 *tr* μου ὑπὸ τὴν στέγην | *om* εἰσέλθης *man prim*; *suprl* *corr* *mg* 7 ἀλλ' *pro* ἀλλὰ 11 *om* οἱ 12 αὕτη *pro* αὕτη | *om* ἦν 13 αὕτην *pro* αὕτῃ<sup>1</sup> 16 πάντας *pro* ἅπαντας 24 τοῖς ὄχλοις *pro* πρὸς τοὺς ὄχλους 27 *add* γὰρ *post* οὗτος 31 *om* εἶπε δὲ ὁ κύριος 34 *tr* φίλος τελωνῶν 39 ἔστιν *pro* ἐστὶ *man prim*? ἐστὶ *corr* 46 *tr* τοὺς πόδας μου.

8:3 σωσάννα *pro* Σουσάννα | αὐτοῖς *pro* αὐτῷ 5 ἑαυτοῦ *pro* αὐτοῦ | ἔπεσεν ἐπὶ *pro* ἔπεσε παρὰ 8 εἰς *pro* ἐπὶ 18 ἐὰν *pro* ἂν *his* 21 *om* αὐτόν 24 ἐπαύσατο *pro* ἐπαύσαντο 26 ἀντίπερα *pro*

ἀντιπέραν 27 τῆς γῆς *pro* τὴν γῆν 29 παρήγγειλε *pro* παρήγγελλε  
33 εἰσῆλθον *pro* εἰσῆλθεν 34 *om* ἀπελθόντες 42 αὐτὴ *pro* αὕτη  
43 ἰατροῖς *pro* εἰς ἰατροὺς 50 πίστευε *corr*? 51 ἔλθων *pro* εἰσελθὼν |  
*tr* ἰωάννην καὶ ἰάκωβον.

9:1 *om* μαθητὰς αὐτοῦ 5 *om* ἀπὸ ἀνιε τῶν ποδῶν 6 *om* τὰς  
7 γενόμενα *pro* γινόμενα 8 ἡ| 'Ηλίας *pro* 'Ηλίας *ex err* 9 *om* ὁ 10 *tr*  
ἔρημον τόπον | βηθσαϊδάν *pro* Βηθσαϊδά 13 *tr* ἰχθύες δύο | ἀγοράσω-  
μεν *pro* ἀγοράσωμεν 15 οὕτως *pro* οὕτω 20 *om* ὁ 24 ἐὰν *pro* ἂν  
ἀνιε θέλῃ 27 ἐστώτων *pro* ἐστηκότων | γεύσονται *pro* γεύσονται  
28 *om* τὸν 33 εἶπε πέτρος *pro* εἶπεν ὁ Πέτρος | *tr* μίαν μωσεῖ 36  
ἐωράκεισαν *pro* ἐωράκασιν 40 ἐκβάλλωσιν *pro* ἐκβάλλωσιν 41 *tr*  
τὸν υἱόν σου ὧδε 47 εἰδὼς *pro* ἰδὼν 49 *om* τὰ 50 ὑμῶν *pro* ἡμῶν  
*bis* 55 *add* ὁ ἰησοῦς ἀνιε ἐπετίμησεν 57 ἐὰν *pro* ἂν 62 *tr* ὁ ἰησοῦς  
πρὸς αὐτόν.

10:1 *add* δύο *post* δύο 2 ἐκβάλῃ *pro* ἐκβάλλῃ 4 βαλλάντιον  
*pro* βαλάντιον 6 *om* μὲν 8 *om* δ' 11 *add* εἰς τοὺς πόδας ἡμῶν  
*post* ὑμῶν 12 *om* δὲ 13 βηθσαϊδάν *pro* Βηθσαϊδά 15 *om* τοῦ  
20 *om* μᾶλλον 22 *tr* μοι παρεδόθη 32 ἀντιπαρήλθε *pro* ἀντιπαρήλ-  
θεν 36 *tr* πλησίον δοκεῖ σοι 39 τῶν λόγων *pro* τὸν λόγον 40  
μέλλει *pro* μέλει.

11:2 *om* ὁ ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς 8 ὅσον *pro* ὅσων 10 ἀνοιχθήσεται  
*pro* ἀνοιγίησεται 11 ἡ *pro* εἰ καὶ 13 *tr* δόματα ἀγαθὰ 26 ἐλθόντα  
*pro* εἰσελθόντα 28 *om* αὐτόν 32 νινευῖται *pro* Νινεῦϊ 33 κρυπτὴν  
*pro* κρυπτὸν 34 *add* ἔσται *post* σκοτεινὸν 38 πρότερον *pro* πρῶτον  
42 *add* δὲ *post* ταῦτα 44 *om* οἱ ἀνιε περιπατοῦντες 50 *om* ἀπὸ  
καταβολῆς κόσμου 51 *add* τοῦ δικαίου *post* "Αβελ 54 *om* καὶ ἀνιε  
ζητοῦντες.

12:4 ἀποκτενόντων *pro* ἀποκτεινόντων 7 *add* ὑμεῖς *post* διαφέ-  
ρετε 9 ἔμπροσθεν *pro* ἐνώπιόν· 11 μεριμνήσητε *pro* μεριμνᾶτε |  
ἀπολογήσεσθε *pro* ἀπολογήσησθε 15 αὐτῷ *pro* αὐτοῦ *post* ζωῇ  
20 ἄφρον *pro* ἄφρων 21 *add* ταῦτα λέγων ἐφώνει· ὁ ἔχων ὧτα  
ἀκούειν ἀκουέτω *post* πλουτῶν 22 ἐνδύσεσθε *pro* ἐνδύσησθε 23  
πλεῖων *pro* πλεῖον 24 ταμεῖον? *pro* ταμεῖον 27 τοὺς? *pro* τὰ *man*  
*prim*; τὰ *corr* 28 *tr* σήμερον ἐν τῷ ἁγρῷ 29 καὶ *pro* ἡ 33 βαλλάν-  
τια *pro* βαλάντια 38 οὕτως *pro* οὕτω 44 αὐτῷ *pro* αὐτοῦ 45 *tr*  
μου ὁ κύριος | ἐλθεῖν *pro* ἔρχεσθαι 47 αὐτοῦ *pro* ἑαυτοῦ 48  
ἀπαιτήσουσιν *pro* αἰτήσουσιν 49 ἐπὶ *pro* εἰς 50 ὅτου *pro* οὐ 53 ἐπὶ



προ ἐφ' 54 οὕτως προ οὕτω 56 ἐν τοῦ οὐρανοῦ καὶ τῆς γῆς 58  
βάλλῃ προ βάλλῃ.

13:3, 5 μετανοήσητε προ μετανοήτε 4 add τοὺς ἀντὶ ἀνθρώπους  
6 ἐν ζητῶν καρπὸν 8 κόπρια προ κοπρίαν 11 ἐν ἔχουσα πνεῦμα  
15 ὑποκριταί προ ὑποκριτά 20 οἱ καὶ ἀντὶ πάλιν 21 ἔκρυψεν προ  
ἐνέκρυψεν 29 οἱ ἀπὸ ἀντὶ βορρᾶ 31 add αὐτῷ post προσήλθον  
34 ἀποκτείνουσα προ ἀποκτείνουσα | τὰ ἑαυτῆς νοσσία προ τὴν  
ἑαυτῆς νοσσιάν 35 οἱ ἔρημος | οἱ ἀμὴν : ἐν λέγω δέ.

14:2 οἱ ἦν 10 ἀνάπεσε προ ἀνάπεσον 13 οἱ ἀναπήρους 15  
ἄριστον προ ἄρτον 26 Ἐαυτοῦ προ ἑαυτοῦ 27 ἐν εἶναι μου 30 οἱ  
ὅτι 32 ἐν πόρρω αὐτοῦ 33 ὑπάρχουσιν αὐτῷ προ ἑαυτοῦ ὑπάρχουσιν.

15:4, 7 ἐνενηκονταενέα προ ἐννενηκονταενέα 4 add οὐ post ἔως  
7 Οὕτως προ οὕτω | οἱ τῷ ἀντὶ οὐρανῷ 9 συγκαλεῖ προ συγκαλεῖται  
10 οὕτως προ οὕτω 20 αὐτοῦ προ ἑαυτοῦ 24, 32 ἀπολωλὼς προ  
ἀπολωλὼς corr 26 οἱ αὐτοῦ.

16:5 αὐτοῦ προ ἑαυτοῦ 15 οἱ ἐστίν 22 οἱ τοῦ ἀντὶ Ἀβραάμ  
25 ὧδε προ ὅδε 29 add δὲ post λέγει.

17:1 add αὐτοῦ post μαθητὰς 4 οἱ ἐπὶ σε 6 φυτεύθητε προ  
φυτεύθητι 7 ἀνάπεσε προ ἀνάπεσαι 9 οἱ αὐτῷ 10 οὕτως προ  
οὕτω | ἐν ἀχρεῖοι δοῦλοι 23 οἱ ἦ 24 οἱ καὶ 26 οἱ τοῦ ἀντὶ Νῶε  
30 τὰ αὐτὰ προ ταῦτα 34 οἱ ὁ ἀντὶ εἰς παραληφθήσεται.

18:1 add αὐτοὺς post προσεύχεσθαι 7 ποιήσῃ προ ποιήσει 9 οἱ  
καὶ ἀντὶ πρὸς | ἑαυτοὺς προ ἑαυτοῖς 11 ἐν ὁ τελώνης οὗτος 13  
ἔτυπτε προ ἔτυπτεν : οἱ εἰς ἀντὶ τὸ στήθος 14 add γὰρ post ἡ 15  
οἱ αὐτῷ 28 οἱ ὁ.

19:3 ἐδύνατο προ ἡδύνατο 4 οἱ δι' | ἔμελλε προ ἡμελλε 7  
πάντες προ ἅπαντες 8 ἰησοῦν προ Κύριον 13 πραγματεύσασθαι  
προ πραγματεύσασθε 19 πέντε corr? 23 οἱ τὴν ἀντὶ τράπεζαν  
29 βηθσφαγὴ προ Βηθφαγὴ 30 οἱ ἀνθρώπων : συρρὶ πρ 31 οἱ  
οὕτως 37 οἱ ἤδη | ἦρξαντο προ ἦρξαντο 40 οἱ ὅτι 46 ἐν ἐποιή-  
σατε αὐτὸν 48 οἱ τὸ ἀντὶ τί | ποιήσουσιν προ ποιήσωσιν.

20:1 ἱερεῖς προ ἀρχιερεῖς 9 οἱ τις 14 οἱ δεῦτε 19 οἱ τὸν  
λαόν 24 δείξατέ προ ἐπιδείξατέ | add οἱ δὲ ἔδειξαν· καὶ εἶπε· post  
δηνάριον 28 μωϋσῆς προ Μωσῆς 32 οἱ πάντων 34, 35 ἐκγαμί-  
ζονται προ ἐκγαμίσκονται 37 μωϋσῆς προ Μωσῆς 41 add τινὲς  
post λέγουσι 46 πρωτοκαθεδρίαν προ πρωτοκαθεδρίας 47 μακρὰ  
προ μακρᾶ.

21:2 *τη τινα και* 11 φοβητρά *man prim : corr* φοβηρά 12 πάντων *pro* ἀπάντων 16 *τη* συγγενῶν *και* φίλων *και* ἀδελφῶν 22 πλησθῆναι *pro* πληρωθῆναι 30 *om* ἤδη *ante* ἐγγύς 31 οὕτως *pro* οὕτω 34 βαρηθῶσιν *pro* βαρυνθῶσιν | αἰφνιδίως *pro* αἰφνίδιος 35 *τη* τῆς γῆς πάσης 36 *om* ταῦτα.

22:3 *om* ὁ *ante* Σατανᾶς 4 *om* τοῖς *ante* στρατηγοῖς 5 ἀργύρια *pro* ἀργύριον 9 ἐτοιμάσομεν *pro* ἐτοιμάσωμεν 12 ἀνάγειον *pro* ἀνώγειον 18 γενήματος *pro* γεννήματος 30 καθίσεσθε *pro* καθίσησθε 32 ἐκλείπη *pro* ἐκλείπη 34 φωνήσῃ *pro* φωνήσει 35 βαλλαντίου *pro* βαλαντίου | οὐθενός *pro* οὐδενός 36 βαλλάντιον *pro* βαλάντιον 45 *om* αὐτοῦ 47 *om* δὲ *ante* αὐτοῦ | αὐτοῖς *pro* αὐτῶν 53 ἀλλὰ *pro* ἀλλ' 54 *om* αὐτὸν *post* εἰσήγαγον 57 *om* αὐτὸν *ante* λέγων 60 *om* ὁ *ante* ἀλέκτωρ 61 *add* σήμερον *post* φωνῆσαι 62 *om* ὁ Πέτρος 66 *om* τε | αὐτῶν *pro* ἐαυτῶν.

23:1 ἤγαγον *pro* ἤγαγεν 2 *add* ἡμῶν *post* ἔθνος 8 *add* χρόνου *post* ἱκανοῦ 15 ἀνέπεμψε *pro* ἀνέπεμψα | αὐτὸν πρὸς ἡμᾶς *pro* ὑμᾶς πρὸς αὐτὸν 18 *om* τὸν 19 *ds* *pro* ὅστις 23 αἰ | Τὸν *pro* αἰτούμενοι αὐτὸν *man prim; corr rubr* 26 *om* τοῦ *ante* ἐρχομένου 35 σέσωκε *pro* ἔσωσε 44 ἐνάτης *pro* ἐννάτης 46 παρατίθεμαι *pro* παραθήσομαι 51 αὐτὸς προσεδέχετο *pro* προσεδέχeto *και* αὐτὸς 54 *om* *και* *ante* σάββατον 55 *om* *και* *ante* γυναῖκες.

24:4 *tr* ἄνδρες δύο 5 τὰ πρόσωπα *pro* τὸ πρόσωπον 10 *σαν* *pro* ἦσαν *man prim : ἦσαν corr* 18 *om* ἐν *ante* Ἱερουσαλήμ 19 ὥς *pro* *ds* 24 οὕτως *pro* οὕτω 33 τοῖς *pro* τοῖς *ante* σὺν 40 ἐδείξεν *pro* ἐπέδειξεν 42 μελισσείου *pro* μελισσίου 43 ἔφαγε *pro* ἔφαγεν : *postea ca* 25 *litt ras* (? *forsitan* *και* τὰ ἐπίλοιπα ἔδωκεν αὐτοῖς *ut in* "Κ Π\* 13. 42. 88. 130. 161.\* 207 *mg.* 278 *mg.* 300. 346 *al*" Tisch) 46 οὕτως *pro* οὕτω 49 *tr* ἐγὼ Ἰδοῦ | ἐνδύσεσθε *pro* ἐνδύσησθε *man prim : ἐνδύσησθε corr.*

τὸ κατὰ ἰωάννην ἄγ(ιον) εὐαγγέλ(ιον)

John 1:28 Βηθανία *pro* Βηθαβαρά 29 *om* ὁ Ἰωάννης 40 *om* δὲ 42 Πρῶτον *pro* πρῶτος | μεσίαν *pro* Μεσσίαν | *om* ὁ *ante* Χριστός 44 *om* ὁ Ἰησοῦς *post* ἠθέλησεν | *add* ὁ ἰησοῦς *post* αὐτῷ 46 μωϋσῆς *pro* Μωσῆς | *om* τοῦ *ante* Ἰωσήφ 49 *om* ὁ *ante* Ἰησοῦς 52 *om* *και* λέγει αὐτῷ.

2:4 *add* *και* *ante* λέγει 16 *add* *και* *ante* μὴ 17 καταφάγεται

*pro* κατέφαγέ 19 *om* ὁ *ante* Ἰησοῦς 22 ἔλεγε *pro* ἔλεγεν : *om* αὐτοῖς 23 *add* τοῖς *ante* Ἱεροσολύμοις.

3:2 αὐτὸν *pro* τὸν Ἰησοῦν 3 *om* ὁ *ante* Ἰησοῦς | *add* ὅτι *ante* ἐὰν 4 *om* ὁ *ante* Νικόδημος 5 *om* ὁ *ante* Ἰησοῦς 10 *om* ὁ *ante* Ἰησοῦς 16 οὕτως *pro* οὕτω 20 *tr* αὐτοῦ τὰ ἔργα 23 σαλήμ *pro* Σαλεῖμ 25 Ἰουδαίου *pro* Ἰουδαίων 28 *om* μοι 36 *add* τὴν *ante* ζῶν<sup>1</sup>.

4:3 ἀπῆλθεν *pro* ἀπῆλθε : *om* πάλιν 13 *om* ὁ *ante* Ἰησοῦς 20 *tr* τοῦ ὄρει τούτῳ 25 μεσίας *pro* Μεσσίας 30 *om* οὖν 31 *add* αὐτοῦ *post* μαθηταὶ 33 *om* οὖν 34 ποιήσω *pro* ποιῶ 37 *om* ὁ *ante* ἀληθινὸς 42 ἐγνώκαμεν *pro* οἶδαμεν 44 *om* ὁ *ante* Ἰησοῦς 46 *tr* πάλιν ὁ ἰησοῦς 47 ἔμελλε *pro* ἤμελλε 51 υἱὸς *pro* παῖς.

5:1 *add* ἡ *ante* ἐορτὴ | *om* ὁ *ante* Ἰησοῦς 4 *add* κυρίου *post* γὰρ | ἐλούετο *pro* κατέβαινε | ἐταράσσετο *pro* ἐτάρασσε | δ' ἂν *pro* δήποτε 5 τριάκοντα καὶ ὀκτὼ *pro* τριακονταοκτὼ 7 βάλη *pro* βάλλη 8 κράβαττόν *pro* κράββατόν 9, 10 κράβαττον *pro* κράββατον 10 ἐστι *pro* ἐστιν | *add* καὶ *ante* οὐκ 11 κράβαττόν *pro* κράββατόν 12 *om* *vs* *lot* (ἠρώτησαν . . . περιπάτει) *man prim*; *suppl* *man al mg* 21 οὕτως *pro* οὕτω 25 ἀνθρώπου *pro* θεοῦ 30 *om* πατρός 35 ἀγαλλιασθῆναι *pro* ἀγαλλιασθῆναι 39 *om* αἰώνιον 41 ἀνθρώπου *pro* ἀνθρώπων 46 μωσεί *pro* Μωσῆ.

6:3 κάθητο *pro* ἐκάθητο *man prim* : ἐκάθητο *corr* 10 *add* ἄνθρωποι *ante* ἄνδρες 17 *add* εἰς τὸ πλοῖον *ante* ὁ Ἰησοῦς 24 *om* καὶ *ante* αὐτοὶ | αὐτόν *pro* τὸν Ἰησοῦν 28 ποιῶμεν *pro* ποιούμεν 29 *om* ὁ *ante* Ἰησοῦς 39 ἀλλ' *pro* ἀλλὰ 40 γάρ *pro* δέ | *add* ἐν *ante* τῇ 44 *add* ἐν *ante* τῇ 45 *om* τοῦ *ante* θεοῦ | ἀκούων *pro* ἀκούσας 51 σωτηρίας *pro* ζωῆς 52 *tr* τὴν σάρκα δοῦναι 54 *add* ἐν *ante* τῇ 55 ἀληθῆς *pro* ἀληθῶς *bis* 58 ζήσει *pro* ζήσεται 60 *tr* ὁ λόγος οὗτος 63 *stl* *pro* ἐστι *man prim*; ἐστὶ *corr* 71 ἔμελλεν *pro* ἤμελλεν.

7:8 *om* ταύτην<sup>1</sup> 9 *om* δὲ | αὐτὸς *pro* αὐτοῖς 10 *tr* εἰς τὴν ἐορτὴν, τότε καὶ αὐτὸς ἀνέβη 12 *om* δὲ 16 *add* οὖν *post* ἀπεκρίθη 20 ἀπεκρίθησαν οἱ Ἰουδαῖοι καὶ εἶπον αὐτῷ *pro* Ἀπεκρίθη ὁ ὄχλος καὶ εἶπε 21 *om* ὁ *ante* Ἰησοῦς 26 *om* ἀληθῶς<sup>2</sup> 27 ἐστὶ *pro* ἐστίν<sup>1</sup> 29 *om* δὲ 32 *tr* οἱ ἀρχιερεῖς καὶ οἱ φαρισαῖοι 33 *om* αὐτοῖς 39 *om* ὁ *ante* Ἰησοῦς 40 τῶν λόγων *pro* τὸν λόγον : *add* αὐτοῦ 41 *om* δὲ 52 ἐγείρεται *pro* ἐγγήγερται 53 — 8:11 *om* *man prim* : *suppl* *man al mg*.

[*peric tot suprl mg* (saec XIII?): *lin prim absciss*; *incip* βαθείος ἦλθεν ὁ ἰησοῦς εἰς τὸ ἱερόν, καὶ πᾶς [*lin dimid amiss in mg sup*] | δασκεν αὐτούς· — *explíc* καὶ μηκέτι ἀμάρτανε.

7:53 καὶ ἐπορεύθη . . . . 8:2 ὄρθρου *absciss cum mg sup*.

8:2 βαθείος *add post* ὄρθρου | ἦλθεν ὁ ἰησοῦς *pro* δὲ πάλιν πα-  
ρεγένετο | *post* καὶ πᾶς *litt* 30 *amiss*, *absciss in mg sup usque ad*  
δασκεν αὐτοῖς 3 ἐπὶ *pro* ἐν | *add* τῷ *ante* μέσῳ 4 εἶπον *pro*  
λέγουσιν | ταύτην εὐρομεν ἐπ' αὐτοφώρῳ μοιχευομένην *pro* αὕτη . . . .  
μοιχευομένη 5 ἡμῶν *add post* νόμῳ | μωϋσῆς *pro* Μωσῆς | *om*  
ἡμῖν | λιθάζειν *pro* λιθοβολεῖσθαι 6 κατηγορίαν κατ' *pro* κατηγο-  
ρεῖν | τὸ *pro* τῷ | *add* μὴ προσποιούμενος *post* γῆν 7 ἀναβλέψας  
*pro* ἀνακύψας | εἶπεν αὐτοῖς *pro* εἶπε πρὸς αὐτοὺς | *om* τὸν | βαλέτω  
ἐπ' αὐτήν *pro* ἐπ' αὐτῇ βαλέτω 9 *om* καὶ ὑπὸ . . . . ἐλεγχόμενοι |  
*om* ἕως τῶν ἐσχάτων | οὐσα *pro* ἐστῶσα 10 εἶδεν αὐτήν καὶ *pro* καὶ  
μηδένα . . . . γυναικὸς | *om* αὐτῇ | γῆναι *pro* ἢ γυνή | *om* ποῦ . . . .  
σου; 11 εἶπεν *pro* εἶπε | *add* ἀπὸ τοῦ νῦν *post* πορεύου].

8:12 *tr* αὐτοῖς ὁ ἰησοῦς | περιπατήσῃ *pro* περιπατήσῃ 14 *om*  
δὲ | ἢ *pro* καὶ<sup>2</sup> 19 *om* ὁ<sup>2</sup> 26 λαλῶ *pro* λέγω 38 ἂ ἡκούσατε *pro* ὁ  
ἐωράκατε | τοῦ πατρὸς *pro* τῷ πατρὶ 39 *om* ἄν 42 *om* οὖν 44 *add*  
τοῦ *ante* πατρὸς 52 γεύσῃται *pro* γεύσεται 53 *om* σὺ 54 ἡμῶν  
*pro* ὑμῶν.

9:3 *om* ὁ 9 *om* ὅτι<sup>1</sup> | *add* δὲ *post* ἐκεῖνος 15 ἐπέθηκε *pro* ἐπέθη-  
κεν | *tr* μου ἐπὶ τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς 21 ἑαυτοῦ *pro* αὐτοῦ 25 *om* οὖν  
27 ἐπιστεύσατε *pro* ἡκούσατε 28 *om* οὖν 29 μωσεί *pro* Μωσῇ  
33 ἐδύνατο *pro* ἡδύνατο 36 *add* καὶ *ante* τίς.

10:4 ἐκβάλλη *pro* ἐκβάλῃ 7 *om* ὅτι 8 *tr* ἦλθον πρὸ ἐμοῦ  
12 *om* τὰ πρόβατα<sup>3</sup> 13 μέλλει *pro* μέλει 14 *om* ὁ<sup>2</sup> *man prim*; *suprl*  
*corr* 23 *om* τοῦ 33 *om* σὺ 39 *om* οὖν 41 σημείον : *init* σ *om*  
*rubr*, *suprl corr*. 42 *tr* ἐκεῖ πολλοί.

11:7 *add* αὐτοῦ *post* μαθηταῖς 9 *om* ὁ | *tr* ὄραι εἰς 15 ἀλλὰ  
*pro* ἀλλ' 16 σὺν αὐτῷ *pro* μετ' αὐτοῦ 20 *om* ὁ 21 *om* ἡ 32 *tr*  
αὐτοῦ εἰς τοὺς πόδας 37 ἐδύνατο *pro* ἡδύνατο 48 οὕτως *pro* οὕτω  
51 ἐπροφήτευσεν *pro* προεφήτευσεν 57 *om* καὶ<sup>1</sup>.

12:2 ἀνακειμένων σὺν *pro* συνανακειμένων 6 ἔμελλεν *pro* ἔμελεν  
11 αὐτόν *pro* τὸν Ἰησοῦν 12 *om* ὁ<sup>2</sup> 13 συνάντησιν *pro* ὑπάντησιν |  
ἔλεγον *pro* ἔκραζον | *om* ὁ *ante* βασιλεὺς 14 αὐτῷ *pro* αὐτὸ 17 ὅτι  
*pro* ὅτε 18 ἡκούσαν *pro* ἡκουσε 30 *om* ὁ *ante* Ἰησοῦς 33 ἔμελλεν

προ ἤμελλεν 34 *om* ὅτι *anle* δεῖ 35 ἐν ὑμῖν *pro* μεθ' ὑμῶν 37 ἐπίστευσαν *pro* ἐπίστευον 39 ἐδύναντο *pro* ἠδύναντο 50 οὕτως *pro* οὕτω.

13:1 ἦλθεν *pro* ἐλήλυθεν 15 *om* ὑμῖν<sup>2</sup> 18 *add* γὰρ *post* ἐγὼ 25 *add* οὕτως *post* ἐκείνος 33 *tr* ἐγὼ ὑπάγω 34 *tr* ἵνα καθὼς ἠγάπησα ὑμᾶς 38 *om* αὐτῷ ὁ | φωνήσῃ *pro* φωνήσει.

14:3 *add* ἐκεῖ *anle* καὶ ὑμεῖς 4 *om* ἐγὼ 17 *om* δὲ 22 *add* καὶ *anle* τί 23 *om* ὁ *anle* Ἰησοῦς 26 *tr* διδάξει ὑμᾶς | εἶπω *pro* εἶπον 30 *om* τούτου | εὐρήσει *pro* οὐκ ἔχει 31 οὕτως *pro* οὕτω.

15:6 αὐτὸ *pro* αὐτὰ | *add* τὸ *anle* πῦρ 8 γένεσθε *pro* γενήσεσθε 16 μένῃ *pro* μένῃ 26 *add* μου *post* πατρός<sup>1</sup>.

16:4 *add* αὐτῶν *post* ὥρα 7· *add* Ἐγὼ *post* γὰρ 16, 17 *om* ἐγὼ 22 ἔχετε *pro* ἔχετε 23 ὁ *pro* ὅσα 33 ἔχετε *pro* ἔχῃτε *man prim*; ἔχητε *corr*.

17:2 ἔδωκας *pro* δέδωκας | δώσει *pro* δώσῃ 6 ἔδωκας *pro* δέδωκας 7 ἔγνωσαν *pro* ἔγνωκαν | ἔδωκάς *pro* δέδωκάς 8 ἔδωκάς *pro* δέδωκάς 11 ᾧ *pro* οὗς 13 ἑαυτοῖς *pro* αὐτοῖς 20 πάντων τῶν πιστευόντων *pro* τῶν πιστευσόντων 23 *add* καὶ *anle* ἡμεῖς.

18:8 *om* ὁ 20 *om* τῇ 24 *add* οὖν *post* ἀπέστειλεν 29 *add* ἔξω *anle* πρὸς 31 δὲ *pro* οὖν<sup>2</sup> 32 ἔμελλεν *pro* ἤμελλεν 34 ἀπεκρίνατο *pro* ἀπεκρίθη | ἄλλος σοι εἶπε *pro* ἄλλοι σοι εἶπον 36 *om* ὁ 40 *om* πάλιν.

19:3 καὶ ἤρχοντο πρὸς αὐτὸν *add* *anle* καὶ<sup>1</sup> 4 καὶ ἐξῆλθε *pro* ἐξῆλθεν οὖν | *tr* αὐτὸν ὑμῖν 6 *add* αὐτόν *post* σταύρωσον<sup>2</sup> 11 *om* ὁ<sup>1</sup> | ἔχεις *pro* εἶχες 12 ἐκραύγαζον *pro* ἔκραζον | ἑαυτὸν *pro* αὐτὸν 13 τούτων τῶν λόγων *pro* τούτου τὸν λόγον | *om* τοῦ | γαβαθᾶ *pro* Γαββαθᾶ 16 οὖν *pro* δὲ | ἤγαγον *pro* ἀπήγαγον 17 ἑαυτοῦ *pro* αὐτοῦ | τόπον *pro* τὸν<sup>2</sup> 20 *tr* ὁ τόπος τῆς πόλεως 25 κλοπᾶ *pro* Κλωπᾶ 27 *add* ἐκείνος *post* μαθητῆς 31 *om* ἡ 34 εὐθέως *pro* εὐθὺς 35 *tr* ἐστὶν αὐτοῦ 38 *om* δὲ *post* μετὰ | *om* ὁ *anle* Ἰωσήφ 40 *add* ἐν *anle* ὀθονίοις.

20:14 *om* ὁ *anle* Ἰησοῦς 15 *tr* ἔθηκες αὐτόν 19 *add* αὐτοῦ *post* μαθηταὶ 21 ἀποστέλλω *pro* πέμπω 28 *om* ὁ *anle* Θωμᾶς 29 *om* Θωμᾶ 31 *om* ὁ *anle* Ἰησοῦς.

21:2 *om* καὶ Θωμᾶς ὁ λεγόμενος Δίδυμος *man prim* : *suppl corr mg* 3 ἐνέβησαν *pro* ἀνέβησαν 6 ἰσχυον *pro* ἰσχυσαν 11 εἰς τὴν γῆν *pro* ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς 14 *om* αὐτοῦ 18 ἄλλοι σε ζώσουσιν καὶ

ἀποίσουσιν προ ἄλλος σε ζώσῃ καὶ οὔσῃ 20 οἱ δὲ ῥοσὶ ἐπιστραφεῖς  
24 add ὁ ἀντὶ καὶ γράψας.

τέλος τοῦ κατὰ ἰωάννην ἀγίου εὐαγγελίου

EDGAR J. GOODSPEED

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

### BARDESANES AND THE ODES OF SOLOMON

Interesting in connection with the results obtained by Gunkel (*ZNTW*, XI, 4, 291-328) and those announced by Preuschen (in a footnote to Gunkel's article), both of whom in their work on the Odes of Solomon have come to the conclusion that these odes are of gnostic origin, is a possible reminiscence from the Odes, certainly a striking parallel, found in the Semi-gnostic Bardesanes (154-222 A.D.). The simile which introduces Ode 6 is striking enough to arrest the attention of any reader and to draw the fire of the man who loves quotations:

אמר וְסִנְחֶלְכָא אִמְרָא חֲמִידָא. סִנְחֶלְכָא מִתְקַלָּא  
סִנְחֶלְכָא מִתְקַלָּא חֲסִידָא וְסִנְחֶלְכָא מִתְקַלָּא. סִנְחֶלְכָא אִנְ חֲסִידָא.

As the hand moves over the harp, and the strings speak,  
So speaks in my members the Spirit of the Lord, and I speak by His love.

The parallels to this striking figure are not so frequent, but that they deserve some attention. The examples here given make no claim to completeness, an attempt at which is impossible to the writer in his present circumstances; if this little note serve but to incite others to the search its purpose will be attained. Of Old Testament examples there is, probably, but one which deserves attention, Isa. 16:11:

עַל־כֵּן מִצִּי לְמוֹאָב כִּפְפוֹר יְהוֹבִי  
וְקִרְבִּי לְקִיר חֶרֶשׁ:

Wherefore my heart soundeth like a harp for Moab,  
and mine inward parts for Kir-heres.

In early Christian literature the first occurrence, unless it be that of the Odes, is found in the writings of that kaleidoscopic genius, Ignatius of Antioch, Eph. 4:1: τὸ γὰρ ἀξιονόμαστον ὑμῶν πρεσβυτέριον, τοῦ θεοῦ ἄξιον, οὕτως συνήρμωσται τῷ ἐπισκόπῳ, ὡς χορδαὶ κιθάρα. διὰ τοῦτο ἐν τῇ ὁμονοίᾳ ὑμῶν καὶ συμφώνῳ ἀγάπῃ Ἰησοῦς Χριστὸς ᾄδεται and Philad. 1:2 συνενῥύμωσται (sc. ὁ ἐπίσκοπος ὑμῶν) γὰρ ταῖς ἐντολαῖς, ὡς χορδαῖς κιθάρα.

The only other parallel which has come to my notice in early Christian literature, and it is a parallel much closer to the Odes than either



think that Bardesanes' use of the figure is secondary to that of the Odes in much the same degree as Ephrem's use of it is secondary to Bardesanes'. The use of the figure in theological argumentation, the twofold use of it in different connections point rather to the reminiscent use of a striking thought, well known to him, to the quoting attitude of mind on the part of Bardesanes, than to invention of his own. The original of the figure is not improbably to be sought in the Odes. If this be so, then it is certain: (a) that the Odes were in existence (at least partially) in the time of Bardesanes (154-222 A.D.); (b) they were known and used in the gnostically inclined circles, in which Bardesanes moved; and (c) finally, taken together with the other material gathered by Gunkel (*op. cit.*), and promised by Preuschen (*op. cit.*), this may be an additional bit of evidence, pointing to just such gnostically inclined circles, as the point of origin for the Odes, or a portion of them, at least.

The fact that Bardesanes has **ܟܢܢܕܪܐ** (*kennāra*) for the **ܟܝܬܗܪܐ** (*ḵithāra*) of the Odes does not necessarily mean that the two are foreign to each other. The two words stand for the same instrument, the one (*kennāra*) being the purely Semitic designation, the other (*ḵithāra*) the Greek, written, like so many of its fellows, in Syriac characters. This being the case, it may well be that Bardesanes had read the Greek or Aramaic (Hebrew?) original, or that he had an earlier translation, or that he had read *ḵithāra*, but, in making use of the metaphor in his own way, substituted for it the Semitic word, the first of these being, all considered, the more likely supposition.

M. SPRENGLING

WATERTOWN, WIS.

#### CONCERNING PATON'S REVIEW OF KÖNIG'S DICTIONARY

Mein Bestreben, den inneren Zusammenhang der Bedeutungen hebräischer Wörter möglichst aufzuhellen ist in der freundlichen Besprechung, die Prof. Paton in diesem Journal p. 107 f. meinem Wörterbuch gewidmet hat, als "a praiseworthy aim" anerkannt worden, und die Gefahr, mit der die Verfolgung dieses Zieles selbstverständlich verknüpft ist, konnte mich nicht von vornherein abschrecken, dieses Ziel ins Auge zu fassen. Ich hoffe auch, dass die Leser meines Wörterbuchs in der Regel meinem Urteil beistimmen können. Denn ich habe *nicht* neue Bedeutungen aus einem vorausgesetzten Grundsinn des betreffenden Wortes abgeleitet, sondern nur die *wirklich existierenden* Schattierungen des Sinnes eines Ausspruchs in *logische Verbindung* bringen wollen. Auch dies schon dürfte ein Fortschritt sein.

Übrigens sei es mir erlaubt, in Bezug auf jene Rezension noch fol-



gende Bemerkungen hinzuzufügen; (a) Die Übersetzung von Eli-melek mit "Gott ist König" wird in Frage gestellt, weil "names of this formation are found in other Semitic languages where there is no trace of monotheism; and consequently this name should be translated 'a God is king'" (p. 109). Aber gerade von mir ist längst betont worden (vgl. mein *Bibel und Babel*, 10te Aufl., S. 40) dass die nicht-israelitischen und die israelitischen Namen von solcher Art unterschieden werden müssen. Bei einem israelitischen Namen, wie Eli-melek von Ruth 1:2f., ist die Übersetzung, die in meinem Wörterbuch gegeben ist, die natürlichste. (b) Der Rezensent sagt p. 109, "In the case of 'abî 'Father,' as an element in proper names König rejects the view that it is construct before the following noun." Da hat Professor Paton sich versehen. Denn auf p. 20 meines Wörterbuchs ist im Gegenteil ausführlich nachgewiesen, dass 'abî ('acht, etc.) nur in einem Teile solcher Zusammensetzungen das Pron. poss. "mein" in sich schliessen kann. (c) Weil ich von dem Singular "Der Ba'al" spreche, wird über mich gesagt, dass "there is more of the dogmatic desire to establish a primitive Hebrew monotheism than there is of sound philological and historical investigation." Aber was hat "der Ba'al" mit dem hebräischen Monotheismus zu tun? Und mein einziges Ziel musste sein, das Material zu entfalten, das in den hebräischen Quellen steht, und diese sprechen von I Kings 2:13 an sehr häufig vom Kult "des Ba'al." Ein andres Prinzip, als rein philologisch und rein historisch zu forschen, hat mich *nie* geleitet. (d) Ueber den Ausdruck Jahve, etc. (p. 111), ist von mir alles gegeben worden, was mir die Sache eines Lexicons zu sein scheint, und was ich in jeder biblischtheologischen und archäologischen Arbeit vertreten zu können meine. Solche Worte, wie die von "dogmatic presuppositions" (p. 111), sollten vermieden werden. Denn wie, wenn ich dieselben gegen meinen Reviewer ausspräche? (e) Übrigens der doppelte Spiritus lenis, der von mir anstatt ʾ gesetzt ist wird nach meinem Vorgang jetzt endlich auch in der *Zeitschrift der deutschen morgenländischen Gesellschaft* angewendet. Man hat also eingesehen, dass die Umschreibung des ʾ durch ʿ=h ein zu starker Missgriff ist, als dass er länger gebilligt werden könnte. Und warum sind die Bedeutungen arabischer Verba gewöhnlich auf lateinisch gegeben? Nun warum haben Nöldeke und Müller ihr Buch *Delectus veterum carminum arabicorum*, das oft von mir zitiert worden ist, lateinisch geschrieben? Die lateinische Deutung arabischer Verba wird niemand stören, aber vielen in Ungarn, Russland usw. willkommen sein.

ED. KÖNIG

UNIVERSITY OF BONN  
GERMANY

## RECENT THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE

### A TESTIMONIAL TO PROFESSOR BRIGGS<sup>1</sup>

The volume before us is published in honor of a scholar and teacher well known to the readers of this *Journal*. The authors themselves say in their preface: "This volume is offered to Professor Charles Augustus Briggs by a little group of his pupils and colleagues with the addition of only two or three other close friends. It is a testimonial of their personal affection as well as of their sense of obligation to the veteran scholar and teacher, and they have chosen as its occasion his completion of seventy years of life, not because they do not hope for him many more years of fruitful work, but because this anniversary recalls to them his long and notable service, and reminds them afresh of all they owe to the stimulus of his untiring energy, his patient research, his fearlessness in proclaiming truth, his warm personal sympathy, and his quick response to every demand made upon his stores of knowledge and the treasures—often unsuspected—of his warm and valiant heart." The best reward that the conscientious teacher can have is such testimony of affection and esteem on the part of those with whom he has been most closely associated, especially when it brings the assurance, which this volume gives, that the pupils are carrying on the work of the master in the spirit by which he himself has been and is moved.

Dr. Briggs has been far more than the occupant of a chair in a great theological seminary. He has been *Doctor Ecclesiae* in the broadest sense of the word, most truly so when the church he was trying to instruct showed itself most ungrateful. The extent of his learning and the catholicity of his interest is strikingly shown by the bibliography of his writings appended to this volume. This catalogue, which does not claim to be complete, includes nearly two hundred publications, and among them are many which have had a large share in molding the theological thought of this country and Great Britain. By the strange irony of ecclesiastical process, Dr. Briggs was held up before the world as a radical and an innovator. His writings have abundantly shown

<sup>1</sup> *Essays in Modern Theology and Related Subjects, Gathered and Published as a Testimonial to Charles Augustus Briggs, D.D., Litt.D., on the Completion of His Seventieth Year, January 15, 1911, by a Few of His Pupils, Colleagues, and Friends.* New York: Scribner, 1911. xvi+347 pages. \$2.50.

how false, how ludicrous in fact, was the accusation. So far from being an iconoclast he is thoroughly conservative, a defender of the great historic churches and of the faith they profess. He has indeed stood manfully for the freedom of biblical scholarship, because he knows that true scholarship cannot submit to have its conclusions prescribed for it by any authority, dogmatic or other, but he has also stood firmly for the idea of an organized Christianity, one catholic and apostolic church. The object for which he has most earnestly prayed is the realization of this idea by the reunion of all the separated bodies which bear the Christian name.

If the volume before us is valid evidence, it must be confessed that Dr. Briggs has impressed his pupils with the idea of free scholarship more distinctly than with his idea of the reunion of Christendom. We should have been glad to see among these papers one or more devoted to the Reformation in its relation to the unhappy divisions which keep us apart. Especially grateful would have been a study of the English church in the seventeenth century, a subject in which Dr. Briggs is an acknowledged authority. The only two papers in the volume which bear on the history of the church are McGiffert's presentation of Calvin's theory of the church, and Platner's discussion of the repression of scientific inquiry in the ancient church.

However, it is better to be grateful for what we have than to wish we had something else. The present reviewer is of course attracted especially by the biblical studies here united. First comes Toy's essay on "Polytheism in Genesis" as a mark of date. The investigation was perhaps suggested by the recent attempt of a Dutch scholar to find distinct marks of polytheism in certain strata of the Pentateuch. Toy gives careful examination to the texts and shows that although polytheism may underlie the original stories which the editors of Genesis used, the passages alleged do not argue for such polytheism on the part of the documents as we now have them. In the second paper Arnold throws light on one of the Old Testament *hapax legomena*. Bewer follows with some valuable notes on Jeremiah, showing how much we still have to learn from this book. Curtis discusses afresh the problem of the return of the Jews under Cyrus. This scholar is evidently impressed by the argument long ago presented by Torrey, with which all Old Testament scholars are now familiar, to the effect that there was no such event. But he still thinks that some sort of return may have taken place under Cyrus, though he says that "the evidence for it is very slight, and we have no reason to believe that the Chronicler's

account is anything else than imaginary." Two papers are devoted to the Psalter, one by Peters, the other by Fullerton. The former argues from a study of the Korahitic Psalms that these compositions had their origin in North Israel, in which case they would of course be older than the fall of Samaria. Fullerton makes a special study of antisacrificial expressions in the Psalms. Among his conclusions I may mention this: that the last two verses of Ps. 51 are not, as now commonly supposed, a later addition to the original poem, but that they belong to it, while the two verses which precede are an insertion. Fullerton also takes occasion to enter upon the vexed question of the *ego* of the psalmists and inclines to the view that for the most part it is the Jewish community that speaks.

Less technical, but of more general interest, are the two papers which come next in order, one by Francis Brown on the decline of prophecy, the other by Day on man and the messianic hope. One of the most important papers is contributed by George F. Moore on the definition of the Jewish canon and the repudiation of Christian Scriptures. With abundant learning the author points out that as in the church the canon was defined because of the rise of heresy and the consequent need of a definite code to which to appeal, so it was in the Jewish community where the early Christians claimed to belong and to have their sacred books recognized in the synagogue. The conclusion is that "it was not the diversity of opinion in the schools about Ecclesiastes and the Song of Songs that first made deliverances about the Scriptures necessary, but the rise of the Christian heresy and the circulation of Christian writings. Older than any catalogue of the canonical books which has been preserved are specific decisions that certain books are not inspired scripture, and among the repudiated books the gospels stand in the front rank." The illuminating discussion by which this thesis is sustained does not admit of compression, or we should be tempted to reproduce it here.

The volume is one that should be read by everyone interested in theological thought.

HENRY PRESERVED SMITH

MEADVILLE THEOLOGICAL SCHOOL  
MEADVILLE, PA.

ISRAEL AMONG THE NATIONS<sup>1</sup>

The time has long passed since any historian could regard Israel as living in isolation from the tumultuous life of the Orient. It is now generally recognized that Israel's life was a part of and inextricably interwoven with that of the great Semitic family to which she belonged. Her history can be understood, therefore, only as it is interpreted against the background of the ambitions and attainments, the thoughts and feelings of the Semitic world.

While this relationship between Israel and her neighbors has thus been realized, there has thus far been no presentation of Hebrew history that has given adequate consideration to it. The title of the book under review promises just the thing that is needed, but the promise is not fulfilled. It is one thing to give a sketch of the political and military relations of a people with its neighbors; it is quite another to trace the "development" of that people "within the framework of world-history." The former task is that undertaken here. The accomplishment of the latter task involves a broader and deeper conception of history than that apparently entertained by Lehmann-Haupt. History is not a mere record of events. Much less is it a list of campaigns, or of successive dynasties. It is rather a setting forth of the entire complex of the interests which make up the life of a people. History is the record of the interrelations and convolutions of the various forces and life-processes that contribute to the development of a nation. It concerns itself to be sure with such concrete and tangible things as dates, wars, treaties, tribute, and changes of dynasties; but it is, to say the least, equally concerned with the less tangible but no less real things of the spirit. By these things does a nation live. The external, objective phenomena are but as the tossing waves on the bosom of the mighty ocean. The navigator must know the depths of the great deep. The outstanding feature of the history of Israel, for example, was not her political activity, nor her military triumphs and defeats, but the development of her intellectual and religious life. The task awaiting the historian of Israel is to discover and trace the interrelations of Israel with the Semitic world along the lines of commerce, art, literature, learning, and religion. A constant interchange in such commodities as these was in progress. It still remains to determine the debit and credit sides in this account between Israel and the nations. It is not enough to have added a *Kulturgeschichtliche Rückschau und Nachlese*

<sup>1</sup> *Israel: Seine Entwicklung im Rahmen der Weltgeschichte.* Von C. F. Lehmann-Haupt. Tübingen: Mohr, 1911. vii+344 pages. M. 10.

as a sort of an afterthought. The next great history of Israel will be the one that takes into full and fair consideration all of these elements and shows how Israel came up from among the nations to be not indeed *sui generis* but certainly *primus inter pares*.

Professor Lehmann-Haupt possesses many of the qualities requisite to the performance of the aforesaid task in an eminent degree. His range of information is unusually wide and accurate. His enthusiasm for detailed investigation is contagious. His judgment is on the whole excellent. He has direct access to a large area of information through his acquaintance with the various Semitic tongues. His self-restraint in the presence of facts is praiseworthy. Within the limits of the task as conceived by himself he has done an admirable piece of work. He is in a certain sense a pioneer in this field, and deserves full credit for his courage and skill. Particularly valuable is the way in which he has constantly reckoned with the outlying non-Semitic peoples whose pressure upon the Semitic world from time to time caused more or less significant changes within the limits of that world. Where there is so much to praise, it is almost ungracious to express dissent. But some questions must be raised in the interests of truth.

The influence of Egypt upon Palestine seems unduly minimized and that of Babylonia correspondingly magnified. For example, such a statement as that Palestine from 2600 B.C. or earlier until about 1600 B.C. was under the practically unbroken dominion of Babylonian politics and culture (pp. 15, 243) is hardly defensible. The facts are against it. To say nothing of mining operations in Sinai and voyages to Phoenicia and the Lebanon region prior to 2600 B.C., Pepi I sent five expeditions to Palestine (2590-2570 B.C.); Pepi II carried on commerce with the Lebanons; Amenemhet I was in constant touch with Syria (2000-1970 B.C.), and Sesostris III (1887-1849 B.C.) campaigned in Syria and welcomed Syrian traders in Egypt. Furthermore, the excavations in Palestine show practically no traces of Babylonian influence in the earlier period; but, on the contrary, constantly reflect the art and customs of Egypt, the next-door neighbor on the south. The altogether convincing evidence of the Palestinian excavations is practically overlooked by our author. In like manner, undue stress is laid upon the fact that cuneiform was used in the official correspondence of Palestine and Egypt as witnessed by the Tel-el-Amarna letters. But cuneiform was not confined to the Babylonians, having been used also by the Hittites and the people of Mitanni, from whom it may easily have been transmitted to Syria and Palestine. In any case, the mere use of a

foreign language for diplomatic and commercial intercourse between nations is not in and of itself indicative of any predominating influence on the part of the people to whom that language belongs.

Coming to the internal affairs of Israel herself, the supposition that Rehoboam gained many victories over Jeroboam which are not on record (p. 71) is exceedingly improbable in a history, one of whose characteristics it is to magnify Judah at the expense of the Northern Kingdom. The Hebrew name Ben-hadad, as has been shown by Dr. D. D. Luckenbill in *AJSL*, XXVII, 267 ff., is to be retained as correct and not changed (p. 77) into Bir-Hadar (Assyrian, *Bir'idri*), which is better read Hadadezer (= Assyrian, *Adad-'idri*). The phrase "Jehus Sohn Ahab" (p. 73) is surely a printer's error. The attempt to place the prophet Hosea in the reign of King Hoshea rather than in the days prior to 734 B.C. can hardly be called successful. The language of Hos. 12:12, 15 certainly does not warrant interpretation as of the invasion of Tiglath-pileser in 734 B.C. and the silence regarding this event and its consequences is not so easily harmonized with the supposition that the prophet spoke after its occurrence as our author seems to think. Nor was the political situation of Menahem's time such as to render improbable the existence of pro-Assyrian and pro-Egyptian parties in Israel as was the case in the prophet Hosea's days. Even though the source of danger in Menahem's reign was Urartu, yet some might easily have turned toward Egypt for relief while others looked in the opposite direction toward Assyria. Again, in the case of Nahum the prophet, there is no real basis for the view that he was one of the exiles of the Northern Kingdom. His interest is not in the north nor is his knowledge of Assyrian places and things so minute and specific as to make his residence in Assyria an imperative conclusion. Still another prophet receives unusual treatment at the hands of our author. Ezekiel's visions or trances are explained as due to his having been subject to epileptic attacks. This is sheer hypothesis and furnishes no real help at that. The visions are not of such a character as to find elucidation in such ways. They are too evidently the result of a fertile and exuberant literary imagination.

One more thing must be mentioned, viz., the author's confidence in the historical value of the Chronicler's work. It is, of course, obvious that the Chronicler is not to be condemned off-hand, thrown out of court without fair trial. But on the other hand, it must not be forgotten that in many cases, where it is possible to test the Chronicler by comparison with other sources he stands condemned of misrepres-

sentation and deliberate invention. This renders it very unwise to place much credence in the Chronicler's unsupported statements on any subject. He is chiefly of value as reflecting the ideals, thoughts, and methods of his own day. Nor has the discovery of the Papyri from Assuan and Elephantine done as much for the Chronicler's reputation as Dr. Lehmann-Haupt would have us believe (p. iv). It is no more easy to accept the "decrees" of the Chronicler's narrative now than it was before the recent discoveries. They remain just as thoroughly Jewish documents as they ever were. Nor is there anything in the new Papyri that in any degree forces the originality of these "decrees" upon us. Indeed, a comparison of the Aramaic of the "decrees" with that of the Papyri points to a much later origin for the former as Professor Torrey has so clearly pointed out in his *Ezra Studies* (1910).

But, passing by these and other questions over which differences of opinion must arise, there remains a deal of sound learning and reliable information in Dr. Lehmann-Haupt's book. He has brought together things that have too long remained apart. He opens up many new vistas and deserves the gratitude of students everywhere for marking out a new path.

JOHN M. POWIS SMITH

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

## A NEW COMMENTARY ON HABAKKUK

The Book of Habakkuk presents a degree of difficulty to the interpreter out of all proportion to its size. A great amount of literature called forth by the desire to solve its problems stands to its credit both in English and in German. A wide diversity of expedients has been employed in these efforts after a solution. Some insist upon the essential unity of the book; others analyze it into almost infinitesimal portions (so e.g. Marti and Nicolardot). Its date is located all the way from the days of Jeremiah to the Maccabaeon period. The author of this latest commentary<sup>1</sup> has studied the work of all his predecessors carefully and is completely satisfied with none of them. He therefore undertakes to present a new attempt to solve the riddle of Habakkuk. His attempt comes well accredited, having been awarded the Senior Ken-nicott scholarship in the University of Oxford in 1909, when it was first written.

The most important part of this commentary is the full and critical

<sup>1</sup> *The Book of Habakkuk*. Introduction, Translation, and Notes on the Hebrew Text. By G. G. V. Stonehouse. London: Rivingtons, 1911. 264 pages. 5s net.



introduction, extending over 129 pages. The translation and the notes on the Hebrew text which constitute the bulk of the book give every evidence of sound scholarship and good judgment. The new element in Mr. Stonehouse's work is in his formulation of the problem which confronted Habakkuk. This may be summarized as follows: The Babylonians are rapidly subduing the entire West. It is a question of but a short time till they will be at the gates of Jerusalem. Their treatment of the subdued nations is oppressive and cruel. The spectacle of the successes of the Chaldeans and the sufferings of the nations overthrown has created panic in Judah. Conflicting parties contend for the control of the state policies. Some are for alliance with one power, some for alliance with another. The prophetic policy of absolute, unflinching trust in Yahweh alone finds no supporters. How long will Yahweh permit this state of affairs to continue? What is to be the outcome of the present turmoil?

This interpretation takes the text of the book in the order in which it stands and eliminates from chaps. 1 and 2 only 2:11-14, 18-20. But a radical emendation of 1:5, 6a is also involved in it and is indispensable, unless these lines are dropped, when no satisfactory connection between 1:4 and 1:6b remains. Further difficulty with this view is occasioned by the character of the language used, according to this hypothesis, to describe the tyrannical treatment of the defenseless peoples by the Chaldeans. It reads very much more like a description of conditions within Judah herself. Further, the use of the terms *torah* and *mishpat* to designate Judah's foreign policy is without any good analogy. It is, indeed, not unlikely that the former of the two might have been so employed, but *mishpat* is too clearly defined to make such an expansion of its content probable. It distinctly denotes that which is right either because so decided by the judge or because it conforms to long-established custom.

Whatever may be thought of this latest offering to the interpretation of Habakkuk, it is certain that the keen criticism bestowed upon the works of previous commentators will compel a revision or a supplementation of their views. The author's treatment of the Psalm of Habakkuk runs along the usual lines. On 3:9, a famous *crux interpretum*, attention may be called to H. St. J. Thackeray's clever suggestion in the *Journal of Theological Studies* for January, 1911, which appeared after this book was in type.

JOHN M. POWIS SMITH

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

THE PSALMS OF SOLOMON<sup>1</sup>

The book under review is one of a series which is being published under the direction of François Martin, professor of Semitic languages in L'Institut Catholique de Paris. It is the fourth volume to appear in the projected series, but some nine others are in course of preparation. Most of the works are studies in Jewish apocalyptic literature, and the general title is *Documents pour l'étude de la Bible*.

This volume was assigned to Professor J. Viteau of L'Institut Catholique de Paris, and he has performed his task in a highly creditable way. One scarcely looks for any great display of originality in reworking a literary problem on which so much excellent work has been done as on the Psalms of Solomon, nor is it in the direction of original suggestion or treatment that the chief value of the work under consideration lies. No remarkable or iconoclastic conclusions are reached, and the main interest and worth lie in the fact that we have here a very complete and thorough examination of the material from a new thought-circle. Students of that fascinating literature of which these psalms are a part are under obligation to Professor Viteau for his painstaking labor.

The book consists—as the full title indicates—of an Introduction, the Greek Text, and a French translation of the Greek. On the pages containing the text and translation, and sharing equally the space with them, are the principal variants of the Syriac version (in French), and critical and explanatory comments. The basal text is that of the Vatican manuscript, the Codex Romanus.

The Introduction is lengthy, occupying 252 pages. A convenient analysis of the psalms is followed by a résumé of Jewish history from the assumption of the high-priesthood by Jonathan to the death of Pompey. This is well done, and furnishes an excellent background for the further questions of Introduction and for interpretation. The question of date is considered, and the conclusion reached is that the composition of the psalms extended over a period of twenty-two years—from 69 B.C. to 47 B.C. The second psalm was the last written, if we except the eighteenth, which is not considered to belong to the genuine psalms. This dating is based on the historical allusions in the Psalms which, in Professor Viteau's thought, refer to Pompey's invasion. He thus follows the consensus of opinion. The collection is an artificial one and it is impossible to detect any principle of arrangement. The author (for unity of authorship for Pss. 1-17 is claimed) is a Pharisee,

<sup>1</sup> *Les Psaumes de Salomon, Introduction, Texte Grec, et Traduction*. Par J. VITEAU. Paris: Letouzey et Ané, 1911. Pp. 427. Fr. 6.75.

possibly a priest, and his place of abode was probably Jerusalem. The purpose of the writings is "always didactic, polemic, and messianic." The psalms were written to encourage the disheartened Jews, justify the ways of God, renew attachment to the theocracy, and infuse hope of the near approach of the Messiah. The composition is not pseudepigraphical in the strict sense of the word, the ascription to Solomon being the work of a copyist or corrector some time before the fifth century of our era.

The doctrinal aspects of the psalms are carefully considered in an impartial, scientific spirit. The ideas are essentially those of the Old Testament from which they were borrowed by the author, and the doctrinal interest of the book is that it shows us the Jewish mind and ethical life in the first century B.C. The original language was Hebrew, from which the Greek version was made, and this in turn was translated into Syriac. The date of the Greek translation is not defined more closely than between 40 B.C. and 70 A.D.

The literary relationships and history of the Psalms of Solomon are considered at length in several chapters, and an extensive bibliography is added. The whole work seems to be done carefully, with judgment, and in a true historical spirit. If the standard of Professor Viteau's work is maintained in all the volumes the series will be a worthy one. This production of French Catholic scholarship will be welcomed as a real acquisition for our study of the period to which it relates.

ERNEST W. PARSONS

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

### STUDIES IN THE REALM OF CHURCH HISTORY

Professor Tucker has undertaken to picture life in the Roman Empire in A.D. 64, treating security, travel, administration, education, religion, science, and so forth.<sup>1</sup> He has done this with admirable judgment and sanity, and has produced a book that is interesting to read and valuable for reference. Technical terms are avoided, and every reasonable effort is made to adapt the book to the general reader. One hundred and twenty-five illustrations enrich the text, and there are a few good maps and plans. As the title indicates, the book takes account of the significance of the time for Christian history, as well as classical, and many points in the life of Paul are helpfully touched upon.

If Professor Tucker's book has a fault, it is that it deals rather with

<sup>1</sup> *Life in the Roman World of Nero and St. Paul.* By T. G. Tucker. New York: Macmillan, 1911. xix+453 pages. \$2.50.

Roman life than with life in the Roman world. Antioch, Alexandria, Ephesus, Athens—these, too, belonged to the Roman world, and had types of life as characteristic and almost as significant as Rome. Upon the life of the provincial in Nero's time the book throws very little light. Yet it is just here that recent discoveries and publications have most extended our knowledge. The forty volumes of Greek papyri (such as, e.g., the Gemellus letters), which would have given Professor Tucker a wealth of material on provincial life, seem to be unknown to him. He has confined himself entirely to the literary and epigraphical sources, and to works, like Friedländer's, built upon them. His references to Paul are not always critically based. Ramsay and Conybeare and Howson are his chief authorities. He accepts the traditional view, based on the pastoral epistles, that Paul's first imprisonment in Rome ended in his acquittal (pp. 1, 383). That the primitive Christian was "a socialist leveler" (p. 386) is probably much more apparent to us than it was to him. On the whole, the early Christian element in the book is inconsiderable and not wholly satisfying; that is not Professor Tucker's field.

A few trifling defects may be noted. That an upward flick of the thumb was the sign of death for the gladiator is the reverse of the usual view (cf., e.g., Friedländer, *Roman Life*, II, 61; Johnston, *Private Life*, 262). To describe the inhabitants of the interior of Egypt in the first century as "mostly speaking Coptic" (p. 45) is an anachronism, to say the least. Puzzuoli (p. 26) for Pozzuoli is probably a misprint. The work as a whole seems accurate, and while it is disappointing on the Greek and Christian sides, it will prove a useful handbook on Roman life in Nero's day.

EDGAR J. GOODSPEED

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

---

None of the former works on the Society of Jesus have treated in detail the daily regimen of the members. The extensive history of Cretinau-Joly is concerned chiefly with the work of the order rather than its internal life. Gothein's excellent volume is too broad in scope and too much occupied with the relation of the society to the Catholic Reformation to find space for this phase of Jesuit life. The critical Catholic work of Huber, *Der Jesuitenorden nach seiner Verfassung und Doktrin, Wirksamkeit und Geschichte charakterisiert* is also concerned with the historical significance of the order. The last important history of the society, by Bernhard Duhr, S.J., *Geschichte der Jesuiten*

*in den Ländern deutscher Zunge*, gives much information concerning the daily life of the Jesuits in their Houses, but does not include the abundant detail necessary for a complete and vivid presentation of the subject. This deficiency in the literature on the Society of Jesus is met by the treatise here reviewed.<sup>1</sup>

Part I, constituting a fifth of the entire work, deals with the different classes of persons resident in the Houses of the order or present there as day scholars. The clearness with which the different classes are described gives a remarkably definite and accurate idea of what constitutes a Jesuit college in the wider sense, a Jesuit college in the narrower sense, and of the relation of classes to each other. This fundamentally important question has not been so well presented in any other work on the Jesuits, unless it be that of Duhr, and removes misapprehensions which are found even in so scholarly a treatise as Mertz's *Pädagogik der Jesuiten*. For a correct understanding of the composition of classes resident in the Houses of the order and of its educational activity this exceptional presentation has the highest value. Numerous illustrations from colleges in different provinces of the order make clear the relation of classes.

Part II is concerned with social life and relations in the Houses of the order. The principles governing the intercourse of members with each other, of full members with the novitiates, with pupils, and with the outside world are set forth with abundance of illustration. Richness of detail concerning customs at table, recreation, use of books, correspondence, sleeping arrangements, festivals, holidays, and all important aspects of daily routine give a vivid impression of life in the Jesuit Houses. New light is thrown on Loyola's ideas concerning his society and in consequence on the effect of those ideas in church history.

One element of value in this treatise is its utilization of new material concerning the Jesuit order. First-hand sources of information concerning it were not abundant, even as late as 1885. The *Acta Sanctorum*, Vol. VII, a part of the letters of Loyola, the *Institutium Societatis Jesu*, and Carayon's twenty-three volumes of *Documenta inedita* were the chief collections. The past twenty-five years have seen the publication of a great quantity of new sources, many of them having high value. The letters of Nadal alone, one of the visitors of the society,

<sup>1</sup> *Forschungen zur Lebensordnung der Gesellschaft Jesu im 16. Jahrhundert*. Von Dr. Phil. Hermann Stoeckius. Erstes Stück: Ordensangehörige und Externe. viii+57 pages. Zweites Stück: Das gesellschaftliche Leben im Ordenshause. iv+198 pages. München: Beck, 1910, 1911. M. 5.

are a mine of information on life in the Jesuit colleges. It is the publication of these sources which has made the present work possible. The knowledge which it presents has been gleaned from a multitude of individual documents and organized with admirable clearness and simplicity. It conforms, in a word, to the highest canons of scholarship in historical science. It is based exclusively on primary sources, is impartial, thorough, and clear.

The matter is presented, moreover, in a more interesting form and with greater animation of style than might be expected in a monograph dealing with so specialized a subject. It is to be hoped that the valuable information here given will be made accessible to American scholars in their own language and that Herr Stoeckius will carry out his intention of supplementing this treatise by further studies on other phases of the same subject.

E. E. SPERRY

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

---

Abbé Jules Thomas, a Doctor of Theology and an honorary canon of the Cathedral of Notre-Dame de Dijon, has published a book on the *Concordat*<sup>1</sup> which enjoys the distinction of having been recognized and approved by official organs of both church and state in France. It bears the *imprimatur* of the Bishop of Dijon. It has been awarded one of the annual prizes assigned "sur le prix du budget" by the Académie des sciences morales et politiques. Its orthodoxy and its scholarship are thus at once avouched for.

Its contents cover a wide field. The first volume traces the origins of the *Concordat* of 1516 in the relations between the papacy and the French crown before that date. It reviews rapidly the earlier history of the subject, and then proceeds to consider more carefully the course of the negotiations between Leo X and Francis I which brought the *Concordat* to pass. The second volume, mainly exegetical in character, analyzes in great detail the text of the *Concordat* itself and of the subsequent acts issued by the pope and the French king to modify and enforce it. The last volume describes the practical workings of the *Concordat* in the sixteenth century, balances its merits and defects, pronounces in its favor, and concludes with a brief comparison of it with the later *Concordat* arranged between Napoleon I and Pius VII in 1801.

By far the most valuable part of this book is that which deals with

<sup>1</sup> *Le Concordat de 1516, ses origines, son histoire au xvi<sup>e</sup> siècle.* L'Abbé Jules Thomas. Paris: Picard, 1910. 3 vols. Fr. 7.50 per vol.

the negotiations immediately preceding the *Concordat*, and the struggle over its registration between Francis I and the Parlement of Paris which immediately followed it. In connection with both of these subjects the author has brought fresh material to light which he has been careful to reproduce in full among his *pièces justificatives*. The documents which bear upon the negotiations of Roger Barne, French ambassador at Rome in 1516, and the extracts from the registers of the Parlement of Paris in 1517 and 1518, constitute important contributions to the available sources upon the subject.

In his treatment of the origins and of the practical workings of the *Concordat*, l'Abbé Thomas is a good deal more attentive to his orthodoxy than to his scholarship. He is plainly of the extreme ultramontaine faction in the French church; he accepts without question the doctrine of papal infallibility and cites papal bulls again and again as final authorities upon disputed points in the relations of church and state. Clearly he is not in the frame of mind to form an accurate historical judgment upon the merits of the controversy between Gallican and Ultramontaine which is the central theme of his work. It is indeed pretty evident that he is writing for the Roman Catholic world rather than for the learned world in general. In such allusions as he makes to the Protestant movement in the sixteenth century, he finds it sufficient to administer wholesale condemnation without any recognition of the points in dispute. It is characteristic of his attitude of mind that he frames his summary of Luther's doctrines upon the terms of the papal bull which excommunicated him.

The book as a whole reveals a curious mixture of careful research and arbitrary dogmatizing. Parts of it cannot hope for a friendly reception outside the ranks of the rigid Ultramontaines; other parts contain important contributions to the difficult history of the relations of church and state which will be welcomed by scholars at large. It justifies at once the *imprimatur* of the bishop and the award of the French Institute.

CONYERS READ

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

In his preface Professor Tschackert modestly says that the present volume<sup>1</sup> is to take the place of Jakob Planck's *Geschichte der Entstehung . . . unsers protestantischen Lehrbegriffs* (1781-1800). Between the

<sup>1</sup> *Die Entstehung der lutherischen und der reformierten Kirchenlehre samt ihren innerprotestantischen Gegensätzen*. Von Paul Tschackert. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1910. x+645 pages. M. 16.

two books lies the nineteenth century, a period of intensive study of the ever-widening circle of sources, a period also more sympathetic toward the beliefs of the Reformers than was the age of enlightenment. It is, therefore, upon firmer and broader foundations that Dr. Tschackert has reared his elaborate, not to say monumental, work.

Unlike Planck the writer excludes the political side of the Reformation and concentrates on the creeds. He aims to describe the rise, progress, and fixation of the various types of Protestant beliefs. The priority of Luther's views entitles them to relatively detailed treatment; but when similar consideration is meted out to the arid controversies of the *Epigoni*, one feels that the allotment of space is governed by national, one might almost say Hanoverian, considerations. However, the remaining third of the book, divided between the Calvinists and various Anabaptist or radical groups, usually furnishes adequate discussion of their characteristic tenets, though it is disconcerting to see the Church of England dismissed with a scant two pages (406 f.).

Like Seeberg our author often incorporates into his text huge masses of source material, a procedure professedly objective, however scandalizing to a lover of mere style. Thus on p. 415 the German text occupies ten lines, while Latin quotations fill the other thirty-five. As icebergs drift with the Arctic currents, so do these "Seebergs" float on the current of thought, occasionally sparkling but too often enveloped in fog. Nevertheless one must concede that the expositions, though lengthy, are seldom tedious, praise which cannot be given to the older books on the theology of Luther. Dr. Tschackert is master of his material and usually lays upon himself the limitations which are the hall-mark of mastery. Especially when summarizing the accepted results of other investigators he is lucidity itself. It is in the more detailed portions of the book, where all is built up around excerpts, that the style becomes labored; but it is precisely here that one should look for contributions, which in a field so often worked must usually be contributions of detail.

The careful bibliographies present for the most part recent special literature on the development of Protestant theology. One remarks the almost complete absence of French and English, and even of American and Dutch titles. This may be partially excused by the fact that the author is interested primarily in the official creeds in use in the Lutheran and in the Reformed churches of present-day Germany.

WILLIAM WALKER ROCKWELL

UNION THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY  
NEW YORK CITY



Professor McGlothlin has rendered a valuable service to the Baptists—indeed to church history. The Baptists have been regarded as a creedless denomination. But here is a book, three hundred pages of which are filled with confessions,<sup>1</sup> showing that the general impression is wrong. But the moment we think of it we see that no religious organization can get on without some formal statement of its doctrines and polity. This was emphatically true in England in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The difference in this respect between the different religious denominations is after all not in kind but in degree.

Years ago Professor Walker published his *Creeds and Platforms of Congregationalism*, and ever since it has been a source-book for Congregational church history. Now, thanks to Professor McGlothlin, we have a similar source-book for Baptist church history.

The introductions and notes are admirable. In fact, if the reader will start in at the beginning and read the introductions through, he will have a very good outline of the essentials of Baptist history with a strong and stimulating flavor of the sources.

In Part I the various articles of the Anabaptists are given. In Part II are found the Mennonite confessions. But our chief interest is in Part III, which is concerned with the English Baptists. Their confessions are grouped under the two historical divisions of Arminian and Calvinistic Baptists. These confessions occupy 241 pages, and are extremely interesting, not only for what they contain in themselves separately, but for the progress of doctrine that is seen running through them when taken all together. How biblical they were is seen in the great number of citations of the Bible. In England the Arminian Baptists arose first; but in America the Calvinistic Baptists were the first to appear. Here only 64 pages are required, showing that American Baptists have not made so much of confessions as have the English Baptists. Of course the necessities were not so urgent. But the confessions that are given have had a far-reaching influence. There are three of them: the Philadelphia Confession; the New Hampshire Confession; and the Treatise on the Faith of the Free-Will Baptists.

Part IV contains 38 pages of confessions of other nationalities, among which we should mention the German, the French, and the Swedish Baptist confessions.

J. W. MONCRIEF

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

<sup>1</sup> *Baptist Confessions of Faith*. By W. J. McGlothlin, Ph.D., D.D. Philadelphia: American Baptist Publication Society, 1911. xii+368 pages. \$2.50.

MEDIAEVALISM AND MODERNISM IN PROTESTANT  
THOUGHT

An account of the course of Protestant theology compressed within reasonable limits has long been a desideratum. The recent work of Professor McGiffert<sup>1</sup> goes a long way toward supplying this want, as far as concerns the pre-Kantian period. The range of the work scarcely corresponds with the title, "Protestant Thought," for it is concerned only with thought on religious subjects, and it may be also that there is a danger that the limitation of attention mainly to the theoretical side of Protestant religious life may lead the unskilled reader to under-rate the worth of Protestant religious progress; but an attempt to keep in view the quality of religious life that sought expression in doctrine would probably have made the work too bulky.

The first half of the book is devoted to the time of the Reformation and, naturally, Luther receives most attention, with Calvin a fair second. A careful discrimination is made between the old and the new in Luther's thought. It is in the former his religious life most appears. "He was pre-eminently a religious character and his great work was accomplished in the religious sphere" (p. 20). But when his views in their entirety are considered "it is clear that Luther was far from being a modern man in his interest and sympathies." "The principle of biblical authority as used by Luther was after all not so completely opposed to the principle of ecclesiastical authority as it might seem." Indeed one result of his insistence on faith as distinguished from works was that among his followers "orthodoxy overshadowed everything else and instead of enjoying greater freedom in religious thought, Protestants were more completely in bondage than their fathers had been" (p. 60). This statement, rather unwelcome to many, seems strictly true, but the sting of it might be alleviated partly by the consideration, if the author had chosen to add it, that the very doctrinal intolerance of Protestants was largely the result of the depth of their interest in truth for truth's sake as against the Catholic regard for the purely ecclesiastical interest.

The analysis of Luther's views is extremely clear and the treatment of them is perhaps not over-severe. It is when the author comes to an interpretation of the inner meaning of Luther's movement that the reader is inclined to insert interrogation marks. Is there not a doubtful antithesis in the statement that Luther, abandoning Paul's view, made salvation "wholly a matter of divine forgiveness rather than of human

<sup>1</sup> *Protestant Thought before Kant*. By Arthur Cushman McGiffert. New York: Scribner, 1911. 261+ix pages. \$0.75.

character"? One wonders also how far the statement "Luther was pre-eminently a religious character and his great work was accomplished in the religious sphere" (p. 20) ought to modify our interpretation of the earlier statement that "the Protestant Reformation was not exclusively nor even chiefly a religious movement" (p. 9).

Calvin receives less sympathetic treatment than Luther. He appears, and correctly, as more of a mediaevalist than the German reformer. To him, "God as sovereign loomed larger than God as Saviour" (p. 98)—a sample of fine succinct statements so frequent in the book. One outcome of Calvin's insistence on authority was that "his higher view of man was obscured and generally lost sight of" (*ibid.*).

The reference to the Anabaptists is on the whole favorable, but rather brief, and the interpretation a little uncertain. When we read that in their view of baptism there was "only the more consistent carrying out of Luther's fundamental principles of salvation by faith alone" (p. 104) and "no one can earn salvation by himself; regeneration by divine grace is always necessary" (p. 104), we wonder why the author says, "Their doctrine was legal to the last degree" (*ibid.*).

In the latter part of the book Protestant scholasticism comes in for the condemnation it deserves. Pietism is appreciated, though the author follows Ritschl's judgment that Spener's interpretation of the Christian life was more Catholic than Protestant.

Rationalism receives a careful, discriminating, and, on the whole, appreciative study. The English movement receives large attention, but the great concurrent movement in Germany is scantily discussed. In this portion of the work the author's fine powers of exposition appear in high degree. His aptness of quotation, summaries of arguments, and general felicity of expression make his account of a movement that has often been regarded as of little worth very interesting reading. The views of nearly all the principal writers are given in their own language. Why no mention should be made of Leland and Lardner is not clear. The author's estimate of Butler is opposed to the prevailing opinion but, in the judgment of the present reviewer, it is correct. Of the first part of the *Analogy* he says, "The general tone of the argument is not at all uplifting" (p. 234). Of the second part he says, "Apologetic as its intention was, it constitutes a step in the evolution of deism into skepticism" (p. 235). "As an apology, either for natural or revealed religion, it is extraordinarily weak, and the line followed in it has been pursued by no important apologist since. This is not because the

work was so effectively done as not to need repeating, but because it was too dangerous in its result" (pp. 238 f.).

Every line of this work is interesting reading, and the book must receive wide attention from the lay reader as well as the professional.

NEWTON THEOLOGICAL INSTITUTION  
NEWTON CENTRE, MASS.

GEORGE CROSS

### CHRISTIANITY AND SOCIAL QUESTIONS

Probably no one could be found better equipped, from the standpoint of historical and economic science,<sup>1</sup> to consider present social problems than the learned author of *The Growth of English Industry and Commerce*. Dr. Cunningham's wide range of study shows itself both in the comprehensiveness of his survey, and in his authoritative comments upon many of the proposals for social betterment which he examines. As regards the range of topics treated, there are discussions of physical conditions of life, of racial differences and the problems arising therefrom, of civil authority, of economic life and its connected governmental and ethical problems, and finally, of personal duty. The preacher who is inclined to rush into economic and social programs without thorough study will find the book an admirable protection; for the author is constantly alert to the unfortunate possibilities of identifying Christianity with the particular program which a given situation seems to demand. His historical learning is always ready to point the moral of past experience. The alternative danger, felt by some, that Christianity may take no stand, and hence lose touch with moral progress, does not trouble him. The "spiritual" mission of the church, in his view, is not only primary, but incompatible with active participation in humanitarian work. Christ "sent his apostles on evangelistic work, and bade them administer the sacraments and exercise pastoral care, but he did not enjoin them to agitate for social reforms." There is, indeed, approval for many kinds of social reforms which have been effected, but it is apparently not safe to help on causes which later may prove but temporary goods. But whatever one's judgment as to the general policy advocated—which may seem the policy of McClellan rather than that of Grant—there can be no question as to the usefulness of such a careful survey of the important factors in the social problem.

JAMES H. TUFTS

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

<sup>1</sup> *Christianity and Social Questions*. By W. Cunningham. Studies in Theology Series. New York: Scribner, 1911. xv+232 pages. \$0.75.

ASPECTS OF MODERN ISLAM<sup>1</sup>

Professor Macdonald is already favorably known to us by his studies of Mohammedanism. His earlier volumes are based on the literature; the one before us gives the results of a somewhat unusual intercourse with Moslems of today. The book is one of the Hartford-Lamson series designed to instruct candidates for the mission field concerning the religions with which they expect to come in contact. Of the volumes heretofore published in this series none is more illuminating and none is more timely than this one. The Mohammedan East is evidently just now entering on a new period of history. What part Christianity shall have in this new era depends much on the tact and intelligence of those who are called to bear the gospel to these peoples. Missions in Moslem lands have done much to elevate and clarify the ideas of the people, but it is a fact lamented by the missionaries themselves that while they have made many converts from the professedly Christian churches they have made scarcely any from the Moslem community. The severity of Moslem law may account for this in part. But it concerns us to inquire whether part of the blame may not be due to lack of information or lack of sympathy on the part of the missionaries. At this point there will no doubt be some incredulity. The East, it will be said, has long been known. Travelers have delighted to make us acquainted with its scenery, its government, its manners, and customs. We know it almost as well as we know our own country. In a sense this is true—there is information in abundance. But the trouble is that much of it is misinformation. A body of tradition has been built up about the oriental which Professor Macdonald does not hesitate to call a conspiracy of misinformation and which meets the foreigner at the threshold and dogs his steps even after he has been long in the land. This misinformation is most likely to have reference to matters of religion, and it is there of course that it is most fatal to the missionary's success. Imbued as we are with the modern spirit we do not appreciate the oriental scale of values. Discovering the Moslem's indifference to accuracy in matters of fact we accuse him of depravity, and reckon his religion a sham. The truth is that the very indifference to matters of fact may arise from the sincerity of his religion. To him the things of religion are the only things of importance—why should so much attention be given to merely mundane affairs? We can easily demon-

<sup>1</sup> *Aspects of Islam*. By Duncan Black Macdonald, M.A., D.D., Professor of Semitic Languages in Hartford Theological Seminary. New York: Macmillan, 1911. xv+375 pages.

strate to him the superiority of our applied science, but we cannot move him thereby to acknowledge the validity of our religion. To him as to the early Christians God has chosen the weak things of the world to confound the mighty.

This is one of the points convincingly brought out in the volume before us. And in line with it is the author's statement that the most successful way of approaching the oriental is through the religious experience which we call mysticism. Contrary to the usual impression he found the dervishes the most approachable of all the people with whom he talked. This is because true religion is emotional in its nature, and sympathy is a matter of the emotions. It follows that the preaching of a theology does not succeed in making converts. In the case of Moslems the difficulty arises from the similarity of their theology to our own. If the missionary discourses of the unity of God, of his power, of his sovereignty, of the impotence of the human will, of the universality of sin, of the necessity of divine guidance, of the rewards of heaven, and the pains of hell, even of the excellence of the gospel, and of the mission of Jesus, the Moslem will assent to it all. He has known all these things from his youth. If he is urged to the life of prayer, to works of charity, to integrity and humility, he may even reply in all sincerity, "all these things have I kept." But this hearty assent to the doctrine does not imply that he should change his religion. He affirms the vanity of earthly things as heartily as we do, and he believes himself to have chosen that good part which shall not be taken from him.

If now we go farther and take a polemic attitude, we shall perhaps try to show him that his prophet was no true apostle of Allah. But in his experience the figure of Mohammed has the central place. All his life he has heard that Mohammed is the crown and seal of the long line of divinely inspired men. His religious affection has fastened upon this figure portrayed in legend as the perfect man. His endeavor to lead a life well pleasing to God has been constant in imitation of the life of the Prophet. To cast reflections on the character of Mohammed is to wound him in his tenderest affections. By inculcating the methods of historic research we may indeed shake this faith. But the higher criticism is not religion, and the result of such studies is more likely to induce a profound skepticism concerning all religion than to make a truly religious Christian out of a truly religious Moslem.

It is interesting to find that converts to Christianity are in some instances at least aware that there is in the new religion something lacking just in this matter of emotional experience. Professor Mac-

donald tells of one man with whom he conversed who had accepted Christianity and who had been a dervish. He was asked whether if the specifically Moslem references could be left out of the religious exercise of the dervish (the *zikr*) he could still find spiritual profit in it. After some reflection he replied that he thought he could, and there seemed to be a shade of regret in his reply as though he wished there might be something of the kind in Christianity. The conclusion is that the missionary must have something more than a correct view of Christian dogma, and something more than a genuinely historic knowledge of the founder of Islam if he is to get into really sympathetic relations with these people. To show what this is, is one object of the book before us. Every one who is interested in heart-religion will read it with interest and profit.

HENRY PRESERVED SMITH

MEADVILLE THEOLOGICAL SCHOOL  
MEADVILLE, PA.

## BRIEF MENTION

### BIBLE

KENT, C. F. *Biblical Geography and History*. With Maps. New York: Scribner, 1911. xviii+296 pages. \$1.50 net.

No one should think of visiting Bible lands without reading carefully such a work as this. In his dash through the history of the Old and New Testaments the author sketches in the foreground both the ancient and modern topographical setting of the narrative. First-hand knowledge of the places gives reality and color and a vividness of description that can never be found in a work compiled from other books. To give clearness and locality to every place mentioned sixteen maps are inserted, based on the best modern authorities. If one wishes to go beyond the lids of this volume, a selected bibliography points the way.

POLLARD, ALFRED W. *Records of the English Bible*. The Documents Relating to the Translation and Publication of the Bible in English, 1525-1611. London and New York: Frowde, 1911. xii+383 pages. 5s. net.

The tercentenary of the translation of King James (or Authorized) Version has opened the doors of our ignorance, and forced us to flee to such sources as are found in the *Records of the English Bible*. Pollard has done a piece of work in this volume that deserves the sincere gratitude of every student of the history of the English Bible. He has selected and published sixty-three source-records belonging to the period, 1525-1611. The stormy times of this period are seen in the decrees of kings and bishops, in the jealousies of churchmen and politicians, in the plottings and monopolies of printers and publishers, expressed in the unique English style of the sixteenth century. Now we shall be able better than ever to appreciate some of the antecedents of the Authorized Version, and also to understand the reasons for some of the strange things that were done by the civil and church authorities from the time of Tyndale down to King James.

*The Authorized Version of the English Bible, 1611.* [Cambridge English Classics.] Edited by WILLIAM ALDIS WRIGHT. In Five Vols. Cambridge: At the University Press; New York: Putman, 1909. 4s. 6d. per volume; 20s. a set. Vol. I, Genesis to Deuteronomy, xxiii+495 pages; Vol. II, Joshua to Esther, 617 pages; Vol. III, Job to Malachi, 775 pages; Vol. IV, Apochrypha, 425 pages; Vol. V, The New Testament, 575 pages.

The tercentenary of the translation of King James Version (1611) has opened new avenues of study to Bible students in Dr. Wright's five bulky volumes. To produce a facsimile reprint of the first folio edition of 1611 would have been a very expensive piece of work. In lieu of that method, the editor put into the hands of the compositors and readers of the University Press a copy of the first edition of 1611, and from that work the present five volumes were reproduced. In place of the black-letter type of 1611 we have roman; instead of the roman of 1611, we have italic; instead of a double-column page of 1611, we have the left- and right-hand pages of the open book reproducing the left- and right-hand columns respectively of a single page of 1611. The quaint spelling, the printers' errors, and the marginal notes are exactly reprinted. The dedication: TO THE MOST HIGH AND MIGHTIE PRINCE, IAMES, by the Grace of God, King of Great Britaine, France and Ireland," etc.; "the Translators to the Reader," happily form the introduction to the text.

Dr. Wright prefaces the Authorized Version by seventeen closely printed pages of variations between the first two folio editions of 1611. These give a startling revelation of the haste and carelessness with which these issues were printed. They also show us how free the first editors and printers were to change the text and spelling of the English of their day. For students of English classics we have here a new usable tool; and for Bible students who interest themselves about the English of the King James Version, and its relation to the earlier English versions, Dr. Wright has prepared a most welcome piece of apparatus.

HAGEN, MARTIN. *Lexicon Biblicum.* [Cursus Scripturae Sacrae, Auctoribus R. CORNELY, I. KNABENBAUER, FR. DE HUMMELAUER aliisque Soc. Jesu presbyteris.] 3 vols., cols. 3382. Paris: Lethielleux, 1905-11. Fr. 46.

The great Jesuit Cursus Scripturae Sacrae, dedicated to Pius X, includes among its introductory books (*Libri Introductorii*) a *Lexicon Biblicum*. This is not a dictionary of the Latin Vulgate, nor precisely a Bible dictionary, although it shows some of the characteristics of each. It is printed in Latin and exhibits the Vulgate forms of proper names, institutions, and subjects. Matters of introduction are not specifically covered by it, being treated in special volumes of the Cursus, but all places, persons, classes, institutions, doctrines, animals, plants, etc., mentioned in Scripture, are discussed in concise and careful articles. The longer articles are followed by bibliographies of important books and articles, Catholic and non-Catholic, and many are signed by Fonck or Knabenbauer. The last remark in Vol. II, that Myra must be read instead of (Vulg.) Lystra, in Acts 27:5, shows a hopeful attitude with reference to the Vulgate text. The dictionary exhibits great learning, especially in technical lines, but the historical and theological treatments will seem to critical students often mechanical and external. There are some excellent tables, maps, and



plans, and in general the work does credit to the learned order which prepared it. It is of especial interest as an index of the opinion of the best Roman Catholic scholarship of the day upon a host of biblical matters.

KENT, CHARLES FOSTER. *The Great Teachers of Judaism and Christianity*. New York: Eaton & Mains, 1911. 166 pages. \$0.75.

The reviewer's estimate of this little book is indicated by the circumstance that upon examining it he at once adopted it as a textbook in the Bible class of a preparatory school which he is teaching. It has grown out of lectures given by the author, and is designed especially for Sunday-school workers. Professor Kent's services in popularizing the results of sound biblical scholarship are well known, and his reputation will be enhanced by this little volume. Its special excellence is in its striking correlation of the teaching of Bible times with modern religious education movement.

#### OLD TESTAMENT

CASPARI, WILHELM. *Vorstellung und Wort "Friede" im Alten Testament*. [Beiträge zur Förderung christlicher Theologie. 14ter Jahrgang, 1910. 4tes Heft.] Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1910. 168 pages. M. 3.

The friends of international peace in general and the student of the Old Testament in particular will be glad to read *Vorstellung und Wort "Friede" im Alten Testament*. The idea of "peace" as such, irrespective of the word used to denote it, is canvassed in the Old and New Testaments and in the literature of the Grecian Jews and in the real post-exilic Zechariah. The three kinds of peace that the Old Testament yields are: (1) that in nature (Isa. 11:6-9); (2) the peace of nations, an original-prophetic conception, especially religious; and (3) the peace of God. The bulk of the book, however, is a study of the Hebrew word שָׁלוֹם, and its ground-form, or root. For the peace-idea in the Old Testament there is no single word in use. This may have been due to the fact that "peace" for a settled people meant a different thing from "peace" for nomads. So that with Israel's settlement in Canaan the peace-idea underwent a change, and this changing condition became a continuous one as Israel's national character changed. שָׁלוֹם may be studied as well from its opposites (cf. Jer. 29:11; 38:4; Isa. 45:7) as from the context in which it is used. Its significance concerns our conception of God (I Kings 2:33; Isa. 45:7; Mal. 2:6) as much as the Israelitish nation. It likewise has a personal as well as a public meaning. And by no means least of all is its religious significance. In Jer. 4:10, 14:13 it is used as the opposite of war—not a usual meaning of this word. Caspari has done an industrious and useful piece of work, that will aid both the lexicographer and the student of Old Testament religion.

MÜLLER, GOTTLIEB. *Studien zum Text der Psalmen*. [Beiträge zur Förderung christlicher Theologie. Herausgegeben von A. Schlatter und W. Lütgert. 14ter Jahrgang, 1910, 2tes Heft.] Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1910. 77 pages. M. 1.80.

Those who work with the original text of the Psalms will thank Müller for his *Studies*. The Septuagint is the main source of helpful readings. Following these the author puts most confidence in Bæthgen's *Psalmen* (3d ed.). He also uses the works of Wellhausen, Gunkel, and Duhm. Notes are given to verses in thirty-eight psalms. But the treatments are distinctly conservative. There is almost an entire absence

of arbitrary handling of the Massoretic text, or of rash emendations, or of excision of words to satisfy the requirements of a metrical theory.

LEHMANN-HAUPT, C. F. *Die Geschichte Judas und Israels im Rahmen der Weltgeschichte*. [Religionsgeschichtliche Volksbücher, herausgegeben von F. M. Schiele. II. Reihe, 1. und 6. Heft.] Tübingen: Mohr, 1911. 95 pages. M. 1.

Readers who expect to find a new work in Lehmann-Haupt's *Die Geschichte Judas und Israels im Rahmen der Weltgeschichte* will be disappointed. It gives us the first eight of the twelve chapters which make up his large work, *Israel: Seine Entwicklung im Rahmen der Weltgeschichte*. A torso is thus the result, since Israel's history is cut off at the fall of Jerusalem in 586 B.C. The tables of chronology, indexes, and the one map are also lacking. Lehmann-Haupt's vivacious style and his clear German sentences are a delight in contrast with some of the involved, prosaic, and doubly complex methods of expression employed by some of the most prolific writers on similar themes.

KÖNIG, EDUARD. *Babylonien und die Deutung des Alten Testaments*. [Für Gottes Wort und Luther's Lehr: Biblischer Volksbücher herausgegeben von Johann Rump. Reihe III. Heft 9.] Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1911. 84 pages. M. 0.60.

The controversy of a few years ago in Germany over the so-called "Babel-Bibel" question finds its echo in König's brochure, *Babylonien und die Deutung des Alten Testaments*. The author pits himself against such writers as Jeremias and Winckler, and vigorously maintains that Israel was not a little Babylonia; nor did she borrow her chief characteristics, her religion, and the spiritual elements of her history from Babylonia. While recognizing large acquisitions from Babylon, he is a champion of Israel's unique features, as over against the so-called pan-Babylonianism.

STRACK, H. L. *Hebräische Grammatik mit Übungsbuch*. Zehnte und elfte, sorgfältig verbesserte und vermehrte Auflage. [Clavis linguarum semiticarum, Pars I.] München: Beck, 1911. xii+288 pages. M. 4.

Strack's Hebrew grammar has been before the German public for almost thirty years. The fact that it has reached its tenth edition testifies to the hearty appreciation that has been accorded it and likewise to the author's praiseworthy desire to keep his book abreast of the most recent scholarship. The changes made in this latest addition are relatively unimportant, the chief one being the inclusion of a brief section on noun-formations. The chief virtues of the grammar are its clearness and its elimination of details. It is therefore well adapted to the use of students beginning the study of the Hebrew language.

STRACK, H. L. *Grammatik des biblisch-aramäischen, mit den nach Handschriften berichtigten Texten und einem Wörterbuch*. Fünfte, teilweise neubearbeitete Auflage. [Clavis linguarum semiticarum, Pars IV.] München: Beck, 1911. 100 pages. M. 2.50.

This fifth edition of Strack's well-known and much-used summary of the grammar of biblical Aramaic is distinguished from its predecessors chiefly by the use that has

been made of the papyri from Assuan and Elephantine. These texts have furnished a great deal of illustrative matter both for vocabulary, paradigms, and syntax. By the incorporation of this new material, Strack's grammar has become the best existing manual on biblical Aramaic.

*Die Schriften des Alten Testaments in Auswahl neu übersetzt und für die Gegenwart erklärt.* VON GRESSMANN, GUNKEL, *et al.* Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1911. Lieferungen 9 and 10. 180 pages. M. 1.60.

In the ninth *Lieferung*, Gressmann continues the exposition of the Psalms begun in earlier parts. Those treated here are classified as prayers of thanksgiving and prayers of petition, both private and public. The exposition is fresh and suggestive along many lines. The tenth *Lieferung* begins a new volume of the work to be devoted to the great prophets of Israel. The beginning of Isaiah's activity is treated here by Hans Schmidt. He holds that a large inheritance of semitic mythology was taken over by the prophets and incorporated into their teachings. Isaiah's Immanuel-prophecy is a case in point. Isaiah in the presence of Ahaz becomes subject to a trance or vision, in which he sees the young woman to whom he refers and the wonder child who is to be born and fulfil Israel's messianic expectations. But if Immanuel is to be identified with the Messiah, how account for the evidently unpleasant character of the tidings from the point of view of Ahaz? In two ways: first, the messianic deliverance will not come until after the Assyrian scourge has swept over the land; second, the news that the messianic king was in sight would be no more agreeable to Ahaz as occupant of the throne than legend reports the story of the wise men to have been to Herod, the king. New interpretations such as this at least arouse interest and stimulate thought. German scholarship is to be congratulated upon having a public sufficiently intelligent and interested in biblical matters to create a demand for a popular commentary exhibiting so high a grade of scholarship as this series is presenting.

GLAZEBROOK, M. G. *Studies in the Book of Isaiah.* Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1910. xix+349 pages.

This book is the product of a course of popular lectures given by the author at Bristol and at Norwich in England. The style of direct address is carried over from the lectures into the book. It makes easy and interesting reading. The author's standpoint is that of the modern school of interpretation. For the most part he is content to assume that standpoint without wasting time upon its defense. His critical conclusions are determined for him largely by Duhamel and Marti. The prophecies are considered by him in four sections: (1) those of Isaiah himself, (2) anonymous oracles from the exile, (3) deutero-Isaiah=chaps. 40-55, (4) trito-Isaiah=chaps. 56-66. The lectures are expository in character and refrain from the discussion of technicalities. A new translation arranged in strophic form illustrates the text. Probably no volume of its size is better adapted to the purpose of informing the average man as to the meaning and purpose of the Book of Isaiah as it is interpreted by the scholarship of today.

## NEW TESTAMENT

SHELDON, H. C. *New Testament Theology*. New York: Macmillan, 1911. viii+364 pages. \$1.50 net.

This book seems designed primarily to meet the needs of the general reader. Critical discussions are kept in the background, while attention is centered upon the statement of the author's positive conclusions. These are in the main of a distinctly conservative type. The presentation is a clear and intelligent statement of the more commonly considered phases of New Testament thought, treated under the conventional theological captions. The task of "New Testament Theology" is taken to be an exposition of the ideas of the various writers of the New Testament books, consequently there is little of value here for one who wishes to approach this study from the side of the religious life of the time. It can hardly be said that the author is very careful to distinguish between the theology of the evangelists and the thinking of Jesus. This is perhaps due to a tendency to confuse the historical Jesus with the Christ of early faith.

D'ALMA, J. *Philon d'Alexandrie et le quatrième évangile*. Avec une préface de P. SAINTYVES. Paris: Nourty, 1910. viii+119 pages. Fr. 1.25.

In brief compass, yet with considerable minuteness, the points of resemblance between Philonic thought and the Fourth Gospel are displayed. These are seen in the conceptions of God the Father, the Logos, the Spirit, and the like. So extensive a dependence upon Alexandrian thought in this gospel may be doubtful, yet many of the points here advanced demand serious consideration.

STEINMANN, A. *Die Sklavenfrage in der alten Kirche. Eine historisch-exegetische Betrachtung über die soziale Frage im Urchristentum*. [Sonderabdruck aus der wissenschaftlichen Beilage zur Germania, 1910, Nr. 8-12.] Berlin: Druck der Germania, 1910. 55 pages.

Although slavery no longer exists among civilized peoples, the author thinks modern conditions exhibit a state of society similar to that of ancient times when men enslaved their fellows; the social status of the lower classes today is essentially that of the ancient slaves. Modern interest in social problems is taken as the justification for investigating the attitude of the early church toward slavery. Three main topics are treated: slavery at the time of early Christianity, Christianity and the lower classes, the position of the slave in the primitive church. The result is a collection of the principal data from the original sources, with frequent references to the opinions of modern writers. The conclusion reached is already familiar to students of the subject. Christians took no revolutionary attitude toward contemporary social conditions. They aimed primarily to free men's spirits and to inculcate the ideal of love as a guide for conduct in all human relationships. Just what this line of study has to offer, in a practical way, for the solution of modern issues is not indicated with any degree of fulness.

BRUSTON, CH. *Fragments d'anciens évangiles récemment retrouvés*. Paris: Fischbacher, 1909. 78 pages.

It is slightly misleading to apply "recently discovered" to all the material edited in this pamphlet. Even the editing is not all done recently. The first twenty pages appeared in the year 1898 as *Les paroles de Jésus récemment découvertes en Égypte*.

To this three pages of "corrections" are now appended. The second section was published in 1905 under the title *Fragments d'un ancien recueil de paroles de Jésus*. Here the editor reprints the fragments he edited in 1898, and adds two other so-called Oxyrhyncus fragments and the Fayum fragment. The remaining pages are of more recent interest. They contain the "Fragment of an uncanonical gospel from Oxyrhyncus," published by Grenfell and Hunt in 1908, and the conclusion of the Gospel of Mark as found in the manuscript lately brought to America by Mr. Freer. In each case the Greek text is accompanied by the editor's notes and a French translation. The last mentioned fragment from Oxyrhyncus belonged, in the editor's opinion, to the Gospel of the Egyptians, and the difficult  $\alpha \mu \eta \epsilon \omega \nu$  in the newly discovered conclusion of Mark is read  $\theta \mu \eta \epsilon \psi \eta$  (optative), *ce qui ne permettrait pas*.

*Évangiles Apocryphes*, Tome I. [Textes et Documents pour l'étude historique du christianisme.] Protévangile de Jacques, Pseudo-Matthieu.

*Évangile de Thomas*. Textes annotés et traduits par CHARLES MICHEL. Histoire de Joseph le Charpentier. Rédactions Copte et Arabe traduites et annotées par P. PEETERS. Paris: Picard, 1911. xl+255 pages.

The introduction deals with problems of date, authorship, manuscripts, etc. The *Protevangeliium* of James, Pseudo-Matthew and the Gospel of Thomas are printed with the Greek or Latin text (as the case may be) on one page and a French rendering opposite, while the History of Joseph the Carpenter is given only in translation. These documents may not be of great value or interest, yet it is gratifying to have them made so easily accessible.

HOLLMANN, G. *Welche Religion hatten die Juden, als Jesus auftrat?* [Religionsgeschichtliche Volksbücher, I. Reihe. 7. Heft.] Tübingen: Mohr, 1910. 64 pages. M. 1; geb. M. 1.30.

The second edition of this concise and popular summary of Jewish religion in Jesus' day is substantially a reproduction of the first edition, which was translated into English in 1909. Though written for the laity in the first instance, as a reliable survey of the main phases of the subject it may also be of service to the specialist.

BRANDT, W. *Jüdische Reinheitslehre und ihre Beschreibung in den Evangelien*. (Beihefte zur Zeitschrift für die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft, XIX.) Giessen: Töpelmann, 1910. viii+64 pages. M. 2.70.

This brochure is valuable especially for the fulness of its citations from Jewish sources as shedding light upon the gospel references to Jewish practices of ceremonial purification. Brandt concludes that the discussions recorded in the gospels primarily represent the interest of the early church, and that the questions which interested the evangelists had not really become issues in Jesus' time. He had spoken of moral rather than of ritual cleanliness and uncleanness.

DE LE ROI, JOH. *Neujüdische Stimmen über Jesum Christum*. (Schriften des Institutum Judaicum in Berlin, Nr. 39.) Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1910. 54 pages. M. 0.75.

Readers are here given an interesting collection of opinions about Jesus, expressed by more or less well-known modern representatives of Judaism in Germany, Austro-Hungary, Switzerland, France, Italy, Great Britain, Sweden, Russia, and North

America. As might be expected, the opinions vary widely in character but it is interesting to note how many Jews hold Jesus in high esteem as one of the noblest of Israel's sons. We doubt whether the compiler of the pamphlet is justified in seeing in this growing attitude of appreciation evidence that the Jewish nation is nearer than formerly to acknowledging Jesus as "my Lord and my God."

SWETE, HENRY BARCLAY. *The Ascended Christ: A Study in the Earliest Christian Teaching*. London: Macmillan, 1910. xv+168 pages. \$0.80 net.

Mysticism is certainly a permanent and indispensable element in a normal and wholesome religious life, and this book will prove helpful to those who have the same presuppositions as the author. But what we may call its psychology will render it "impossible" for many others. The author's well-known scholarship and his earnest religious spirit command respect.

BUCHANAN, E. S. *The Four Gospels from the Codex Veronensis (b)*. Being the first complete edition of the Evangelium Purpureum in the Cathedral Library at Verona. With an introduction descriptive of the MS and two facsimiles. [Old Latin Biblical Texts: No. VI.] Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1911. xxiii and 198 pages. 21s. net.

Of the extant manuscripts of the Old Latin gospels, the Codex Veronensis (b) is among the oldest and best. It was written early in the fifth century and has probably always been at Verona, where it is the chief treasure of the cathedral library. Of its 418 leaves twenty-five have been lost and seven corroded away by the ink. The manuscript is written on purple-dyed parchment in silver and gold letters. It contains the four gospels in the characteristic Latin order, Matthew, John, Luke, Mark. It is at the end of Mark that damp has so injured the writing. The text was first edited by Bianchini in 1749, and his work has been twice reprinted. Mr. Buchanan publishes the text in full, line for line and column by column, prefacing it with a short introduction describing the manuscript and its correctors, and discussing its type of text. His publication is a notable addition to the Old Latin materials of textual study, for while Bianchini published most of the manuscript, Mr. Buchanan has been able to decipher ten more leaves in whole or in part than Bianchini printed, and moreover the recent reprint of Bianchini's edition is, in Mr. Buchanan's opinion, not wholly trustworthy. It is a matter of interest to have the full text of a Latin gospels of the age of Jerome thus made fully and freshly accessible. Mr. Buchanan's English is not always above reproach. It is confusing to read that "The other leaves that are missing were missing when first numbered" (p. viii). His views on the value of the Old Syriac are rather too strongly put (p. xx).

---

#### PATRISTIC

GRAPIN, ÉMILE. *Eusèbe: Histoire Ecclésiastique, Livres v-viii. Texte grec et traduction française*. [Textes et documents pour l'étude historique du Christianisme.] Paris: Picard, 1911. 554 pages. Fr. 5.

The second part of Grapin's convenient edition of the *Church History* of Eusebius contains books v to viii in Greek and French, with a few pages of textual and historical notes. The text does not differ importantly from that of the recent

Berlin edition (Schwartz), but the French version, which occupies the right-hand page, will, at least in France, facilitate the consultation of the original. The indices are postponed to the end of Vol. III.

HILL, J. HAMLYN. *The Earliest Life of Christ Ever Compiled from the Four Gospels*. Being the Diatessaron of Tatian (ca. A.D. 160). Literally translated from the Arabic Version and containing the Four Gospels Woven into One Story. With an Introduction and Notes. 2d ed., abridged. Edinburgh: Clark, 1910. Imported by Scribner. xv+224 pages. \$1.25.

The new edition of the English Diatessaron will be welcomed by many. Mr. Hill's translation is less literal than that of Professor Hogg, being over-influenced by Ciasca's Vulgate Latin rendering of Tatian. Hill's introduction is a useful presentation of the probable origin and history of the Diatessaron, although it is very far from certain that the separate gospels existed in Syriac before the appearance of the Diatessaron (p. xi), and very improbable that Tatian meant his work to be used along with them (p. xiv). That the Diatessaron was composed "about A.D. 160" (p. v) is unlikely. But the presentation of the Diatessaron in English, with marginal references showing the careful interweaving of the Four Gospels throws important light upon the critical and literary processes of the second century and deserves attention from all students of early Christian literature.

#### CHURCH HISTORY

ZEGARSKI, TEOFIL. *Polen und das Basler Konzil*. Posen. Verlags-Druckerei "Praga," 1910. 77 pages.

This is an inaugural dissertation presented to the philosophical faculty at the University of Freiburg. It traces the connection of Poland with the various stages of the Council of Basel. The result is that Poland returns to obedience to the Roman pope, 1447-49.

HUMBERT, L'ABBÉ AUGUSTE. *Les origines de la théologie moderne*. I. "La renaissance de l'antiquité chrétienne (1450-1521)." Paris: Lecoffre, 1911. 356 pages. Fr. 3.50.

In this volume Abbé Humbert has given us from the Roman Catholic point of view the first part of what promises to be a very interesting discussion. This first part deals with the revival of Christian antiquity in the period between 1450 and 1521. It treats of the traditional lines of influence, such as the Rule of Faith, the Scriptures and the Fathers, the Scholastic Theology from the Sources, the attempt at Theological Reform in the Middle Ages, Contemplative Knowledge and Discursive Science, The Bible and Mysticism, The French Mystical School and Its Conception of Theology. Among the precursors are Wycliffe and the Lollards, and the German biblical theologians of the fifteenth century, Wessel and Goch. A long and interesting chapter is given to the New Science in which the influence of the Italian Humanists, John Colet, Jacques Lefevre and Reuchlin figure prominently. Then especially through the influence of Erasmus, scholasticism is displaced by a Christian philosophy. Another chapter discusses the relations of St. Jerome, Reuchlin, Erasmus, Mutian, Cajetan, Melanchthon, Augustine, and Luther, and so we are led up to the Wittenberg theology.

ODHNEN, CARL THEOPHILUS. *Michael Servetus—His Life and Teachings*. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1910. 96 pages. \$0.50.

Under this pretentious title the author has had published a little volume of less than one hundred pages. There is need, indeed, for an impartial and scientific treatment in the English language of the life and teachings of Michael Servetus. But one does not have to read many pages of the work under consideration in order to discover that it lacks both impartiality and scientific character. Throughout the book the author writes as the zealous advocate and apologist for Servetus in opposition to the latter's contemporary critics and calumniators. And why this zeal in behalf of Servetus? Because the author believes Servetus to have been a forerunner of Swedenborg, the founder of the "New Church," of which sect the author is an adherent. In fact, the main purpose of the author is to point out the similarity of Servetus' teachings to those of Swedenborg—the latter half of the volume consisting chiefly of selections from Servetus' writings set over against sentences from the pen of Swedenborg. The author, indeed, adduces considerable evidence in support of such a similarity of teaching, presenting thus a study in comparative theology which will be of interest to students in this field of investigation.

A further serious defect of the work is the scarcity of references to the sources of his biographical material.

WARING, LUTHER HESS. *The Political Theories of Martin Luther*. New York: Putnam, 1910. 293 pages. \$1.50.

It has long been recognized that the religious revolution of the sixteenth century inaugurated by Martin Luther affected profoundly the subsequent political development of western Europe. Not until comparatively recent years, however, has the attention of scholars been directed toward Luther's specific teachings, ideas, or theories regarding such questions as the origin of the state; the relation of church and state; the functions of the state, and the like. During the last two decades a considerable number of works have appeared dealing with various phases of Luther's activity and influence in the sphere of politics, several of which are devoted to a presentation of Luther's political theories as such.

Dr. Waring seems to have been utterly ignorant of the fact that others had preceded him. Neither in his bibliography nor in the text of his work is there the slightest reference to these researches of foreign scholars. Obviously, therefore, the book is seriously defective in its scholarship and can claim little respect from trained historians.

Dr. Waring has not confined himself closely to his theme, but has given us rather a summary, by means of quotations, of opinions concerning government, mentioning, almost incidentally, the political theories of Luther. It should be added, that, in the opinion of the reviewer, Dr. Waring has grasped and presented correctly Luther's essential political principles.

VON SCHUBERT, DR. HANS. *Reich und Reformation*. Tübingen: Mohr, 1911. 48 pages. M. 1.

This essay originated in an address delivered by Dr. von Schubert, prorector of the University of Heidelberg, in connection with the annual festival held to celebrate the founding of the university. Dr. von Schubert is the editor of the latest edition



of Moeller's well-known *History of the Christian Church* and the author of a widely used manual of church history.

Impressed by the fact that toleration may be easily destroyed, and by the effect of religious division in complicating Germany's economic and political problems, he approaches the Reformation with the question whether the imperial government did not at least make a start in the preservation of religious unity. Had the central government solved the religious problem for the whole nation, instead of leaving it to the various local governments for settlement, intellectual and spiritual unity might have been preserved in Germany. He finds that between 1522 and 1524 there was an increasingly strong party in Diet and *Reichsregiment* which desired the settlement of the religious question by an imperial law with uniform provisions for the entire empire. This plan failed, and by 1526 the question had to be referred to individual princes for settlement as they pleased. Religious reform was thus removed from the domain of the central, imperial government and placed within the jurisdiction of the local authorities, princes and cities. Even this situation did not make religious unity hopeless, however, for had the Emperor used force, the evangelical princes might have been coerced into the acceptance of the old faith, at least in a modified form. The reference of the religious question to the princes and cities was, of course, a concession to particularism and thus destroyed religious unity in Germany, but it saved Protestantism, for the imperial government would have acted only in favor of the old church.

---

#### DOCTRINAL

BORNHAUSEN, KARL. *Der religiöse Wahrheitsbegriff in der Philosophie Rudolf Euckens*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1910. 63 pages. M. 1.60.

The philosophical works of Eucken have had a great vogue in Germany during the last few years, and more recently are being widely read in translation in England and in this country. Eucken has gathered about him many enthusiastic followers; and this new philosophic school, at once strongly idealistic, speculative, and religious, has become perhaps the most noteworthy movement in contemporary German philosophy. Its strong religious emphasis has naturally been welcomed by most theologians; but closer study is convincing many of them that Eucken's philosophy, however inspiring and influential it may be in turning the currents of German philosophic thought more strongly toward idealism and religion, has as a system of thought comparatively little to contribute to the philosophy of religion. This monograph, by one of the younger associates of Herrmann and the neo-Kantian philosophers at Marburg, represents this point of view. It approaches Eucken's philosophy on the side on which it is most open to criticism—its theory of knowledge. Reviewing its historical antecedents and affinities, the author finds them much more in the speculative system of Plotinus, Spinoza, Fichte, and Hegel than in the critical philosophy of Kant. Turning then to Eucken's epistemology and particularly to his conception of truth, Bornhausen finds it hazy, indefinite, and speculative, a philosophy of word and emotion rather than of critical thought, which in no realm does justice to the individuality and concreteness of truth. In the realm of religion he thinks this uncritical "universalizing" of truth particularly dangerous, because it obscures the individuality of all true religious experience, and tends to identify religion with philo-

sophical speculation. Finally, the author outlines his own concept of truth and its place in ethics and religion, following in general neo-Kantian lines. The monograph is important for any thorough and critical study of Eucken's philosophy.

GISS, AUGUST J. *Die menschliche Geistestätigkeit in der Weltentwicklung*. Eine kritisch-philosophische Betrachtung des menschlichen Geistes; mit Anwendung der Principien auf die Entwicklung der menschlichen Gesellschaft. Band 1. Leipzig: Deichert (Georg Böhme), 1910. xvii + 278 pages.

The author presents a critique of the Kantian philosophy as the foundation of his thesis. He finds in the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* a confusion of pure idealism and what he terms a thoroughgoing criticism. In the second edition Kant endeavored to eliminate the confusion by his refutations of idealism but with scant success. The task of a critique is twofold: to determine the limits of knowledge for the subject and to regard the object of knowledge as of secondary importance. Kant's contradictions follow from his failure to observe this. In the *Dialektik* Kant treated only the individual and failed to recognize the social element as did Hegel. The result of the author's criticism of Kant is a developmental theory of knowledge, in which subjectivism forms an essential part and which is based upon faith in an unchangeable order. The *Ding an sich* is replaced by a thought-world. All activity of the soul involves co-operation which forms the ideal of spiritual development and arises out of a spiritual history. This theory of development is applied by the author to the philosophy of science involving, as it does, a consideration of the Kantian concept of Nature. The question of the finality of a given stage of a development leads to the analysis of the state and of the church as institutions exhibiting development. In the case of the church successive aims are discoverable; the institution itself, a man who is the symbol of that which is higher in life, or the belief in a Higher Being to which the institution is a minister. The historical analysis brings us down to the time of Christ. So far from criticism destroying the essence of religion, it rather establishes it and discovers that religion is empirically the expression of something deep in the soul. The argument shows keen analysis and is important in its emphasis on the onward push of the soul and on the social element in all progress, even religious.

LOBSTEIN, P. *An Introduction to Protestant Dogmatics*. 2d ed. Translated by A. M. Smith. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1910. 298 pages. \$1.62.

One is glad to see that a second edition of this valuable little book has been called for. Perhaps nowhere can the English reader find in so brief compass a better exposition of the fundamentals of the Ritschlian position. One may not agree with the author at all points, but no preacher or theologian can fail to profit from a careful perusal of the volume.

KREYHER, JOHANNES. *Zur Philosophie der Offenbarung*. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1910. 238 pages.

This is a collection of essays in apologetics, which undertake to defend against various modern scientific and philosophical theories what is taken to be the content of a supernatural revelation, viz., the older orthodox interpretation of the scriptural doctrines of the being and attributes of God, of the world and man, of redemption and the way of salvation, and of the last things.

MONTGOMERY, G. R. *The Unexplored Self*. An Introduction to Christian Doctrine for Teachers and Students. New York: Putnam, 1910. 249 pages. \$1.25.

This well-meant but not very convincing volume contains some suggestive thoughts and expresses throughout a genial, liberal, and yet vital faith. Perhaps it is the author's apprenticeship as a newspaper correspondent that explains his "snappy" but scrappy style and the appetizing character of his headlines as compared with the frequently disappointing character of the paragraphs. The book is better in conception than in execution, and one cannot but doubt its value with reference to the purpose indicated in the sub-title. Still, it has some suggestive thoughts which are worth more than the price of the volume.

CHAMPION, J. B. *The Living Atonement*. Philadelphia: Griffith and Rowland Press, 1910. 346 pages. \$1.25.

Mr. Champion holds that reconciliation is not the full meaning of atonement; repentance and forgiveness do not exhaust the whole ethical necessity. Atonement is the righting of a moral wrong, a work which was accomplished by Christ, through his sinless identification with sin and suffering therefor. In consenting to the sin of his crucifixion—a sin which brought the sin of the world to a head—Christ became identified with sin. But this identification was sinless because Christ saw in his crucifixion an event willed by God the Father, because of the redemptive value it was to have. Still, the identification with sin incapacitated the Son for communion with the Father, as was shown by his cry of dereliction on the cross. Because of the identification, however, when Christ died, sin died actually and potentially; and so the sin of the crucifixion was transformed into a power of righteousness. Thus Christ's death made him atonement.

If there is here any coherent theory of the atonement, it is doubtless in some respects a new one, and yet it is not very surprising that its novel elements should not have occurred to anyone before. But is it not a pity that so much ingenuity should be wasted in the vain attempt to solve the problem as to how the wrong of past sin can be made right? Is it not forever a wrong that cannot be undone? And are not the only practical and the only soluble questions how to lead the sinner to repentance, reconciliation with God and righteousness, and how to counteract the evil effect of his past sin?

SNOWDEN, JAMES H. *The Basal Beliefs of Christianity*. New York: Macmillan, 1911. ix+252 pages. \$1.50 net.

"The present volume is an attempt to state the basal beliefs of Christianity in a form for popular readers. It touches lightly on deep and difficult matters and emphasizes the broad and practical aspects of Christian facts and faith. . . . The book of course contains nothing new and only aims to give new expression to old truths. It is not intended for theologians or ministers, but mainly for lay readers, Sabbath-school teachers and Christian workers."

These words from the author's preface adequately describe the book.

MAINS, GEORGE PRESTON. *Modern Thought and Traditional Faith*. New York: Eaton & Mains, 1911. xxi+279 pages. \$1.50 net.

The significance of this book is that the author is a high official of the Methodist Episcopal church, a man of extended reputation as pastor, preacher, and book agent,

who enjoys the confidence of ministry and laity. His spirit is all that could be desired. He believes that "the fruits of biblical criticism as handed over to the church have been winnowed and gathered by devout, consecrated, and most capable Christian minds."

"The question of criticism fundamentally is one of immeasurably greater importance than that of disturbing or failing to disturb the favored notions of an unscholarly belief. It is a question of so addressing Christian truth to the high-school and university-bred young life of the present world as to command both their intelligence and their conscience. . . . But such disturbance would better occur a thousand times over than the persistent attempt to bind the church to views which the educated mind of the age has not only outgrown, but which it utterly rejects."

The author's bibliography contains only English titles. He appears not to have reckoned with some of the harder and more profound books. Dr. Mains has our sympathy on account of the unhappy "Introduction" contributed by another; it does not represent the author's own attitude.

---

#### COMPARATIVE RELIGION

DE GROOT, J. J. M. *The Religion of the Chinese*. New York: Macmillan, 1910. viii+230 pages. \$1.25.

Dr. de Groot is the author of the standard work on *The Religious System of China*, a massive treatment in 6 vols., containing in the five volumes issued about 2,500 royal octavo pages. There can be no question therefore of his competency to furnish a convenient summary of the religious beliefs and practices of China such as the present volume contains. In seven chapters he treats the animism, demonism, belief in specters, ancestral cult, Taoism, and Buddhism of the Middle Kingdom, and that from the standpoint of present practice. While much of the history of Chinese religion is necessarily included, the discussion is not concerned with origins in the sense of the period earlier than Confucius. The question, e.g., of an original monotheism is not definitely raised. The author asserts, however, that "there is no reason to doubt that (the present system apart from Buddhism) is the first religion the Chinese race ever had" (p. 2), and implicitly this (rightly) denies original monotheism. The discussion is simple and utterly without pedantry, luminous, and straightforward—one of the "good little books."

JORDAN, LOUIS HENRY. *Comparative Religion: A Survey of Its Recent Literature*. 2d section, 1906-1909. Edinburgh: Otto Schulze & Co., 1910. 72 pages.

Mr. Jordan's service to the science of religion is continuous and noteworthy. Possessing splendid linguistic accomplishments, he has ample qualifications for a survey of the literature of the subject. To these he adds a spirit of appreciation as well as of gentle criticism which knows no school and no antagonisms, provided the aim be to enlarge the acquisitions of truth. In the present issue he notices and characterizes briefly twenty-five books, brochures, or pamphlets (among them two of his own). In the footnotes useful pointers to other recent literature are given, and in the discussion not merely are the excellences and defects of the books and

methods of treatment discriminately stated, but tendencies and lines of investigation are set forth.

A worker in this field will find Mr. Jordan's judgments well worth weighing, even if the decision (as will sometimes happen) goes against him.

#### MISCELLANEOUS

WARD, HARRY F. (Editor). *Social Ministry*. An Introduction to the Study and Practice of Social Service. Edited for the Methodist Federation for Social Service. New York: Eaton & Mains, 1910. 318 pages. \$1.00.

This volume can hardly be better defined than by its subtitle. It attempts "to sketch in broad outline the historical basis of our social service movement and the problems raised by the industrial organization of life, then to discuss more specific forms of social service by those whose lifework has been given to them." The twelve chapters are contributed by as many different writers, some of whom are Methodist ministers and professors, while others are leaders in social work of national reputation. Among the outstanding chapters are those by President George E. Vincent on "The Industrial Revolution"; by Miss Mary E. McDowell, of the University of Chicago Settlement, on "The Helpless in Industry," and by Dr. Edward T. Devine on "Constructive Philanthropy." The book is made particularly valuable for ministers by two chapters on "The Organization of a Church for Social Ministry," and "Social Service in the Rural Church," which are evidently born out of actual experience. The comprehensiveness of all the subjects considered makes their treatment necessarily general and popular; but just on this account the book should serve as a most helpful introduction to the modern social problem, and to the most hopeful methods for its solution.

*Fünfter Weltkongress für freies Christentum und religiösen Fortschritt*. Berlin: 5 bis 10 August, 1910. Protokoll der Verhandlungen. Herausgegeben von Max Fischer und Friedrich Michael Schiele. Berlin: Schöneberg; Protestantischer Schriftenvertrieb, G. m. b. H., 1911. 813 pages. M. 7.50.

The congress of men who believe in modernist conceptions of Christianity, which met in Berlin last summer, constituted one of the significant marks of progress in the creation and extension of an *esprit de corps* among liberal thinkers. This complete report of the proceedings is of peculiar interest both as a historical document and as an aid to the clearer apprehension of modern problems. A splendid array of eminent names presents itself in the table of contents. The first general theme to which the congress addressed itself was the debt which the liberal movement in countries other than Germany owe to German theologians. Making all allowance for the courtesy which would lead to an exaltation of German influence, the statements of representatives of other nations reveal the extraordinary influence of German thought throughout the Protestant world.

The second general theme was "German Theology and the German Church." Among the contributors are Harnack, Gunkel, Dörner, Titius, Wobbermin, Troeltsch, and others. Some fundamental problems were considered and subjected to searching analysis. It is interesting to discover in nearly all of these addresses the clear recog-

nition of the fact that the empirical method of investigation makes impossible the retention of the older idea of a Christianity with a fixed authoritative content. But the religious experience of the speakers usually demanded some "absolute," some "permanent" or "eternal" basis; and the aim in most cases was to discover some such "absolute" which should be compatible with the empirical attitude of scientific inquiry. This would seem to indicate that the liberal theology is in the difficult position of trying to serve two masters. So long as religious confidence depends upon an "absolute," the more dogmatic assertions of orthodoxy will better meet the demand. Liberalism can develop a consistently strong position only as a basis of faith shall be discovered which shall be frankly harmonious with the empirical spirit instead of striving to retain a shadow of the older absolutism. However, the open-minded attitude of the participants gives promise that in the near future this central problem will be more clearly apprehended. The establishment of an "absolute" in most cases is an excursus in the interests of a conservative religious sentiment rather than a direct development of the discussion.

The third general theme considered the mutual relations of religious bodies both within and without Christianity. The irenic spirit of these addresses is heartening to those who wish to see co-operation between religions and churches.

The most important addresses of the congress have been translated into English and are published in pamphlet form by Williams & Norgate. A translation of the entire proceedings also appears from the same press.

MOORE, A. W. *Pragmatism and Its Critics*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1910. ix+283 pages. \$1.36.

In the first four chapters of this volume, Professor Moore states "the issue between pragmatism and its critics" and then gives a brief historical account of the "rise of absolutism," the "difficulties" involved, and the "rise of pragmatism" itself. He continues his discussion by giving an exposition of "how ideas work" from the pragmatic point of view, and then in the remaining seven chapters republishes from various philosophical journals, papers, modified at times, in which he had on former occasions met the different groups of critics, for the most part realists and absolutists.

The many misinterpretations of the movement are clearly indicated and the essential features are restated and illustrated. The way is thus prepared for greater unanimity among pragmatists themselves, while the force of many unjust criticisms is diminished. One wishes to say, also, that the opponents, too, may be taken into camp and made to feel at home, but one may hardly expect that result. The book is especially valuable as a *résumé* of the entire pragmatic movement by one of the group skilled in the use of his opponents' weapons.

KERN, JOHN A. *A Study of Christianity as Organized; Its Ideas and Forms*. Nashville, Tenn.; Dallas, Tex.: M. E. Church South, 1910. xxxi+572 pages.

After forty-four years of active service in the Methodist Episcopal church Professor Kern publishes a volume of 572 pages embodying his experiences in Christianity as organized. His readings and reflections have extended far beyond the boundaries of his own denomination. There is meant to be no controversial spirit in the book. The author has taken pains to make himself familiar with other forms

of polity than his own. To make sure of his ground he has submitted portions of his manuscript touching central themes in other bodies to those who could speak with authority.

He has kept close to his subject: a study of Christianity as organized, showing the necessity of organization, the abuse of organization, and the great benefits of organization when properly directed and controlled. The student of church history will find that this work covers an essential part of his field. The different parts, chapters, and sections are arranged in the order of their development, and the logical connections are never lost sight of.

The book consists of three parts entitled "Brotherhood," "Office," and "Autonomy." The concluding chapter on "The Prophet in Administration" is an interesting discussion of "a certain personal qualification in one who would conduct successfully the business of organized Christianity."

**BUMPUS, JOHN S.** *A Dictionary of Ecclesiastical Terms.* Being a History and Explanation of Certain Terms Used in Architecture, Ecclesiology, Liturgiology, Music, Ritual, Cathedral Constitution, etc. Philadelphia: Lippincott; London: T. Werner Laurie, 1911. 324 pages. \$5.00.

We have spent several hours running through this dictionary, and we have seldom used time more pleasantly or profitably. To the mature churchman, trained from his youth up in ecclesiastical forms, the book will possibly seem commonplace. But for young churchmen we fancy that it will be found extremely helpful as containing in short the essentials of the forms he must observe and know.

By the Nonconformist who has inherited centuries of revolt against many of the ideas defined here the work will be welcomed as taking him by a short road to information that is now necessary to any well-educated man. Moreover, in these days when he is free from the necessity of conforming he will be able to go back to the heart of the idea that once pulsated with warm and vigorous life. And it will be surprising if, having the genuine historical sense, many of these old ideas do not find in his soul a generous response. The scope of the work is seen in the sub-title: "A History and Explanation of Certain Terms Used in Architecture, Ecclesiology, Liturgiology, Music, Ritual, Cathedral Constitution, etc."

## BOOKS RECEIVED

The more important books in this list will be reviewed at length.

### BIBLE

The Authorized Version of the English Bible, 1611. Edited by William Aldis Wright. 5 vols. Cambridge: The University Press, 1909. 20s. net; 4s. 6d. each.

Brown, John. The History of the English Bible. Cambridge: University Press; New York: Putnam, 1911. 136 pages. \$0.40.

Kent, Charles Foster. Biblical Geography and History. With Maps. New York: Scribner, 1911. xvii+296 pages. \$1.50.

Pollard, Alfred W. (editor). Records of the English Bible. The Documents Relating to the Translation and Publication of the Bible in English, 1525-1611. London: Frowde, 1911. xii+387 pages. 5s.

### OLD TESTAMENT AND ALLIED SUBJECTS

Bennett, W. H. The Moabite Stone. Edinburgh: Clark; New York: Scribner, 1911. 86 pages. \$1.00.

Die Schriften des Alten Testaments. 9 und 10 Lieferung edited by H. Gressmann, H. Gunkel, *et al.* Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1911.

Fiske, A. K. The Great Epic of Israel. The Web of Myth, Legend, History, Law, Oracle, Wisdom and Poetry of the Ancient Hebrews. New York: Sturgis & Walton, 1911. x+376 pages. \$1.50.

Hänel, Johannes. Die aussermassoretischen Übereinstimmungen zwischen der Septuaginta und der Peschitta in der Genesis. Giessen: Töpelmann, 1911. 87 pages. M. 3.60.

Kennett, Robert H. The Composition of the Book of Isaiah in the Light of History and Archaeology. The Schweich Lectures, 1909. London: Frowde, 1910. vi+94 pages. 3s.

King, E. G. Early Religious Poetry of the Hebrews. Cambridge: University Press; New York: Putnam, 1911. 156 pages. \$0.40.

König, Eduard. Babylonien und die Deutung des Alten Testaments. (Für Gottes Wort und Luthers Lehr!) Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1911. 84 pages. M. 0.60.

Lehmann-Haupt, C. F. Die Geschiehe Judas und Israels im Rahmen der Weltgeschichte. (Religionsgeschichtliche Volksbücher.) Tübingen: Mohr, 1911. 93 pages. M. 1.

Lehmann-Haupt, C. F. Israel, Seine Entwicklung im Rahmen der Weltgeschichte. Tübingen: Mohr, 1911. v+344 pages. M. 8.

Stonehouse, George G. V. The Book of Habakkuk. Introduction, Translation, and Notes on the Hebrew Text. London: Rivington, 1911. 264 pages. 5s.

Touzard, J. Comment utiliser l'argument prophétique. Paris: Bloud & Cie. 62 pages. Fr. 0.60.

Wight, Joseph K. The Beginning of Things in Nature and in Grace, or A Brief Commentary on Genesis. Boston: Sherman, French & Co., 1911. 188 pages. \$1.20.

Wright, William Aldis (editor). The Hexaplar Psalter, Being the Book of Psalms in Six English Versions. Cambridge: The University Press; New York: Putnam, 1911. 389 pages. \$8.

### NEW TESTAMENT AND PATRISTICS

Abbott, Edwin A. "The Son of Man," or Contributions to the Study of the Thoughts of Jesus. Cambridge: The University Press; New York: Putnam, 1910. lii+873 pages. 16s. 6d.

Blunt, A. W. F. (editor). The Apologies of Justin Martyr. (Cambridge Patristic Texts.) Cambridge: University Press; New York: Putnam, 1911. lviii+154 pages. \$2.25.

Bonhöffer, Adolf. Epiktet und das Neue Testament. (Religionsgeschichtliche Versuche und Vorarbeiten.) Giessen: Töpelmann, 1911. xii+412 pages. M. 15.



- The Coptic Version of the New Testament in the Southern Dialect, otherwise called Sahidic and Thebaic, with Critical Apparatus, Literal English Translation, Register of Fragments, and Estimate of the Version. Vol. I, The Gospels of S. Matthew and S. Mark, xii+648 pages; Vol. II, The Gospel of S. Luke, 479 pages; Vol. III, The Gospel of S. John, Register of Fragments, etc., Facsimiles, 399 pages. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1911. £4 4s.
- Drews, Arthur. The Christ Myth. Translated from the 3d ed. (revised and enlarged) by C. Delisle Burns. Chicago: Open Court Publishing Co., 1911. 304 pages.
- Emmet, Cyril W. The Eschatological Question in the Gospels, and Other Studies in Recent New Testament Criticism. Edinburgh: Clark; New York: Scribner, 1911. xiii+239 pages. \$2.25.
- Goethals, Augustin. Jean précurseur de Jésus. (Mélanges d'histoire du Christianisme.) Paris: Fischbacher, 1911. 61 pages.
- Goethals, Augustin. Joseph témoin de Jésus. (Mélanges d'histoire du Christianisme.) Paris: Fischbacher, 1911. 29 pages.
- Gregory, Caspar René. Vorschläge für eine kritische Ausgabe des griechischen Neuen Testaments. Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1911. 52 pages. M. \$50.
- Grist, W. A. The Historic Christ in the Faith of Today. New York: Revell, 1911. 517 pages. \$2.50.
- Harnack, Adolf. Neue Untersuchungen zur Apostelgeschichte und zur Abfassungszeit der synoptischen Evangelien. Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1911. 114 pages. M. 3.80.
- Hertlein, Eduard. Die Menschensohnfrage im letzten Stadium. Ein Versuch zur Einsicht in das Wesen altchristlichen Schrifttums. Berlin: Kohlhammer, 1911. 193 pages. M. 4.
- Hill, J. Hamlyn. The Earliest Life of Christ Ever Compiled from the Four Gospels, Being the Diatessaron of Tatian (ca. A.D. 160). Literally Translated from the Arabic Version and Containing the Four Gospels Woven into One Story. With Introduction and Notes. 2d ed., abridged. Edinburgh: Clark; New York: Scribner, 1910. xv+224 pages. \$1.25.
- Hilty, Carl. Das Evangelium Christi. Mit einigen erläuternden Anmerkungen. Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1910. xv+316 pages.
- Holtzmann, Heinrich Julius. Lehrbuch der Neutestamentlichen Theologie. Dritte und vierte Lieferung. Tübingen: Mohr, 1911. xx+321-580 pages. M. 5.
- Hutton, Edward Ardron. An Atlas of Textual Criticism. Being an Attempt to Show the Mutual Relationship of the Authorities for the Text of the New Testament up to about 1000 A.D. Cambridge: University Press; New York: Putnam, 1911. xvi+120 pages. \$0.50.
- Jacquier, E. Le nouveau Testament dans l'église chrétienne. Tome premier. Paris: Lecoffre, 1911. 443 pages. Fr. 3.50.
- Moffatt, James. An Introduction to the Literature of the New Testament. (International Theological Library.) New York: Scribner, 1911. xli+630 pages. \$2.50.
- Mosiman, Eddison. Das Zungenreden geschichtlich und psychologisch untersucht. Tübingen: Mohr, 1911. xi+137 pages. M. 4.50.
- Robertson, A. T. Kurzgefasste Grammatik des Neutestamentlichen Griechisch. Mit Berücksichtigung der Ergebnisse der begleichenen Sprachwissenschaft und der KOINÉ-Forschung. Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1911. xvi+312 pages. M. 5.
- Scott, E. F. The Kingdom and the Messiah. Edinburgh: Clark; New York: Scribner, 1911. vii+261 pages. \$2.50.

#### CHURCH HISTORY

- Allison, William Henry. Inventory of Unpublished Material for American Religious History in Protestant Church Archives and Other Repositories. Washington: Published by the Carnegie Institution, 1910. vii+254 pages.
- Bachmann, Ph. J. Chr. K. v. Hofmanns Versöhnungslehre und der über sie geführte Streit. Ein Betrag zur Geschichte der neueren Theologie. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1910. 73 pages. M. 1.50.
- Balfour, The Right Hon. Lord of Burleigh. An Historical Account of the Rise and Development of Presbyterianism in Scotland. Cambridge:

- University Press; New York: Putnam, 1911. 172 pages. \$0.40.
- Baumgarten, Otto. Die Abendmahlsnot. Ein Kapitel aus der deutschen Kirchengeschichte der Gegenwart. (Religionsgeschichtliche Volksbücher.) Tübingen: Mohr, 1911. 39 pages. M. 1.
- Bourdoulou, Sermons du carême de 1678. Paris: Bloud & Co., 1911. 127 pages. Fr. 1.20.
- Cross, George. The Theology of Schleiermacher. A Condensed Presentation of His Chief Work, "The Christian Faith." Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1911. xi+344 pages. \$1.65.
- Gairdner, James. Lollardy and the Reformation in England. Vol. III. London: Macmillan, 1911. xliii+415 pages. \$3.50.
- Hauck, Albert. Kirchengeschichte Deutschlands. Fünfter Teil. Das spätere Mittelalter. 1. Hälfte. Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1911. 582 pages. M. 12.50.
- Heikel, Ivar A. Kritische Beiträge zu den Constantin-Schriften des Eusebius. (Eusebius Werke, Band 1.) Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1911. 100 pages. M. 3.50.
- Heussi, Karl. Kompendium der Kirchengeschichte. Tübingen: Mohr, 1910. xxxii+611 pages. M. 9.
- Holmes, T. Scott. The Origin and Development of the Christian Church in Gaul during the First Six Centuries of the Christian Era. Being the Birkbeck Lectures for 1907 and 1908 in Trinity College, Cambridge. London; New York: Macmillan, 1911. xiv+584 pages. \$4.
- Manskopf, Johannes. Der Mann Gottes in der bildenden Kunst. Tübingen: Mohr, 1910. 64 pages. M. 2.
- de Marmande, R. Le cléricalisme au Canada. Paris: Nourry, 1911. 203 pages. Fr. 2.50.
- Schmidt, Ulrich. P. Stephan Fridolin, Ein Franziskanerprediger des ausgehenden Mittelalters. München: Leutner, 1911. 166 pages. M. 3.80.
- Scholz, Heinrich. Glaube und Unglaube in der Weltgeschichte, Ein Kommentar zu Augustins de Civitate Dei. Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1911. viii+224 pages. M. 5.
- Schonack, Wilhelm. Sir Thomas Browne's Religio Medici. Ein verschollenes Denkmal des englischen Deismus. Tübingen: Mohr, 1911. 57 pages. M. 2.
- von Schubert, Hans. Reich und Reformation. Tübingen: Mohr, 1911. 48 pages. M. 1.
- Smith, Preserved. The Life and Letters of Martin Luther. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1911. xvi+490 pages. \$3.50.
- Steffen, Bernard. Hofmanns und Ritschls Lehren über Heilsbedeutung des Todes Jesu. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1910. 155 pages. M. 2.80.
- Taylor, Henry Osborn. The Mediaeval Mind. A History of the Development of Thought and Emotion in the Middle Ages. London: Macmillan, 1911. 2 vols. xvi+613 and vii+589 pages. \$5.
- Thureau-Dangin, Paul. Le Cardinal Vaughan. Paris: Bloud & Co., 1911. 127 pages. Fr. 1.20.

## DOCTRINAL

- Baltzer, Otto. Glaubensfragen. Tübingen: Mohr, 1911. 68 pages. M. 1.50.
- Deer, E. Z. The Uncaused Being and the Criterion of Truth. To Which Is Appended an Examination of the Views of Sir Oliver Lodge concerning the Ether of Space. Boston: Sherman, French & Co., 1911. vii+110 pages. \$1.
- de la Barre, A. La Morale d'après Saint Thomas et les Théologiens scholastiques. Mémento théorique et guide bibliographique. Paris: Beauchesne & Co., 1911. xxvii+148 pages. Fr. 3.
- Elert, Werner. Prolegomena der Geschichtsphilosophie. Studie zur Grundlegung der Apologetik. Leipzig: Deichert, 1911. 115 pages. M. 2.
- Heim, Karl. Das Gewissheitsproblem in der systematischen Theologie bis zu Schleiermacher. Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1911. ix+385 pages. M. 7.
- Illingworth, J. R. Divine Transcendence and Its Reflection in Religious Authority. An Essay. London and New York: Macmillan, 1911. xvi+255 pages. \$1.75.
- Kähler, Martin. Das Kreuz Grund und Mass für die Christologie. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1911. 76 pages. M. 1.50.
- Macdonald, Loren B. Life in the Making. An Approach to Religion through the Method of Modern Pragmatism. Boston: Sherman, French & Co., 1911. 223 pages. \$1.20.
- Robinson, H. Wheeler. The Christian

Doctrine of Man. Edinburgh: Clark; New York: Scribner, 1911. 365 pages. \$2.25.

Schmidt, Wilhelm. Der Kampf um die Religion. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1911. 332 pages. M. 5.

Taylor, R. O. P. The Athanasian Creed in the Twentieth Century. Edinburgh: Clark; New York: Scribner, 1911. viii+170 pages. \$1.50.

Titius, Arthur. The Place and Limitations of the Theory of Evolution in Ethics. Reprinted from the Report of the Fifth International Congress for Free Christianity and Religious Progress. Schöneberg, 1911. 26 pages. 9d.

#### COMPARATIVE RELIGION

Avebury, Lord. Marriage, Totemism and Religion. An Answer to Critics. London and New York: Longmans Green & Co., 1911. ix+243 pages.

Macdonald, D. B. Aspects of Islam. New York: Macmillan, 1911. 375 pages.

Nilsson, Martin P. Primitive Religion. (Religionsgeschichtliche Volksbücher). Tübingen: Mohr, 1911. 124 pages. M. 1.

Pischel, Richard. Leben und Lehre des Buddha. Leipzig: Teubner, 1910. 126 pages. M. 1.25.

#### PRACTICAL THEOLOGY

Cooke, G. A. The Progress of Revelation. Sermons Chiefly on the Old Testament. Edinburgh: Clark; New York: Scribner, 1910. ix+200 pages. \$1.75.

Fiebig, Paul. Die Psalmen für die Schüler und Schülerinnen höherer Lehranstalten. Tübingen: Mohr, 1911. 19 pages. M. 0.40.

Hello, Ernest. Prières et Méditations Inédites. Paris: Bloud & Co., 1911. 63 pages. Fr. 0.60.

#### MISCELLANEOUS

Bumpus, John S. A Dictionary of Ecclesiastical Terms. Being a History and Explanation of Certain Terms Used in Architecture, Ecclesiology, Liturgiology, Music, Ritual, Cathedral Constitution, etc. Philadelphia: Lip-pincott, 1911. 324 pages. \$5.

Fléchier. Oeuvres choisies. Paris: Bloud & Co., 1911. 128 pages. Fr. 1.20.

Frank, Henry. Psychic Phenomena, Science and Immortality. Being a Further Excursion into Unseen Realms beyond the Point Previously Explored in "Modern Light on Immortality," and a Sequel to that Previous Record. Boston: Sherman, French & Co., 1911. 556 pages. \$2.25.

Fünfter Weltkongress für freies Christentum und religiösen Fortschritt. Protokoll der Verhandlungen. Zweiter Band. Berlin: Protestantischer Schriftenvertrieb, 1911. 353-813 pages.

Gillet, Le Pere. La valeur éducative de la morale Catholique. Paris: Lecoffre, 1911. 380 pages. Fr. 3.50.

Grover, Delo Corydon. The Volitional Element in Knowledge and Belief, and Other Essays in Philosophy and Religion. Boston: Sherman, French & Co., 1911. ix+167 pages. \$1.20.

d'Herbigny, Michel. Un Newman Russe. Vladimir Soloviev. Paris: Beauchesne & Co., 1911. xvi+336 pages. Fr. 3.50.

Keary, Charles Francis. The Pursuit of Reason. Cambridge: The University Press, 1910. 456 pages. 9s.

Knott, John O. Seekers after Soul. Boston: Sherman, French & Co., 1911. 208 pages. \$1.20.

Kohler, Kaufmann (editor). David Einhorn. Memorial Volume. Selected Sermons and Addresses. Limited Edition. New York: Bloch Publishing Co., 1911. viii+482 pages.

Mehlis, Georg. Logos: Internationale Zeitschrift für Philosophie der Kultur. Band I, Heft 3. Tübingen: Mohr, 1911. 289-418 pages. M. 4.

Mulert, Hermann. Wahrhaftigkeit und Lehrverpflichtung. Tübingen: Mohr, 1911. v+71 pages. M. 1.50.

Taft, Marcus Lorenzo. Strange Siberia along the Trans-Siberian Railway. A Journey from the Great Wall of China to the Sky-Scrapers of Manhattan. New York: Eaton & Mains, 1911. 260 pages. \$1.

The New Schaff-Herzog Encyclopedia of Religious Knowledge. Edited by Samuel Macaulay Jackson, D.D., LL.D., Vol. X, Reusch—Son of God. New York: Funk and Wagnalls Co., 1911. xvii+499 pages. \$5.

Zwemer, Samuel M. The Unoccupied Mission Fields of Africa and Asia. New York: Scribner, 1911. xx+260 pages. \$1.

# THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY

Volume XV

OCTOBER, 1911

Number 4

## THE MOST IMPORTANT MOTIVES FOR BEHAVIOR IN THE LIFE OF THE EARLY CHRISTIANS

---

E. VON DOBSCHÜTZ  
University of Breslau, Breslau, Germany

---

It is a common belief that action is rationally controlled. In this, however, we deceive ourselves. Our actions are actually determined by a variety of motives often contradictory of which we are frequently wholly unconscious. Moreover, we go astray when we transfer our criterion of rationality to the actions of men who belong to an earlier age and a different civilization. If nowadays a German, an Englishman, and an American act quite differently under similar circumstances, how much more must this be true of men in antiquity. It stands to the credit of Jacob Burckhardt to have shown in his book on the Age of Constantine the Great<sup>1</sup> how different were the motives by which men in the past were controlled from those familiar to us.

Theology has also pursued this line of thought. At present it emphasizes, with almost excessive sharpness, the difference between the world-view of primitive Christianity and that of our age. It also takes pains to show how this difference must have produced a peculiar type of action, varying from that of our day. It is, in fact, scarcely possible for us to imagine how men would act who believed the air to be full of all sorts of spirits, and who expected the

<sup>1</sup> *Die Zeit Konstantins des Grossen*, Basel, 1852, 2. Aufl., Leipzig, 1880.

end of the world and the immediate destruction of all things. What seems to us irrational stands out as normal in their behavior.

On the other hand, these first Christians lived as do men today in their world which was unfolded in the same familiar succession of day and night, summer and winter; in a world of eating and drinking, toil and recreation, trade and commerce, distress and anxiety, sickness and death. How did they live? What were the incentives determining their action? This question deserves further consideration.

In the first place, it is a fact that our only sources of information, the New Testament writings, are obviously largely indifferent toward the common circumstances of life. Neither in the case of Jesus nor of his apostles do we know what they ate and drank, or how they were dressed. We have no notion of their daily life. The sources give us only individual acts, or, more especially, single words, expressions of ideas. It is much easier to write about the theology of the New Testament, or about the world-view of primitive Christianity, than about the activities of Christians, and the motives prompting their action.

## I

Primitive man lived under the spell of belief in the power of the stars, the guidance of omens, and the sinister effects of magical arts. Even such enlightened men as the emperor Tiberius were tools in the hands of their astrologers who claimed to read the future from the constellation of the stars.<sup>2</sup> Accordingly a contradiction was always in evidence. On the one hand man felt himself a slave of destiny bound by an unalterable fate, the *ἀνάγκη*; yet, on the other hand, conscious of his freedom of will, he tried to interfere with anticipated events; and in order to accomplish this end he did not shrink from even the most atrocious crimes.<sup>3</sup> How many children have been sacrificed to these astrological delusions!<sup>4</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Burckhardt, *ibid.*, pp. 10 f. and 209 ff.; more recently Professor R. Reitzenstein has indicated the significance of astrology in religious history, *Poimandres*, 1904, pp. 69 ff.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Eusebius, *Hist.*, VIII, 14, 5.

<sup>4</sup> The children of Bethlehem are an example of such an offering to astrology to which the child Jesus himself almost fell a victim (Matt. 2:7-16).

Eusebius<sup>5</sup> claims that the emperor Maximian Daza did not move so much as a finger's breadth without the advice of omens and oracles, and the Megarian, Terpsion, in all seriousness understood the demon of Socrates as an ominous sneeze.<sup>6</sup>

How is it with the Christians? Are traces of such influence found here? Only negatively. The Christians proudly confess that they are free from this influence. Jesus' trust in God does not admit of fatalism, of belief in an unalterable destiny, and of submission to the power of the stars. Certainly the Christians were acquainted with all these ideas, for they had themselves been slaves of these powers; but all this lay behind them now for Christ had freed them from it. With what disdain Paul speaks of the beggarly elements of the world,<sup>7</sup> and how joyfully he professes faith in the love of God, and in Jesus Christ, from whom no constellation of the stars can separate him.<sup>8</sup> Ignatius exults in the thought that the new star, around which all the rest of the constellations, together with the sun and moon, danced in concert, brought confusion to all astrology and abolished all magic.<sup>9</sup> Anxious attention to omens is so alien to the thought of Christians that they must even be exhorted not to forget in their plans that they are not indeed wholly masters of their own life, but that God is to be consulted regarding their affairs.<sup>10</sup> The magical practices of heathendom are mentioned only as something lying outside of Christianity. In his letter to the Galatians, who are in ill repute in this respect, Paul uses *βασκαίνειν* figuratively, and enumerates *θαρρακεία* among the vices (the works of the flesh).<sup>11</sup> According to Acts 19:19 the preaching of Paul at Ephesus, in connection with a brilliantly successful act of exorcism, effected the conversion of many persons from belief in magic, and led to the destruction of many magical books. Through their faith the Christians knew themselves to be immune from all hurtful influences; they could take up serpents and drink poison without suffering harm.<sup>12</sup>

<sup>5</sup> *Hist.*, VIII, 14, 8.

<sup>9</sup> *ad Eph.* 19.

<sup>6</sup> Plutarch, *De genio Socratis*, xi.

<sup>10</sup> Jas. 4:13 ff.

<sup>7</sup> Gal. 4:9; Col. 2:20.

<sup>11</sup> Gal. 3:1; 5:20.

<sup>8</sup> *εψωμα* and *βάθος*, Rom. 8:39.

<sup>12</sup> With [Mark] 16:18 compare the illustrations in Acts 28:3 f., and in the legends about John in the apocryphal Acts and in Tertullian, *praesu. haer.* 36.

But do we not have here a kind of rival magic? Is not the use of Jesus' name in the stories of healings, as in Acts 2:6, 16, and especially in exorcism, quite on a level with the use of a magical formula?<sup>13</sup> Is it to be understood otherwise when Paul places the name of Christ and the power of Christ side by side in condemning the offender in Corinth?<sup>14</sup> Do not his views of baptism, and the Lord's Supper show a sacramental idea verging on the magical? One less cautious might say that they show magical traits.

In several recent publications this view has been strongly maintained,<sup>15</sup> and it at first impresses one favorably. But when one reflects upon the general tenor of Paul's letters it becomes clear that, for Paul, at all events these were only detached notions which stood quite in the background, and which probably were only an unusual expression of a supreme religious experience of God's power.<sup>16</sup> Perhaps it is otherwise with Luke, who, as a physician not indeed of the school of Hippocrates, yet in the spirit of hellenism, represents Christianity to his readers as the superior healing power, the higher magic.<sup>17</sup> Yet at the same time he thinks of something quite different and incomparably higher, viz., the Savior of sinners and the certainty of divine grace. Similarly the Epistle to the Hebrews pictures Christianity as the fulfilment of the Old Testament sacrificial system, and nevertheless has in view the annulment of all sacrifice in the heavenly high-priesthood of the Son of God who mediates for his own people.

Thus the New Testament when carefully read corroborates the impression, derived from other sources, of the great influence of these astrological and magical arts upon the life of the times. But it shows this only as the background against which the life

<sup>13</sup> Mark 9:38 ff.; Acts 19:13 ff.

<sup>14</sup> I Cor. 5:4.

<sup>15</sup> A. Eichhorn, *Das Abendmahl im Neuen Testament*, 1898; W. Heitmüller, *Taufe und Abendmahl bei Paulus*, 1902, and *Im Namen Jesu*, 1902; H. Gunkel, *Zum religionsgeschichtlichen Verständnis des Neuen Testaments*, 1903; W. Bousset on I Cor., chaps. 10 and 11; A. Dieterich, *Eine Mithrasliturgie*, 1903; R. Reitzenstein, *Die hellenistischen Mysterienreligionen*, 1910.

<sup>16</sup> E. von Dobschütz, "Sakrament und Symbol," *Theologische Studien und Kritiken*, 1905, 1-40; and *Der gegenwärtige Stand der neutestamentlichen Exegese*, 1906.

<sup>17</sup> Accordingly Simon Magus desires to purchase from the apostles the magical power of communicating the Holy Spirit; but how forcibly Peter rejects this idea (Acts 8:19 f.)!

of the Christian, itself determined by other motives, stood in contrast. It is not enough to say that this points merely to the close connection of primitive Christianity with Judaism. True, the New Testament in spite of its gentile interest belongs on the Jewish side; but the Judaism of this period was not identical with the religion of the prophets. On the contrary Jews were in ill repute as magicians and exorcists. Christianity stood in contrast both to Judaism and to heathenism as the religion of the new salvation, the true faith in God.

## II

For Jews as for gentiles the world was filled with numerous good as well as evil spirits. Everywhere there lurked imps and demons to do men harm; and everywhere benevolent spirits stood ready to help provided men knew how to put them under obligation; hence the wealth of apotropaic magic with which Greeks as well as Romans surrounded life from the cradle to the grave to safeguard against the evil spirits; hence all sorts of gifts and pious practices to please and honor the good spirits.

The Jews classified these spirits as demons and angels. Against the former he arrayed his exorcism; the latter received a respect almost verging on worship and that too not solely among the Essenes. The Christians of the first century in every way share these notions. What a rôle exorcism played in Jesus' lifetime and later, is evident from the gospels and Acts.<sup>18</sup> In I Cor. 8:7 we see that their former heathen attitude had been retained by many Christians. But at the same time we notice that for Christians themselves all has changed: victorious assurance has displaced anxious watching; in the name of Jesus even the demons are subject to them.<sup>19</sup> Without the complex apparatus of Jewish exorcism<sup>20</sup> every Christian cast out the hostile demons, expelling them simply in the power of Jesus' name.<sup>21</sup> And if this again looks like a higher form of magic, Rom. 8:28 shows a very different point of view. One can read through all the Pauline letters without being seriously concerned with this richly demoniacal world.

There is only one point where it stands out clearly, that is,

<sup>18</sup> Cf. especially Acts 16:16 ff.

<sup>20</sup> Cf. Josephus, *Ant.*, VIII, ii, 5, 47.

<sup>19</sup> Luke 10:17.

<sup>21</sup> Mark 16:17.



in reference to participation in the heathen sacrificial cult. In I Cor. 8:7 we see how the gentile felt about this, and how in accordance with his previous gentile thought many a Christian continued to feel. Partaking of the sacrificial flesh brings one into immediate contact with the god to whom the offering belongs, that is, as the Christian now said, into contact with the demon again. Such contact is thought of as quite mechanical. The sacrificial flesh is infested by the demon, therefore the weaker Christians fear to partake of it even unawares. It is quite otherwise with Paul and with the majority of the Corinthian community. As the gods of the heathen are nothing, so the sacrificial flesh is nothing; it is ordinary flesh, and cannot harm a Christian if he partakes of it with thanksgiving to God. Only one thing does Paul emphasize, in contrast with the shallow intelligence and bold indifference of many Corinthians, viz., that in heathendom (not in individual idols) demoniacal powers are certainly active, and he who gives himself thoughtlessly to heathen society thereby steps within the circle of their influence. That is to say, it is the spirit of heathendom against which Paul warns his Corinthian converts; the danger is not in the flesh of the offered beast, but in fellowship with the adherents of heathendom.

It can be called enlightened Jewish judgment when Paul so disdainfully characterizes as dumb idols the heathen gods of which he, however, says remarkably little.<sup>22</sup> But it is because of his Christian point of view that he, overlooking the whole world of demons, takes Satan himself as his enemy. In all the adversities he encounters, in the prevention of journeys, in sickness, in the appearance of false teachers, in the apostasy of some adherent he sees Satan's activity.<sup>23</sup> But even here victorious certainty predominates in early Christian thought. Satan can do no harm, he cannot stop God's work; he is conquered,<sup>24</sup> overthrown,<sup>25</sup> bound.<sup>26</sup> So Christians do not live in fear; and at the same time, through Christ, they are freed also from the fear of death.<sup>27</sup> Indeed, Satan must ultimately be of service for the work of salvation; the

<sup>22</sup> I Cor. 12:2; I Thess. 1:9.

<sup>23</sup> I Thess. 2:18; II Cor. 2:11; 11:14; 12:7.

<sup>24</sup> Mark 3:27.

<sup>25</sup> Luke 10:18.

<sup>26</sup> Rev. 20:2.

<sup>27</sup> Heb. 2:15.

sinner is handed over to him for the destruction of the flesh in order that the spirit may be saved in the day of the Lord.<sup>28</sup>

The thought of good spirits has also undergone a change; for certainly Christians believe in benevolent beings, in angels. For every man and every child there was a guardian angel who stood in the presence of God,<sup>29</sup> and it was thought possible to see and hear a person's angel.<sup>30</sup> But even if some consideration is due to these angels,<sup>31</sup> nothing depends on their favorable attitude; for they are simply ministering spirits who have to fulfil God's will for the sake of those who inherit salvation.<sup>32</sup>

Christians feel themselves of equal rank with these spirit beings, yes, even superior to them.<sup>33</sup> Thus, the primitive Christians' belief in angels is not a determining motive of moral action; it only serves to bring to more vivid expression the Christian's absolute trust in God.

In the ascetic tendencies of the Phrygian Christians we recognize how easily the ancient belief in such mediating spirit beings gave rise to the thought that it was necessary to pay special honor to them by acts of self-denial. The ascetic practices which Paul styles self-chosen worship (*ἐθελοθησκεία*) are clearly connected with the reverence for angels (*θησκεία τῶν ἀγγέλων*)<sup>34</sup> as is fully shown in the well-known gnostic systems, with their aeon-cult and their encratism. But here again, Paul points out in the Colossian letter how belief on Christ as the Son of God, who stands high above all these spirit-powers, the mediator of creation as well as of the work of salvation, so represses all these spirit-beings, that it almost

<sup>28</sup> I Cor. 5:5. Cf. my book, *Die urchristlichen Gemeinden*, pp. 269 ff. English translation by G. Bremner, *Christian Life in the Primitive Church*, pp. 387 f.

<sup>29</sup> Matt. 18:10.

<sup>30</sup> Acts 12:15.

<sup>31</sup> I Cor. 11:10 is not yet satisfactorily explained. We do not know whether the angels here are thought of as guardians of order, as mediators of prayer, or more especially as beings morally undetermined, therefore incitable to sin, and carnally lustful.

<sup>32</sup> Heb. 1:14.

<sup>33</sup> Rev. 22:9; I Cor. 6:3. If, indeed, rabbinical Midrash would solemnize the law by claiming the mediation of angels in the law's promulgation, in just this do the Christians find a proof of its inferiority: Gal. 3:19; Acts 7:38; Heb. 2:2.

<sup>34</sup> Col. 2:18, 23.

means their annihilation. Christ on the cross has triumphed over them—effective paradox of faith.

### III

As in the popular conceptions of antiquity all events in nature and history were not viewed as happening in their rigid logical succession, but in isolation,<sup>35</sup> so also in human conduct every act appeared as something by itself, which, as was thought often to be the case, was called forth by some influence acting from without. Here we enter the rich territory of inspiration and of revelation. On Jewish soil instruction from angels corresponded to the oracle of heathendom, and here, as there, dreams played a rôle.

Primitive Christianity also is familiar with all this, and it exercises no slight influence in the determination of human life. The nativity narrative of Matthew's gospel shows us the influence of the dream combined with the appearance of an angel. Luke's narrative in Acts speaks repeatedly of visions (*δραμα*) which determine individual's actions, the best known being that of Paul at Troas, which induced him to pass over into Europe.<sup>36</sup> Commonly two visions occur correspondingly with reference to one another, thus attesting their divine objectivity. For example, those of Paul and Ananias,<sup>37</sup> or Peter and Cornelius.<sup>38</sup> Indeed, Luke pictures Paul's journeys through Asia Minor as though Paul had formed no definite plan of march, but had allowed himself to be directed now north, now west, solely by a constantly renewed instruction of the Spirit.<sup>39</sup> Visions strengthened him in Corinth.<sup>40</sup> He formed his decision for his last great journey *ἐν τῷ πνεύματι*,<sup>41</sup> while foreboding of death and a direct prophetic announcement of his fate attended him.<sup>42</sup> The letters of the apostle substantiate the view that revelations and visions played a great rôle in his life.<sup>43</sup> Upon an explicit revelation he decided to go up to Jerusalem to the so-

<sup>35</sup> It is hardly necessary to state expressly that the philosophical views of, e.g., the Stoic, stand in sharp contrast with this popular conception. The idea of logical connection appears in the New Testament, for example, in Jas. 1:14 ff.

<sup>36</sup> Acts 16:9.

<sup>37</sup> Acts 10:1 ff.

<sup>38</sup> Acts 18:9.

<sup>39</sup> Acts 9:10 ff.

<sup>40</sup> Acts 16:6 ff.

<sup>41</sup> Acts 19:21.

<sup>42</sup> Acts 20:25, 28; 21:11.

<sup>43</sup> Cf. especially II Cor. 12:1 ff.

called apostolic council;<sup>44</sup> yet we observe that he planned extensively,<sup>45</sup> that he chose his fields of activity according to clear principles, that these revelations are not something sudden and external, encroaching upon his activity, but they are answers to questions which he has laid before God in prayer.<sup>46</sup>

Very often in the life of the community, and of the individuals when some special step had to be taken, such revelations, mostly in the form of prophetic utterances, determined the matter in question. Acts 13:1 f. mentions this in reference to the commissioning of the missionaries, and Acts 1:26 shows that even the lot was used as a means of ascertaining God's will; yet at the same time the narrative of Acts 6:1-6 concerning the appointment of the seven, through election by the congregation at the suggestion of the Twelve, may be borne in mind, and also Paul's purely natural manner of expression in I Cor. 16:15 f. Stephen and his companions set themselves to minister to the saints; Paul on his own initiative despatched Timothy;<sup>47</sup> he admonished the brethren to go before him;<sup>48</sup> Titus accepted this admonition willingly, indeed, going forth of his own accord, and in this act Paul saw evidence of a divine activity upon Titus' heart.<sup>49</sup> One sees here how easily the natural point of view passes over through religious conviction into the supernatural. It is the nature of Christian faith to recognize God's will in all events, as Luther set forth so clearly in his letter to the magistrate of Prague about the right method of choosing and consecrating a Protestant Bishop: when all human affairs in the election and consecration moved forward in an orderly manner one was to believe firmly that this was from God. There is here no distinction between the ancient and the modern view. It is the religious conviction in contrast with the irreligious.

#### IV

In contrast with the joyousness of the older Greek life, there had grown up in the hellenistic period a deep tendency toward a pessimistic view of life. Man was oppressed by a feeling of guilt, and

<sup>44</sup> Gal. 2:2.

<sup>45</sup> Rom. 15:19 ff.

<sup>46</sup> Cf. II Cor. 12:1 ff.; also I Thess. 4:15 ff., and my explanation in Meyer's *Kommentar*, 7. Aufl., 1909, pp. 193 f.

<sup>47</sup> Cf. I Thess. 3:2, 5; II Cor. 8:18, 22.

<sup>48</sup> II Cor. 9:5.

<sup>49</sup> II Cor. 8:16 f.

this guilt was due to nothing other than his material existence. The pure soul was contaminated through contact with the physical body ( $\sigma\omega\mu\alpha = \sigma\eta\mu\alpha$  of the soul). Hence the necessity of expiation and self-denial. Accordingly asceticism was a widespread tendency, expressing itself especially in the form of vegetarianism and abstinence from wine. In favor of this, all sorts of reasons were found, rational and hygienic, as well as transcendental (through metempsychosis). But still the determining motive was that ascetic tendency which rested upon a dualistic world-view. This current was so strong in hellenism that even Judaism, whose monotheistic world-view was originally quite averse to such asceticism, had been drawn under its spell.

And now came primitive Christianity with its joyously confident life and its high moral earnestness. Jesus had stood in outspoken opposition to the ascetism of John the Baptist. But we are not surprised to find this feature in the primitive Christian mission receding before the insistent disposition toward asceticism. If holiness was actually one of the chief quests of Christianity, then the ancient man, heathen as well as Jew, could not understand it other than in the sense of abstinence from all material enjoyment. And he must have been confirmed in this by beholding the uncontrolled sensuality of heathendom, as well in the heathen cultus as in the theater and the public play. To be a Christian meant to live otherwise than the heathen, so the conclusion was that it meant the mortification of the flesh, the combating of sensual pleasure, the practice of asceticism.

We can see that in many, indeed in almost all, Pauline communities, this motive for the conduct of life was more or less strongly operative. Cautious individuals in Corinth would avoid marriage and renounce the eating of flesh (in which, however, their fear of contamination through contact with the idol sacrifices was determinative); in Rome there was among the Christians a circle of strict vegetarians about which we unfortunately know nothing definite, and in the Phrygian communities ascetic practices appear in connection with speculation about aeons, and angel worship, as we have already seen.

This is, however, only one phase of the matter. Other circles in

the same communities made the catch word of Christian freedom a cloak for an unbridled life. They formed for themselves a theory of moral *adiaphora* which allowed widest latitude for the indulgence of all sensuous desires. Directly in opposition to them, others were confirmed in their ascetic inclinations. Here they saw the principle of holiness which seemed to them the more important menaced by the principle of freedom.

It is certainly remarkable that Paul, the great teacher of his communities, knew how to find the right way in this conflict of principles. For he was a man combining the ancient world-view with strong ethical inclinations, a man, therefore, whose natural bias was in the direction of asceticism. He was unmarried, and would that all others were the same.<sup>50</sup> He clearly had the greatest sympathy for those vegetarians in Rome even though he designated them as "the weak in the faith."<sup>51</sup> But he most decidedly deprecates making a law for Christianity out of such asceticism.<sup>52</sup> The positive right of marriage is fixed for him on the basis of a word of the Lord about its indissoluble character,<sup>53</sup> as is also the right to eat all foods with thanksgiving to God the creator; in consequence of Jesus' words all is pure, nothing is of itself unclean.<sup>54</sup> The only decisive thing for Paul is one's own conscience and consideration for the conscience of the brother, that is, love.

To this decision, given by Paul not without self-conquest, we owe it that the basal thought of the moral life in Christianity was not submerged in the stream of such ascetic tendencies as we have mentioned. How great the danger was is shown in Revelation 14:4 where only virgins are expressly recognized as perfect Christians, and in the gnostic schools established upon ascetic regulations of the Christian life. On the other hand, it is greatly to the credit of the great church community that it so steadfastly refrained from making a law out of asceticism, although it appeared to be an ideal embodying so much higher a type of Christianity. The theory of a double moral standard,<sup>55</sup> though we look upon it from the Protestant standpoint as something so inferior, eventually saved the fundamental thought of the gospel for modern times.

<sup>50</sup> I Cor. 7:7.

<sup>51</sup> Rom. 14:1 f.

<sup>52</sup> Col. 20:2 f.

<sup>53</sup> I Cor. 7:10.

<sup>54</sup> Mark 7:15 ff.; 14:14, 20.

<sup>55</sup> Cf. especially Did. 6:1.

## V

If national custom was a power in heathendom, for the strict Jew it was life, and Jewish custom was something quite distinctive. We know from the Roman satirists what an impression it made upon the different strata of heathen society. Despite all hostility against the Jews, despite all abhorrence of, and contempt for them, their tenacious adherence to their ancestral customs made an impression. Many a thing seemed interesting and important, and was often copied, just because it was really groundless, or because its meaning was difficult to comprehend. Although hellenistic Judaism took such pains to adapt its legalistic teaching, as the true practical philosophy, to the tastes of the heathen, in actual life the community in the Diaspora was kept together through strict exclusiveness in external relations, and through faithful adherence to the ancestral customs within the community.

Christianity had soon overleaped the national barriers, and created communities in which Jews and gentiles were found together. A *superstitio nova*, as its enemies called it, it had no customs of its own to offer, nor could it according to its spirit sanction offhand the customs of gentiles and of Jews. The enthusiastic sway of the spirit could at first deceive Christians as to the deficiency showing itself here. Paul could expect of the Spirit that it would shape the life of the community from within, without the aid of external regulation. But he himself often had eventually to intervene to establish order, and he did it both consciously and unconsciously under the influence of Jewish custom.

We see in Peter's case how hard it was for a Jew to free himself from the customs of his people. Although Peter through association with Jesus, who was perfectly free inwardly because bound only to God, had attained to a certain conception of freedom, yet it cost him a great effort to draw the practical consequences of his conviction. This is shown by the state of affairs in Antioch where he, under the first impression of the flourishing community life here among Jews and gentiles, did not hold himself aloof from its fellowship, but later timidly drew back at the remonstrance of zealous Jewish Christians.<sup>56</sup> The Book of Acts sets forth this

<sup>56</sup> Gal. 2:11 ff.

problem still more clearly in the story of Cornelius. There is need of an impressive heavenly command to divert Peter's thoughts from his exclamation of alarm: "No, Lord, I have never eaten anything common and unclean."<sup>57</sup>

Recent research, with its keener eye for the illogical and the psychologically genuine, has observed that even Paul, in spite of all his clarity on questions of principle as to the limits of Judaism, as to the worthlessness of the law, and the impossibility of erecting Jewish customs in the gentile community, is definitely entangled in Jewish prejudices and in participation in Jewish rites which goes even farther than mere accommodation. Such items as the circumcision of Timothy, the vow in Cenchreae, the Nazirite vow in Jerusalem, all of which the Tübingen criticism easily rejected as harmonistic distortions of the genuine Pauline portrait, are today generally considered authentic.<sup>58</sup>

Thus we can see that even Paul as an organizer of the community acted both consciously and unconsciously under the influence of Jewish customs. The most important point is that he, following the impulse toward self-preservation which is found in the synagogue of the Diaspora, strongly recommended to his communities exclusiveness toward those without and close union within. Regard for the impression made upon outsiders also plays a rôle in determining the behavior of Christians. They avoid offending either Jews or gentiles, or the community of God.<sup>59</sup> But far more important is their self-differentiation from those who are without—they have no fellowship with those who serve idols.<sup>60</sup> This stands out especially clearly in Paul's letters to the Corinthians, among whom certainly a strong inclination seems to have existed to continue their former life, including intercourse with former friends. On the contrary we see in I Pet. 4:4 that the sharp distinction is already clearly drawn, and the gentiles on their part take offense at the fact that the Christians are so exclusive and consider themselves better than the heathen.

<sup>57</sup> Acts 10:14 ff.

<sup>58</sup> Harnack, *Beiträge zur Einleitung ins N.T.*, IV, 1911.

<sup>59</sup> I Cor. 10:32; cf. I Thess. 4:12.

<sup>60</sup> II Cor. 6:14 ff.



While with Paul a liberal attitude always dominates, in the Johannine writings we meet the principle of being otherwise than the world and of shutting one's self out from all gentile affairs. This principle is expressed with an energy which is only explicable as coming from Judaism and from Jewish Christianity.<sup>61</sup> At the same time a tendency to inner unity is evident in the exclusive emphasis on the "Love one another" and the "brotherly love"; while with Paul Christian *caritas* extends beyond the narrow confines of the community.<sup>62</sup> And while in Paul's writings the fundamental principle of order is balanced by the principle which never disregards freedom, his later period shows a distinct tendency to make the former exclusively valuable, and this, too, in a sense which often already recalls hierarchic rulership. Subordination to the leaders of the community is the highest Christian duty.

## VI

Up to this point we have been concerned with those views which early Christianity shared in common with its age. But in addition to these we find, as specifically its own, the eschatological note, that is, the belief that with the parousia of the Lord, the final judgment of human destinies, the transformation of all outer relationships, and the time of salvation are immediately at hand. We are not concerned here with the ideas about this future, nor with the significance of eschatology for questions of belief,<sup>63</sup> but only with its effect upon life.

It is evident that such a belief can exert the strongest influence upon the actions of those who share it. But the motive can make itself felt in very different directions; it can stimulate moral energy, or it can paralyze it. We observe the latter in Thessalonica, where a too strenuous expectation of the end put many Christians into a

<sup>61</sup> Cf. III John, chap. 7; I John 3:13; 5:21; John 17:14, etc.

<sup>62</sup> I Thess. 4:9; Gal. 6:10.

<sup>63</sup> I may here refer to my Oxford lectures, *The Eschatology of the Gospels*, 1910, London: Hodder & Stoughton, in which I believe I have shown that eschatology, certainly for Jesus and his apostles, in addition to its ethical significance as a stimulus, had served the dogmatic interest of setting Jesus' person and work in the right light. The saving significance of Jesus' death cannot be understood without the background of eschatology, either according to Rom. 3:21 ff. or according to Heb. 9:23 ff.

state of excitement, while they simply neglected their immediate moral obligations. As up till now the pressure of the social situation had necessitated the exertion of all their powers, so at the moment when the prospect of freedom from this pressure showed itself their energy accordingly relaxed. They no longer worked but went about idly, although their excessive spiritual activity prevented them from realizing this defect. Hence their financial affairs became disarranged, they became a burden to the community, and they discredited Christianity in the eyes of the gentiles.<sup>64</sup> Paul, who in his first letter had very definitely exhorted them to watchfulness *and* sobriety,<sup>65</sup> found himself compelled in his second letter to speak very forcibly against these disorderly brethren.

But this is really only an anomalous effect, observed in this place only. For the most part this expectation of the imminent end acted as a strong moral stimulus. From it Paul himself derived his incentive for carrying the gospel with all possible haste throughout the whole world.<sup>66</sup> Moreover, he freely set before his communities the nearness of the Lord's parousia as a valid parenetic motive. Here ancient Jewish ideas of the imminent judgment day are mingled with the Christian expectation of the dawning time of salvation. Here are motives of fear<sup>67</sup> and fervent longing, and exhortations to sanctification<sup>68</sup> and to the realization of genuine Christian character.<sup>69</sup> In Heb. 10:25 the expectation of the end strengthens the demand for close inner union and mutual exhortation, while in I John 2:18 it intensifies the warning against false teachers.

Thus eschatology as a powerful motive for moral strenuousness, for watchfulness, and for preparedness,<sup>70</sup> certainly plays an important part in the discipline of primitive Christianity. Nevertheless this expectation of the *parousia* exercised scarcely any material influence over the content of Christian behavior. True, in I Cor. 7:29 ff. Paul adduces the brevity of the present world-order among the motives which dissuade the Christian from entering matrimony, but it is only a fortifying motive. From eschatology alone he would

<sup>64</sup> I Thess. 4:10.

<sup>66</sup> Cf. Mark 13:10.

<sup>68</sup> Rom. 13:11 ff.

<sup>65</sup> I Thess. 5:6 ff.

<sup>67</sup> Phil. 2:12.

<sup>69</sup> Phil. 4:5.

<sup>70</sup> Cf. Luke 12:25; 21:34; I Pet. 1:13.

not have arrived at his negative attitude toward marriage, had not the basal ascetic tendency of the time suggested it. Even the idea that in existing conditions, as Christianity found them, nothing was to be changed,<sup>71</sup> is only in the smallest part determined by the thought that this is but a short transition period. Weightier is the genuine gospel thought that everyone is to walk as the Lord has apportioned to each, as God has called him. In contrast with Judaism, which would fain tear its proselytes from their relationships, the Christian regarded the natural relationships of life as God-given.

## VII

If, now, all these motives, foreign to us but familiar to the ancients and to primitive Christianity, were not the decisive ones for them, whence may we look in primitive Christianity for the source of so distinctive a type of behavior that it seems in many respects foreign to us? Whence may we discover the moral power which regards the most exacting demands as eagerly to be obeyed? We see clearly that it is not because of asceticism imposing self-tormenting and severe renunciations, nor is it due to Jewish rabbinical striving after righteousness, seeking to win the highest possible reward through the performance of the greatest possible works. The fundamental temper of Christianity is otherwise. It is one of gladness, joyfulness, spontaneity. This is attested by such acts as the joyous surrender of all possessions by Joseph called Barnabas,<sup>72</sup> by free-will ministrations for the community, such as the journey of Stephanas<sup>73</sup> and of many other brethren, by the bountiful contributions of the gentile Christians for their brethren in Jerusalem,<sup>74</sup> and by the contributions of the Philippians for the apostle.<sup>75</sup> Many more evidences might be cited. This note may also be traced throughout the exhortations of the apostle Paul: "As you already do, so may you abound more and more."<sup>76</sup> Paul does not think of lightening the burden of such sayings of the Lord as those about loving one's enemies, refraining from asserting

<sup>71</sup> I Cor. 7:17 ff.

<sup>72</sup> Acts 4:36 ff.

<sup>73</sup> I Cor. 16:15.

<sup>74</sup> II Cor. 8:1 ff.; Rom. 15:26 ff.

<sup>75</sup> Phil. 1:5; 4:15.

<sup>76</sup> I Thess. 4:1.

one's rights, and suffering unjustly in order to make them more acceptable to the communities as many a preacher does. He sets these things before them with all harshness as unquestioned activities of the Christian disposition, and he counts on their fulfilment precisely in the power of that joyousness which is ready for any sacrifice.

Whence comes this disposition? It is what we call the enthusiasm of primitive Christianity, the inspiration which of itself lifted men out of and above themselves. But what is the source of this inspiration? We say too little when we call it the activity of the spirit of God upon these men. That it certainly was, and not as some call it, a psychopathic phenomenon, a contagion similar to that in the days of the flagellants of the Middle Ages. But spiritual activity, where it is genuine, is always bound up with existing presuppositions. What were these presuppositions? These first Christians had experienced something which had completely transformed them. Salvation had come into the world with Jesus, and the gospel of Jesus had freed them from all the restrictions which formerly rested upon them; the guilt of sin was removed from them, and the power of the demons, of the stars, and of magic, was broken. They felt themselves free and exalted. These poor artisans and slaves saw themselves called to participate in the kingdom of glory. Indeed Paul taught them that to be in God's kingdom meant not only being a citizen and a subject, but being a joint ruler.<sup>77</sup> Accordingly all earthly values were displaced. What was earthly life, what were earthly goods, what was honor and fame among men when contrasted with this salvation which they possessed and which could be called eternal life, a pure possession, and a divine glory! They had become transformed. When Paul called Christians a new creature, it is not theory but personal experience which he is ever reiterating.<sup>78</sup> And the things around them had also been changed.

<sup>77</sup> I Cor. 4:8.

<sup>78</sup> Philo says of the Jewish proselytes *γίνονται γὰρ εὐθὺς οἱ ἐπηλύται σώφρονες, ἐγκρατεῖς, αἰδήμονες, ἡμεροί, χρηστοί, φιλόανθρωποι, σεμνοί, δίκαιοι, μεγαλόφρονες, ἀληθείας ἑρασταί, κρείττους χρημάτων καὶ ἡδονῆς*.—*de virt.* 182 (Cohn-Wendland, V, 323). This moral change Paul has observed in more than one member of his community.

And all these things had happened to them purely through divine grace without effort on their part. This called forth a feeling of gratitude which showed itself as one of their strongest impulses. It is already so represented by Jesus in the parable of the two debtors and it was expressed in the tears of the sinful woman<sup>79</sup> as in the anointing at Bethany.<sup>80</sup> To this was traced the courage of Joseph of Arimathea when he ventured to ask Pilate to release the body of the crucified one,<sup>81</sup> and this was the motive for all the heroic deeds of primitive Christianity. Paul expresses it powerfully in his own way when he designates the one who was made free by Christ as servant of Jesus Christ, as bound to Jesus Christ. It is thankfulness which binds him to serve the one to whom he is indebted for his new existence. John means this when he says we love him because he first loved us.<sup>82</sup>

### VIII

But the strength of an impulse is not the only criterion of its worth. It is just when enthusiasm is at its highest pitch that it can most easily go astray, as the history of ecstasy sufficiently demonstrates. The feeling of freedom, misconstrued in an intellectual direction, can certainly lead to serious moral error, as we observe in the free thinking at Corinth. The feeling of unreserved surrender to a seer, to a prophet, or to a savior, can degenerate into fanaticism—one thinks of Islam. It is the character of the guiding personality that ultimately stands out as precisely the factor determining the direction which all outgoing impulses receive. Now, Jesus' character is holy love<sup>83</sup> and from this the chief motive in early Christianity is fixed as holy love—not *eros* in the sense of the Greeks—even of the best such as Plato—but *caritas*,<sup>84</sup> that is, the love which seeks nothing for itself, and does not even act in order to satisfy its desire to love, but thinks only in the highest sense of the well-being of others; not a love which gives alms, but one which serves. Where this principle of ministering love, which

<sup>79</sup> Luke 7:41 f.

<sup>80</sup> Mark 14:3 ff.

<sup>81</sup> Mark 15:43.

<sup>82</sup> I John 4:9 f., 19.

<sup>83</sup> Besides Professor Peabody's writings, reference may here be made to J. Ninck, *Jesus als Charakter*, 1906.

<sup>84</sup> Cf. Harnack's brilliant exposition of I Cor., chap. 13, in the *Sitzungsberichte der Berliner Akademie* (1911), VII.

does not even stop short of death for the good of others, is moved into the center of all thinking, there must the entire life become changed; there no one calls his goods his own, but all things are had in common;<sup>85</sup> there each one gladly places himself at the service of, and makes personal sacrifices for, the common cause; there each one serves the other and seeks to bear the other's burdens;<sup>86</sup> there no one thinks to avenge an injury done him, but seeks to requite evil with good.<sup>87</sup>

I would not be misunderstood. I do not say that Jesus brought a new moral teaching based upon the principle of love for mankind in general, or even for enemies, but that Christ, in bringing a new religion, established a new relation between God and men, which is of a spiritually moral sort through and through, and so brought a new morality. As fellowship with God is represented in Jesus, and through him is re-established among men, it had to be converted into a new moral conduct. That the moral powers of primitive Christianity were so strenuous is not to be wondered at. On the contrary, the wonder is that this tension was so quickly relaxed, and that with the second generation after Jesus' death it could happen that Christian preachers must say to their congregations: according to the example of Christ we ought to live for the brethren—where abides love, if one never once helps the needy brother out of his distress.<sup>88</sup> This only shows that very soon in Christendom that experience of salvation, upon which all this moral energy rested, was no longer realized so powerfully as to overcome the opposition of moral indolence and laxity. Beside the church of Smyrna with its self-denying ability and its patience in suffering,<sup>89</sup> and that of Philadelphia with its missionary zeal and its faithful confession,<sup>90</sup> stands the church of Ephesus which has forsaken its first love,<sup>91</sup> the church of Sardis which is alive only in name,<sup>92</sup> and the church of Laodicea with its lukewarmness.<sup>93</sup>

The retreat of eschatology, the disillusionment brought about through the delay of the longed-for parousia, certainly contributed something to this result. Afflictions increased in number, yet the

<sup>85</sup> Acts 4:32.

<sup>86</sup> Gal. 6:2.

<sup>87</sup> Rom. 12:17, 21.

<sup>88</sup> I John 3:16 f.

<sup>89</sup> Rev. 2:8 f.

<sup>90</sup> Rev. 3:7 ff.

<sup>91</sup> Rev. 2:4.

<sup>92</sup> Rev. 3:1.

<sup>93</sup> Rev. 3:16.

promised salvation failed to appear. That is the situation of the Christians to whom the Epistle to the Hebrews is directed. But this disillusionment would have been easily overcome if the experience of salvation in its original power had been newly awakened. Instead of this, the author of Hebrews shows that even with the leading men of the time, notwithstanding their insight into the unique grandeur of the salvation offered in Christ, the understanding was perverted. They lived more in hope than in faith; their faith is only trustful hope, and therefore no longer has transforming power.

With this transformation of Christianity from a religion of experienced salvation into such a religion of hoped-for salvation, is connected in this later period also the greater prominence of sacramental ideas, since belief in a future salvation needs stronger and more obvious guarantees. Religion of the spirit and of truth is thus drawn into the *τελεταί* of hellenism, which is saturated with oriental influences. Therewith the door is opened widely to all the *superstitio* of antiquity, and it streams into Christianity with alarming speed and strength,<sup>24</sup> bringing with it on the one hand belief in demons, and devil play, and, on the other, worship of angels in connection with the cult of saints.

And since it is no longer God and his salvation which are kept exclusively in view, but man and his accomplishments, asceticism, in the sense of meritorious action to help win salvation, very soon comes into Christianity. The note of joy and pleasure is past; there is trembling and fear as formerly before Jesus came.

So we see that all the motives of antiquity which in primitive Christianity exerted scarcely any perceptible influence upon the first Christians, asserted themselves with increasing power from the second century on, as was the case also outside the Christian church in the religious development of heathendom, in Neoplatonism. Against this background is seen the significance of the fact that early Christianity was so free from these motives. The New Testament belongs in antiquity, in the first century, yet it nevertheless transcends its age and belongs to all the centuries.

<sup>24</sup> See my article, "Charms," in Hastings' *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*.

## THE HEBREW VIEW OF SIN

HENRY PRESERVED SMITH  
Meadville Theological School

The theologian is constantly tempted to read the monuments of the past in the light of present experience. And in no case is this temptation more strongly felt than in the discussion of the important topic of sin. Generations of pious men have elaborated a clear-cut doctrine of sin, regarded as apostasy from God, and they have then found this doctrine everywhere enunciated in Scripture. Even treatises on biblical theology have not always escaped the influence of this strongly established tradition. For this reason there seems to be room for a fresh investigation of the facts, and this is attempted in the following paper.

Lexical tradition assigns to the common Hebrew word for sin (חטא) the primitive meaning, "he missed the mark." One passage in the Old Testament seems to support this definition, where we read: "Every one could sling a stone at a hair and not *miss*." But noticing that the verb is pointed as a *hiphil* we see that there is no reason for departing from the usual meaning. What the author meant was that the archer did not *make the arrow go wrong*. The Arabic lexicographers, who are commonly cited in favor of the alleged primitive meaning, know quite well that the word means "he did wrong." They do indeed cite instances where the archer makes the arrow go wrong, and they also cite cases where the verb apparently means "he strayed from the road." They are careful to add, however, that this may be done intentionally or unintentionally, which disproves the alleged primitive meaning; for no one misses the mark or the road intentionally. The fact that here also the causative form of the verb is used shows that the Arab thought of the man who strayed from the path as *spoiling the trail*, confusing it, making it wrong.

We cannot get farther back toward primitive usage than than

<sup>1</sup> Judg. 20: 16.



to say the verb means simply "to go wrong," or "to be in the wrong," whether this comes about through heedlessness (the Arab uses the word of the boiling over of a pot), by mistake, or by malice prepense. The Koran agrees with this, for on the one hand it calls Pharaoh, Haman, Joseph's brothers, and Potiphar's wife by the name "sinners," and on the other allows that in case of unintentional error ("sin") forgiveness may be granted.

A large number of Old Testament passages show that a sin is anything which puts a man in the wrong with reference to another man, which offends him. Pharaoh's butler and baker offend their master, and are put into prison. Laban pursues Jacob and reminds him that he is able to do him an injury. Jacob expostulates: "What is my trespass? What is my sin that thou hast hotly pursued me?" Similarly Abimelech to Abraham: "What have I done to thee, and what have I sinned against thee, that thou hast brought upon me and my kingdom a great sin?" David raises the same question when convinced of Saul's enmity. Jephthah's argument with the Ammonites turns on the point whether there has been actual injury (sin) to justify the war. Judah will be a sinner against his father if he does not bring Benjamin back to him, and Bathsheba asserts that if Adonijah comes to the throne she and Solomon will be sinners. In no one of these cases is there a question of violation of positive law, or of deviation from a moral standard. The only thing which the writer has in mind is that there has been offense of one person by another. Similarly, when Hezekiah confesses to Sennacherib that he has sinned, he does not mean that he did not act in good conscience in revolting, but that events have put him in the power of his adversary. To this extent only is he in the wrong.<sup>a</sup>

Emphasis is evidently laid upon the fact that an offense has been committed, and not at all upon the motive of the offender. Moreover it is assumed that the offended party will take his revenge without stopping to inquire into motive. The avenger of blood will pursue the manslayer, and the common conscience justifies him in taking life for life without allowing any plea in mitigation.

<sup>a</sup> The cases cited are so familiar that I have not thought it necessary to give references.

Moreover the solidarity of the clan is such that the offense against one becomes an offense against all. Here is where the poor man, the client, or the slave finds his security. The poor man can appeal to his more powerful brother, the client can claim the aid of his patron, and the slave that of his master to avenge him of his adversary. As every violation of tribal custom involves offense of some member of the clan there is a standard of morality, but not a code of law in our sense of the words.

Offenses against the divinity are regarded from the same point of view with offenses against men. Direct infringement of his rights will of course call out his anger. Uzzah's well-meant grasping of the Ark was a sin. So was David's intrusion into the sphere of the divine knowledge in taking the census. The tragedy of the house of Eli was brought about by the conduct of his sons who despised the sacred offerings. Their father warns them that it is more dangerous to offend God than to offend man: "If a man sin against a man God will arbitrate the matter; but if a man sin against Yahweh, who can intercede for him?" Jonathan ate a little honey on which a taboo rested, and the God demanded his life as a penalty, though the trespass was done in entire ignorance. The people sinned against Yahweh in eating with the blood because the blood is Yahweh's portion. The non-payment of vows is of course a sin because it withholds what belongs to Yahweh. Pharaoh's sin against Yahweh consists in forbidding his people to make the pilgrimage and pay their dues at the sanctuary. As in the cases of an offense against men the emphasis is laid not at all upon the motive but upon the fact of an injury having been done. The injury may be by words as well as by deeds. Job fears that his sons may have sinned by cursing God in their hearts, and the crowning proof of Job's own righteousness is that he did not sin with his lips or charge God with injustice.

As the divinity is a member of the clan he may be offended by any breach of tribal morality. The human members of the clan are in fact his clients, and may count on his help to vindicate them against overbearing tribesmen and also against strangers. So Abraham was protected even when we should pronounce him in the wrong. Yahweh thus taking the part of the weaker party became

the guardian of tribal morality. The most striking case is that of Uriah. David seems to have had no scruples about his conduct in this matter until Yahweh interfered directly—was not the subject in the power of the king? But Yahweh looked upon Uriah as his client and took his part. Then David recognized that he had sinned against Yahweh. From this point of view we understand the preaching of the earlier prophets. The sins of the people were not violations of some published code of morality—no such code is appealed to. They consisted in trespass upon the rights of the widow, the orphan, and the client, who were recognized by Yahweh as under his care. It is sometimes said that the wrath of Yahweh is roused only by those offenses which break the covenant between him and his people. But there is no evidence that these sins of which the prophets speak were regarded as breaches of the covenant. All that is assumed is that the rights of those who cannot protect themselves are cared for by God. Even the rights of foreigners are thus protected. Joseph would sin against God if he trespassed upon the marital rights of his master. The men of Sodom were sinners against Yahweh in that they violated the common-sense of decency, as well as the rights of hospitality. Damascus, Edom, and Moab are denounced because they have outraged humanity by their cruelty.

Up to this point we have no reason to suppose that the Old Testament writers conceived sin as apostasy from God or transgression of his law. Sin is anything which offends a person, and God is prominent in the thought of the writers because he is the most powerful person whom one is in danger of offending. It is clear, however, that at some point in history the idea that sin is transgression of a divine command comes in. It is probable that this view became prominent only after the establishment of the monarchy. And it is probable that case-law preceded a code or body of statutes. We have already seen that the divinity was appealed to, to arbitrate between man and man. What this means is set before us in the account of Moses' activity as minister of the oracle: "The people come to me to inquire of God; when they have a suit they come to me and I judge between a man and his fellow." The context shows that the judgment was given by the

prophet in the name of Yahweh. In this state of affairs disregard of the judgment of Yahweh would be an offense against him and call forth his wrath. When the king became chief justice of the nation disobedience to his direct commands was also reckoned among the chief sins. Apparently a considerable time elapsed after the establishment of the monarchy before the necessity was felt of collecting the scattered decisions and commands of the king in a code. The Deuteronomic writers, however, saw that it would be well to define in white and black the rights of Yahweh and to record his judgments. It is they who define sin to be disregard of the judgments and disobedience to the statutes, and to this they add violation of the covenant.

It needs no argument to show that the violation of the covenant is direct trespass on the rights of Yahweh. The covenant gave him an exclusive claim on the worship of the people. Defection from him roused his jealousy. Jeremiah holds that Israel has gone beyond the gentiles in depravity because they have exchanged their God for another. Hosea had already compared their sin to that of the wife who is unfaithful to her husband. The reason for all the calamities which befell Judah is found in this: "Your fathers forsook me and walked after other gods and served them." The Deuteronomic writer paraphrases this: "They made him jealous by strangers and provoked him by abominations." The later literature is full of such accusations.

It is obvious that we have got to a point where the intention is recognized as determining the quality of the act. Disobedience to a specific command of Yahweh cannot be unwitting. Thus Saul in sparing Agag must have been cognizant of what he was doing, though he could hardly have fully realized the consequences which would follow. The case of the people in the wilderness who so often refused to obey the command of Moses, and who chronically murmured against their God is similar. Disloyalty is emphasized: "How long will this people despise me and how long will they not believe in me in spite of all the wonders which I have done in the midst of them?" In Jeremiah also the sin of Israel comes from the fact that the people walk in the stubbornness of their evil heart. On the other hand, Yahweh was gratified by the willingness of the

people to hear the instructions of Moses, and wished that there might be such a heart in them to fear him always.

Such passages show that there was a correct apprehension of sin as a state of mind. But it still remains true that when the Hebrew writer used the word *sin* he thought rather of the fact that an offense had been committed than of the state of mind of the offending party. Evidence of this is found in the prominence given to unwitting offenses, especially in the later literature. With the best intention in the world it was still possible to be a sinner. To understand the anxiety of the believer on the subject of unwitting sin we must remember the traditional right of the offended party to compensation, regardless of the intention which lay behind the act. If the injured person does not take the *talio* he must be satisfied by a money payment. In other words, a sin creates a claim, and the sinner rests under this as a debt until satisfaction is given. The idea is well expressed by Mohammed: "The soul charged with the load of its actions shall not bear that of another," and again: "The unbelievers say to the believers, We will carry your sins; but they shall not carry any part of their sins, for they are liars; but they shall surely carry their own burdens."<sup>3</sup> In the Old Testament we read that the man who curses his God shall "carry his sin," and Yahweh found the sin of Sodom very heavy. Although, as we see from these instances, the load is called sin, the more common word for it is "guilt" (עֲוֹן). The people who disobeyed in the wilderness "carried their guilt" forty years. Isaiah sees his people loaded down with guilt, and declares that they drag guilt along with cords of falsehood, and sin with a cart-rope. Cain finds his guilt too heavy to bear, and the context shows that he is thinking not of the load upon his conscience, but of the liability to be slain by some avenger.

The point here is that the load of guilt, however it has been contracted, is realistically conceived as resting upon the offender until it can be removed. It rests not alone upon the offender. The solidarity of the clan or nation is such that the offense of one becomes the offense of all. Abimelech knew that if he had invaded Abraham's rights he would have brought sin upon his whole king-

<sup>3</sup> Koran 39:9 and 29:11.

dom. Aaron brought guilt upon the community by making the calf, though we may remark that in this case the community took part in the sin. Achan, however, by his sin infected the whole people, though they were in ignorance of the transgression for which they suffered. The Deuteronomist warns his reader not to make the land sin, and the context shows that he is not thinking of the evil example but of the guilt contracted by the individual infecting the community. When Abigail, and afterward the woman of Tekoa, politely offer to take David's guilt upon themselves they are of course thinking that there is no actual danger, but the form of speech shows that the thought of transference of guilt was not foreign to the people. The Law declares that one should rebuke his neighbor if he sees him sinning, otherwise he will "bear sin" because of him. Especially prominent in the thought of reflecting men was the burden of guilt which descended from father to son. The bloodshed by Saul rested upon his house until the debt was discharged. The exiled Jews therefore, in complaining that the fathers had eaten sour grapes and the children's teeth were set on edge, had tradition on their side. The Levitical writer draws a somber picture of the people in the captivity pining away in the guilt of their fathers. To the people who so vividly realized the burden or debt of sin the important question was whether this load could be removed. The answer of the Law was that it could, if it had been unwittingly contracted.

To understand the treatment of this question we need to take account of a class of passages which we have hitherto left out of our discussion. These visualize sin, not as a burden but as a stain, not as a debt but as a defilement. This idea is of course ancient. Priestly tradition had always thought of certain things as "taboo," that is, contrary to the worship of Yahweh. The man infected by a taboo must not approach the sanctuary, for the sanctity of Yahweh reacted against the thing taboo and destroyed it. It is Ezekiel who among Old Testament writers first distinctly identified sins with things ritually unclean. He classes all sins as "abominations"—a distinctly ritual term, designating whatever is contrary to the nature of the divinity. In his view the reason why Israel was given over to the enemy was that the people had

made Yahweh's house intolerable to him by these uncleannesses. The kings had brought their foreign slaves into the temple and had buried their dead in its immediate vicinity. Therefore Yahweh does not hesitate to say: "They have polluted my land with the carcasses of their detestable things and have filled mine inheritance with their abominations."

That sin and defilement are identified must be evident from many passages. Thus the priest *takes sin upon himself* if he eats anything which dies of itself or that is torn by beasts, or if he touches anything that has been in contact with a dead body—all ritual offenses. And it must be evident that the whole group of words which speak of cleansing, washing away, purifying, wiping out sin or guilt are based upon the ritual conception, for these words originally referred to acts of lustration performed at the sanctuary or at least commanded by the priest. It is the business of the minister of the sanctuary to inform men what they must do in order to approach the Divinity in an acceptable manner, and this involves the removal of whatever defilements they have contracted. The blame of Judah's calamities is laid upon the priests because they have been lax in this duty: "Her priests did violence to my tora, and profaned my sacred things; they did not distinguish between sacred and common, and they did not instruct concerning clean and unclean . . . so I was profaned in the midst of them." In giving the instruction here referred to the priests were guided by a tradition which had come down from antiquity, and which of course became more elaborate as time went on. The codification of this tradition showed the earnestness of the post-exilic community in the endeavor to make their land fit for the dwelling of Yahweh. They would guard against everything which would disturb the sacred character of the land. In the literal sense Israel was to be a kingdom of priests; all the members of the community were to be consecrated persons, living in a consecrated land. This was why Yahweh had separated them from all the nations: "You shall therefore make a distinction between clean beast and unclean, and between clean fowl and unclean; and you shall not make yourselves abominable by beast or bird or anything wherewith the ground teems, which I have sepa-

rated from you as unclean; and you shall be sacred to me, for I, Yahweh, am sacred." The danger of contamination under such a system needs no demonstration.

What we have to note is that these defilements are offenses against the Divinity just as truly as any of the ethical transgressions against which the prophets inveigh. In fact the Hebrew writers themselves do not always make clear whether a particular sin is trespass upon the rights of God or man, or disobedience of a statute, or ritual uncleanness. When they speak of Achan's sin they call it a trespass as though the invasion of Yahweh's property rights were in question. But the course of the narrative shows that the contagion of a taboo laid upon the devoted thing was what infected not Achan alone but the whole camp. The frequent denunciation of polytheism is based not alone on the idea that worship of another god is disloyalty to Yahweh, but also on the thought that the rites of another divinity are highly taboo. The broth of abominable things of which these worshipers partook brought them into communion with the demons, and they could not partake of the cup of Yahweh and at the same time of the cup of these others. From this point of view we understand the pitilessness with which the Deuteronomists command that all the inhabitants of an idolatrous city shall be exterminated, and that all their property shall be destroyed by fire. The whole is something infected, contact with which would be dangerous.

When the priestly view prevailed, it is evident that the tendency to a strictly ethical conception according to which sin is in the intention, must receive a setback. In a world full of things unclean, defilement is certain to be contracted in spite of the most strenuous efforts to avoid it. Yet if contracted it is dangerous not only to the infected person but also to the whole community. Fortunately the priestly tradition not only defined what constituted impurity; it also prescribed means by which impurity might be removed. First of all the community may be cleansed by the expulsion of the infected member. The leper, he who has an issue, the one who is defiled by contact with a corpse, must be shut out of the camp, so long as the defilement lasts. Those who of set purpose commit any of the graver offenses against Yahweh



are to be excommunicated permanently, or else put to death—for our present purpose it is not necessary to inquire which alternative is contemplated by the Law. Thirty-six different crimes are specified as entailing this penalty, and the list shows the complete fusion of the ethical and the ritual point of view. For we find, side by side with incest, blasphemy, and idolatry, the purely ritual offenses of eating the sacrificial flesh when unclean, eating fat or blood, and eating leavened bread in Passover. Where, however, these acts are committed in ignorance, and wherever defilement is contracted by the accidents of human life the infected person may be purified by an offering.

The close connection of the offerings prescribed for these cases with the subject of sin is indicated by their names. One of them is called *hattath* from the verb we have studied; the other is the *asham*, from a root meaning "to be guilty" or "to trespass." We may conjecture that originally both of them were intended to make good some damage that has been done, being in fact money payments discharging the debt, which, as we have seen, rests upon every offender. The *asham* appears in connection with the return of the Ark from the country of the Philistines, where those who have had it in charge and have experienced the anger of Yahweh make acknowledgment of their wrong by a gift of golden mice. In another passage we learn that the priests were authorized to receive the money of the *asham* and the money of the *hattath*. It does not seem violent to interpret both words as designating damages assessed upon an offender against ritual tradition. As is the case in our legal use of the word "damages," the same term is used to designate the trespass and the payment which is to make good the trespass. In the case of the *hattath* it seems possible to trace the steps by which the word passed from one meaning to the other. Our starting-point must be the activity of the priest already alluded to, his activity in determining whether the layman was fit to approach the Divinity. In this way he distinguished between clean and unclean. If he found his client unclean he must instruct him how to get rid of the infection. The same verb is used to designate both acts—pronouncing the man unclean, and relieving him of the disability. The verb used is the intensive stem of the root we have been considering.

When Jacob expostulated with Laban for the way in which he had been treated he said: "That which was torn by beasts I brought not to thee; I bore the loss of it." The verb translated "I bore the loss of it" means "I unsinned it." The same verb is used in the ritual for the house infected by what is called leprosy. The house is to be "unsinned" or "undefiled" (to coin words that will represent the idea) by a purifying rite, similar to the one used in the case of a human leper.<sup>4</sup> Whether demonistic beliefs originally underlay the ritual does not now concern us, for the documents make no use of such beliefs. They content themselves with codifying the practices which remove the defilement. When the ashes of a burnt heifer are sprinkled on the man who has been in contact with a dead body they "unsin" or "undefile" him. Ezekiel uses the same verb to describe the cleansing both of the altar and of the sanctuary which alone will make them fit for the service. Parallel is the command to Moses to "unsin" the altar of the tabernacle before consecrating it, and in this case it is distinctly said that the rite is accomplished by the *hattath*.

The cleansing of the leper has been referred to, and may be looked at a little more closely. Two distinct ceremonies are enjoined. The first takes place outside the camp and is performed with two birds. One of these is slain, the other bird is dipped in its blood, and some of the blood is sprinkled on the convalescent. The living bird is then allowed to go free. Demonistic ideas are here in evidence. The blood of the slain bird is the means of communion between the man and the living bird, the effect of which is to transfer whatever uncanny influence still lingers about the man from him to the bird which then flies away with it. This preliminary ceremony is separated by an interval of seven days from the one which follows it. This second one brings the man into communion with Yahweh, for at its conclusion he offers a burnt-offering, showing his full right in the congregation. This communion is effected by an *asham*, probably because it is assumed that during his separation the man has not paid all his dues at the sanctuary. The significance of the ceremony is seen in the application of the blood of the offering to the right ear, the right thumb, and the right great toe of the offerer. Moreover there is a rite

<sup>4</sup> Lev. 14:49 and 52.

of consecration with oil: "The priest shall take some of the log of oil and pour it into the palm of his left hand, and the priest shall dip his forefinger in the oil which is in his left hand, and shall sprinkle the oil with his finger seven times before Yahweh, and of the rest of the oil the priest shall put some on the tip of the right ear of him that is to be cleansed, and on his right thumb, and on his right toe, over the blood of the *asham*; and the rest of the oil that is in the priest's hand he shall put upon the head of him who is cleansed." The parallel with the consecration of the priest has often been noted. In that case also the blood of an offering (here called the consecration offering) is applied to the right ear, thumb, and great toe of the priest, and the sacred oil is poured over his head as well as sprinkled on his garments. If the idea of consecration is present in the case of the priest it must also be present in the case of the leper. Oil is said, in fact, to effect the consecration both of the tent and of the priests.<sup>5</sup>

Though *asham* and *hattath* were originally intended to compensate for some damage or trespass, both have now become means of purification. Their sacredness is such that they counteract the innumerable taboos which may infect men or things. It is because this purifying effect is common to both classes that they are so imperfectly distinguished by the Levitical writers. In one instance they seem to be actually identified, for we read that he who has discovered his fault "shall bring his *asham* to Yahweh for his sin which he has sinned, a female from the flock, a lamb or a kid, for a *hattath*." In another passage "water of *hattath*" is evidently water of purification.<sup>6</sup> It is not without reason, therefore, that Josephus says: "The Law has ordained several *purifications* at our sacrifices," and relates that Moses *purified* the priests with water from perennial springs and "with such sacrifices as are usually offered to God on such occasions." Josephus was well aware that Jewish and gentile ideas on this subject were very similar. Greek religion laid much stress upon purifications; purifying sacrifices were offered at the opening of the festivals;

<sup>5</sup> Lev. 8:10-12, 22 f. The rite of cleansing for the leper is contained in Lev. 14:1-32.

<sup>6</sup> Num. 8:7; cf. Lev. 5:6.

those who had attended a funeral and were therefore defiled were cleansed by sacrificial blood; the altar itself was cleansed by sprinkling with blood.<sup>7</sup>

The rigor of the Pentateuchal theory is evident. The code was compiled for a community of the faithful who are supposed always to have the will to obey. The sin unto death, that is, any disobedience which is committed with full knowledge, is to be punished with death or excommunication: "There is no forgiveness for the sin unto death," says the Book of Jubilees, and the New Testament parallel will occur to everyone. Judith tells Holofernes that if the people of Bethulia once trespass on the sacred things, even under pressure of famine, they will surely be destroyed. It is for the ignorances only of the Jews that the angels make intercession. The first effect of the stringency was to extend the definition of unwitting sin so as to include a good deal which could not be said to be done in ignorance. So long as the believer was conscious of an intention to keep the Law he could hope that his errors would be charged to ignorance. The protestations of innocence and uprightness which we read in some of the Psalms become more intelligible if we remember that the authors mean to assert that they have not sinned with a high hand, that is, with malice prepense.

It follows that where there was a genuine conviction of sin recourse was not had to the sin-offerings for relief. That there was real conviction of sin in the Jewish community is abundantly evident. Tender consciences had their sensitiveness heightened by the thought that even unwitting sins might bring calamity upon the community, and they were further depressed by the continuing misfortunes of their people which they interpreted as the evidence that the burden of past sins had not yet been lifted. Daniel voices the convictions of the pious when he says: "We have sinned and dealt perversely, have done wickedly and have rebelled, even turning aside from thy commandments and thine ordinances, neither have we hearkened to thy servants the prophets." In like manner the second Isaiah: "Our rebellions are many before thee, and our

<sup>7</sup> Numerous citations will be found in Wächter, *Reinheitsvorschriften im griechischen Kult*, and also in Stengel, *Opferbräuche der Griechen*.

sins testify against us; for our rebellions are present with us and as for our guiltinesses we know them—transgressing and denying Yahweh, turning away from following God, speaking oppression and revolt, conceiving and uttering from the heart words of falsehood.” On the basis of the priest-code these authors must give up hope, for, as we have seen, this code has nothing but excommunication for those who sin in the sense of these confessions.

As if to give us double assurance that the hope of forgiveness was not based on the ritual the most penitent of these writers take pains to tell us that God does not desire burnt-offering or sin-offering. The ground of their conviction is of course that the prophets had been, if anything, hostile to the sacrificial service. The priest-code alone never was the law of the Jews. They had along with it the other books, and the teachings of these books on the subject of sin and forgiveness had great influence on the spiritually minded. The priest-code was taken at its face value, as showing the way of purification for those who made mistakes or were uninstructed. But forgiveness for sin in the proper sense of the term was looked for on quite other than ritual grounds.

The prophets though, as we have said, opposed to the ritual and even denouncing it as valueless in the sight of God, were yet very positive that forgiveness will be granted to those who seek it. Even Jeremiah, the most pessimistic of them, holds out the hope of pardon. But the forgiveness will be an act of free grace and not conditioned by sacrifice. Ezekiel, the most ritualistic of the prophets, agrees with the others: “Not for your sake [certainly not for the sake of your sacrifices we might read between the lines] but for my sacred name’s sake do I act,” is his frequent assertion. The same prophet insists that all that the sinner has to do is to turn from his evil ways. This is the more significant in that to his view the sins of the people are all defilements, and ritual cleansing is necessary to the communion of Yahweh with his people. The messianic time will be distinguished by the punctilious care with which the purifying sacrifices will be offered. But before this time comes there will be an act of free forgiveness—a purification graciously ministered by God himself: “I will sprinkle clean water upon you and you shall be clean; from all

your filthiness and from all your idols will I cleanse you; a new heart also will I give you and a new spirit will I put in you."

The narrative books lay no stress on sacrifices as a condition of forgiveness. The recalcitrant people who so tried Yahweh's patience in the wilderness were frequently forgiven, but not on the ground of expiatory sacrifices. The intercession of Moses is by prayer and expostulation without rites or ceremonies. Even in the striking scene where Aaron saves the people from annihilation by prompt intervention it is the sacred incense which is effective and not a sacrifice of any sort. The crime of David, serious as it was and impossible to excuse on the ground of ignorance, was forgiven when he confessed it and no mention is made of sacrifice. The prayer of Solomon at the dedication of the temple assumes that Yahweh will forgive when the sinner prays toward the place. With reference to the Jews of the dispersion this was of course a distinct benefit, for it was physically impossible for them to bring the sin-offering if such had been required. But this cannot be the reason why the sin-offerings are ignored in so many passages. If the sin-offerings had been necessary to forgiveness (in the mind of the priestly writers, I mean) they would have been insisted on in spite of considerations of mere convenience. All that the prophetic theologian requires of the wicked man is that he forsake his way and turn unto Yahweh and he will abundantly pardon. The Sibylline oracle does not require even the gentile convert to bring a reconciling sacrifice, but urges him only to give up murder and bathe the whole body in running water, and stretching out hands to heaven to pray for forgiveness for former deeds, and to reconcile with praise to God the former bitterness.<sup>8</sup>

Doubtless the priestly writers were moved by the expectation that in the time to come the people would receive the supernatural cleansing promised by Ezekiel. Instead of making the forgiveness of the people depend upon the sacrifices, they believed that the forgiveness would come first, after which there would be no intentional sin and all that would be needed would be purification from unintentional or accidental defilement. Was it not written that

<sup>8</sup> That in a few cases Yahweh is said to have been mollified by a burnt-offering does not invalidate what has been said.

Yahweh would forgive the guilt of the people and remember their sin no more, after which he would enter into a new covenant with them, writing his laws in their hearts? In the confidence that the messianic time was just at hand the great evangelical prophet assures Zion: "I am he who blots out thy rebellions for my own sake and I will not remember thy sins," and again: "I have blotted out as a cloud thy transgressions, and as a thick mist thy sins." In like manner the Psalmists declare that God has forgiven guilt, has covered up sin, has turned from the fierceness of his wrath. Every favorable turn of the national fortune was taken as an earnest of the good time coming, but the benefits which the people tasted by anticipation were in no sense conditioned by the sacrificial system.

And if these writers did not make forgiveness conditional upon the bringing of a sin-offering, it is also true that the ritual itself does not require repentance as necessary on the part of the offerer. This is not clear to many Bible readers, and the commentators think it necessary to read between the lines and they assure us that repentance is presupposed. But it is strange that this is nowhere stated in so many words. The distinctive word "repent" is not found in connection with the sacrificial rules. In connection with the trespass-offering it is indeed once said that the offerer shall *confess*. But this is only because the amount of the trespass must be made known before the priest can tell whether the man is in fact conforming to the law. Affliction of soul is commanded for the great Day of Atonement, but even here it is not said that men must be sorry for their sins. The critical nature of the day is sufficient to account for the somber mood of the worshipers without supposing any distinct repentance. The priestly writers only showed their consistency in thus ignoring the subject of repentance, for they provided purification for unwitting sins only, and a man cannot in any just sense repent of a defilement which he has contracted without intent.

Why then, it will be asked, is so much emphasis laid on the sacrificial system? The answer must be plain: the emphasis was the emphasis laid upon the observance of the Law as a whole. In all its parts the Law is the will of God, and to break one of the

least of the commandments is to incur his wrath. The pious Jew rejoices not that the sacrifices have obtained forgiveness for him, but that his obedience has been accepted. When he is conscious that he has fallen short he finds relief in confession and prayer, knowing that the sacrifices of God are a broken spirit. There was no doubt a vivid sense of the value of the purifications, which value consisted in their keeping the people in communion with Yahweh. But this value did not inhere in the sin-offerings in any special sense. The head-band of Aaron takes away the guilt of the sacred things; the daily burnt-offering preserves the covenant.

Evidence that it was really the observance of the Law which was emphasized may be found in the Wisdom literature. Here, as is well known, special attention was given to the ethical precepts of the Law, and it is even held that guilt may be removed by attention to these. "By kindness and fidelity guilt is erased," says Proverbs, and Ben Sira is in harmony: "As water quenches fire so righteousness will obliterate sin." The same author credits piety toward a father with equal potency. Daniel exhorts Nebuchadnezzar to redeem his sins by righteousness, and his guilt by showing mercy to the poor. Tobit believes that before the Most High mercy is a good sacrifice, and that beneficence saves from death and cleanses every sin. According to the Psalms of Solomon the righteous man atones (compensates) for unwitting sin by fasting and humbling his soul. These writers do not reject the sacrificial service, as is shown by Ben Sira, who exhorts to the faithful performance of the sacrifices as something commanded, at the same time warning his reader not to trust to their efficacy too implicitly.

It is only in this later period of the history that we get the familiar definition of sin as disobedience or any want of conformity (intentional or unintentional) to the Law of God. And when we go farther and say that sin is any deviation from the perfect ethical standard embodied in the Law, we go beyond what is written. In fact the Jew did not inquire whether the Law embodied the perfect ethical standard or not. The Law embodied the will of God for Israel; that was enough for the faithful, and any inquiry into its reason or its conformity with man's ethical ideas was



rationalism. It is astonishing that this should be ignored when Ezekiel in plain terms says that Yahweh had given the people laws that were ethically indefensible: "I gave them statutes not good, and judgments in which they should not live, and polluted them with their gifts in making them sacrifice every firstborn, that I might make them guilty, that they might know that I am Yahweh."<sup>9</sup> The declaration of the Psalmist that the judgments of Yahweh are truth, only shows the variety of conceptions with which we have to deal.

After what has been said it is hardly necessary to ask whether the animal victim in the sacrifices (specifically in the sin-offering) was a substitute for the offerer, suffering the penalty which should have been visited on the man. The question may be touched upon, however, because Babylonian analogies seem to favor the strictly vicarious theory. The case is this: In some Babylonian rites of healing an animal is slain, and the body is brought into contact with the sick man. The demon of disease is then begged to accept the life of the animal for the life of the man, after which the disease is supposed to leave the man and take possession of the animal carcass. The texts seem specifically to assert that the animal is a substitute for the man. Such assertions are conspicuous, however, by their absence in the case of the Hebrew sin-offering. Various cases of substitution do indeed occur in the Old Testament. The most easily explained is the ram which took the place of Isaac in the story of the testing of Abraham. The story is intended to justify the provision of the Law which allowed the firstborn son to be redeemed instead of being sacrificed. But this is not a case of substitutionary atonement; the life of the firstborn is not forfeited, nor is the offering a sin-offering. A late writer in thinking of the offering of the firstborn does indeed ask: "Shall I bring my firstborn for my rebellion, the fruit of my body for the sin of my soul?" But the context shows that he is seeking to know whether the most valuable of all offerings will secure him access to the Divinity. Moreover the question is introduced only rhetorically to show that the popular conception of the sacrifices is an erroneous one. It is sometimes thought that Moses offers himself as a substitute for

<sup>9</sup> Ezek. 20: 25 f.

his people when he prays to be blotted out of Yahweh's book. But the context shows his meaning to be that if they are to be destroyed he wishes to share their fate. When David prays that the hand of the destroyer may be upon him rather than on the people, he means that he is in fact the guilty one, and there can be no question of substitution.

There is therefore in these cases no genuine vicariousness. And, as we have seen, the whole sacrificial system shows no trace of the idea that the animal was a substitute for the man. Only one rite which we have not yet considered might be adduced in favor of such a theory. This is the sacrifice of the Day of Atonement. But the more closely we examine the ritual the more difficult it is to suppose the idea of substitution to underlie it. The central feature is the sacrifice of one of two goats, and the sending away of the other into the wilderness. The sacrifice is a *hattath* like the others, differing from them only in that its blood purifies the inner sanctuary. The other goat is then burdened with the uncleanness which have been detached from the sacred place, and is made to carry them away to the desert demon to whom they belong. Neither animal is a substitute for a guilty man, or for the guilty nation.

The ceremony which we have just considered is unique in that it recognizes the existence of the desert demon to whom the impurities can be consigned. It is of course possible that in their origin some of the other sin-offerings may have been based on a belief in demons. But if so the belief was not at all in the consciousness of the Levitical writers. The proof is that if the animal victim had actually taken up into itself the impurity of a man its flesh would have become taboo. But these writers take special pains to inform us that the flesh is most sacred. Ezekiel commands that the *asham* and *hattath* be slain on the same tables with the burnt-offering, and that their flesh be cooked in the same pots. Moreover these offerings are actually sacrificed to Yahweh, that is, their blood is sprinkled on the altar, the fat and kidneys are burnt there. This could not be done if they had contracted the taboo of the man for whom they were offered. For the most part also their flesh was eaten by the priests though in some cases it is to be burned

outside the camp. In the latter case we may have a survival of demonistic notions, though I do not think this is at all certain.

There can be no question of substitution in those cases where the evil-doers suffer and thus relieve the community of the guilt resting upon it. The hanging of the chiefs when the people were led away by Midian turned the wrath of Yahweh. According to the other account this was effected by the slaying of Zimri and his paramour. But this means only that Yahweh is satisfied by the punishment of some of the evil-doers and pardons the rest. Saul's sons were impaled for the guilt of their father, but this was because the solidarity of the family made them partakers of his guilt. The principle of the Law is that the soul which sins with full knowledge shall be cut off with its guilt in it. The consolation of the righteous is that Yahweh will destroy the sinners out of the land, and that in the restored Jerusalem the uncircumcised and the unclean will not enter.

Only two passages, if I am not mistaken, convey the idea that the righteous may suffer for the guilty. One of these is the pathetic speech of Judah in which he offers to remain in slavery instead of Benjamin who is supposed to have forfeited his freedom by a crime. The other is the description of the suffering Servant who bore the guilt of many. This chapter of Isaiah is the culmination of a long course of reflection on the ways of Providence. The fact of the innocent suffering with the guilty when the nation was punished for its sins was too obvious to be ignored. One of the Pentateuchal writers realized the problem and embodied its solution in the account of Abraham's intercession for Sodom. His solution is of course no solution, and the Book of Job which considers the same problem in a different form ends in a *non liquet*. But the Isaian author boldly affirms that the innocent suffer for the guilty. In the account of the Maccabaeen martyrs the same thought seems hinted at—the sufferings of the seven brothers cruelly put to death for their fidelity to the Law will satisfy the wrath of the Almighty roused against the nation as a whole. But it is difficult to say how far the narrative regards this as a real case of the innocent suffering for the guilty, and how far the author is possessed by the old notion of solidarity, according to which the guilt of the community rests on all its members.

The idea of substitution is sometimes thought to be contained in the phrase translated in some passages "bear guilt," in others, "take away guilt," and in itself capable of conveying either meaning. The unwitting sinner is said to bear his guilt until the sacrifice removes it, and, on the other hand, Saul asks Samuel to take away his sin, that is, to forgive it. When Ezekiel asserts that the Levites have been guilty in times past and adds that they shall bear their guilt, he evidently means that their degradation from the priesthood is their punishment for their unfaithfulness. But in the legal code where it is said that the Levites shall take away (bear) the guilt of the people, the apparent meaning is that by their sanctity they will purify the people. By analogy we must translate the declaration to Aaron: "Thou and thy clan shall take away the guilt of the sanctuary, and thou and thy sons shall take away the guilt of your priesthood." The parallel says that the plate of gold bearing the inscription "Sanctity to Yahweh" shall be on the forehead of Aaron and "Aaron shall take away the guilt of the sacred things which the sons of Israel shall consecrate in all their sacred gifts, and it shall be always upon his forehead that they may be accepted before Yahweh." There is here the same idea of purification which we have found to underlie the sacrificial service. The plate of gold, having consecrating efficiency, counteracts any remaining taboo which may cling to the oblations of the people, or even to the priestly ministrations. There seems to be no case where this phrase (bear the guilt) implies substitution.

Our study has shown us that two separate views of sin may be traced in the Hebrew Scriptures. One of these is social. According to it sin is what offends another person, human or divine. When fully developed this leads to the idea that sin is disobedience to constituted authority expressing itself in a command. The other view is ritual, according to which sin is anything which makes a man unfit to approach the sanctuary. The combination of the two views came about when social regulations and priestly traditions were embodied in a written code, every item in which was regarded as an express command of Yahweh, one equally binding with another.

## THE "TWO NATURES" AND RECENT CHRISTOLOGICAL SPECULATION

### II. THE NEW TESTAMENT JESUS THE ONLY REAL JESUS

BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD

Princeton Theological Seminary, Princeton, N.J.

In a former article<sup>1</sup> we have pointed out that the doctrine of the "Two Natures" is the common presupposition of the whole body of the New Testament writings—a presupposition which is everywhere built upon, and which comes to clear enunciation wherever occasion calls for it. The literature gathered into the New Testament is not only the earliest Christian literature which has come down to us, but goes back to within twenty years or so of the death of Christ; and since it did not create but reflects the faith it expresses, it must be allowed to possess a retrospective significance in its unbroken testimony to the belief of Christians. What the whole Christian community is found to be resting in, with complete assurance, as the truth respecting the person of its founder in, say, A.D. 50—a time when a large number of his personal followers were doubtless still living, and certainly the tradition of which they were bearers (cf. Luke 1:2) cannot have become obscured—can scarcely fail to have been the aboriginal belief of the Christian body. Nevertheless, a determined effort is still made to discover an "earlier," "more primitive," "simpler" view of the person of Christ behind the oldest attested doctrine. There is confessedly no "direct" evidence of the existence of any such "earlier," "more primitive," "simpler" view. "Of the religion of the earliest Jewish-Christian community," says Johannes Weiss, as he enters upon the exposition of "the faith of the primitive community,"<sup>2</sup> "we have no *direct* witnesses; for we can, today, no longer consider the Epistles of Peter and James genuine works of the primitive apostles"—largely, it needs to be remembered, because they do not contain the "more primitive" Christology which it is assumed

<sup>1</sup> *The American Journal of Theology*, July, 1911, pp. 337 ff.

<sup>2</sup> *Christus*, usw., 7.

these "primitive apostles" must have cherished. But it is thought that by means of indirect evidence, the existence in the first age of Christianity of an earlier view of Christ than any which has found record in the New Testament may be established. The whole mass of expressions of which the New Testament writers make use in speaking of Christ, is subjected to a searching scrutiny with a view to discovering among them, if possible, "survivals" of an "earlier" mode of thinking of Christ. Weiss accordingly continues:

For this pre-Pauline epoch also we are first of all directed to the letters of Paul. He occasionally speaks of having received something from the primitive community (I Cor. 15:3 ff.). But more important still are the numerous elements of the oldest primitive-Christian conceptions which without expressly notifying the fact he carries along in his theology, and which betray themselves to the eye of the investigator as a universal-Christian stratum underlying the more Hellenistically colored specifically-Pauline doctrine. Similarly, all the other documents of the Apostolic and post-Apostolic age contain such old Christian traits, which point back to the standpoint of the oldest community. Thereto we reckon especially the discourses in the first part of Acts. Though they may have come from a later time, yet, precisely in their Christology, they contain very antique conceptions.

What is attempted, it will be seen, is on subjective grounds—there are, in the circumstances, none other available—to distinguish, among the New Testament deliverances concerning Christ, those which belong to the primitive age from those which belong to the age when the books were written. The whole New Testament is doubtless laid under contribution for this purpose, but the happy hunting-ground of the quest is found in the early chapters of the Acts and in the Synoptic Gospels.

It is not without the clearest justification that we have emphasized the purely subjective grounding of this quest. If we possessed a single Christian document earlier in date than those which constitute our New Testament, in which was taught the special Christology which it is proposed to extract from our New Testament as an earlier form of belief than that which the New Testament itself universally commends to us, there might be some excuse for gathering out of our New Testament books the sentences and forms of expression which seemed to fall particularly in with the

teachings of this earlier document and pronouncing them survivals of its earlier modes of thought. But in the absence of any such earlier document, what reason is there for pronouncing these forms of expression "survivals"? The touchstone by which their "earlier" character is determined, Weiss tells us, resides in "the searcher's eye." That is to say, shortly, in the critic's a-priori paradigms. The critic comes to his task with a settled conviction, a priori established, that Jesus was a mere man, and must have been thought of by his followers as a mere man; and sets himself to search out in the extant literature—which is informed by a contrary conviction—modes of expression which he can interpret as "survivals" of such an "earlier" point of view. Meanwhile, there is no evidence whatever that these modes of expression are "survivals," or that there ever existed in the Christian community an "earlier" view of the person of Christ than that given expression in the New Testament writings. Reinhold Seeberg has quite accurately expounded the state of the case when, speaking more particularly of Harnack's unfortunate attempt to distinguish in primitive Christianity an "adoptionist" and a "pneumatic" Christology, he says:<sup>3</sup>

Investigators, in my opinion, are as a rule misled by this—that they make the "historical Jesus" their starting-point by simple assumption, and treat all expressions which go beyond this as attributes added to him in gradual precipitation on the ground of faith in his resurrection. The historical starting-point is, however, in reality contained in three facts: (1) that Jesus in his earthly life manifested a superhuman self-consciousness; (2) that his disciples were convinced by him, *after* his resurrection, not precisely *by* it, that they had directly experienced and received proof of his divine nature; and (3) that they accordingly honored and proclaimed him as the heavenly Spirit-Lord. These facts are, in my opinion, indisputable, and from these facts as a starting-point—they are simply "given" and not deducible—the entire thought-development can be fully explained.

<sup>3</sup> *Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte*, I, 104. Seeberg, of course, only repeats in this what has been clearly pointed out from the beginning. Thus E. K. A. Riehm, *Der Lehrbegriff des Hebräerbriefes* (1867), 332, remarks: "That it is only on the basis of his well-known false preconception to the effect that the *original* Christian conception of the person of Christ was an Ebionitish one, that Schwegler refers the declarations as to the exaltation of the person of Christ to a mere effort, to a *tendency*, while he refers the declarations as to the likeness of Christ to men to the *tradition*, we note only in passing."

When the study of historical records is approached with a fixed assumption of an opposite point of view to their own as instrument of interpretation, it is not strange if their representations are replaced by a set of contradictory representations. But the "results" thus reached are not in any recognizable sense "historical." They are the product of wresting history in order to fill in a foregone conclusion of abstract thought.<sup>4</sup>

It should not pass without very particular notice that the forms of expression gathered from our New Testament books, out of which is to be fashioned an "earlier" Christology than that presupposed by this literature, do not lie on the face of the New Testament as alien fragments. It is not without significance that Johannes Weiss, after remarking that Paul occasionally puts forward statements as derived by him from "the primitive community," at once adds that, for the purpose of reconstructing the faith of this "earlier community" from Paul's writings, "survivals" in his writings not expressly notified as such are both more numerous and more important. In other words, our New Testament writers who have preserved for us the elements of this "earlier" Christology wholly different from their own and, indeed contradictory to it, have preserved them with the most engaging unconsciousness of their alien character: in point of fact, they have written down these contradictory sentences with no other

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Albert Schweitzer's characterization of this method of criticism in an analogous field (*The Quest of the Historical Jesus*, 330-31): "In order to find in Mark the life of Jesus of which it is in search, modern theology is obliged to read between the lines a whole host of things, and those often the most important, and then to foist them upon the text by means of a psychological conjecture. It is determined to find evidence in Mark of a development of Jesus. . . . Mark knows nothing of any development in Jesus. . . . Another hitherto self-evident point—the historical kernel which it has been customary to extract from the narratives—must be given up, until it is proved, if it is capable of proof, that we can and ought to distinguish between the kernel and the husk. . . . Whatever the results obtained by the aid of the historical kernel, the method pursued is the same: it is detached from the context and transformed into something different. 'It finally comes to this,' says Wrede, 'that each critic retains whatever portion of the traditional sayings can be fitted into his construction of the facts and his conception of historical possibility, and rejects the rest.' The psychological motiving and the psychological connection of the events and actions which are proposed to be found in Mark simply do not exist. That being so, no results whatever can be reached by the reworking of his narrative by means of an a-priori psychology."



thought than that they were the just expression of their own proper views; and they betray no sense of embarrassment whatever with respect to them. This is true even—or perhaps we should say, especially—of the extreme case of the record of Peter's christological utterances in the earlier chapters of the Book of Acts. It is quite clear that Luke is wholly unaware that he is recording views of his Lord which differ from his own, which, indeed, are in sharp conflict with his own and, to speak frankly, stultify his entire attitude toward his Lord, for the validation of which his whole great two-part work was written. We may well ask whether such unconscious *naïveté* can be attributed to such an alert writer as Luke shows himself to be. Or if with Johannes Weiss<sup>5</sup> we deny these chapters to Luke and suppose the speeches of Peter "free compositions" of a later author, the *tour de force* which we attribute to this great nameless dramatist rises quite to the level of the miraculous. It is hardly worth while to ask similarly whether Paul, in his fervid expressions of reverence to Christ as "Lord," can be supposed with such simplicity to mix in with his own language, so vividly expressive of this reverence, other forms of speech standing in flat contradiction to all that he was proclaiming, merely because he found them in use in "the primitive community." Surely the Epistle to the Galatians does not encourage us to believe Paul to have been filled with such blind veneration for "the primitive community," that he would be likely to continue to repeat its language in devout subjection to the authority of its modes of statement, though it ran counter to his profoundest convictions and his most fervent religious feelings.

The general point we are endeavoring to make deserves some elaboration with special reference to the Synoptic Gospels. It is particularly behind their narrative that the traces of an earlier conception of the person of Christ than that presented by our whole New Testament—inclusive of these gospels—are supposed to be discoverable. It is frankly allowed, as we have seen, that the Gospels as they stand present to our view a divine Christ, an incarnated Son of God, who came to earth on a mission, and whose whole earthly life is only an episode in the existence of a Heavenly

<sup>5</sup> *Encyclopaedia Biblica*, I, 47-48; see the allusion above, p. 547.

Being. But it is immediately added that in the narrative put together from this standpoint, there are imbedded elements of an earlier tradition, to which Jesus was a mere man, bounded by all human limitations. And it is assumed to be precisely the task of criticism to identify and draw out these elements of earlier tradition, that we may recover from them the idea formed of Jesus by his real contemporaries and, therefore, presumably, the true conception of him before he was transformed by the reverent thought of his followers into an exalted Being, to be which he himself made no claim. We say nothing now of purely "literary criticism"—the attempt to ascertain the sources on which our gospels as literary compositions rest, and from which they draw their materials. For this "literary criticism" in no way advances the discovery of a "more primitive" Christology lying behind that presented by the authors of our gospels. It would have been a strange proceeding indeed had the authors of our gospels elected to draw their materials, by preference, from earlier documents presenting a totally different, or, rather, sharply contrasting conception of Jesus from that which they had in heart and mind to commend to their readers; and they are obviously wholly unaware of doing anything of the kind. Happily, we are delivered from the necessity of considering the possibility of such a literary phenomenon. It is no doubt impossible to reconstruct any of the sources which "have found their graves" in our gospels with full confidence, with respect either to the details of their contents or even to their general compass. But neither the "narrative source"—the so-called *Urmarkus*—which underlies all three of the Synoptics, nor the "discourses-source"—the so-called "Logia"—which underlies the common portions of Matthew and Luke not found also in Mark, on any rational theory of its compass and contents, differs in any respect in its christological point of view from that of the Gospels, so large a portion of which they constitute.<sup>6</sup> We may remark in passing that this carries the evi-

<sup>6</sup> We have already seen above (p. 358) Johannes Weiss incidentally noting the use in the "discourses-source" of the "Son of Man," of Christ: of course, the same use occurs in the *Urmarkus*, however it be reconstructed. But the general point is easily demonstrable in detail.

dence for the aboriginality in the Christian community of the two-natured conception of Christ back a literary generation behind the Synoptics themselves; and that surely must bring us to a time which can scarcely be thought to be wholly dominated by Paul's innovating influence. It is enough for us here to note, however, that "literary criticism" does not take us back to documents presenting a "pre-Pauline" Christology. If such a "pre-Pauline" Christology is to be found in the background of our gospels, much coarser methods of reaching it than "literary criticism" must be employed.

The absurd attempt of P. W. Schmiedel to reverse the conception of Christ transmitted to us by the Gospels, by insisting that, in the first instance, we must trust only such passages as are—or rather, as, when torn from their contexts, may be made to seem—inconsistent with the main purpose of the evangelists in writing their gospels, namely, to honor Christ, is only an unusually crass application of the method which from the beginning has been common to the whole body of those who, like him, are in search of evidence in the Gospels of the existence of a "more primitive" tradition than that which the Gospels themselves represent. The essence of this method is the attempt to discover in the gospel narrative elements in the delineation of Jesus which are inconsistent with the conception of Jesus which it is their purpose to convey; to which unassimilated elements of a different tradition, preference is at once given in point of both age and trustworthiness. This method is as freely in use, for instance, by Johannes Weiss, who seems to wish to separate himself from Schmiedel,<sup>7</sup> as by

<sup>7</sup> Or can Weiss not have Schmiedel in mind in writing as follows (*Jesus von Nazareth*, 1910, 93): "What mandate of the historical method, however, tells us that the interested parties [*die Beteiligten*] are to be distrusted under all circumstances? There no doubt still exist people to whom the declarations of a pious man are antecedently suspicious. We need not argue with them; they have been born a century and a half too late. They simply neglect a moral duty when they deny to those who differ with them the same bona fides they make claim to for themselves. The truly unprejudiced man will say: 'With reference to the nature of a personality we shall always reach ultimately a clearer notion along with those who have surrendered themselves to his influence than with those whom either hate has made blind, or who have simply taken no interest in him. It is possible to think the reverence shown him excessive and to draw back from many things his friends say of him: yet certain fundamental traits are here most surely to be found.'"

Schmiedel himself. Let us note how Weiss deals with the matter:<sup>8</sup>

The Christology of the evangelist himself [he is speaking of Mark] is very far advanced in the direction of the Johannine; there can be no doubt that Jesus is to him the Son of God, in the sense of a divine being with divine power and divine knowledge from the beginning on. Nothing is hidden from him: his own destiny, the denial, the betrayal, the fate of Jerusalem—he tells it all exactly beforehand. Nothing is impossible to him: the most marvelous healings, like the sudden cure of the withered hand, of leprosy, of blindness, are performed by him without any difficulty; he raises a dead person; he walks on the water, and feeds thousands with a few loaves; he makes the

<sup>8</sup> *Jesus von Nazareth*, usw., 132–33. It is perhaps worth while to observe how Riehm, in a passage which has already been adverted to (*Der Lehrbegriff des Hebräerbriefes* [1887], 331–32), already deals with this sort of criticism as applied by Schwegler to the Epistle to the Hebrews: "The two kinds of expression, set side by side, stand in remarkable contrast. Now it is said that the Son as the effulgence of the glory of God possesses the fulness of God's essential glory, then again that like us he partakes of flesh and blood; now that he is eternal and unchangeable, then again that he is like us in all things; now he is exalted high above all men, and even above angels and set in an absolutely unique relation to God, then again he is placed on the level of men and set forth as standing in a human relation to God; there is no trait in the nature of God which is not found also in the nature of the Son, and yet it is only through severe conflicts of suffering that he struggles to attain the highest stage of moral-religious perfection; he upholds all things by the word of his power, and yet he is subjected to the cruellest sufferings and the death of the cross. With an eye on these contrasts it is easy to understand how Schwegler came to the contention (II, 388): 'We perceive still in the Christology of the Epistle to the Hebrews the lack of harmony which belongs to the first beginnings; we meet everywhere with an unreconciled contradiction of the two constitutive elements of the person of Christ, the human and the divine in him, his subordination beneath the Father, and his co-ordination and consubstantiality with the Father. In spite of the visible effort which the author makes to bring the divine in Christ to its highest possible and most specific expression, there presses continually forward the traditional human conception of the person.' This contention is, however, thoroughly false. That it is only on the basis of his well-known false presupposition that the *original* Christian conception of the person of Christ was an Ebionitish one, that Schwegler refers the declarations of the exaltation of the person of Christ to a mere effort, to a *tendency*, while he refers the declarations of the likeness of Christ to men to the *tradition*, we note only in passing. But even apart from this, do these two kinds of declarations really stand in an unreconciled contradiction to one another? The author makes it very clear that in his own consciousness the conciliation of the two modes of conceiving Christ, as the Son of God and as true man, was fully carried out, when in 5:8 he expressly says that the sonship to God and the learning of obedience through suffering in no way (as might be thought) exclude one another. It is accordingly clear to him that Christ *on earth* could be God's Son, and true man *at the same time*; that he was both in *one* person."

fig tree wither—it is all related as if nothing else could be expected; we see in these accounts neither the bold faith to which all is possible nor the enthusiasm of one beside himself, nor natural intermediation; Jesus can do just anything. And therefore, to the evangelist, it is nothing singular that at his death the sun was darkened, and the veil of the temple was rent; and that he left the grave on the third day—all this follows altogether naturally and of itself from his Christology. But alongside of these stand other traits: his power rests on the Spirit, which was communicated to him at baptism; we see how this Spirit struggles with the spirits (1:25, 3:11, 5:6, 8, 9:25); his miraculous power is limited by unbelief (6:5), he must have faith himself and find faith in others if he is to help; his dominion over suffering and death has its limits; he trembles and is afraid, and feels forsaken by God; he is ignorant of the day and hour; he will not permit himself to be called “Good Master”; he prays to the Father like a man, and is subject to all human emotions, even anger, and to mistake with reference to his disciples.

The whole art of the presentation is apparent. Weiss would make it appear that there are two Jesuses in Mark's narrative, a divine Jesus and a human Jesus; and if we take the one, he suggests, the other must be left. Mark himself believed in the divine Jesus; the human Jesus, which he places by his side, must therefore be the “earlier” Jesus, to which he has been so accustomed that he cannot away with him even when he would. The astonishing thing, however, is that Mark is entirely unconscious of the straits he is in. He records the human traits, which are supposed to refute the whole portraiture he is endeavoring to draw, with no sense of their incongruity. For, “we must remember,” as Dr. Percy Gardner admonishes us,<sup>9</sup> “that the Gospels are not mere colorless biographies but collections of such parts of the Christian tradition as most impressed a society which had already begun to seek in the life of its founder traces of a more than human origin and nature.” They are, to put it more accurately, presentations of the salient acts and sayings of Jesus by men who thoroughly believed in the divine Christ, and who wished—as Dr. Gardner says of Paul, the master of two of these evangelists—to “place the human life of Jesus between two periods of celestial exaltation.” Why then did these men, of all men, preserve elements of an earlier tradition which contradict their own deepest convictions of the origin and nature of their Lord? Is it because they lacked

<sup>9</sup> *Jesus or Christ?* Being the *Hibbert Journal* Supplement for 1909, p. 46.

literary skill to convey the picture they were intent on conveying, and so, as Dr. Gardner puts it, in their attempt to depict the Jesus they believed in, the "human legend was not effaced, but it was supplemented here and there with incongruous elements"? Surely, the day is long since past when our gospels can be treated thus as naïve narratives by childlike hands endeavoring only to set down the few facts concerning Christ which had come to their knowledge. If these elements of "the human legend" were retained, it was, on the contrary, precisely because they presented to the consciousness of these writers no incongruity with their conceptions of the divine Christ; and that is as much as to say that the Jesus whom they were depicting was in their view no less truly human than truly divine. The life of the Master on earth, which they placed between the two periods of celestial exaltation, bore for them the traits of a truly human life.

But as soon as we say this, it is clear that we cannot appeal to the human traits which they ascribe to Jesus as evidence of the existence of an "earlier" Christology than theirs, which looked upon Jesus as merely human. These traits are congruous parts of their own Christology. They are not fragments of an earlier view of Christ's person, persisting as "survivals" in a later view; they are the other half of a consistent christological conception. They supply, therefore, no evidence that there ever existed an earlier Christology than that in which they occupy a necessary place. We may reject, if we please, the Christology of the evangelists, and, rejecting it, insist that Christ was not a divine-human, but simply a human being. But we can get no support for this private, and possibly pious, opinion of our own, from the writings of the evangelists. The human traits, which they all ascribe to Jesus, do not in the least suggest that they, in the bottom of their hearts, or others before them, believed in a merely human Jesus. They only make it manifest that they, and those from whom they derive, believed in a Jesus who was human. The attempt to distort the evidence that they believed in a Jesus who was human, as well as divine, into evidence that they had inherited belief in a merely human Jesus, and unconsciously lapsed into the language of their older and simpler faith, even when endeavoring to commend quite

another conception, does violence to every line of their writings; it is not acute historical exposition, but the crassest kind of dogmatic imposition. Because from the critic's own point of view the doctrine of the "Two Natures" involves a psychological impossibility, when he finds the evangelists presenting in their narratives a Jesus who is both divine and human, he proclaims that there are clumsily mixed here two mutually inconsistent Christologies chronologically related to one another as earlier and later; and because from his own point of view a purely divine Jesus were as impossible as a divine-human one, he pronounces that one of these two warring Christologies which makes Jesus a mere man, the earlier, "historical" view, and that one which makes him divine, a later, "mythical" view. For neither the one nor the other of these pronouncements, however, has he other ground than his own a-priori prejudice. The divine and the human Jesus of the evangelists do not stand related to one another chronologically, as an earlier and a later view, but vitally, as the two sides of one complex personality; and had there been reason to interpret them as chronologically related there is no reason derivable from the evangelists themselves—or, we may add, from the history of thought in the first years of the Christian proclamation—why the human view of Christ's person should be supposed to be the earlier of the two. From all that appears in these narratives, and from whatever other records we possess, Jesus was, on the contrary, from the beginning understood by his followers to be very God, sojourning on earth. In a word, not only is the doctrine of the "Two Natures" the synthesis of the entire body of christological data embodied in the pages of the New Testament; and not only is it the teaching of all the writers of the New Testament severally; but the New Testament provides no material whatever for inferring that a different view was ever held by the Christian community. The entire Christian tradition, from the beginning, whatever that may be worth, is a tradition of a two-natured Jesus, that is to say, of an incarnated God. Of a one-natured Jesus, Christian tradition knows nothing, and supplies no materials from which he may be inferred.

This determination of the state of the case includes in it, it will be observed, Jesus' own self-testimony. We know nothing of

Jesus' self-consciousness, or self-testimony, save as it has been transmitted to us by his followers. The Jesus whom the evangelists have given us testifies to the possession of a self-consciousness which matches perfectly the conception of Jesus which the evangelists are set upon conveying; indeed, the evangelists' conception of Jesus is embodied largely in terms of Jesus' self-testimony. Behind this we can get only by the method of criticism whose inconsequence we have been endeavoring to expose. That "historical Jesus," whom Johannes Weiss (in act of bearing his witness as a historian to the historical validity of the higher Christology) describes as, "so far as we can discern him, seeing his task in drawing his followers into the direct experience of sonship with God, without demanding any place for himself in their piety,"<sup>10</sup> has never existed anywhere except in the imaginations of Weiss and his "liberal" fellow-craftsmen. The evangelists know nothing of him nor does he lurk anywhere in the background of their narratives. The only Jesus of which they have knowledge—or whose figure is traceable in any of their sources—is a Jesus who ranked himself above all creatures (Mark 13:32, one of Schmiedel's "pillar-passages," of which J. H. Moulton speaks as "that saying of uniquely acknowledged authenticity");<sup>11</sup> who represented himself as living continuously in an intercourse with God which cannot be spoken of otherwise than as perfect reciprocity (Matt. 11:25; Luke 10:22—a passage which has its assured place in the "discourses-source"); and who habitually spoke of himself as the "Son of Man" (as witnessed in both the "narrative-source" and the "discourses-source"—of course, with all the implications of heavenly origin, ineffable exaltation, and judgeship of the world—divine traits all—which accompany that designation). It is pure illusion, therefore, for Karl Thieme to think of himself as faithful to the self-consciousness of Jesus, or as casting off only an "apostolical theologoumenon (*Glaubensgedanke*)"—which he considers no fault—when he attaches himself to a merely human Jesus and pronounces all that is more than this "mythological."<sup>12</sup> This

<sup>10</sup> *Paulus und Jesus* (1909), 5.

<sup>11</sup> *Free Church Year-Book and Who's Who* for 1911, cited in the *Expository Times* May, 1911, 339.

<sup>12</sup> *Z.Th.K.*, XVIII (1908), 431, 442.



merely human "historical Jesus" is a pure invention of the wish that is father to the thought, and would have been, not merely to Paul, as Martin Brückner justly reminds us,<sup>13</sup> but to all the New Testament writers as well, and to Jesus himself, as depicted by them and as discernible in any sense behind their portraiture—just "nonsense."

We cannot withhold a certain sympathy, nevertheless, from men who, caught in the toils of modern naturalism, and unable themselves to admit the intrusion of the supernatural into this world of "causative nexus," are determined to keep the merely human Jesus, whom alone they can allow to have existed, free from at least the grosser illusions concerning his person with which the thought of his followers has been (in their view) deformed. There surely is manifested in this determination—utterly unhistorical as it is, in both spirit and effect—a strong underlying wish to honor Jesus; to preserve to him at least his sanity—for that is what it comes to in the essence of the matter. A merely human Jesus, who nevertheless believed himself to be God, were a portentous figure on which to focus the admiring gaze of the Christian generations. We may well believe that a saving instinct underlies all the more extreme historical skepticism in the modern attempts to construe the figure of Jesus, as it is somewhat grotesquely phrased, "historically." The violence done to historical verity, for example, in denying that Jesus thought and proclaimed himself the Messiah, receives a kind of—shall we say psychological, or shall we say sentimental?—if not justification, yet at least condonation, when we reflect what it would mean for Jesus, if, not being really the Messiah (and from this naturalistic point of view the whole body of messianic hopes were but a frenzied dream), he nevertheless fancied himself the Messiah and assumed the rôle of Messiah. There may even be pleaded a sort of historical condonation for it; it certainly were inconceivable that such a man

<sup>13</sup> *Die Entstehung der paulinischen Christologie* (1903), 12: "For the Christ, too, is for Paul, a redemptive-historical personality. Of course, not in the modern sense. The historical Christ in, say, the sense of the Ritchlian school, would have been for Paul, nonsense. The Pauline Christology had rather to do with the experiences of a heavenly being which have, and should have, an extraordinary significance for humanity."

as Jesus is historically authenticated as being—his whole life informed, for example, with a gracious humility before God—could have been the victim of such a megalomania.<sup>14</sup>

It is into a perfect labyrinth of inconsistencies and contradictions, in fact, that the assumption that Jesus was a mere man betrays us; and from them there is no issue except by the correction of the primal postulate. The old antithesis *aut Deus, aut non bonus* need, indeed, no longer be pressed; none in these modern days (since Renan) is so lost to historical versimilitude as to think of charging Jesus with coarse charlatanry (cf. Matt. 27:63). But his integrity is saved only at the cost of his intelligence. If none accuse him of charlatanry, there are many who are ready to ascribe to him the highest degree of fanaticism, and a whole literature has grown up in recent years around the matter. There is, indeed, no escape from crediting to him some degree of "enthusiasm," if he is to be considered a mere man. And this, let us understand it clearly, is to ascribe to him also, when the character of this "enthusiasm" is understood, some degree of what we are accustomed, very illuminatingly, to call "derangement." It is easy, of course, to cry out, as Hans Windisch, for example, does cry out, against the antithesis "Either Jesus Christ was mentally diseased, or he was God-man," as "frightful and soul-imperiling."<sup>15</sup> It is that; but it offers us, nevertheless, the sole possible alternatives. Shall we not recognize it as a delusion which argues mental unsoundness when a mere man proclaims himself God? Even D. F. Strauss taught us this much two generations ago: "If he were a mere man" says he,<sup>16</sup> "and, nevertheless, cherished that expectation"—the expectation, to wit, of quickly coming on the clouds of heaven to inaugurate the messianic kingdom—"we cannot help either ourselves or him. He was, according to our conceptions, a fanatic (*Schwärmer*)."<sup>17</sup> It is possible, no doubt, sturdily to deny

<sup>14</sup> This point is admirably elaborated by M. Lepin, *Jésus Messie et Fils de Dieu d'après les Évangiles Synoptiques* (1907), 163.

<sup>15</sup> *Theologische Rundschau*, May, 1911, 221. He has in view especially Ph. Kneib, *Moderne Leben-Jesu-Forschung unter dem Einflusse der Psychiatrie* (1908), and H. Werner, *Die psychiatrische Gesundheit Jesu* (1907), both of whom press the antithesis.

<sup>16</sup> *Der alte und der neue Glaube*, 80.

that Jesus could have harbored these high thoughts of himself, or cherished these great expectations. But this is flatly in the face of the whole historical evidence. It is undeniable that the only Jesus known to history was both recognized by his followers and himself claimed to be something much more than man, and to have before him a career accordant with his divine being. Nor can this lowered view of Jesus be carried through: neither Harnack, nor Bousset, nor Hausrath, nor Otto has been able, with the best will in the world, to present to us a Jesus free from supernatural elements of self-consciousness.<sup>17</sup> So that it is a true judgment, which Hermann Werner passes upon their efforts to depict a merely human Jesus: "The historical Jesus of the liberal theology is and abides a mentally diseased man—as Lepsius strikingly said, 'a tragedy of fanaticism' (*Schwärmerei*)."<sup>18</sup> If these supernatural claims were "mythical," then either there was no real Jesus, and his very personality vanishes into the myth into which all that is historical concerning him is sublimated, or the real Jesus was the subject of acute megalomania in his estimate of himself.

And here we discover the significance in the history of thought of the new radicalism which has, in our day, actually raised the question—a question which has become a "burning" one in Germany, the home of the "merely human Jesus"—whether "Jesus ever lived." Men like Albert Kalthoff and Karl Kautsky, Wilhelm von Schnehen and Arthur Drews, emphasize the fact that the only Jesus known to history was a divine being become man for human redemption—not a deified man, but an incarnate God. If this Jesus is a mythological figure—why, there is no "historical Jesus" left. The zeal for vindicating the actual existence of a "historical Jesus," which has developed in the circles of German "liberalism" during the past two years, is most commendable. The task is easy, and the success with which it has been accomplished is correspondingly great. But the real significance, whether

<sup>17</sup> These particular names are adduced only because they happen to be those singled out by H. Werner for examination in a striking article entitled "Der historische Jesus der liberalen Theologie—ein Geisteskranker," published in the *N.K.Z.* (May, 1911), XXII, 5, 347-390. He shows in detail that the Jesus of each of these authors presents symptoms of paranoia.

<sup>18</sup> H. Werner, as above, 383-89.

of the attack or the defense, seems to be only slowly becoming recognized, or at least to have been acknowledged by those involved most deeply in the conflict. It lies, however, very much on the surface. Arthur Drews is simply the *reductio ad absurdum* of David Friedrich Strauss. And the vindication of the actuality of a "historical Jesus," against the assault of which Drews has become the central figure, is the definitive refutation of the entire "mythical theory," which, inaugurated by Strauss, has been the common foundation on which the whole "liberal" school has built for two generations. There is, of course, nothing more certain than that "Jesus lived." But there is another thing which is equally certain with it; and that is expressed with irrefutable clearness and force by Arthur Drews when he declares that "the Jesus of the oldest Christian communities is not, as is commonly thought"—that is to say, in the circles of "liberalism"—"a deified man, but a humanized God." It is impossible to sublimate into myth the whole Jesus of the New Testament testimony, the Jesus of the evangelists, the Jesus of all the evangelical sources which can be even in part isolated and examined, the Jesus, in a word, of the entire historical witness, and retain any Jesus at all. The "mythical Jesus" is not the invention of Drews, but of Strauss, and it is common ground with Drews and all his "liberal" opponents. It is a mere matter of detail whether we say with Weinelt that the historical Jesus was a mere man, but a man whom "we know right well—as well as if we could see him still before us today, and were able to hear his voice"; or with Pfeiderer, that he was certainly a mere man, but is so bound up with the legends that have grown up about him that we can never know anything about his real personality; or with Drews, that there is no reason for supposing that he ever existed at all: a mere matter of detail, indifferent to history, which knows nothing of any Jesus but the divine Jesus. The advent of the new radicalism into the field of discussion cannot fail, however, greatly to clear the air; the merely human Jesus is really eliminated by it from the catalogue of possible hypotheses, and the issue is drawn sharply and singly: Is the divine-human Jesus, who alone is historically witnessed, a reality, or a myth? *Tertium non datur*.

Thus we are brought to the final issue. The two-natured Christ is the synthesis of the whole mass of biblical data concerning Christ. The doctrine of the Two Natures underlies all the New Testament writings severally, and it is commended to us by the combined authority of all those primitive followers of Christ who have left written records of their faith. It is the only doctrine of Christ which can be discerned lying back of our formal records in pre-written tradition; it is the aboriginal faith of the Christian community. It is the only alternative to a non-existent Christ; we must choose between a two-natured Christ and a simply mythical Christ. By as much as "Jesus lived," by so much is it certain that the Jesus who lived is the person who alone is witnessed to us as having lived—the Jesus who, being himself of heavenly origin and superior to the very angels, had come to earth on a mission of mercy, to seek and save those who are lost, and who, after he had given his life a ransom for many, was to come again on the clouds of heaven to judge the world. No other Jesus than this ever lived. No doubt he lived as man, his life adorned with all the gracious characteristics of a man of God. But he cannot be stripped of his divine claims. We have already had occasion to advert to the gross contradiction which is involved in supposing that such a man as he was could have preserved that fine flavor of humility toward God which characterized his whole life-manifestation and yet have falsely imagined himself that exalted being in whose fancied personality he lived out his life on earth. The trait which made it possible for him to put himself forward as the Fellow of God would have made the humility of heart and demeanor which informed all his relations with God impossible. Our modern humanitarians, of course, gloze the psychological contradiction; but they cannot withhold recognition of the contrast of traits which must be accredited to any Jesus who can really be believed—even on their postulates—to have ever existed.<sup>19</sup> Stand-

<sup>19</sup> "What contradictions must Jesus have united in himself on the basis of the liberal life-picture of him," exclaims H. Werner (*Neue kirchliche Zeitschrift*, May, 1911, p. 389). "He was at the same time humble and proud, acute-minded and weak-minded, clear-sighted and blind, sober-minded and fanatical, with profound knowledge of men and no self-knowledge, clear in his insight of the present, and full of fantastic dreams of the future. His life was, as Lepsius strikingly said, 'a tragedy of fanaticism.'"

ing before this puzzle of his life-manifestation, Adolf Harnack writes:<sup>20</sup>

Only one who has had a kindred experience could go to the bottom here. A prophet might perhaps attempt to lift the veil; such as we must be content to assure ourselves that the Jesus who taught self-knowledge and humility, yet gave to himself, and to himself alone, the name of the Son of God.

And again:<sup>21</sup>

But it is of one alone that we know that he united the deepest humility and purity of will with the claim that he was more than all the prophets who were before him, even the Son of God. Of him alone, we know that those who ate and drank with him glorified him, not only as the Teacher, Prophet, and King, but also as the Prince of Life, as the Redeemer, Judge of the world, as the living power of their existence—"It is not I that live, but Christ in me"—and that presently a band of the Jew and gentile, the wise and foolish, acknowledged that they had received from the abundance of this one man, grace for grace. This fact which is open to the light of day is unique in history; and it requires that the actual personality behind it should be honored as unique.

In similar vein Paul Wernle, having pointed out that the two elements found in the Gospels are also found in Jesus' own consciousness, exclaims:<sup>22</sup>

What is astonishing in Jesus is the co-existence of the super-human self-consciousness with the most profound humility before God. It is the same man that cries, "All things have been delivered unto me of my Father, and no one knoweth the Father save the Son," and who replies to the rich young ruler, "Why callest thou me good, there is none good save God." Without the former, a man like us; without the latter, a fanatic.

By his last words Wernle apparently fancies that all is said which needs to be said in order to explain the anomaly, when it is said that Jesus takes up "the rôle of Mediator": we shall no longer be surprised that he claims something on both parts. But the astounding features of the case cannot be so lightly disposed of. When the two elements of it are given each its full validity; when the completeness of Jesus' humility before God is realized on the one side, and the height of his claim reaching to the supreme deity itself, on the other, it is safe to say that such a combination

<sup>20</sup> *Das Wesen des Christentums* (56-60 Tausend, 1908), 82.

<sup>21</sup> *Christianity and History*, E.T., 1896, 37 (German 5th ed., 10).

<sup>22</sup> *Die Anfänge unserer Religion* (1904), 28.

of mental states within the limits of a single nature will be acknowledged to be inconceivable. It is inconceivable that the same soul could have produced two such contradictory states of mind contemporaneously. Could have *produced* them, we say. Should we not add the question whether a single soul could even have harbored such contradictory states? Such contradictory states of consciousness could no more dwell together in one unitary conscious spirit than issue from it as its creation. The self-consciousness of Jesus is, in other words, distinctly duplex, and necessarily implies dual centers of self-consciousness. Only in such a conception of the person can the mind rest. If Jesus was both the Son of God, in all the majesty of true deity, and a true child of man, in creaturely humility—if, that is, he was both God and man, in two distinct natures united, however inseparably and eternally, yet without conversion or confusion in one person—we have in his person, no doubt, an inexhaustible mystery, the mystery surpassing all mysteries, of combined divine love and human devotion. If he was not both God and man in two distinct natures combined in one person, the mystery of his personality passes over into a mere mass of crass contradictions which cannot all be believed; which, therefore, invite arbitrary denial on the one side or the other; and which will inevitably lead to each man creating for himself an artificial Jesus, reduced in the traits allowed to him to more credible consistency—if indeed, it does not directly tempt to his entire sublimation into a highly composite ideal.

It can scarcely be necessary to add that escape from these psychological contradictions, incident to the attempt to construct a one-natured Christ, cannot be had by fleeing to “the discoveries of the new psychology.” It is vain to point, for example, to the phenomena of what is commonly spoken of as “multiple personality” as offering a parallel to the duplex consciousness manifested by our Lord. We need not insist on the pathological character of these phenomena, and their distressing accompaniments, marking as they do the disintegration of the normal consciousness; or on the lack of affinity of the special form of mental disease of which they are symptomatic with the paranoia from which Jesus must have suffered, on the hypothesis that he was no more than a

man. It is doubtless enough to ask what kind of a super-divine nature this is that is attributed to him under the guise of a human nature, which is capable of splitting up in its disintegration into supreme Godhood and perfect manhood as its aliquot, perhaps even as aliquant, parts. If the mere fragments of his personality stand forth as God in his essential majesty and man in the height of man's possibilities, what must he be in the unitary integration of his normal personality? Surely no remotest analogy to such a dualism of consciousness can be discovered in the pitiable spectacle of Dr. Morton Prince's "Miss Beaucamp" and her "Sally."<sup>23</sup> If we have here a merely human personality, in dual dissociation, the miraculous multiplication of the loaves and fishes is eclipsed; the fragments are in immeasurable overplus of the supply.

It may seem more hopeful, therefore, to call in "the new psychology" as an aid to the explanation of the mystery of our Lord's person, when the divine nature is not denied. Even if, however, the original nature be conceived as divine, and the man Jesus be interpreted as a dissociated section of the divine consciousness, which maintains itself in its full divinity by its side, what have we given us but a new Docetism, complicated with a meaningless display of contradictory attributes? A special form is sometimes given<sup>24</sup> to this mode of conceiving the matter, however, which, perhaps, should not pass without particular notice. Appeal is made to the curious cases of "alternating personality," occasionally occurring, in which a man suddenly loses all consciousness of his identity and becomes for a time, longer or shorter, practically a different person. Thus, for example, Ansel Bourne, preacher, of Greene, R.I., became suddenly A. J. Brown, confectioner, of Morristown, Pennsylvania, and remained just A. J. Brown for some months with no consciousness whatever of Ansel Bourne, until just as suddenly he became Ansel Bourne again with no consciousness whatever of A. J. Brown.<sup>25</sup> In the light of such

<sup>23</sup> Morton Prince, *The Dissociation of a Personality. A Biographical Study in Abnormal Psychology* (1906).

<sup>24</sup> As, for example, very recently by D. A. Murray, *Christian Faith and the New Psychology* (1911).

<sup>25</sup> The case is described by William James in his *Principles of Psychology* (ed. 1908), I, 391-93.



instances, we are asked, what psychological obstacle forbids our supposing that the divine being who created the universe and has existed from eternity as the Son of God became for a season a man with all the limitations of a man? Why may we not, with psychological justification, look upon Jesus Christ as the infinite God "functioning through a special consciousness with limited power and knowledge"? Why not explain the man Jesus, in other words, just as the "alternative personality" of the Second Person of the Trinity? Such purely speculative questions may possess attractions for some classes of minds; but they certainly have no concernment with the Christ of history. The problem which the Christ of history presents is not summed up merely in the essential identity of the man Jesus with the God of heaven, but includes the co-existence in that one person, whom we know as Christ Jesus, of a double consciousness, divine and human. The solution which is offered leaves the actual problem wholly to one side. In proposing a merely human Jesus, with a divine background indeed, of which, however, he is entirely unconscious, it constructs a purely artificial Jesus of whom history knows nothing: the fundamental fact about the historical Jesus is his unoccultated divine consciousness.<sup>26</sup>

For the same reason the suggestion which has been made<sup>27</sup>

<sup>26</sup> Therefore even the cautious and strictly limited appeal to the phenomena of multiplex personality by J. Oswald Dykes (*The Expository Times*, January, 1906, XVII, 156) is without effect. He says: "I am far from implying that the analogy between the phenomena of the subliminal life, and the coexistence in our Lord of divine and human consciousness is either close or satisfying. The case of incarnate Deity is and must be unique and incomparable. What they do suggest is that within the mysterious depths of a single personality, there may coexist parallel states of spirit life, one only of which emerges in ordinary human consciousness. They may serve to repel the superficial objection that such a dualism is impossible. Within Christ's complex and wonderful constitution, room might be found for a life-activity, verily His own, yet of which He had on earth no human consciousness, or at most, it may be, an intermittent and imperfect knowledge; and, if it were so, the psychology of the human personality has nothing to say against it." The case supposed is not that of the historical Christ.

<sup>27</sup> By W. Sanday, *Christologies Ancient and Modern* (1910); further explained in a more recent pamphlet, called *Personality in Christ and in Ourselves* (1911), in which the incarnation is expressly reduced to the indwelling of the Holy Spirit. Cf. also H. R. Mackintosh, *The Expository Times*, XXI (August and September, 1910), 486, 553.

that the phenomenal Jesus may be allowed to be strictly human, and the divine Jesus be sought in what it is now fashionable to call his "subliminal self," is altogether beside the mark. The "subliminal self" is only another name for the sub-conscious self; and the relegation of the divine in Jesus to the realm of the unconscious definitely breaks with the entire historical testimony. Even if the hypothesis really allowed for a two-natured Christ—which in the form, at least, in which it is put forward, it does not, but presents us with only a man-Christ, differing from his fellow-men only in degree and not at all in kind—it would stand wholly out of relation with the only Christ that ever existed. For the Christ of history was not unconscious, but continually conscious, of his deity, and of all that belongs to his deity. He knew himself to be the Son of God in a unique sense—as such, superior to the very angels and gazing unbrokenly into the depths of the Divine Being, knowing the Father even as he was known of the Father. He felt within him the power to make the stones that lay in his pathway bread for his strengthening, and the power (since he had come to save the lost) rather to bruise his feet upon them than he might give his life a ransom for many and afterward return on the clouds of heaven to judge the world. Of this Jesus, the only real Jesus, it cannot be said that his consciousness was "entirely human"; and a Jesus of whom this can be said has nothing in common with the only historical Jesus, in whom his divine consciousness was as constant and vivid as his human.

The doctrine of the Two Natures supplies, in a word, the only possible solution of the enigmas of the life-manifestation of the historical Jesus. It presents itself to us, not as the creator, but as the solvent of difficulties—in this, performing the same service to thought which is performed by all the Christian doctrines.<sup>28</sup> If we look upon it merely as a hypothesis, it commands our attention by the multiplicity of phenomena which it reduces to order and unifies, and on this lower ground, too, commends itself to our acceptance. But it does not come to us merely as a hypothesis. It is the assertion concerning their Lord of all the primary witnesses of the Christian faith. It is, indeed, the self-testimony of

<sup>28</sup> Cf. B. F. Westcott, *The Gospel of Life* (1882).

our Lord himself, disclosing to us the mystery of his being. It is, to put it briefly, the simple statement of "the fact of Jesus," as that fact is revealed to us in his whole manifestation. We may reject it if we will, but in rejecting it we reject the only real Jesus in favor of another Jesus—who is not another, but is the creature of pure fantasy. The alternatives which we are really face to face with are, Either the two-natured Christ of history, or—a strong delusion.

## THE CLASSIFICATION AND EVOLUTION OF MIRACLE

JOHN EDWARDS LE BOSQUET  
First Congregational Church, Boulder, Colorado

The term miracle is in this paper regarded as applicable to those events which are the acts of a personal god, or God. If this is not clear it will become so as we advance.

The peculiarity of the concept of miracle is that it unites in itself two ideas which *eo ipso* make the perception of a miracle impossible. That is to say, a miracle is by definition an inner-worldly act of an outer-worldly actor. As Spinoza<sup>1</sup> urged long ago, there is no possible method of ascertaining from a human—as such inner-worldly—point of view that the actor behind any event is outer-worldly. For every such event may be asserted to have been the result of some other inner-worldly fact. Even though that assertion could never be proven for any particular event, yet in the nature of the case no demonstration within the world can establish with certainty that a power outside is, in any given instance, acting. There is no loophole in this reasoning. It is perfectly true that a miracle, in the very nature of the case, cannot be objectively proven. The fact is—and this is a matter of empirical psychology—miracles have never been, as so commonly assumed, objective facts, cognized as such and then inferred from. Miracles are—to speak with logical precision—a hypothetical class to which events having certain characteristics are with more or less assurance assigned. However it may have been in thought and ordinary speech, men do not first infer from miracles; they first of all in fact must infer *to* miracles before they have a standing-ground for further inferences.

One cannot in consequence directly investigate—still less classify—miracles as obvious and unmistakable empirical facts; one may only examine and if possible classify the characteristics which as matter of observation have determined men to class certain events as miraculous. Now these characteristics, subjec-

<sup>1</sup> *Tractatus* (London, 1862), 127.

tive though they are, are as clear-cut in their way as any objective characteristics could be, so that in point of fact miracles constitute in the history of religion a consistent and easily distinguishable class of events. This classification of miracles according to subjective impressions made by certain events is by no means a prejudging of miracles as delusions. The inference from certain characteristics to miracle may well be a perfectly accurate inference. This method asserts neither the truth nor the falsity of miracles. The point is only that miracles, whether they exist or not—and this way of approach can be, as no other, entirely non-committal—are not and in the nature of the case cannot be objectively given phenomena. This is not prejudice; it is the result, the only possible result, of examining and elucidating the very idea of miracle.

As a result of an examination of the history of religion in general and of the Hebrew religion in particular—in which latter the concept of miracle is present in most detail and has been most worked over—it has become to me increasingly clear that the concept of the miraculous springs from one of three subjective impressions, viz., the sense of awe, of interest (benefit or injury), or of the unusual. These three may any one of them be present in the event therefore called miraculous, or they may exist more or less intermingled. The possibility is freely granted that they may occur—especially if in very moderate intensity—without leading to the inference that the event in question is a miracle. But when an event is regarded as miraculous in the history of religion, it is so regarded because of the presence of one or more of these subjective characteristics. The genesis and development of miracle is then to be followed by tracing the rise and progress of these states from lower to higher levels. There will be no particular profit in going into the complicated working together of these three. I shall in this paper try only to separate and discuss by itself each of the three as a basis for the inference to and development of the miraculous.

#### I. THE AWE-INSPIRING EVENT AS MIRACLE

Awe at its lowest is fear. The savage finds himself in a world of facts he does not understand but from which he must wrest

a livelihood. Mistakes are frequent, and the savage is constantly injuring himself unwittingly. Fear is a part of the atmosphere he breathes in a way and an intensity which we well-guarded moderns cannot probably even faintly imagine. It is not unnatural that the fear-causing events should be assigned to the spirits or gods on lower or higher levels. Jevons aptly compares primitive man to one set down in a machine-shop "full of the most various and complicated machinery working at full speed," in which "he must make his experiments or perish, and even so, his survival is conditional on his selecting the right part of the machine to handle."<sup>2</sup> That the savage is not in a state of continual terror is due to the alliance he strikes up with one or another of the powers so obviously present.<sup>3</sup> As he becomes, in process of this necessary experimenting, better acquainted with Nature, many of the fear-inspiring events get to be manageable and in so far comprehended. Thus many events gradually lose their note of the divine—they cease, that is, to be miracles. The forces of Nature become also, to a degree, subject to man through incantations, rain-making, etc., or the savage believes so, which amounts to the same thing. But yet, though fear is thus being transcended, there is for these forces of Nature perhaps an aesthetic reverence (as, for example, in the Vedic religion), but, usually more dominating, a sense of awe at the immense power involved which is apparent to the idlest observer.<sup>4</sup> So the sun and moon, the stars the ocean, the lightning, excite a reverence which leads men to regard these as either gods outright or, on a higher stage, as expressions and acts of the gods.<sup>5</sup> So the phenomena of sex are attributed to a divine power working in and upon men—a not unnatural inference when one bears in mind the powerfulness of the sexual sensations and the mysteriousness of a potency which brings new individuals into being. That awe, by a natural tendency of primitive inference, leads to the thought of a divinity is seen in the rise of the belief that certain places are peculiarly holy.

<sup>2</sup> Jevons, *Introduction to the History of Religion*, 17.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, 105.

<sup>4</sup> Chantepie de la Saussaye, *Religionsgeschichte*, I, 324.

<sup>5</sup> Siebeck, *Religionsphilosophie*, 60.

It is awe in the sense of uncanniness which some neighborhoods—wild scenery, high places, forests,<sup>6</sup> etc.—excite which leads to an assurance of their divineness. The many expressions in both Old and New Testament, with their frequent religious appreciation of Nature, are excellent examples of the way in which, at a high stage of religious thought, the divine is conceived as acting in all Nature.<sup>7</sup> One should note that the conception of God's action spreads into humanity as well as Nature. In some mysterious fashion God acts in the very deeds men do.<sup>8</sup> Further, at this high religious elevation awe is no longer the mere passive reaction upon the event which it was at earlier stages: awe is here possible, not to everybody, but only to the pious. It is religious genius which in the Psalms and in the words of Jesus grasps divine activity where "the *stumpfe* gaze of ordinary men sees only ordinary happenings"<sup>9</sup> and active insight is necessary in order to follow what they see. So awe, remaining still subjective, develops from a passive feeling to an active faith.

Just what is in mind in saying above that "the divine is conceived as acting in all Nature"? To call natural events works of God is not a mere way of describing Nature. In such cases the words "miracle," "works of God," would be but words from which all awe had vanished. Neither is the thought flattened here to a mere pantheism which calls Nature, and ultimately all, God just because it has awe for existence as such. An awe which is the attribute of facts *qua* facts is become an indiscriminate glorification—Whitman-like—of ugly and beautiful, evil and good, false and true, equally. Such a conception of God's activity would be the death of all appreciation of the good, the true, and the beautiful, which must as such include a distaste for their opposites. The miracle as awe-inspiring event in the Bible is begotten by an attitude—active, as already noted—toward every fact of the world. This attitude appreciates the Divinity in every fact, not as that

<sup>6</sup> Chantepie de la Saussaye, *Manual of the Science of Religion*, 162.

<sup>7</sup> Schultz, *Alttestamentliche Theologie*, 535-37; Holtzmann, *Neutestamentliche Theologie*, I, 163 ff.

<sup>8</sup> Dillman, *Alttestamentliche Theologie*, 300.

<sup>9</sup> Schultz, *op. cit.*, 538.

fact is, but in that for the gaze of religious insight the will of God is believed to be using and dominating it. The reverence for Nature is a reverence for God working in and utilizing Nature, not for the facts of Nature as such. It is God, not Nature, that is revered. This is what constitutes the wide difference between the pantheist phrase "all the world's a miracle" and that same phrase in the mouth of a theist. Quite apart from any metaphysical prejudices, it need hardly be said that a pantheistic rendering of miracle, though an undoubted end-point in the development of the concept here considered, is not—because ultimately lacking distinctions of value—so high in the development of miracle as the theistic rendering hinted at above. Yet the actual content of the (extreme) theistic view of miracle—as resulting from awe—is, in respect of order in the world, not different from the pantheistic view of that same order. A sense of the regularity of Nature and its divine basis is potentially, though not actually, reached in the Bible. There is order, though that order is not absolute. But extend the ideas of Nature as contained in the type of miracle here under consideration, and the limiting conception is that every event, without exception, is the expression of a divine actor behind who is in every event operative. In so far the events in that order have become, not so much deeds of God—though they are so termed—as imbedded in a divine order which they obey. Thus the miracle of awe comes as event, by the force of its own development, to fade away. In ceasing to be evident, however, it ceases, by definition, to be properly called miracle. The concept has evolved into a something which gathers up all its value but is not itself. It has become a faith in a regular divinely ordained law-abidingness in the world, by virtue of which all that is, is the act of God.

## II. THE INTEREST-SERVING EVENT AS MIRACLE

The sense that this or that event is advantageous or the reverse somewhat overlaps at one point the sense of fear—which was the beginning of the miracle from awe. Fear and the sense of the dangerous—the acutely disadvantageous—are scarcely separable in the concrete. But abstractly there is a difference between the



terror element and the selfish sense of threatened loss. More clearly the favorableness of certain facts is positively distinguishable from the mere negative absence of fear; and as the development proceeds, the two subjective states of awe and of interest become plainly diverse.

At its lowest ebb the note of interest is perceptible in the feeling-tone of agreeableness and disagreeableness for the individual or the community. At greater intensities one event or another is felt to be signally harmful or beneficial.<sup>10</sup> Here, again, the inference is natural and, in the history of religion, a commonplace to the assurance that the event of signal advantage, or especially<sup>11</sup> of signal injury, is the act of a god who favors or is angry with the person or tribe concerned.<sup>12</sup> The tone of interest—particularly that of benefit—must be somewhat conspicuous, else the event will not be deemed a miracle. A peculiarly opportune shower, a much-needed victory over an enemy, or—to take a striking historic example—the destruction of the Armada in the days of Elizabeth: these are all, for ordinary reasoning of the beneficiaries, plainly and unmistakably deeds of God. Similarly a blight, a famine, or a terrible accident is, because so injurious, regarded as a direct act of the gods, and this possibly quite apart from any other subjective impression which the event might also be supposed to produce. Indeed, in time of calamity other subjective states are likely to be put entirely into the background by the keen sorrow at a loss sustained. One has but to remark a current modern expression for fires, earthquakes, and similar violent calamities—"acts of God." The note of interest will be the stronger if reinforced by awe—perhaps, for example, at the violence of the natural event—or by the sense of the unusual, if, for example, the victory or defeat were perhaps one that had not been expected in view of the smallness of numbers of the victors, or in view of the apparently overwhelming numbers of the party that was nevertheless vanquished. But the interest element, as such, is, even so, the dominating motive leading to the inference that a divine power

<sup>10</sup> Chantepie de la Saussaye, *Manual of the Science of Religion*, 129.

<sup>11</sup> Lubbock, *History of Civilization*, 220-26.

<sup>12</sup> Chantepie de la Saussaye, *Religionsgeschichte* (3te Aufl.), I, 325, 369, 380, etc.

is at work. That this is true is seen clearly if one observes the immediate practical result of the event in the community. Directly following the occurrence there are ceremonial rites of thanksgiving to the god if the event be favorable, or the whole community—if the event be harmful—makes immediate expiation, and casts about to find and put away whatever may presumably have offended the god.<sup>13</sup>

At a higher level the note of interest develops from a selfish, material one to a plane which is unselfish and ethical. A pretty illustration of this advance is to be found in the Jewish prophecy of the exile. Pre-exilic prophecy had emphasized the fact that, in view of the ethical nature of God, calamity was sure to come from him upon sinful Israel in the defeat of Israel by Assyria, and later of Judah by Babylon. The mass of the people did not reach this exalted conception, but with the actual arrival of the incredible calamity they could not avoid the subjective feeling that it was an act of God signifying his profound displeasure. The exile is for them, that is, an act of God because having the (material) interest-tone. As time went on one development of thought upon the subject came to adopt the explanation of the prophets before the exile, viz., that the sin of Israel and Judah was the reason of divine disfavor, and proclaimed, with a view to the future weal of the nation, the necessity of being certainly holy before God. This development finds its expression as to the past in the Deuteronomic editors of the Books of Kings; as to the future in chaps. 40-48 of the prophecy of Ezekiel and in the Levitical law in general. But there was a second development in prophecy which is on the unselfish ethical plane. In view of the discouragement of the people, prophecy had changed from the denunciatory to the comforting. A great prophet of the exile<sup>14</sup> in particular sought to solve the problem of Israel's humiliation in a new and highly original way. His conclusion was that the calamities which had come upon them were not, as the pre-exilic prophets had said and the people in their discouragement had now come to believe, a sign of divine disfavor, but were on the contrary a mark of Jahve's

<sup>13</sup> Chantepie de la Saussaye, *Manual*, 145.

<sup>14</sup> The author of the "Ebed Jahve" passages in the Book of Isaiah.

honor bestowed upon Judah.<sup>15</sup> The suffering had been sent, that is, that through the Jews' patient bearing of it the world might come to know the truth clearly displayed—the truth which was to be found only in Judah for all the ends of the earth. Judah was therefore the "suffering servant" of Jahve, and as the mediator of the world's salvation should at length "see of the travail of his soul and be satisfied."<sup>16</sup> For this prophet the fact of disaster in the exile is, on the material plane, admitted. It is, however, with greatest emphasis denied that this is really a disaster. The exile and the calamities in its train have for this prophet and those who accepted his conclusion the note therefore not of disfavor but of favor, in that Judah is chosen as God's missionary. That is to say, the exile is inferably, now as before, a miracle because of the subjective note of interest, not, as earlier was thought, of interest in the sense of material injury, but in the sense of spiritual honor and therefore of higher benefit than any material prosperity. The interest-tone of the event has risen before our eyes to a higher level upon which mere material benefit or injury is ignored as relatively unimportant and only the sense of higher advantage which is visible is regarded as indicating decisively an act of God.

The note of interest is, however, to rise still higher. The germ of this advance is already present in the "Ebed Jahve" passages just referred to. Emphasis was placed there on the divine favor to Judah, but as a sub-purpose of the act there is mentioned the salvation of the world. This latter is still another and much higher type of benefit which in the New Testament comes out into the clear. In the figure of Jesus, God is seen to be acting, because of the profound sense that his coming to earth means the spiritual blessing of mankind. The honor shown to Jesus in this fact is mentioned and gloried in, but is now, in its turn, become the sub-purpose in comparison with that ethical and spiritual purpose which, as the Christians felt this to be the note of his life, showed them that his advent and life are to be as such gathered up in the thought of one long act of God (the Incarnation). By St. Paul the whole course of the history of the Jews is regarded as a divine

<sup>15</sup> Smend, *Alttestamentliche Religionsgeschichte*, 345.

<sup>16</sup> Isa. 53:11.

act of discipline and education by which they were trained first on the low level of the law, and then with the coming of Jesus were brought up to a higher plane<sup>17</sup>—and this, that the “Jew first and also the gentile”<sup>18</sup> might be brought to salvation. Here, at length, then, the interest-tone has broadened to include, potentially, all men, and deepened to mean for them the highest conceivable ethical and spiritual perfection. It is, as serving interest in this sense, that at this highest point certain events and classes of events and even whole movements of history are looked upon as acts of God. The note of interest remains self-interest, but the self involved becomes progressively truer and more inclusive till at last it is not the individual but the social self, not the actual but the ideal self, whose interest conceived as forwarded makes it certain that here is an act of God.

There are two formal aspects of this development to be noted. They are the same as those of the foregoing section (“the awe-inspiring event as miracle”). The tone of interest develops from a more or less passively felt gladness and gratitude at certain events to a more and more active subjective state. At the highest it is due to a religious exertion or to a past religious attainment; it is a sign, at all events, of an advanced religious life—that one has the subjective attitude of believing that a given event or historical development or personal word<sup>19</sup> is the expression of a divine purpose conserving the highest interests. So this type of divine activity becomes a matter for faith. Again, at this highest point miracle tends to dissolve into an order. In the case of Jesus, for example, the note of interest does not attach to event as such, but to the whole course of the life and death of Jesus. In calling the incarnation “one long act of God”—as was done above—the word “act” was considerably strained. It was rather an order than with precise accuracy an “act.” So Paul, because of the note of ethical uplifting in the history of the Jews, and because of the note of hope for the gentiles in that same history, sees God acting there, not in special events but immanently as an ethical dynamic force in history. As before with the miracle inferred from awe, so here this type of miracle dissolves logically into the general order of the

<sup>17</sup> Gal. 3:23-25.

<sup>18</sup> Rom. 2:10.

<sup>19</sup> Cf. I Cor. 12:3.

world, which rests indeed upon the will of God, but is yet an order aiming at the progressively more inclusive and more perfect ethical condition of men. The purpose of God to save all men is realized to be a regular and universal method of divine action. Whoever has faith, whoever connects himself, that is, with that purpose of God, finds justification and salvation.<sup>20</sup> This is a regular divine order, not present here and there alone in separate arbitrary acts or series of acts, but everywhere present and operative for the highest interests (salvation) of men. The doctrine of election is indeed a rabbinic degeneration—of exclusiveness—from the splendid universalism of the New Testament. The figure of the Devil was also inconsistent with the idea of the ever-operative divine activity. But these inconsistencies need not disturb us. The tone of interest as justifying the inference to the act of God reaches, in places, at least, the highest ethical and religious plane, and is thought of, not as attaching to events, but as a teleological order of the world, called the will of God.

### III. THE UNUSUAL EVENT AS MIRACLE

The usual—and hence the unusual—is a subjective category which finds foreshadowings in the animal world. The beasts have their customary lairs, places for watering, etc. The “cat in a strange garret” indicates plainly her possession of a sense of the unusual. Much of the safety of animals depends, in fact, on their skill in noting the unusual, which is often as such the dangerous. Primitive man has still more this sense of the customary and consequently also a frequent sense of surprise at the unexpected. It is sometimes insisted that there can be no miraculous—meaning a miracle of this “unusual” type—until the conception of all-pervading law is reached, a law of which miracle must be the violation. In reply to such an argument it must be emphasized that in so far as the usual and the unusual are possible subjective categories, just so far the inference is possible from the unusual event to a god who, himself exceptional and alien, may all the more naturally be regarded as the source of any strange-seeming events. The conception of scientific law is an advanced expression of our sense of

<sup>20</sup> John 3:16.

the usual, but it is not the only possible expression of that sense. The unusual is not a quantitative but a qualitative aspect of an event. The shooting of a rifle is to the untutored savage as unusual in quality as the beholding of a ghost would be to one of us. There is entire possibility of a miracle, in the sense of an unusual event, in the prescientific stage of thought. There is, even on the lowest plane, a sufficient background of the usual to make the category of the unusual possible;<sup>21</sup> and this quality of an event, at sufficient intensity, makes the inference to miracle natural and practically irresistible.

In the earlier stages the usual is a category which is present, but not widely inclusive. Hence the unusual is not only more vague but more frequently met than at any later period. Many passing and for later days natural events of daily life seem strange. In brief, the accidental may appear the unusual and therefore the miraculous. A divine actor may be inferred from the strangeness or peculiarity which the savage feels to be present as he regards a natural object (fetichism), or some one of his fellows in whom a special power or ability is manifest,<sup>22</sup> or an animal or species of animals (totemism) which has surprising strength or cunning.<sup>23</sup> It is true that fetichism and totemism rise fully as much probably from the sense of awe—where the oddness or extraordinary power inspires terror—or from interest—where the meeting with a certain object or animal is followed or accompanied by misfortune or good luck—as from the sense of unusualness as such. To avoid repetition I mention these here only. The gods or spirits operant may have been regarded originally as being either the object itself (so Siebeck<sup>24</sup> insists) which would then be conceived as an alien power sojourning in the world of ordinary things, or as various spirits acting through or in phenomena (so Tiele<sup>25</sup> urges). For our purposes here which view is taken is immaterial. In either case there is involved an event having the subjective tone of the unusual, from which a divine actor is inferred. At this stage, where the

<sup>21</sup> For support of this contention see: Jevons, *op. cit.*, chap. iii; Frazer, *Golden Bough*, I, 31; Kaftan, *Dogmatik* (3te Aufl.), 273; Dillman, *op. cit.*, 308.

<sup>22</sup> Frazer, p. 130.

<sup>23</sup> *Religionsphil.*, 60.

<sup>24</sup> Tylor, *Primitive Culture* (3d ed.), II, 229.

<sup>25</sup> *Science of Religion*, I, 69 ff.

miraculous and the accidental are almost synonymous, miracle is a frequent, almost daily, affair. The savage is much like a country child on its first visit to the city. There are some things which are usual—the people met are the same human beings as those known at home. So animals, carriages, clothes, etc., are already familiar. But at the same time there is much all about one that is surprising and often decidedly startling. Something like this is life to primitive man. The unusual is frequent. It is his unspoiled, naïve wonder which in part explains his belief in a chaotic multitude of spirits of all kinds—which is the raw material for the less naïve, more systematic mythologizing of later times. Wonder is not a constantly present factor, of course, else it would speedily be blunted. Many events which we should suppose the savage would regard as exceptional, he very often fails to notice at all. But frequently, again and again, his wonder is excited, and it is true to the facts to say that the unusual is a relatively larger category than at any later stage.

In time, however, the accidental by racial experience becomes largely, though not wholly, known for what it is and the category of the unusual narrows and narrows. In particular, men come to have inklings of the regularity of natural forces. The happenings of Nature, somewhat classified and assigned to certain gods, become in so far usual and no longer, therefore, miraculous. But the unusual, though largely lopped off, persists still unreduced in the common attitude toward omens, portents, immediate healings, and in general as regards certain events which, though admittedly possible, are regarded as surprising exceptions to the ordinary run of events. Events with this tone of the unusual become thus relatively more and more infrequent but they do not altogether disappear. They persist on and on as obviously objective phenomena to the common opinion, everywhere, one may say, where the scientific attitude of mind has not been reached, or at least has not as yet been assimilated. Illustrations of the miracle thus inferred from an unusual event are numerous.<sup>26</sup> In fact, the miracle of

<sup>26</sup> For Old Testament references see Schultz, *op. cit.*, 539. For classical and patristic material see Trede, *Wunderglaube im Heidenthum*, usw. The apostolic church tended to make workings of the Holy Spirit synonymous *überhaupt* with the extraordinary; cf. Gunkel, *Wirkungen des heiligen Geistes*, 23.

ordinary discussion nowadays is of this type in practically every case. This may well have occurred to the reader already. There is a reason for the fact which is rather important, to which we now turn.

It should be remarked that the characteristics of the "unusual" miracle are, in process of time, brought into greater and greater relief and emphasis. As civilization advances, that is, the miracle of this type takes on an ever-increasing intensity of surprisingness, till with the scientific *Weltanschauung* the subjective tone of unusualness mounts to such a pinnacle of the extraordinary that it comes by many thinkers to be declared a priori impossible. This is referred to here not by way of argument, but only as illustrating the development of the miracle as unusual which becomes more and more the antithesis of that regularity which was for miracles of the two preceding varieties the goal of development. Further, as result of the heightening of the irregularity of this type of miracle, and especially as over against the otherwise increasing orderliness of the world, it comes about that a miracle now becomes, by very contrast-effect, more and more obvious. So far from ever reaching, like the other two types, a point where a degree of religious elevation is needed for feeling this subjective tone, quite the contrary is true. So long as this type of miracle is felt to be actually existent at all—the tendency of scientific advance is, as already remarked, toward the flat denial of its possibility—so long it in its development becomes more and more evidently and certainly existent for anybody who sees or hears of its occurrence. It becomes thus in its progress more dominating, one might truly say domineering, over men. It is not at all conditioned by the faith of the believer, but compels him ever more passively to accept it because of the brutal obviousness of its intense extraordinariness.

It will be well perhaps in conclusion to pause upon the fundamental antithesis which has disclosed itself between the first two and the last type of miracles as these reach the logical end-point of their development. Both the awe-inspiring and the interest-serving types of miracle are, at the highest stage of their evolution, miracles which do not necessarily have the note of the unusual, but tend, as we have seen, to have, along with their note of awe or



interest, the note of the usual, and at length have that note of the usual to such an extent that only the religious genius or those taught and inspired by him with his faith can detect the miraculous as at all present. Indeed, quite apart from the external appearance of usualness, the very essence of the conception of the activity of God which the tones of awe and interest more and more approach, lies in the fact that God's activity is conceived, so far as these notes are concerned, as a regular, unvarying—usual—affair. The usualness indeed comes to be one of the chiefly prized attributes of the activity of God, as conceived by the final development of these two types of miracles. On the other hand, of course, the miracle as unusual event never ceases in any sense to be unusual, but its unusualness is ever more and more startling. There is a real parting of the ways here. Down one road—that of the not necessarily unusual—goes, on the higher stages of religious development, miracle as awe-inspiring and interest-serving; down the other road—that of the necessarily and increasingly unusual—goes the miracle as unusual event. This parting of the ways is already reached in essence with the appearance of Nature Religion as such. Certain natural events are, because of awe or the sense of interest, assigned to certain gods, and each event of that class, being regularly henceforward so assigned, has in so far implicitly become a usual event. This procedure may, of course, issue in pantheism. But whether the tendency be toward pantheism or theism does not concern our present point. There are classes of events, deeds of the gods, which are in essence regular, and therefore usual. Alongside these is another class of events, also actions of the gods, which are unusual. Whether these be assigned to the same gods to which the “usual” acts are assigned or to different gods *ad quem* matters not. The difference of conception, the thought that there are, from the point of view of the usual, two kinds of divine action, remains in principle an unreduced antithesis. In the concrete, naturally, the two types of divine action will be much intermingled, but the two conceptions, as conceptions, are yet clearly separable. The Bible is again the best illustration of this duality in the conception of the divine working. Both sides of the antithesis are found there and are by recent biblical students

insisted upon as two varieties of miracles.<sup>27</sup> God works in the regularity of Nature, but also in marvels which as such are irregular. We find in one most instructive passage<sup>28</sup> lying side by side each of these types of actions of God used to describe the same event from two different points of view. Each depicts the way in which God so acted as to make it possible for the children of Israel to cross the Red Sea. According to the one strand (J) God made a strong east wind to blow all night so that the waters became easily fordable; according to the other strand (P) God, immediately upon the lifting of Moses' hand, made the waters as walls on either side so that the children of Israel walked through on dry land.

Which of these two points of view as to miracle is the more religious and the more fruitful for present-day faith is a question which must recur to every thoughtful reader. Certainly the whole conflict and doubt as to miracle at this present is felt with reference to the miracle which claims to violate natural law—the "unusual" miracle at its extreme. If the miracles of awe and interest at their highest could be defended and held over against the miracle of unusualness, then all that is precious in the idea of divine activity could be kept intact for religious faith and we should escape at the same time a heavy burden of apologetics and misunderstanding.

<sup>27</sup> Schultz, *op. cit.*, 537; Holtzmann, *N.T. Theol.*, I, 163.

<sup>28</sup> Exod. 14:16-22.

## THE CHRISTOLOGY OF A MODERN RATIONALIST

---

FRANK HUGH FOSTER  
Olivet, Mich.

---

It is the purpose of the present article to describe the Christology of a modern Christian rationalist. Any such description must be in a large degree understood as personal and individual, since no such writer has any warrant for speaking for another; and yet it may be possible to make a statement with which a considerable number would agree. It will be the effort here to avoid that which is unduly individual and to speak in as representative a manner as possible. Inasmuch as Christian rationalism begins in a protest against the historic theories of the person of Christ, it will be necessary to begin with a statement of certain negative positions.

The fundamental objection to the acceptance of the church Christology is that it is not proved. As an abstract proposition, the doctrine that God intervened in the history of the world for man's salvation, and that, in some way not further defined, God himself came into a unique union with humanity in the person of Jesus Christ, may readily be admitted as a possibility by any believer in the personality of God. But when the definite doctrine of ecclesiastical Christology is presented for one's acceptance, the rationalist finds that it is wholly without proof. It depends for what authority it possesses upon the statements of writings that are of uncertain origin, of late date, and marred by an attitude toward the marvelous which of itself would be enough to invalidate their authority. Hence, while he might possibly accept this Christology as a possible opinion, or as one which he found helpful, or to which his education personally inclined him, he could not regard it as a doctrine capable of being erected into an element of a creed or of an authoritative liturgy. For himself, he declines to accept it. That is his personal attitude; and he recognizes that it may

be of little importance to others, however important to himself. But even if he should accept the Christology of the historical creeds as a private opinion, he would be none the less earnest in demanding that it should never be illegitimately used as a condition of church fellowship or as a form of subscription required of officers of the church. Such uses he regards, in the uncertainty which must attach to it, as entirely unjustifiable and absolutely unethical.

In deciding whether he should accept the church Christology for himself, the rationalist is led by the following considerations: He has formed, through his study of nature, the conception that all its events proceed according to law. He finds in the early records of the race the most abundant evidence that men originally and for the most of their history have had an entirely different conception. They have believed in constant and innumerable exceptions to the order of nature, introduced by various beings of a supernatural character, both evil and good, weak and powerful, interfering for ends the most trivial as well as the most important. He finds in early mankind unreasonable fears brought with them as they emerged from the conditions of the savage barbarism in which they originally lived, and an equal love of the astonishing and marvelous. Every age, according to this view of the world, is an age of miracle; and all miracles are equally transient in their effects and insignificant in their purpose. The religions of the world all arose in ages of miracle, and have been perpetuated under the influence of a constant belief in such interferences in the order of nature. The Christian religion is like all the rest in this particular. To none of these miracles does he give any credence, whether they be the marvelous impossibilities of Buddhistic legend, or the trivialities of mediaeval monkery, or the miracles of the New Testament, so hallowed, even to himself, by the teachings and associations of centuries of ecclesiastical history. All these stand or fall together, for there is no essential difference in the attitude of their narrators to them, and they fall with the rise of that conception of the world which has developed under the name of law. The incarnation, resurrection, and ascension of Christ are but examples of this general category of the miraculous found in Christianity

in common with the other religions, and they fall with the rest. Miracles remain abstractly possible, as already remarked; but this concession loses all importance in the eyes of the rationalist, because it becomes so entirely improbable to him that God ever has so interfered or ever will interfere. The reign of law was wisely established and has needed no revision.

This position is, of course, entirely a dogmatic one. The prejudice in every age against dogmatic, that is, philosophical or rational, methods has been so strong that it is well to add another consideration. Not all rationalists start from a dogmatic position. Some have come to it from historical studies, unconscious of any philosophical presuppositions. Modern history is founded upon the scientific idea of law. If this idea be taken, however, merely as a guiding thread, or clue, the results of the historical investigation will be so consistent and reasonable that they will compel a subsequent, if they have not had an antecedent, consent to the principle of the invariability of law. Taken in any way which modern investigators are likely to follow out, the critical study of the New Testament history, the study of the history of the doctrine in the church, and the study of comparative religion, will all themselves suggest, and powerfully reinforce when already suggested, the conception that the whole supernatural apparatus of historical Christianity is the product of the times in which it originated, and that literally taken, as the creeds and confessions take it, it is without proof.

With the fall of these elements of the church's historical teaching, falls also the whole edifice of the traditional Christology. The whole question of the union of two natures, human and divine, in one person, Christ, disappears. The old insoluble enigmas disappear. Conjunction and union, the development of the God-consciousness of Jesus, the *kenosis*, and all the other methods of making intelligible the primary idea of two natures in one person, have lost their meaning and interest. The rationalist sees a man born into the world who receives the name of Jesus, and is subsequently called the Christ. He takes him as a man, as all others do; and seeing no reason for ascribing to him anything more than humanity, he leaves him under this plain and simple category,

and his Christology becomes, in summary, simply this: that Christ was a man.

But while, upon the formal side, his Christology is exhausted in this simple statement, its real contents will prove to be far richer. What does he think of this man, Jesus? What does he believe himself to derive from him? And what relations does he sustain to him which may be called present and real relations? The answer to such questions as these will give the real contents to the Christology, the form of which is the true and simple humanity of Jesus.

1. The answer of such questions will naturally begin with the *historicity* of Jesus. Was Jesus a historical person?

It should be premised, for the sake of clearness, that in some important respects it makes no difference to the modern thinker whether Jesus was a historical person or not. In spite of the emphasis which has been laid in certain quarters upon Christianity as a historical religion, and the importance of the study of history to its right interpretation, it may be still maintained that no system of truth which shall dominate the mind and claim authority over the conduct of man can rest upon the reality of any historical personality. Salvation cannot be something "objectively" secured by the work of a historical person, as is supposed in current views of the atonement, because it is the inner state of the soul, the condition of harmony and communion with God. Truth cannot be something which depends upon the existence of the person who first spoke it to the world, because it is truth only as it shines to the mind by its own light. If these current views were correct, then a historical personage would be necessary for the existence of the Christian religion, and Christianity would be exposed to every breath of criticism which should assail the Gospels as the original authorities for the life of Christ. Truth must be placed above such dangers as those which would arise to it under this method of conceiving it. Though Jesus should be proved never to have existed, the truth which has come down to us, and which we have received because of its own self-evidencing value, and which we have found to work out such great results in the liberation of our spirits from the thralldom of sin and the establishment of holy relations with the Heavenly

Father, would still be true, and its effects would remain unaltered. In this sense a historical Christ is unnecessary.

The original and the principal reason for doubting the historicity of Jesus is the presence in the Gospels of the mythical element. The picture presented of Jesus in the Gospels is not historical; and the step is short to the conclusion that perhaps there was no historical Jesus at all. But the presence of mythical elements in the story of the life of a man does not disprove his historicity. Charlemagne was surrounded with this element in a biography written of him not long after his death. Martin of Tours and Bernard of Clairvaux were wonder-workers. Myths surround Washington, Lincoln, and even Roosevelt. But we nevertheless believe in the historical reality of all those persons.

Recent discussions as to the historicity of Jesus have been fully reviewed in the January and April numbers of this *Journal*. They leave the following impressions upon the mind: First, that the unanimity of the tradition that there was an epoch-making teacher in Palestine called Jesus remains unexplained upon any hypothesis presented as a substitute for the simplest and most natural explanation, that there was such a teacher. Second, that the supposition that there was a pre-Christian, Jewish-heathen Jesus god and cult, is unsustained by what facts we have and is altogether incredible. Third, that the special importance attached in the early Christian history to the person of Christ finds its most natural explanation in the reality of that person. If Christianity started in an idea, the transfer from an idea to a person, and to an "objective" system of salvation, is difficult to account for; whereas, if the start was made with a person, it is easy to explain the idealization of that person and his history, and the rise of myths, since the same process is going on around us even at this late and intellectual day. Fourth, that, in particular, the testimony of the Apostle Paul to the historicity of Jesus is too clear to admit of rejection. True, the "four undisputed epistles" of Paul are no longer undisputed, but they have not been disputed successfully. Paul's testimony, of which they are full, is the more credible because he makes so little of the life of Jesus in his writings or his theology. Nor does he seem to have any personal interest in miracles. But he who directly after the death

of Jesus came in conflict with the new Christian community had every opportunity to know whether Jesus was a historical personage or not, and he believed in his natural birth,<sup>1</sup> his human life, and his violent death upon the cross. Up to the present time there is no sufficient reason for rejecting Paul as a witness to the historicity of Jesus, and hence no sufficient reason for surrendering belief in his personal reality and the genuineness of his human career.

2. But when we come to the *construction of his personality* we find this involved in difficulties. Of no single historical detail can we be absolutely sure, unless it be his death by crucifixion. There were too many humiliations connected with that to admit of its invention. Two different places contend for the honor of his birth. Did he deliver at one time and place the Sermon on the Mount? Did he regard himself as the Messiah? Did he place the emphasis upon belief "in me" which is asserted in the Fourth Gospel? In regard to these details men will always differ, and of them all it may be said that it is of little consequence what decision is reached. Definite knowledge of the life of Jesus may be absolutely wanting, but there is a general impression which may be arrived at, which is of value. From Jesus have gone forth sweet and holy influences which have made, under the experience of God's people throughout the ages, and often by their development and addition, a body of Christian conceptions, thoughts, ideals, aspirations, teachings, consolations, and hopes. In a sense they are all Christ's. But whether any of them is of importance to us individually will depend upon its evidence to us and its application to our condition. That is light which shines. Its absolute historicity in connection with the personality of Jesus Christ is of little comparative importance.

And yet a picture of Jesus is attainable by us which is one of wondrous sweetness and attractiveness, the sweetest and most attractive in the world. It is that of a lowly teacher, of the common people in origin and hence delivered from that pride of wealth and

<sup>1</sup> Should not Gal. 4:4, which is sometimes quoted in favor of the virgin birth, be quoted against it? Paul is endeavoring in this passage to emphasize Christ's full identification with humanity. Hence "born of a woman" means born just as all other men are. The argument would be weakened if there were anything exceptional in the birth of Jesus; therefore Paul must have intended us to understand that there was nothing exceptional.



birth which seems effectually to close the channels of human sympathy with most men who have it, simple in his demands and entirely free from the pursuit of worldly success, content with the humblest provision for his wants if he could only perform his mission in the world. This was that of a teacher. First, he was a good man in his own inner life, united with God in the most intimate bonds of personal communion, bent upon the life of holy love for his own part and eager to help introduce his fellow-men into the same holy service. He began his ministry by works of kindness, healing the sick and relieving every form of misery which it was possible for him to relieve. He sought the individual religious good of every soul he met and proclaimed the way of salvation through repentance and forgiveness. Hence he encountered the increasing opposition of the officials of an external and organized church. He gathered about him a group of disciples to whom he taught the fatherhood of God, explaining the nature of righteousness and guiding them in the paths of right living. Thus public relations and personal morals came into the scope of his teaching. He preached to great multitudes everywhere, even under circumstances of great personal danger to himself. He practiced and taught the life of prayer. At last the opposition to him grew so great that he must either abandon his work and retire to obscurity or suffer the extremest enmity of the Jewish leaders, which in such a case could scarcely fail to be fatal. It was through perseverance in his work that he met his death. More personal traits are not altogether lacking to this picture, though they may be less certain historically. His beautiful face, his winning manner, his compelling persuasiveness, his in-offensiveness and his personal self-effacement, his interest in his friends, his capacity of scorn and anger (but not for himself), his dialectic skill, his personal aloofness from sin combined with his charity for the sinner, his unwearied pursuit of his daily labors, his sadness over the world, his consolation in the presence of God—these things appear in the watermarks of the history, and are scarcely to be neglected.

3. The *sinlessness* of Jesus meets with a similar solution. Of course, if we hold the old view of original sin, we shall need the old view of the miraculous birth (and then the immaculate conception of

the Virgin herself) to maintain Jesus' sinlessness. If men are born into the world guilty and condemned to eternal punishment, Jesus, as sharing in our humanity, must be a sinner. Not more favorable to his sinlessness is the view which regards every deficiency as sin. But deficiency and imperfection may represent a stage in the evolution of humanity and thus constitute a perfection to the clarified thinking of our own age. The true question in respect to Jesus will be whether he had a pure heart, fixed upon God as the supreme object of his affections, whether he obeyed his own law of love, both toward God and man, and whether he maintained this characteristic perpetually in his daily life and grew thereby. The answer to this question may well be, Yes.

We could not maintain this position upon an uncritical view of the gospel narratives. The disrespect which Jesus showed to his mother at Cana and elsewhere, the petulant and unreasonable cursing of the fig tree, the destruction of the property of the swineherds of Gadara, would each be inconsistent with Jesus' sinlessness, were we obliged to accept their truth. Fortunately they are all unhistorical, because essentially associated with unreal miracles. There may be other similar elements, such as the somewhat defiant claim of sinlessness in the Fourth Gospel. All these we may simply sweep aside; and if the result is not a sinlessness upon which dogmatic positions (such as his fitness for bearing the sins of others) could be built, we need not relinquish our persuasion for that, because we do not intend to build anything upon it except the comfort which the thought may reasonably give us.

For the benefit which the conception of the sinlessness of Jesus confers on us is that of a realized ideal. An ideal of sinlessness would not be without its value, considered as a standard and a goal toward which we could direct our efforts. But a realized ideal has the further element of encouragement. To believe that a man has once attained sinlessness is of great comfort in the actual struggle of life. We can believe in the prevalence of holy purpose in the lives of many men. It is our hope for the increasing righteousness of the world. But we do not find this purpose uninterrupted, as it should be, in the men with whom we have to do in real life, or in our own personal experience. It was uninterrupted

once! It may have been often again! It shall be in me! Such is the argument of faith and hope; and the result is an enlargement of actual attainment.

But, of course, when the sinlessness of Jesus is not merely a pious opinion, but a conviction to be used as an element of maintaining the actual conflict with sin, its potency will depend upon the degree of certainty with which we are able to embrace it. Now, whatever has to be abated from the gospel picture of the character of Jesus here and there, it remains, after all that a reasonable criticism can do, that there is a picture of an ideal man. It still is the loftiest ideal which has yet been produced in literature. If we had necessarily to believe that he taught the doctrine of "the other cheek" as it stands in Matthew, some might belittle his strength and virility on that account. But the general picture, minor details here and there being remitted to further discussion, is lofty indeed, so much so that it still remains our unsurpassed ideal. In that famous passage in which John Stuart Mill defended the historicity of Jesus, he said: "Religion cannot be said to have made a bad choice in pitching on this man as the ideal representative and guide of humanity; nor, even now, would it be easy, even for an unbeliever, to find a better translation of the rule of virtue from the abstract into the concrete than to endeavor so to live that Christ would approve our life." And hence the picture of Christ here given carries with it a strong proof of its reality. It is not necessary to go to professed Christian apologists for the old argument, that it was impossible for those who wrote the Gospels to invent such an ideal, and that its existence is proof of its origin in a real personality. Mill has himself presented the same argument. "Who, among his disciples," he says, "or among their proselytes, was capable of inventing the sayings ascribed to Jesus, or of imagining the life and character revealed in the Gospels? Certainly not the fishermen of Galilee: as certainly not St. Paul, whose character and idiosyncrasies were of a totally different sort: still less the early Christian writers, in whom nothing is more evident than that the good which was in them was all derived, as they always professed that it was derived, from the higher source." In this sense, the ideal of Christ is a self-evidencing one.

\* See *Three Essays upon Religion* (Am. ed.), 253 ff.

4. We also view his *acquaintance with God* as complete—that is, so far as human beings can either have, or estimate, such an acquaintance. He himself, according to the Fourth Gospel, gave the profoundest definition of eternal life which has ever appeared, when he styled it “acquaintance with God” (John 17:3). He spoke also of his union with the Father as a “oneness” with him (John 10:30; 17:21), which was a moral oneness out of which came unity of purpose; so that even the almightiness of the Father might be invoked confidently by the Son for the protection of his sheep. But more than any mere phrasing of his acquaintance with God, the entire atmosphere of the life of Jesus, the perfect confidence with which he moves as a child in the Father’s house and completely at home, the clearness of vision of spiritual truths and the certainty of knowledge with which he speaks (things “seen and known”), reveal how absolutely this is true, that he knew God. The word “acquaintance,” bold as it sounds in such a connection at first, is after all the true word; for Jesus knew God as one friend knows another. He was the “friend of God” in the same sense in which Abraham was, who pleaded for Sodom as friend pleads with friend, but in a far higher degree. When Jesus says to the paralytic, “Thy sins be forgiven thee,” it is because he is confident of his knowledge of God’s conditions of forgiveness, which this man has fulfilled. He knows the very root of the system of duties. He teaches “with authority,” because he speaks out of the fulness of perfect knowledge of the will of God.

Now, acquaintance with God can come only from the impartation of himself by God to the soul. Jesus spake what he had “heard from God.” He, least of all men, could profess to know God because of any special insight, or as if such knowledge could be self-discovered. The man who knows God must know him upon the side of the revelation of His loving-kindness and tender mercy, of His consolations and providences. God reveals Himself thus only to those who are at heart one with Him. His grace is always operative to draw men to Him, as the heat of the sun is always poured out upon the earth; but He can intimately communicate Himself only to those who accept this grace, as the sun will warm only those who move into its rays. Hence there is a close relation

between the sinlessness of Jesus and his knowledge of God. The latter could not be true were not the former entire. Every degree of imperfection in the former would involve some degree of error or defect in the latter. And it is the combination of both which leads to the next particular in our enumeration.

5. The perfection of Jesus as the *ideal teacher* in things pertaining to God. He received, through his perfect consecration to the will of God, all that he, as a human soul, was capable of receiving; and thus he imparts to us what still remains the loftiest religious instruction of which the world has any knowledge.

We need not maintain, of course, that his teaching in every respect is incapable of improvement or even correction. There will doubtless come a time when aspects of his teachings of which he had no conception will appear. It is possible that we are now living in a time when, in the new interest and knowledge of social conditions and responsibilities which have arisen, fundamental modifications of some of the ethical teachings of Jesus will be called for. But we shall perform this modification at some points by the light which is afforded at other points by the great underlying principle of love, which he illuminated to man as no one had before and no one has equally since. But such suggestions aside—which are mainly possibilities, important only to a correct understanding of our positive position as to his teaching—it becomes astonishingly evident, when we compare Jesus with other great founders of religions, how much greater he is. The gulf is so deep between him and them that they do not seem to know God at all! Confucius tells so little about God that he can scarcely be called a religious teacher. The *nirvana* of Buddhism is not heaven. But Jesus brings out the being and nature of God with perfect distinctness. While he says little about the omnipotence of God, he lays great emphasis upon his infinite love, which is the foundation of the moral universe. When the idea of the divine providence, which is but the corollary of infinite love, by which he cares for every individual son of man; and of prayer, as the means of communion between the earthly child and the Heavenly Father; and the conception of duty and of responsibility upon our part, are added, you have all the features which still appear to us the

highest and best in the religious thinking of the world—and they are all the teachings of Jesus. Upon them has been founded our Western civilization, and by them it is distinguished from the civilizations of India and China, yes, and from that of Turkey.

In this way Christ becomes an authority for us. The rationalist who starts out by denying any absolute authority except that of perceived truth, ends by acknowledging the authority of Jesus *as an expert*. This does not involve the acknowledgment of any infallibility on the part of Jesus. Paul also is an expert and an authority, even though some of his undoubted teachings, as for example in respect to marriage and divorce, be rejected in the clearer light of the present time as defective. Paul himself abstracted from the real Jesus in favor of the ideal Christ; and we may do the same. But it remains that we may listen to Jesus with peculiar respect, and that we actually do so. He is the one who has made it perfectly clear that he who does not love his brother does not love God.

6. We may also view him as our *perfect example*. Not, of course, as to the details of his life, but as to its spirit. His acceptance of the nearest duty, his persistence in performing it, his loyalty to his mission, his indifference to personal considerations, his preference of his work to life—these are the great features of his life, and here he is the unsurpassed example. To view duty as he viewed it and to maintain one's love to God and men with the same entire subordination of merely selfish interests is still the highest ideal which we have of moral perfection and our unattained standard.

7. And we may also say, finally, that our relations with Christ culminate in his ideal presence with us. Paul, in consequence of his personal theology, viewed the fellowship of the Christian with his Master as a personal and real spiritual presence of Christ with him. This was, of course, dependent upon his conception of his divine attributes and his active government of the world in the interest of the ultimate kingdom of God. But the Fourth Gospel presents the matter in a form more acceptable to modern thought when it speaks of the presence of Christ as ideal. "It is expedient that I go away. . . . The Comforter will come to you." The present Christ is, literally, the personal presence of God with the

soul. The teachings of Christ still remain the material of instruction which the soul uses and God uses with the soul; and hence it is that the Comforter "receives" of Christ's words and "shows" them unto the believer. Thus Christ has his *real* present place in the experience of the Christian.

It is, no doubt, here that the most difficult point in the transition from traditional to rational views is to be found. Orthodox piety often seems to culminate in the worship of Christ. But what is it that we have been worshipping in Christ? Is it not the divine in him, the "Word," the Second Person of the Trinity, or "God in Christ"? And what have we worshiped in God, under this form, but his attributes of mercy, personal love, forgiveness, grace—in a word, his benevolence?

Now, we may say that it has been natural and possibly necessary to view these divine attributes as displayed in Christ rather than as inherent in the Infinite Spirit Himself. Mankind has come out of an animal ancestry into humanity, out of savagery into civilization, out of slavery into freedom, out of despotism into civil liberty, out of the era of deficit into that of surplus. Now, out of each of these states it has brought a heritage of fear. Man feared the wild beasts, then savage men, then the great masters of men's fortunes and their lives, then kings, and always hunger. The world seemed hard and unjust, and the Power that lay behind it unmindful of human suffering. They feared him with dread and apprehension. The earliest history is full of it. Men must not "touch the mount," lest the inscrutable deity should flame forth in some unanticipated form of wrath. The earth might open and swallow offenders. And even when a chosen people felt themselves secure, they were still afraid that they might forfeit divine favor by their sins, and sins were often utterly non-moral transgressions. Fear, inherited, instinctive, vague, but real, inescapable, dominated the conception of God as of the world, and made it long impossible to believe in God's entire goodness. To be sure, the most exalted spirits of Judaism had escaped from this nightmare, and believed in the loving-kindness and tender mercy, the truth, the righteousness, and the vindictive justice of God. But they had their mediators and system of mediation between God

and man; and the early Christians, like Paul who was under the influence of paganism from his youth, felt the need of a Mediator, and ascribed the loving side of the Deity to another than the Father, to the incarnate and suffering Deity, that is, to Christ. But the world has now come out into a new epoch. Even that of deficit has at last passed away. There is no need that any man should suffer from wild beasts and wild men, or even from hunger, except as men have failed to avail themselves of the stores of help that actually exist. And thus we have come to the point where we can recognize the entire and unqualified goodness of God, and can now ascribe directly to the Father all those merciful and gracious traits which have attracted us so powerfully to Christ. The idea of God thus emerges for the modern thinker from the darkness of the ages of dread and becomes what Jesus himself taught, that of a Father, possessed of all the tenderness of the best earthly father, and infinitely more. And thus the worship of Christ merges in the worship of the Father, and his presence with us is now understood as the true presence of the Father, communing directly, as an Infinite Spirit can, with our spirits, and thus establishing a personal contact between the infinite and the finite person.

Thus the rational Christology becomes a *Christology of values*. The rational faculty operates first critically to destroy the literal interpretation of the old church Christology by exhibiting its lack of proof, and ultimately its unreasonableness. It operates further to protect the thinker in the positive construction of his own Christology from affirming that which is irrational. If he accepts in any sense the sinlessness of Christ, he is not to do this in a sense which will involve irrationality. There is no such element in the simple position that a man should have a perfect union of will with God, choosing the divine will as the law of all his actions, nor in this, that he should maintain such a union. Further than this the rational argument does not go, except we consider the congruousness of the idea of sinlessness with all we know of Jesus, which, however, would hardly give us what might be called proof of the position. As a foundation for argument for any other position, we must finally say that Jesus' sinlessness lacks proof. But there is more to be said than this upon the positions which have



been advanced in these pages upon the rationalistic Christology. They are found to have value for the development of the Christian life. They have been borne upon the current of Christian thought from the beginning. They have a meaning, which is evident from the position which they have held among the leading ideas of the church. They have been found to awaken spiritual energies and to promote peace of mind and practical piety. The progress of the church along the course of the ages may be said to be principally due to its ideas of Christ, not, of course, to the false or defective elements which are found in them, but to the truth which they convey. In the earlier times these true elements may have been inseparable from the forms in which they were presented and unworkable without them. In the knowledge of the new time by which the false and the defective are stripped off, what remains? The ideal of human sinlessness, as a standard and a goal, is of too great value to relinquish. It is best conceived under the form of a sinless person: many can conceive it in no other way. We may thus choose, for the purposes of edification, to view it thus, and we may say that Jesus was this sinless person. We do not affirm positively, as a matter incontrovertible, that he was; but, inasmuch as we find the idea valuable for help and the personification of it equally helpful, we accept it. It would not be helpful as a mere arbitrary supposition, for which there was nothing to be said but this, that we liked it and found it useful. It has for it a considerable variety of reasons. Its very helpfulness is an argument for its truth. But our final reason for accepting it, since the arguments in its favor cannot be said to raise it above all doubt, is its value.

And so with all the other elements of Christology mentioned above. The rational Christology becomes a Christology of values, and will prove more effective than the old, we may hope, in helping humanity on to a more intimate fellowship with God, a loftier morality, and a more abundant service to man.

## RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE AND THEOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT

---

GEORGE GALLOWAY  
Castle-Douglas, Scotland

---

The great inheritance which the intellectual life of this century derives from the last century is the idea of development. It is a commonplace to say that this conception has revolutionized our way of regarding nature, life, and human society. And no one today would approach the study of a type of plant or animal, or a particular human institution, without considering it from the evolutionary standpoint. As Aristotle remarked long ago, the best way to philosophize about the nature of a thing is to study its process of growth. The genetic method has been successfully applied to the study of religions, and the progress of the religious consciousness has been traced from its lowly beginnings in animism and spiritism to its culmination in ethical and spiritual religion. One of the results of this investigation has been to show how essentially a process of development is a feature of a living religion. When a religion becomes stereotyped and mechanized the vital spirit ebbs from it, even though it may linger long as an external institution. So perished the ancient faiths of Greece and Rome, and so must perish any religion which is divorced from the spiritual life and culture of the age. For life means growth and fruitful interaction with the environment; and the living thing has the capacity to select and appropriate elements which nourish its inner being and promote its development.

To those who have entered into this way of thinking the position of theology at the present day gives much ground for reflection. While the other sciences are undergoing a rapid development, it has remained stationary, if not absolutely, yet to a very great extent. Most, if not all, of the churches are burdened with a theology which grew up and assumed form in what may be termed a prescientific age, and the right to modify and reconstruct is by

no means universally recognized. And until this right is fully conceded, the position of an enlightened teacher of the subject must, to say the least, be an awkward and difficult one. The *sons et origo mali* lay in the notion generally accepted in the creed-building ages, and not yet entirely extinct, that it was possible to elaborate a systematic body of religious doctrine which would be the norm of spiritual experience and belief for all time. And conservative sentiment, which interfuses itself with all religious things, acts as a protecting bulwark against the spirit of innovation. To those under the dominion of this feeling it savors of sacrilege to alter and amend the "faith once delivered to the saints."

But the herald signs of change are becoming visible above the horizon. The pressure of modern knowledge is making itself felt even in quarters which have long been inhospitable to new ideas. One of the most interesting and significant features of the religious outlook is the rise of the vigorous Modernist party within the Church of Rome. The Romish church indeed has all along had a theory of development, but it was a theory incompatible with the true idea of organic growth. For its developmental principle was that of accretion, not of transmutation, and the church accepted the idea of an unalterable deposit of faith. Elements which were "performed" there might be further defined, explicated, and elaborated: but real reconstruction was excluded, and what had been taken up into the structure of the Catholic creed could never be discarded. Under such limitations a true reconciliation with modern knowledge was not possible. As Father Tyrrell has said: "A bold contention that all ecclesiastical development is simply a mechanical unpacking of what was given in a tight parcel 2,000 years ago!" To this he opposes Modernism as "an expression of an opposite contention, of a belief in time, in growth, in vital and creative evolution." And one cannot doubt that progress is bound up with the frank and full acknowledgment of this principle.

Although a more liberal spirit has prevailed in the Protestant church, yet the theologians of Protestantism tacitly took over from the pre-Reformation church the idea that it was possible to have a creed universally and always valid. But they believed that creed must be founded on Scripture, as the Word of God, and not on

the tradition and authority of the church. And apparently they assumed there could be no other interpretation of Scripture admissible than their own. Hence they made no provision for development, and changed and enlarged views of the Bible have made the uncritical method in which they elaborated their doctrines unsatisfactory. So the idea of development in theology is just as much a pressing problem for the intelligent Protestant as for the enlightened Catholic.

It will be of advantage to make some observations at this point on the way in which this problem of development has been dealt with by two schools of thought in Germany during the last century. The former drew its inspiration in the main from Hegel, and tended to merge theology in a philosophy of religion. The theory was that theology expounded religious truth in the form of representation or figurative thinking, while the speculative thinker had for his task to purify and elevate this matter and bring it into the form of the philosophic notion. This was the method followed by the Swiss theologian Biedermann, and it was adopted, perhaps in a less whole-hearted way, and with less radical results, by Pfleiderer and Lipsius. So far as this method stands for the right to exercise critical reflection on the dogmas of the church, and for an attempt to bring about greater coherency between the elements of doctrine, the justice of its claim need not be disputed. The objection to it was that in some hands it degenerated into an arbitrary application to historic materials of an assumed higher point of view instead of being a sympathetic criticism and reconstruction from within. It was no doubt his sympathy with the reaction provoked by the extremes of the speculative method which prompted Ritschl to take up and seriously work out the thought of Schleiermacher, that theology must be the living outcome and expression of Christian experience. In other words it should endeavor to give a general and coherent exposition of the principles involved in the Christian consciousness. Hence the Ritschlian attempt to show that doctrines were values, and to build up a theology on judgments of value. The natural affinity of this method with the pragmatic method, about which we hear so much at present, hardly needs to be pointed out. Though one may disagree with a good deal in the

Ritschlian work, it is only fair to say that it was a genuine effort to liberate theology from a dead weight of dogma, and to bring it into a living relation with religious experience. Hence, whatever its shortcomings, Ritschlianism did much to vitalize the study of theology in Germany and in this country.

But certain assumptions are made by writers of this school which deserve to be examined. It is assumed by Harnack, Bousset, and others that, by a study of the records of Christianity, and by following the working of the Christian spirit in history, it is possible to distinguish essential from non-essential elements and to reconstruct a primitive Christian consciousness which is normative. Yet in the selection and valuation of historic materials, in order to make clear what is essential, the critic must bring with him some guiding conceptions, some ideal of what religion ought to be. He cannot pretend that what is called "the essence of Christianity" is explicitly set forth in the biblical literature and distinguished from the non-essential. The historian must bring something of his own with him in forming his judgment, and his own spiritual valuations help to form the ideal by which he judges. For this reason he cannot form an absolute disinterested appreciation of the life of the past; he always sees the past through the spiritual environment in which he is placed. And to reconstruct in all its fulness the religious experience of a distant time when the *Weltanschauung*, to use a convenient phrase, was very different from his own—to reconstruct such an experience with perfect accuracy is beyond his power. It does not follow that what the present-day historian finds to be the essence of Christianity would have expressed the mind of primitive Christians themselves. Ritschlian critics eliminate the eschatological element from the essence of the gospel; but it is hardly to be thought that this was a subordinate matter to the early church. And then, along with this assumed ability to separate clearly essential from non-essential elements, there goes the further assumption that the essential the critics have reached is the proper norm by which to test the historic evolution of the Christian consciousness. With "the true nature of Christianity" to guide them, writers like Harnack and the late Edwin Hatch regard the elaborate theology of the ecclesias-

tical creeds as in the main a *damnosa hereditas*. It is a false accretion due to the irruption of the Greek speculative spirit which overlaid and distorted the genuine Christian consciousness. The beginnings of this process of distortion are discernible, according to Bousset, even in the Pauline theology. Now I am not concerned to maintain that there is not an element of truth in these contentions, nor to deny that arbitrary and accidental materials have intruded themselves into the faith. None the less the view before us suggests a very pessimistic reading of the evolution of theology. Almost from the first theology began to misconceive and pervert, and only after 1,900 years are we beginning to clear away these false additions and to get back to the substratum of truth! The form and the content of religious experience cannot be separated and opposed to one another in so drastic a fashion. Doctrinal constructions which were quite alien to it could not have been forced on the Christian consciousness, and it would hardly have accepted patiently a yoke felt to be oppressive. In fact some measure of elective affinity must have existed, and no doubt there was a process of interaction between the form and the content. One cannot suppose, for example, that the theological construction of Christ as the divine Logos was regarded by the consciousness of the early church as a metaphysical subtlety or a superfluous speculation. It was the formal statement of the value-experience Christ had for the souls of his followers. Of course to say this is very far from saying that the doctrinal statement of the church's faith by the theologians of the fourth and fifth centuries of our era is to be taken as an absolute and final statement. Spiritual experience is not a stereotyped magnitude but a living and growing thing, and for this reason the doctrines which seek to generalize and define it will require to be modified and reconstructed from time to time; the new wine must be put into new bottles. But this is quite consistent with our holding that the body of doctrine developed at a particular stage was at least a relatively suitable expression of the existing religious consciousness. The ancient creeds of the church are felt by our age to be unsatisfactory, not because they were mistaken and perverted constructions from the first, but because the growing spiritual

consciousness has moved beyond them and has ceased to find a full satisfaction in them.

It may be of use, in view of the practical importance of the question, to explain more fully the relation, as we conceive it, of religious doctrine to religious experience. That doctrine (and the formulation of doctrines in a theological system) is a kind of excrescence on the religious life is not a tenable theory. It is not an arbitrary or an accidental product, but has its place and function in the logic of religious development. Every vital religion that reaches a certain stage of growth will expand into doctrines, just as the tree arrives at a point when it puts out branches. In the technical sense doctrine is a comparatively late product of religious development, but it is prepared for in the early stages of religious growth. Theology is always the outcome of reflective thought; yet even in the primitive period man had his instinctive beliefs by which he gave meaning to his religious experiences. Without this rudimentary qualification of feeling by thought no experience could be called religious: prior to the use of language as the medium of ideas religion in the proper sense could not exist. The rise of myths and cosmogonies betokens the further development of this aspect of the religious consciousness; but religion has to pass from the tribal to the national form, from the level of unconscious to conscious development, ere the structure of religious doctrine begins to grow. It is then that, in obedience to the deep-rooted impulse of man's nature to ask for reasons, theology commences its work of thinking out and expounding the meaning of what is done in religion. The cult and its ritual are the oldest part of a developed faith, and they go back, in their rudiments at least, to a primitive period. And the early theologian sets to work to explain the significance of the acts performed in the ritual, and to explicate in doctrines what is done in worship. Around the relatively stable material of the cult doctrines proceed to gather; and afterward of course the task of the theologian assumes a wider scope and meaning when theology comes into contact and interaction with independent aspects of culture like science and philosophy. Inasmuch as religious experience is concentrated around the cultus, theology may be said from its commencement to be an

endeavor to set forth the meaning of religious experience. There is something legitimate and even necessary in this, for man is not only a being who feels and wills; he also desires to know and understand. And if the thinking-function evolves later in the order of time, it is not on that account inferior in the order of value. So theology comes in to answer the demand made by a growing self-consciousness, the demand, namely, that religious experience be generalized and thus become a significant content. Only by means of religious ideas embodied in doctrines can a religion be taught and spread. Only because religion is a thinking of experience as well as a feeling-state can it function as an aspect of the growing life of culture.

Accordingly I am forced to dissent from some things which the late Professor James has said, in his vivid and picturesque way, about religious doctrine in his *Varieties of Religious Experience*. Admitting the value of what James, followed by Pratt, Delacroix, and others, has to tell us of the function of the subconsciousness in giving a psychological explanation of mysticism and other religious phenomena, it is still, I think, a mistake to treat the feeling-life as the one and essential foundation of religion, while theology is a secondary and not very important superstructure. It is perfectly true that there is more in spiritual experience than can be expressed in doctrine, and we all know that there are depths in the inner life which defy verbal expression. But this does not prove that doctrine is not an essential aspect of any developed religion. And in truth we have only to remember the interaction, already noted, between form and content to see that religious ideas in their turn promote the development of spiritual feeling. For ideas can become the centers and rallying points of emotion, and the more stable sentiments can also gather round them. With much that Professor James says about the practical valuelessness of scholastic theology and the metaphysics of the divine attributes one may agree. But the fact is that we are here dealing with a theology which the spiritual life of the age has outgrown, or is fast outgrowing, and the argument is not relevant against theology in the exercise of its legitimate function of interpreting religious experience.



In offering some further observations on the subject I would urge that a candid acceptance of the principle of development in theology is indispensable, for spiritual experience itself develops. It is sometimes argued that in a religion you have a determinate principle, revealed in a typical experience, which maintains itself unchanged throughout. As I have contended elsewhere, this is to forget that a religion has its being in the consciousness of living minds, and as such it is subject to interaction with the other contents of that consciousness. The scientific knowledge of the age, its ethical ideas, and its practical aspirations are all reflected in individual minds, and the religious spirit cannot remain unaffected by them. To suppose that a specific and typical form of religious experience can maintain an abstract identity with itself from age to age, a changeless aspect of a changing mind, is to assert what has no psychological probability. Experience as life begets subtle alterations of outlook and valuation while the historic process is running its course; and, as Eucken has suggestively remarked, it is never the past as it once was that we re-create, but the past as it is interpreted through the spiritual life of the present. However anxious we might be to do so, we are unable to pass beyond our spiritual environment and reproduce in ourselves the very form and pressure of the spiritual experience of Christians in the first century. In an article in the *Hibbert Journal* (April, 1908, p. 491) Dr. Forsyth confidently puts the question: "If we may not rest on the mere dictum of an apostle, may we not rest upon our own repetition of the apostolic experiences, the experience which made the apostles?" Now if this only means that the history of Christianity reveals a continuous spiritual experience which connects itself with the person and work of Christ, few unprejudiced minds will be found to dispute the statement. But if, as seems more likely, the words are meant to convey the idea that an experience of Christ, say that of St. Paul, repeats itself in identical form from age to age, then there are difficulties in such a theory. For individual experience must always be psychologically and socially conditioned, and no exact repetition of past experience seems possible. If a single and specific type of experience, reproducing itself from generation to generation, lay behind the development of

Christianity, it is hard to see why there should be those great changes in spiritual and ethical ideals which the history of the church discloses. At the very least one must suppose that the experience was obscured, distorted, and modified by other influences which militated against its full and clear expression. And this is practically to admit that the typical experience is qualified in its working by interaction with other elements.

It may be said that the line of argument we have been developing appears to sacrifice any principle of identity in religious experience, and that it would follow that the Christian consciousness today is only the same in name with that of the first Christians. In reply it may be said that there is an identity, but it is not that of a hard and fast type but of a living process of growth which is continuous throughout. For the gift of Christ was a spiritual life, a seed of promise sown in the hearts of men and by fruitful interaction taking fresh form and expression from age to age. It is not the weakness, it is the strength of the Christian spirit at once to enrich and to be enriched by other elements in the expanding life of man. And it maintains through all its movement the unity of spirit and purpose which preserves its continuity.

Now this developmental character of spiritual life requires a corresponding development on the side of its theological expression. But this truth is often obscured by the fact that men are not fully aware how essentially growing is religious experience, and they do not realize the movement in which they are involved because change is gradual and proceeds without observation. Though we may not fully recognize it, our religious consciousness is none the less affected by the knowledge and ethical culture of the age, and receives color and meaning from them. Hence the impossibility of simply going back to the past and trying to reproduce its spirit and outlook. The spiritual life of the present, for example, would forbid the primitive Christian eschatology, and even Calvinistic predestinarianism cannot now enter into the vital substance of the faith.

But with the full acceptance of the principle that spiritual experience is not a stereotyped form but a developing process, development in its doctrinal expression becomes a necessity. And

the theological distress and unrest of our time are, in part at least, due to the fact that conservative sentiment and institutional interests strive to maintain the validity of theological forms which have become too narrow for the content of the spiritual life. It may be granted that the work of reconstruction will bring with it many serious problems and perplexities, and the old method of elaborating dogmas out of texts of Scripture, read uncritically, is no longer available. In some departments of his task the theologian will have to cultivate closer relations with the philosopher whose office is "to think things together." In other matters the need of greater simplicity and reserve will be apparent. Yet, whatever the difficulties, the duty of theological development cannot be postponed indefinitely; it ought rather to be courageously faced in the interests of vital and practical religion.

## CRITICAL NOTES

---

### A CRITIQUE ON PROFESSOR WARFIELD'S ARTICLE, "THE CHRISTOLOGY OF THE NEW TESTAMENT WRITINGS" IN THE JULY NUMBER OF THIS JOURNAL

Dr. Warfield's article on the Christology of the New Testament writings in the July number of this *Journal* is in several points in the true succession of the famous theological writings of an Athanasius and an Augustine. Thus, in the first place, his article of twenty-five pages, though its special thesis is the "Two Natures" in Christ, appeals to but a single word of Jesus himself and that a word which might easily be turned against him. He practically ignores what one might naturally suppose should be regarded as the supreme, if not only, source of information on his thesis. Just so did Athanasius. The mine from which he quarried his arguments in proof of the deity of Jesus was not the teaching of Jesus himself, but the eighth chapter of the Book of Proverbs!

Now why should the revelation in Jesus be completely overlooked when men are discussing the question of his own nature? Is he not a competent witness? Have we not a considerable body of sayings attributed to him which are generally accepted as genuine, and have we not a record of his life which is quite as likely to throw light on the nature of his being as were the men who drew up the Creed of Chalcedon in the middle of the fifth century? Is it reasonable to pass by Jesus in the proposed investigation, and to ask Paul to tell us what Jesus really was? Did Paul know Jesus better than Jesus knew himself? This method of arriving at the New Testament doctrine of the person of Christ was culpable indeed in the fourth or the fifth century, but by what term can it be adequately characterized when advocated in the twentieth century?

Or is the fact that our author makes no appeal to Jesus himself—a single saying being excepted—a confession that he cannot discover any suitable material for his purpose in the words or the life of the Master? If that is the case, we accept his silence as fit and eloquent.

In the second place, the article before us belongs in the Athanasian succession because though raising a historical question it settles it in an unhistorical manner. Its general thesis is "The Christology of the New

Testament Writings," which, however, with no apparent consciousness of the unfitness of the procedure, is narrowed down to the thesis of the "Two Natures."

This historical subject is treated in a strictly unhistorical fashion. For the author, instead of proceeding to the sources in the attitude of an inquirer after truth, goes first to the theologians of the fifth century, and after a brief statement of their relation to the church authorities of earlier times, which relation is said to have been one of essential harmony, he declares that the "Chalcedonian christology . . . is only a very perfect synthesis of the biblical data." This is his "key" to the "treasures of the biblical instruction on the Person of Christ," and it "enables the reader as he currently scans the sacred pages to take up their declarations as they meet him, one after the other, into an intelligently consistent conception of his Lord." Now this is a perfectly clear statement of a mental attitude that absolutely excludes historical investigation. The author is satisfied, abundantly satisfied, not only to take the theologians of the fifth century as his guides in the interpretation of Scripture but to accept their deliverance on the nature of Jesus as "a very perfect synthesis of the biblical data," the true "key" that unlocks the treasures of the Bible regarding the person of Christ. Nor have we even yet quite expressed the author's joyous satisfaction with this "key." It is "not merely a synthesis of all the data concerning the Person of Christ found in the New Testament," but it is "the doctrine of each of the New Testament books in severalty. There is but one doctrine of the Person of Christ inculcated or presupposed by all the New Testament writers without exception. In this respect the New Testament is all of a piece."

Thus, we have the singular phenomenon—singular in this age of the world and of scientific investigation—the phenomenon of a writer who, proposing to discuss the christology of the New Testament writings, tells us, before he has so much as opened the New Testament, what it teaches as a whole and what each particular book teaches or presupposes, and tells us in the positive tones of one who is perfectly sure that he possesses the whole truth. This is precisely the method which was followed by the early theologians to the infinite injury of the Bible—the method which the Antioch school of interpretation gave promise of being able to break, but which nevertheless remained in full force until the rise of the modern historical method. This is not investigation, not an impartial seeking after truth, not an attempt to get into the atmosphere of the writers of the New Testament and to understand them. One whose attitude toward the *sources* of Christianity is of this sort may

indeed speak of "portentous symptoms of the decay of vital sympathy with historical Christianity which is observable in present-day academic circles," but it is impossible that he should convince any reader who takes up the subject under discussion by the modern method that this "decay of vital sympathy with *historical* Christianity" is decay of sympathy with *vital* Christianity. If a man means by "historical Christianity" something that did not spring out of the full revelation in Jesus as a plant from a root, then he speaks of phenomena which may be historical but are not Christian. If one defines and measures "historical Christianity" by the Creed of Chalcedon, regarding this as a "very perfect synthesis of the biblical data," as the "key" which unlocks the treasures of the biblical instruction on the person of Christ as none other can, then, in the name of Christ, we appeal from his "historical Christianity" to the Christianity of the Founder.

We have now indicated the author's mental attitude toward his subject and what it signifies. We shall meet with no surprises if we go on and note what he finds when at last he does open the New Testament itself. We know exactly what he has set out to find, and an able man can find in the Bible what he will if he is allowed to seek in his own way. There can be no profit therefore in any lengthy survey of his handling of New Testament texts. A few sentences will fairly indicate his exegetical method.

The author's appeal to Paul, which constitutes the major part of his article, is an appeal to three specific texts and to the word "Lord" as applied to Jesus. The texts are Rom. 9:5; Phil. 2:6; and Col. 2:9.

Of Rom. 9:5 the author says, "It is mere matter of fact that Paul, . . . designates Christ here, 'God over all, blessed forever.'" Mere matter of fact! The passage is no *crux* to him. That many able interpreters have differed widely as to Paul's meaning, and that they still differ, is naught to him. Of Phil. 2:6 he declares: "To say that Jesus Christ is 'in the form of God' is then to say not less but more than to say shortly that he is 'God.'" Col. 2:9 is dispatched in six lines, for it declares "in plain words that Christ is an incarnation of the Godhead in all its fulness."

It seems to us quite idle to reply to this type of exposition. To understand it one needs to revert to the author's statement on an earlier page, that the "key" to "the treasures of the biblical instruction on the Person of Christ" is such that it enables the reader as he "currently scans the sacred pages," and so forth "Currently scans"! Yes, one who reads in that way, one who, convinced of the adequacy of the "key,"

merely notes the surface of the text, may pass lightly over Rom. 9:5, Phil. 2:6, and Col. 2:9, and find them delightfully "plain." There are, however, few scholars who do not admit that these passages are unusually difficult. Of the real problems involved in them the reader of this article gets little idea.

The author's remarks on Paul's use of *κύριος* seem singularly wide of the mark. Thus he declares that "*κύριος* is not with Paul of lower connotation than *θεός*"; and again, "'Lord' is Paul's divine name for Christ; is treated by him as Christ's proper name—as, in fact, what can scarcely be called anything else than his inter-trinitarian name and, in this technical sense, his 'personal' name." This language simply ignores what anyone may learn from a Greek lexicon<sup>1</sup>—that *κύριος* is a word of *relation*. It has, therefore, in itself, nothing to tell us of Paul's conception of the *nature* of Jesus.

Perhaps the most obvious criticism to be made on the author's handling of Paul's letters is that he focuses attention exclusively upon a small part of the data. It is special pleading in an aggravated form. He notes Rom. 9:5, but has nothing to say of such passages as I Cor. 15:28, Rom. 16:27, and I Tim. 2:5; he appeals to Phil. 2:6, but is silent regarding I Cor. 3:21, Rom. 8:29, and Eph. 3:19.

It was remarked above that the author, though discussing the nature of Jesus, refers to but a single saying of the Master, that of Mark 13:32: "But of that day or that hour knoweth no one, not even the angels in heaven, neither the Son, but the Father." The comment on this text is worth quoting for its light on the author's expository manner. He says: "When Mark records our Lord himself as testifying that he is, in the hierarchy of being, above even the angels, he places him outside the category of created beings; and there is no reason to doubt that with him as truly as with all his Jewish compatriots the Son of God which he repeatedly calls Jesus connoted, as John defines the phrase for us (5:18), just 'equality' with God."

Now we may notice (1) that Jesus does not testify that he is above angels "in the hierarchy of *being*." He says simply of a certain event of the future that it is known neither to the angels nor to the Son. It is implied that the Son is above the angels in respect to knowledge, but higher knowledge does not imply a different and higher order of *being*, else would our author himself be of a different and higher order of being as compared with a first-year man in Princeton Seminary. (2) When Mark records this saying of Jesus, our author says he places him "outside

<sup>1</sup> See Col. 4:1.

the category of created beings." Then to stand higher than angels in *knowledge* is to be "outside the category of created beings"! But any Christian man has a higher knowledge of God's work of redemption than the angels can have, for he knows by *experience* what it is, while angels, so far as we can affirm, have no experience of it. Does it therefore follow that the Christian man is above angels "in the category of *being*"? (3) It is said that Mark repeatedly calls Jesus the Son of God. It is somewhat remarkable that anyone who even "currently scans the sacred pages" should make this assertion. Aside from the title of the Gospel—which scholars do not ascribe to Mark—there is not one passage in which *Mark* himself can be said to call Jesus the Son of God. He does indeed represent the demons as saying (twice) to Jesus, Thou art the Son of God (3:11; 5:7), but must we suppose that he indorsed what was said by demons? He represents a Roman centurion as saying of Jesus (15:39), "Truly, this was a son of a god"! Must we suppose that he indorsed this sentiment? It is certainly quite different from the other sentiment. Mark represents Jesus as replying in the affirmative to the query of the high priest (14:62), "Art thou the Christ, the Son of the Blessed?" and he records that on two occasions (1:11; 9:7) a voice out of heaven claimed Jesus as "my beloved Son"; but these are of course not independent assertions of Mark's own opinion.

Probably the author means that Jesus is repeatedly designated a Son of God *in the Gospel of Mark*. Even this statement, however, would be inaccurate, for the exact title "The Son of God" is found in Mark but *once* (3:11). Only when its *equivalents* are counted, can it be said to be used repeatedly.

The assumption of the last part of the author's comment, viz., that the title Son of God "connoted" for Mark "equality with God" is a mere assumption, and since the author does not attempt to put any support under it, we may dismiss it without further notice.

These brief remarks on the author's exegetical method may suffice. One who regards the Creed of Chalcedon as a "very perfect synthesis of the biblical data" and as the "key" which unlocks "the treasures of the biblical instruction on the person of Christ" may well see "portentous symptoms of the decay of vital sympathy with historical Christianity" in the Christian world of today, but the writer of this critique believes that the Christianity of Christ was never so sympathetically understood and never so powerful as it is today.

GEORGE HOLLEY GILBERT

DORSET, VT.



IS BELIEF IN THE HISTORICITY OF JESUS INDISPENSABLE  
TO CHRISTIAN FAITH?

In complying with the request of the editor for a brief comment upon the article by Professor Macintosh, "Is Belief in the Historicity of Jesus Indispensable to Christian Faith?" in the July number of the *American Journal of Theology*, I wish at the outset to state my hearty assent to the apologetic value of his argument for religion as interpreted by Christianity. Christianity is in the world and shares in the power possessed by all socialized ideas and ideals to stimulate conduct and hopes. Men are likely to be religious in accord with Christian ideals as long as these are component parts of the social milieu. In so far as these concepts are derived from a historic Jesus they may fairly be said to be Christian in the strict sense, even though men cease to believe in a historic Jesus. Similarly, men are Platonists or Stoics who are oblivious to the origin of the beliefs or attitudes they possess. The position taken by Professor Macintosh in these regards requires no argument, for it is self-evident. We might as well argue that men can be breathers of oxygen and nitrogen although they have no record of the original chemical and physical events that gave rise to our atmosphere.

But is this just the question at issue? Would Christianity without a historic Jesus really remain what the word has meant? It would be a religion—for the sake of argument, conceivably a higher development of religion than that which the western civilization has called Christian. But would it be *Christianity*? Would the faith it engenders any more properly be called Christian than liberal Judaism or Buddhism?

Such an issue may appear academic. Why not let the word Christian have a new and more generic, less historical, meaning? We are always ready to call that Christian which we regard as ideal, even though it is quite impossible to trace it to any definite statement or position of Jesus or Paul. Any word may legitimately be given a new content provided we all agree in usage. I recognize the force of this argument, and should be the last to split hairs argumentatively. And I should be quite ready to use the term "Christian" in an ethical sense without reference to matters of either theology or criticism.

But the issue seems to me more than that of a definition. It really involves the momentous question as to whether we are in the process of evolving a new phase of religion from historic Christianity in the same way that the early church brought its imperial message from Judaism, and Socrates and Plato brought their idealism from the Sophists and the thesaurus of philosophical reflection bequeathed them by the earlier

Greek thinkers. It would not be the first time the effort has been made to submerge New Testament teaching in general culture, and in much the same fashion of substituting dehistoricized, speculative systems for a Christianity with historical content. Docetism, Gnosticism, Manicheanism, Rationalism of the mythical sort, all made the endeavor to relieve religious faith of the historical elements of Christianity in the interest of intellectual freedom and progress. That they failed was doubtless due to a variety of causes, but it is also true that they failed because they deprived their followers of that element of certitude born of the experiences of a historical Jesus which I cannot help feeling is one characteristic of Christian faith. Perhaps the modern attempt may be more successful, although I doubt it.

After all, definition is not without importance. What *is* Christian faith? I judge that Professor Macintosh means to give its content when he says that "whatever judgment might be rendered upon questions of historical fact . . . the content of the Christian view of God, as the holy and loving fatherly God, would remain, and with it the Christian belief in providence, immortality, sin and its forgiveness, the saving value of voluntary vicarious suffering, faith and repentance, regeneration and sanctification, the Holy Spirit and a divine humanity. Even the idea of revelation would not be essentially altered; the Christlike everywhere would be interpreted as revelation." This clear statement makes it appear that he uses "faith," not in the psychological, but in the theological, sense. Personally I prefer to restrict the word to the psychological usage. To me Christian faith means the religious expression of the activities of the self at the suggestion and under the direction of Christian ideas. Platonic, Buddhistic, Mohammedan faith would be a similar activity of the self under the influence of the respective ideas. And I would agree heartily with Professor Macintosh that saving faith, in the personal religious sense, does not wait upon the verdict of the higher criticism as to the historicity of Jesus. Men are not saved by mere orthodoxy or heterodoxy. In the sense that their wills are at one with God's, men who never heard of Jesus, have been and are to be saved. But should we, for instance, say Abraham had Christian faith? Or should we say that in him religious faith, however imperfect, possessed a quality that, as Paul saw, made Abraham one with those who through the clearer revelation and deeper certainty given by Jesus also trust God as fatherly and so partake of the divine spirit? But are not this clearer revelation and deeper certainty born of the conviction that God has actually expressed Himself in a definite individual of history?

Is any genuine religious faith, no matter what its relation to historical

Christianity, to be called Christian? If it is, the word "Christian" ceases to have its old and gets a new meaning. It no longer means a group of ideals that unite it with and are, as it were, embodied in and guaranteed by the experience of a definite historical person. It comes to mean a religious philosophy which has evolved from a culture which still is colored by a religion that involved a belief in a real historical person by whom it was founded.

It seems to me that whatever such a position gains in general apologetic value it loses in its incentive to faith as a form of personal expression. Christianity is more than the common divisor of religion and philosophy. For me a historical Jesus of messianic value is in himself a revelation. He adds data to that knowledge and to those ideals which control that form of religious self-expression which we call faith. To remove him from history would be to change materially that knowledge and those ideals. If his character and resurrection are definite facts, then we certainly have more knowledge of the real nature of the spiritual life than would otherwise be ours.

The content of each of those beliefs which Professor Macintosh lists as constituting the content of Christian faith, notably the fatherliness of God, immortality, and the worth of vicarious suffering, would certainly be modified. Without the historical Jesus they could not be much in advance of the beliefs of modern liberal Judaism or even of Platonism. Whether faith as then constituted would be Christian or supra-Christian, will, as I have indicated, depend on what is meant by Christian. Personally I prefer to hold to the original conception of the word as giving a definite and evangelic historical support to the validity of our confidence in those great values a developing humanity has always hoped and at times has had the temerity to believe are persistent. Christianity without a Jesus would be a generic religion and ethics, but would it be a gospel that breeds religious assurance? Is not Christianity's historic quality an element of its claim to reveal that which is in advance of even Hebraic religious experience?

But here we come to the question of questions: Is the gospel of and about Jesus as set forth in the New Testament to live in our modern culture? Personally I believe it will, and, with the necessary historical resolution that it will live, as set forth with historical content by Jesus and Paul. When criticism shows that belief in a historical Jesus is untenable I shall be ready to redefine Christian faith in the wider sense. Until then I should hold that Christian faith (in its fullest sense) will lose something of its essential character in proportion as it

replaces the experiences of a genuinely historical Jesus with social values. Christianity (in the theological sense of the term) is more than a religious philosophy; it is a *religion* born of personal loyalty and with the trust that comes from confidence that the word has taken flesh and has worked in actual life the "creed of creeds."

SHAILER MATHEWS

---

### IGNATIUS AND THE ODIST

Perhaps it is worth while to draw attention to a certain amount of similarity not so much between the Ignatian letters and the early Christian hymns which Dr. Harris had recovered, as between Ignatius and the Odist.

This likeness seems the more significant since they are so evidently different in their pursuits and still more in certain pre-eminent features of their character. Ignatius is a practical man (*Phil.* viii): "I have done my part as a man prepared to bring unity." Unity spiritual and practical is the one thing he seems to care for. Though his exaltation may have led him to overrate the importance of his efforts in this direction yet none but a man with a strong hand could write that line (*Rom.* ix): "Remember in your prayer the church in Syria which instead of *me* is to have God for its shepherd. Jesus Christ will [now] alone be her bishop. . . ." And only a character which did not lack a real firmness could ever insist so vehemently and yet persistently on the monarchical principle in the organization of the church, waiving all objections and difficulties with a steadfast conviction.

Men objected to a bishop who was very sparing in words. A bishop should preach and speak—Ignatius replies with authority (*Eph.* vi): "And forasmuch as one sees a bishop silent, he ought to fear him more. For anyone whom the master of the house sends to take care of his own household we ought so to accept as if he were the sender himself. Therefore it is clear that the bishop must be looked upon as if he were the Lord Himself." Now Ignatius being himself a bishop, his reasoning here comes dangerously near a vicious circular argument. But this is really not the case. For his own conscience he must have been quite right: *The source of his authority is a special inspiration, of which he is conscious and which for his feeling is enforced by his impending martyrdom.*

Here is a point of agreement with the Odist which must not be overlooked. The inspiration of Ignatius is of course preconditioned by his being an ecclesiastic of strong temper, yet his conviction of it is as firm

and intense as is the case with the poet who may have been his older contemporary. We may compare, e.g., *Phil.* vii:

If some have tried to lead me astray as to the flesh, yet *the Spirit* does not go astray, being from God. For He knows from where He is coming and where He tends to, and He convicts the hidden [thoughts]. I have cried out, in the midst of their speaking, with a strong voice, *a voice of God*: "cleave to the bishop and the presbytery and the deacons." If some have suspected me that I said these words from a knowledge of the schismatic tendencies of some, [Christ] is my witness, in whom I am fettered, *that I did not know this from human flesh. But the Spirit proclaimed*, saying thus: "Do nothing without the bishop. Consider your flesh as God's temple. Love unity, shun schisms. Be imitators of Jesus Christ as He himself is of His Father."

The same indwelling of the Spirit is claimed by the Odist, e.g., in Ode VI:

1. As the hand moves over the harp, and the strings speak
2. So *speaks in my members the Spirit of the Lord*
12. Blessed are the *ministers of that draught*, who are *entrusted* with that water of his
19. For *everyone knew them* in the Lord and they lived by living water for ever.

Here the Odist is also looking on persons who bear authority based on inspiration, and if the draught be a sacramental draught, the "ministers" which "everyone knew in the Lord" may eventually have been the same officials Ignatius is contending for. But whether they were or were not, from this ode and others proceeds clearly that the martyr and the Odist are at one in their *claim for an authoritative teaching* based on inspiration. They claim this prerogative for themselves and for their spiritual equals. The measure of this equality is of course taken in different ways by the poet or the bishop but the fact itself is clear enough.

This *authority is taken in full earnest* by both of them, though the exercise of it must have differed altogether. Without indulging in any speculation on this point, we may yet feel rather sure that neither Ignatius nor the Odist has considered as a mere rhetorical flourish the thoughts which the latter expresses in Ode XXIX.

6. For I believed in the Lord's Christ: and it was seen by me that He is *the Lord*
7. And He showed me His *sign*, and He led me by His light and gave me the *rod of His power*;

8. That I might *subdue the imaginations* of the peoples and the power of the men to bring them low;
9. To *make war by His word*, and to take victory by His power.
10. And the *Lord overthrew my enemy* by His word, etc.

Though the practical cry "unity" which Ignatius carried also into his theological reflections is absent from this ode, we have no reason to doubt that these words were spoken from his heart. Of course the Odist does not so much enlarge on the Cross as the bishop on his way to the arena and the lions, but the program of what must have been his life is here.

Both of them front the masses. Their strength is in a personal vocation. Their confidence finally rests on a feeling of special inspiration which equips them for their task.

The fact of the Odist's substituting his own personality and his *own sufferings* for those of Christ recurs also, though in a restrained form, in the letters of the Syrian bishop. Behind this fact we must suppose a common conception of some mystical significance of the personal hardships which they both suffered for Christ's sake in following up the promptings of their inspiration. Going back we are then apt to think of some cognate utterances of St. Paul, and looking forward we meet the idea of a sort of vicarious suffering in some way realized by the extravagances of asceticism.

One is tempted to think that the *Odists' standing* was a more easy one and that his claim of inspired teaching conveyed by means of his utterances was less strenuously met by his opponents than is the case in the Ignatian letters. I cannot see one clear passage in the Odes behind which we might get a glimpse of what is portrayed in *Phil.* viii, 2:

I beseech you, do nothing *κατ' ἐρίθειαν*, but *κατὰ χριστομαθίαν*. For I have heard some people saying: "If I do not find it in the ancient things—in the Gospel—I do not believe." And on my saying to them: "It is (Holy) Writ," they answered me: "It lies open for proof." But for me, "The ancient things" is Jesus Christ, the unviolable ancient (*palladia*) are His cross and His death and His resurrection and the faith wrought by Him.

The Odist puts all the stress on this last point, being of course more the man of the inward life. Yet *the earlier three are not absent*. They are—for the Odist's manner—conspicuous in Ode XLII:

1. I stretched out my hand and approached my Lord,
2. For the stretching of my hands is *His sign*.
3. *My expansion is the outspread tree* which was set upon the way of the righteous one.

Then the execution by the malice of the Jews and the Lord's resurrection together with the significance of that fact are slightly touched upon:

4. And I became of no account to those who did not take hold of me (cf. John 14:30), and I shall be with those who love me.
5. All my persecutors are dead; and they sought after me, who hoped in me—because I was alive—
6. And *I rose up* and am with them, and I will speak by their mouths. . . .
8. And *I lifted up over them the yoke of my love*. . . .

Ignatius speaks of these same points but in a much more forcible way when giving a testimony to the Christian character of the Smyrnaean church (*Smyrn.* i):

For I knew you as perfected in immoveable faith as if you were *fixed by nails to the cross* of the Lord Jesus Christ with flesh and spirit . . . . (2) . . . . whose (i.e. Christ's) fruit we are . . . . that He might *lift up a sign* to eternity through His *resurrection for His holy and faithful people*.

Ode XIX is a rock of offense. The language is too oriental for our taste which, however, does not imply that a Christian audience at another place and time would have received a similar shock. Ignatius, e.g., indulges in metaphors which go far in this same direction, e.g., *Rom.* vii, 3: "I desire the bread of God, which is the flesh of Jesus Christ, who is from the seed of David, and I desire as a drink his blood, which is incorruptible love." Though we are accustomed to expressions of the same type, e.g., in a well-known chapter of St. John, yet the fact of a rather bold and harsh metaphor exists none the less. Equally harsh is *Troll.* viii: ". . . in faith which is the flesh of the Lord and in love which is the blood of Jesus Christ."

There is a compactness in such language which reminds one of *Semitic mentality*. Ignatius, *Eph.* xviii, 1: *περίφημα τὸ ἐμὸν πνεῦμα τοῦ σταυροῦ*, has quite the air of a Hebrew or Syriac nominal clause with a downright *status constructus*. "Offscouring my cross-spirit" is no Greek, and must have been a horror even to Epictetus. It is even beyond the papyri.

But people who can speak and write in this way are apt to think in a corresponding shorthand manner when elevated to the higher grounds of eloquence or poetry. When the Odist is singing (Ode XI): "*My heart was cloven* [circumcised, i.e.,<sup>1</sup> pruned?] and its flower appeared; and

<sup>1</sup> *Gzar* usually means "to circumcise." Payne-Smith, *Thes. Syr.*, does not mention a meaning "to prune." Yet the derivative uses of *gzar* are many and show so much freedom in handling the primitive meaning, that we may be allowed to call the "circumcision" of a fruit-tree pruning.

grace sprang up in it: and it brought forth *fruit* to the Lord," the same spiritual fact is before the eyes of the martyr-bishop, who expresses it in a corresponding, though less beautiful, manner (*Trall.* xi) when denouncing his adversaries: "For these are no *planting* of the Father. Then, if they were, they would appear as '*branches of the Cross*' and their *fruit* would be imperishable."

This "planting" is an idea which the Odist has woven into Ode XXXVIII, where the idea of suffering—so prominent in Ignatius' mind that he is condensing it everywhere in the use of the "cross"—is also present in the very reduced form of "danger."

. . . . He established me

18. For He set the root and watered it and fixed it and blessed it; and its fruits are for ever
19. It struck deep and sprung up and spread out, and was full and enlarged,
20. And the Lord alone was glorified in His planting and in His husbandry: by His care and by the blessing of His lips,
21. By the beautiful planting of His right hand: and by the discovery of His planting and by the thought of His mind.

Ignatius is twice using this same *botanical metaphor*, but in both cases (*Trall.* xi; *Phil.* iii) he is speaking as a controversialist, clipping the precious coinage stamped by the prophets and poets. Such is the case also with the Odist's metaphor of the crown (*Magn.* xiii): . . . . ἀξιοπλόκου πνευματικῷ στεφάνου τοῦ πρεσβυτερίου ὑμῶν. This "crown worthy to be twined" is the presbytery. There is a great difference here with the beautiful words "The Lord is on my head like a living crown"—but for Ignatius a living "crown" is after all an expression of enthusiasm, fired at the sight of his Christian and organizatory ideals embodied in a circle of living men. For this beauty the eyes of the poet were perhaps shut.

But they are brought quite near to each other by the *experiences of their innermost life*. In *Rom.* vii we read: "For I write to you while yet living but loving to die. My love has been crucified and there is no matter-loving fire (πῦρ φιλόλογον) in me, but a *living and speaking water within me, that is saying: Onward to the Father*." Here the mystic and the poet in the bishop are roused by the anticipation of martyrdom—and his words are such as constantly recur in the Odes. It would be needless to copy the places, where inward comfort and refreshment, the cool shades of rest, the experience of the inspiration of a quiet soul, are condensed in this pregnant simile "living and speaking water." "Onward to the Father" is the sound of unity in the divergent characters of both.



There is more of this. The difference between both characters and their *unity in enthusiasm* is grafted imperishably in the strong and living words of Ode VII:

As the impulse of anger against evil so is the impulse of joy over what is lovely.

Surely the Odist would not have failed to understand the impetuous character of Ignatius and would have appreciated somehow his angry anxiety for a harmonious and well-ordered life in the churches, which he came to visit.

On the other hand Ignatius was surely much more inclined to *restfulness and joy* than his letters at first sight would suggest. With a consistency in which perhaps a good deal of sympathy may be suspected he defends his colleagues that are called "silent." We may recall *Eph.* vii quoted above, but the same fact recurs in *Phil.* i, where the bishop of the place is said "to have more influence when silent than those people who speak vanity." So in *Rom.* ii he himself beseeches his friends to "keep away from him *in silence* [σιωπήσῃτε ἀπ' ἐμοῦ], then *he will become a word of God* [λόγος θεοῦ], but if you become again amorous of my flesh, I shall again be an echo" (πάλιν ἴσονται ἡχώ). This surely is again a confession tinged by a sort of mysticism akin to that of the Odist. This observation adds some weight to another similarity, *Eph.* xv, 2: "Who has truly *acquired the mind* [λόγος] *of Jesus*, is able to *hear also His rest* [δύναται καὶ τῆς ἡσυχίας αὐτοῦ ἀκούειν] that he may be perfect, so that he [or "He"?] may be *working through what he speaks* and may be known through *his silence*." (Better: that his words may be deeds and his silence a speech.) Ode XXVI has:

1. I poured out praise to the Lord *for I am His*:
  2. And I will speak His holy song, for my heart is with Him
  3. For His harp is in my hands and the *Odes of His rest* shall not be silent
- . . . . .
13. *For it suffices to know and to rest: for in rest the singers stand.* . . . .

Of less importance may be the fact that "the harp" in the Odes is a spiritual harp, being probably a living instrument of holy inspiration. But this instrument was not entirely unknown to the bishop whether it had come to his notice in Syria or elsewhere. In *Eph.* iv he writes:

For your justly renowned presbytery, worthy of God, is *so joined together with the bishop as the strings to a harp* [χορδαὶ κιθάρα]. Therefore in your unanimity and harmonious love Jesus Christ is sung. And you laymen form a choir, in order that you, being harmonious in unanimity, receiving your cadence from God, in one voice may sing to the Father through Jesus Christ. . . . .

Of the "silent" bishop mentioned in *Phil.* i, Ignatius uses the same words: "for he is in such a harmonious accord with the commandments as the harp with its strings."

The singing in a choir recurs once more in *Rom.* ii, 2, "that you, forming a choir in love, may sing to the Father in Christ Jesus."

The interest in music and poetry which is displayed in these sentences is suggestive of a *possibility of much nearer contact* in these early days between poets, like our Odists, and churchmen even of a militant type, than one might at first sight be inclined to suspect.

We may not pass in silence the striking similarity of feeling in the domain of *eschatology and apocalyptic thought*. Ignatius, e.g., gives in *Eph.* xix a short sketch of an apocalyptic discourse, which he promises to pursue in "a second booklet." The topic of this treatise was to be (*Eph.* xx) the *οικονομία εἰς τὸν καινὸν ἄνθρωπον Ἰησοῦν Χριστόν*, but he is feeling the need of a special apocalyptic inspiration to treat worthily of this theme (*μάλιστα ἐὰν ὁ κύριός μοι ἀποκαλύψῃ τι*). Now if we turn to Ode XVIII we find these apocalyptic strings resounding there also:

4. The choking bonds were cut off by his (?) hands: I received the face and the fashion of a new person.

In the rest of this ode the poet clothed with this new personality speaks and acts as if *transformed into Christ's nature*. "Closed doors" are opened, bars of iron broken and melted, "nothing appeared closed to me because I was the door of everything." Much more prominent is this character in Ode XXII with its dragon, or XXIII with the mysterious celestial document and the "wheel." Ode XXXVIII contains also a strong apocalyptic element. We do not know how Ignatius would have spoken from the heights of apocalyptic vision, but *his themes are surely not strange to the Odists' mind*. This appears from *Eph.* xix:

And from the Ruler of this aeon was hidden the *Virginity of Mary* and her *Giving Birth*, likewise also the Death of the Lord: three loudly resounding *mysteries* which have been wrought in God's rest [*ἄτινα ἐν ἡσυχίᾳ θεοῦ ἐπράχθη*]. How then was it made visible to the aeons? A star was lighted in heaven above all the stars, and its light was unspeakable, and wonder was roused by its newness. And all the other stars together with the sun and the moon formed a choir for the star, but He was increasing his light above everything. There was a confusion also, whence might be this newness unlike to them.

And from this cause all magic and every tie of evil was annihilated. *Lack of knowledge* was destroyed, the old kingdom was given over to decay through God's revelation in human form to a newness of eternal life; what was prepared by God took a beginning.

For this reason the whole was in commotion since the extermination of Death was purposed.

Now among other parallels, two are important here. Firstly, that the destroying of *Agnōia*, "Lack of knowledge," is one of the first fruits of the "oeconomia toward [or "in"] the new man." The Odist often seems to differ from the type of Christianity represented by Ignatius in laying much more stress on truth and error than on the Cross, but Ignatius also is not much engrossed by the idea of personal sin. Atonement as conceived by him may have been much more an "illumination," a "salvation from error" than anything else, and his "Cross" might perhaps be represented as a cross of light.

But still more important is the *coincidence with Ode XIX*. There also the virginity of Mary and the Birth are hymned as mysteries. We cannot guess on this point what particular concept was in the mind of Ignatius as being "hidden from the Ruler of this aeon," but when the thoughts which he combines with the star are so startling, we may presume that he would not have heard without edification the passage, which to some scholars seems incongruous with the elevated tone of other odes.

Finally without pressing this point attention may be drawn to the fact that for Ignatius the words *temple* and even *altar* have a meaning which is entirely spiritual. This is also often the case in the Pauline and Johannine writings and elsewhere, and seems to call for a revision of the arguments based on the supposed presence of the Jewish sanctuary in some of the odes.

As an appropriate title for this collection of odes the words "God and the soul" have been suggested. Much may be said for the acceptance of such a designation as being perfectly true to the spirit of the poet, only it must be remembered that it is not the poet's soul alone but a larger circle of cognate minds which was thus singing the praises of the Lord and joining with him in a spiritual choir.

The *other-worldliness*, the mystic atmosphere in which the Odist breathes, gives at first the impression of being wholly personal and exceptional. Yet we hear even Ignatius confessing (*Rom.* iii): Οὐδὲν φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν: "Nothing in this world of appearances is good." Even Ignatius, however intent he may be on the organization and the discipline necessary for a living Church, is longing also for the "Pure Light" above. He beseeches the Roman brethren not to mar his upward flight by their love. His only desire is "to acquire God."

On this ground both the bishop and the poet meet and from this point

of view the eschatological vision of earlier days, as far as we can separate this from apocalyptic conceptions, falls a little back, though it is not absent.

From these remarks one point results, viz., the possibility of spiritual fellowship between the Odists and Ignatius. This is perhaps a fact of some importance. We may probably feel justified, therefore, in declining any attempt to remove this poet from the wider domain of the nascent catholic church, since even such a strong supporter of its cause as Ignatius undoubtedly was has so much in common with him. Literary dependence is out of the question, but *spiritual kinship* is so clear in this case, notwithstanding the evident difference in character and pursuits, that one may feel sure of its testimony. Moreover, if there were some more knowledge to be had of first-century Christian ritual and liturgy, if we could hear the early "prophets" addressing their audience, or catch the tune and words of these hymns, which according to Pliny were sung in their choirs, probably these Odes would appear but one collection out of many.

J. DE ZWAAN

BAMBRUGGE, HOLLAND

## RECENT THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE

### RECENT BOOKS ON THE QUESTION OF JESUS' EXISTENCE

The question of whether Jesus ever lived continues to attract attention. Drews's *Christusmythe*, which answers this question negatively, has recently been rendered into English;<sup>1</sup> and W. B. Smith, whose *Der vorchristliche Jesus* (1906) denied Jesus' historicity, now presents further arguments in support of his position.<sup>2</sup> Clemen<sup>3</sup> and Troeltsch,<sup>4</sup> who hold to Jesus' historical personality, discuss some important phases of the problem.

Drews's conclusions have already been examined at some length in these pages.<sup>5</sup> English readers will appreciate the convenience of having this book in a translation. While the views set forth in the book may not appeal to a wide circle of readers, the author is unquestionably at present the foremost champion of this skeptical movement which has attracted so much notice within the last year or two, particularly in Germany. He has recently issued a second volume in German, reiterating his conclusions and defending his position against opponents, but this later work does not supersede the earlier book from which the English translation has been made. Here we have a clear presentation of the strongest arguments that are nowadays urged against the reliability of the Christian tradition about Jesus, and also a constructive statement of the true origin of Christianity as interpreted by these critics. Their fundamental contention is that primitive Christianity drew its initial inspiration not from Jesus as a unique human personality, as modern critical theology maintains, but from the worship of a Jesus-Savior-God who was gradually given a concrete yet fictitious human form by the early interpreters of the new religion.

<sup>1</sup> *The Christ Myth*. By Arthur Drews. Chicago: Open Court, 1911. 304 pages. \$2.25.

<sup>2</sup> *Ecce Deus: Die urchristliche Lehre des reingöttlichen Jesu*. Von William Benjamin Smith. Jena: Diederichs, 1911. xvi+316 pages. M. 6.50.

<sup>3</sup> *Der geschichtliche Jesus: Eine allgemeinverständliche Untersuchung der Frage: hat Jesus gelebt, und was wollte er?* Von Carl Clemen. Giessen: Töpelmann, 1911. 120 pages.

<sup>4</sup> *Die Bedeutung der Geschichtlichkeit Jesu für den Glauben*. Von Ernst Troeltsch. Tübingen: Mohr, 1911. 51 pages. M. 1.

<sup>5</sup> *American Journal of Theology*, January, 1911, pp. 24 ff.

W. B. Smith, in the first part of his work, tries to show, as the subtitle of his book suggests, that the most primitive thought about Jesus was reverence for him as a god, and that this would have been an impossibility had he actually lived a human life. The keynote of this early religion was, therefore, the elevation of monotheism—reverence for the Jesus-deity—in opposition to current polytheism. But how did these early worshipers of Jesus, whom Smith regards as strict monotheists, dispose of God himself? He can hardly be dispensed with entirely, for worship of him as a person distinct from the person of Jesus is pervasive in early Christian tradition. Smith would avoid this dilemma by saying that the Christians thought of Jesus as *irgendwie eins mit der Gottheit*. But the “irgendwie” needs minuter definition. And when he claims that the representation of Jesus given in Mark is more godlike and less purely human than that given in the Fourth Gospel, he is surely looking through glasses that not many of us can hope to be permitted to wear. The other main topics of his discussion are “the negative evidence of the New Testament,” Schmiedel’s “foundation-pillars,” “the silence of Josephus and Tacitus.” The whole New Testament literature as here interpreted turns out to be evidence against Jesus’ existence as a historical person; Schmiedel’s “pillars,” which are constructed from the oldest New Testament evidence, are consequently “gestürzt”; and the references to Jesus in Josephus and Tacitus are spurious.

Clemen, in fourteen popular lectures delivered before the combined faculties of Bonn University, makes a critical survey of these radical views, examines and restates the evidence for believing in Jesus’ existence, depicts in outline the things for which Jesus stood, and remarks upon Jesus’ abiding significance for religion. Clemen holds that it is impossible to account for the rise of Christianity without the supposition of a personal founder. While recognizing the importance of the activity of *ideas*—a point of which the extremists make so much—Clemen contends that Christianity embodied distinct elements which point to the creative activity of an individual founder. For example, the Christian conception of God—his nearness, the nearness of his kingdom, and his love, are ideas which the contemporary world could not have supplied. They are Jesus’ own contribution. The sources of information for our knowledge of Jesus are estimated from the standpoint of the modern critical school, and the career and teaching of Jesus are interpreted accordingly. Finally we are told that Jesus is not merely the great historical founder of Christianity who no longer has significance for us, but a mighty personality whose influence still is experienced by his

followers. Clemen's popular survey of this whole question is one of the best that has come to our notice.

Troeltsch's brochure consists of a lecture delivered at the Swiss Christian students' conference in Aarau, and so is brief and popular. He pronounces the doubt about Jesus' existence to be a "foolish question" and a "monstrosity." He is more concerned with the question of how belief in the historicity of Jesus stands related to faith today. He finds Jesus chiefly significant as a noble human personality whose teaching was of a fundamentally religio-ethical character. Jesus' worth is practical rather than dogmatic in type; he answers the need which the religious community feels for a support, a center, and a symbol of its religious life.

SHIRLEY JACKSON CASE

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

### JOHANNES WEISS'S COMMENTARY ON I CORINTHIANS

The ninth edition of the Meyer Commentary on I Corinthians<sup>1</sup> is not a mere revision but a new book by an independent scholar. The work so long in the hands of G. Heinrici has now been intrusted to Johannes Weiss. The result is a masterful study full of helpful suggestions. Most striking in the commentary is the author's theory that the epistle is a compilation. "I hope," Weiss says in his preface, "to have placed my ideas on this in the background and not thereby to have neglected weightier exegetical-historical tasks." This theory, nevertheless, is characteristic of the author's exegetical method. He emphasizes that our manuscripts do not take us back to original copies of Paul's letters but to copies of a church collection. We have evidence of four letters which the oldest collector should have found in the Corinthian church archives; and it is hardly probable, Weiss affirms, that these much used rolls all remained in good order and condition. It is still less likely that two of the rolls should have disappeared and the other two be perfectly preserved.

Here then is the key by which our author explains many of the difficulties that I Corinthians presents. He has a sharp eye for discrepancies and little patience with any attempt to harmonize them. He is easily disturbed by differences of mood and difficult transitions. The

<sup>1</sup> *Kritisch-exegetischer Kommentar über das Neue Testament*. Begründet von Heinr. Aug. Wihl. Meyer. 5. Abtheilung, 9. Auflage. *Der erste Korintherbrief*. Völlig neu bearbeitet von D. Johannes Weiss, Professor der Theologie. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1910. xlviii+388 pages. M. 9.

explanation is generally found in the condition of the text. Chap. 13 could not have stood originally in its present connection; 4:14-21 was written probably on a later day than the preceding vss. 4:6-13. 10:1-22 (23); 6:12-20; 9:24-27; 11:2-34; 16:7b-9, 15-20 belong to an entirely different letter from the rest of the epistle. 1:2; 4:17; 7:17; 11:16; 14:33 are catholicizing interpolations of the editor who adapts the letters for universal use. Editorial additions are also found in 10:29-30; 11:11 f.; 14:34 f. Like Heinrici, Weiss explains away the Christ party by treating ἐγὼ δὲ χριστοῦ in 1:12 as a gloss. He finds with Lütgert a libertine Gnosticism in the Corinthian church, but refuses to connect it with a Christ party. Again, the exegetical difficulty in 2:13 is most happily solved by accepting Blass's conjecture that λόγους here is a gloss. Some corruption of the text is also suspected in 1:6; 1:24; 3:16; 4:2, 6; 7:2b, 4b; 9:17; 10:17.

Weiss certainly throws light in this way on many difficult passages, and gives strong justification for his attacks on the text. But the question arises whether in his exegesis literary analysis has not become too much of a *deus ex machina*. Hans Lietzmann's recent commentary stands in an interesting contrast. Lietzmann hesitates to reject even a passage like 14:34 f. which is in such flagrant contradiction to 11:2-16, and speaking of 4:6, he makes the significant remark: "We cannot fully understand the passage just because we have before us a private letter of intimate character. For this reason all textual changes and interpolations are at the outset to be rejected." Such a statement is one-sided, but has Weiss on the other hand allowed sufficiently for this private quality of the letter and the necessarily obscure historical situation? Surely exegetical difficulties are not to be explained so exclusively by an appeal to corruptions of the text.

Despite this stress on the need of literary analysis, our author appreciates the unity of the epistle and has himself pointed out a noteworthy characteristic of its style which answers some of his own arguments for division. A theme is frequently followed by a digression, and then a return to the theme, according to the formula, *a, b, a*. 2:6, 9, 13 are digressions of this sort. The same development of thought is shown to be present even in details, for instance: *a*) 1:18-25; *b*) 1:26-31; *a*) 2:1-5. Appreciation is repeatedly expressed by Weiss for the literary merit of the epistle. Attempts to deny its Pauline authorship are treated as unworthy of notice.

Like his predecessor, Weiss interprets I Corinthians in the light of a thorough study of contemporary Hellenic culture. The close relation-



ship of the epistle, both in form and in thought, to the Stoic diatribes he sets forth clearly. It is a pleasure to note also that the deep-seated differences are not neglected (cf. pp. 52, 90, 185). He discusses fully the influence of Greek mystery cults on Paul, and shows by frequent quotation his indebtedness to Reitzenstein's studies in this field. Weiss's own treatment of the problem is well balanced. He does not connect the term *μυστήριον* too closely with these cults. He points out that in the Greek mysteries it has to do with a *δράμενον*, a holy dramatic action which is to be beheld, but that in Paul's writings it is a disclosure of God's thought revealed to the inspired prophet (p. 55). On the other hand, speaking of the account of the Lord's Supper in I Cor. 11:20 ff., he says: "It is clear that here a *δράμενον* in the sense of the ancient mystery cults is presented."

No feature of the commentary is more valuable than its careful discussions of various Greek terms. Paul's use of *τέλειαι* was not borrowed from the mystery cults but is to be traced to an ethical usage developed especially by the Stoics. The contrast of *ψυχικός* and *πνευματικός* in chap. 15 was intelligible to Paul's readers because of the parallel contrast between *ψυχή* and *πνεῦμα* in the popular cults. *ιδιώτης* in 14:16 is a technical term for the unbaptized proselyte or catechumen. *πλεονεξία* is probably not greed but egoism in the widest sense. Such are the conclusions reached in some of these excursus. It is of interest to note that Weiss interprets 7:36-38 as referring to a practice among the early Christians of virgin marriages. Grafe's theory thus gains further confirmation. It is evidently growing in favor. Paul's acquaintance with the teachings of Jesus, Weiss emphasizes again and again. 7:25 shows, he thinks, that "the Words of the Lord" were not a creation of the church which grew with the passage of time, but already in Paul's day were in essentials a completed whole, not open to development.

The student of Paul lays down Professor Johannes Weiss's commentary on I Corinthians impressed with its contribution to our knowledge of the epistle, and glad to have it at hand for constant reference. Its sane, liberal scholarship makes it worthy of a place in the famous series to which it belongs. The typographical work is clear and accurate. These few mistakes, however, were noticed; p. 73, l. 12, *πνευματικοί* for *σαρκικοί* *έστε*; p. 145, l. 42, *ειδωλάτραι* for *ειδωλολάτραι*; p. 245, l. 6, John 6:26 for John 6:28.

GEORGE D. CASTOR

PACIFIC THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY  
BERKELEY, CAL.

## IMPORTANT DOCUMENTS FROM THE EARLY CHURCH

Heft 2, of the fifth volume of the third series of Harnack and Schmidt's *Texte und Untersuchungen*,<sup>1</sup> is in every way a worthy addition to that series. Dr. Karapet Ter-Mëkërttschian is already known to scholars as the discoverer and editor of the treatise of Irenaeus *ad Marcianum*, which is lost in the original Greek and of which no Latin version exists. He discovered both it and the two last books of the larger work *Adversus Haereses* in December, 1904, among the manuscripts preserved in the Church of the Theotokos at Eriwan. How long these manuscripts had been in this church he does not tell us; when in the years 1888 and 1890 I visited it, and inquired if there were any codices there, I was shown nothing except a MS copy of the Gospels.

In his *Vorwort* the editor examines afresh the question of the age of this version of Irenaeus. The manuscript itself is of Cilician origin and was written at the request of the archbishop John, a brother of King Hethum. This John was ordained bishop in 1259 and died in 1289; but the book itself is already cited by Stephanus, a prelate of Siunik in the eighth century; and two of the citations made by him recur in a dogmatic treatise ascribed to an Armenian Catholicos Sahak, who was probably the patriarch of that name from 678 to about 700. On these grounds the editor and discoverer ascribe the version to the century 650-750, when the monophysite controversy was raging in Armenia, and the doctors of the Armenian church may have seen in Irenaeus' work a useful weapon against the partisans of the council of Chalcedon. If, however, we compare this version of Irenaeus with the version of Philo made before the middle of the fifth century we see that they are both from the same hand. The diction of the Irenaeus is thoroughly classic and it exhibits the same translatorial devices and idiosyncrasies as the Philo. Above all we meet with the same paraphrastic combinations of several Armenian words to express a simple Greek compound verb or substantive. Of such uses the following are examples:

(The triple numbers refer to volume, page and line of Cohn and Wendland's edition: R.H. signifies the fragments collected by Rendel Harris; Prov., the fragments of the *De Providentia* in Eusebius; Mangey, Mangey's edition, Vol. II, page and line.)

<sup>1</sup> *Irenaeus gegen die Häretiker*, Buch IV u. V in armenischer Version entdeckt von Lic. Dr. Karapet ter-Mëkërttschian z.z. Bischof in Tauris (Persien). Herausgegeben von Lic. Dr. Erwand Ter-Minassiantz. Leipzig: Heinrichs, 1910. 264 pages. M. 10.

*Adv. Haer.* iv. 53. 1, *Κενὸς ὄντας* = *ibrou zi thaphura en* the same use of *ibrou zi* to render the Greek Participle used causally is common in the Philo version, e.g., i. 73. 8, 4. 45. 11, 4. 278. 13, 4. 280. 3, *Prov.* 82, R.H. 66.

*Ibid.*, τὸ ἴδιον λυσitelés = - *ziureantz shah augtin*. *Iur* renders *ιδίος* in *Prov.* 81, 4. 24. 24, 4. 51. 1, etc.

The phrase *Shah augti* is used to render the *πορισμός* in *Mangey* 481. 38, *Prov.* 62. *Augti* renders *λυσitelés* R.H. 52, 54.

*Ibid.*, διὰ μικρὰς καὶ τυχοῦσας αἰτίας = *wasn phoxr en dushpaqay paidjatzats*. So *Philo* 4. 302. 24: *μικρῶν καὶ τῶν τυχόντων* = *phoxuns en kam dushpaqayats*: 5. 166. 18 οὐκ ἀπὸ τοῦ τυχόντος = *otck i dushpaqoy*.

*Ibid.*, τέμνοντας = *bajanen*. So *Philo* R.H. 14, 5. 81. 1.

*Ibid.*, διαιροῦντες = *hat koloren*. This word renders *κατακόπτοντας* (*ἀρμονίαν*) R.H. 29.

*Ibid.*, κατώρθωσις = *Ulluthiun*. So *Philo* 4. 291. 20.

*Ibid.*, ὁλόκληρος = *amboldsch*. So *Philo* 4. 11. 21, 4. 33. 20 and *passim*.

iv. 60. 1. *ἀποβαλὲν* = *i batz hanel êkeneni*. The same four words are combined to render *ἐλπὶδα ἀφρημένον* in 4. 3. 9. *προὔβαλετο* in 4. 24. 15 is rendered *i durs zhan ênkêiz*, and without *hanel* the phrase renders *ἐκβάλλειν*, *ἀπορρίπτειν*, *ἀποβάλλειν* in 1. 75. 1, R.H. 51, 1. 108. 25.

*Ibid.*, τοὺς εὐνομουμένους = *or bari aurinauq khalaluthean warin*, i.e., "those who are well guided by laws of peace." The very same cumbrous equivalent renders *ἡνομήθησαν* in *Philo* 4. 2. 18, viz., *Khalal aurinauq waretsan*. This is a palmary example.

*Ibid.*, ἐπιμονῆς = *tevoluthean*. So *Philo* 1. 74. 21.

*Ibid.*, καταιγίζονται = *êstgians ambastanutheans êndunin*. *αἰτιάται* is similarly rendered in 4. 288. 15, and *êstganem* renders *αἰτιῶμαι* in *Prov.* 62 and 111, 4. 41. 4, 4. 30. 2.

*Ibid.*, ἀμέλειαν = *plerg helgutheann anphuthuthean*. So *plergutheamb helgaloy* renders *ὑπερθέσσειν* in 4. 288. 5, and *anphuthuthiun* renders *ἀμέλεια* in *Mangey* 480. 44.

iv. 62, ἵσπερείσθαι = *pakas gol en nuaz*. The same phrase renders *ἐπιλείπειν* in 5. 21. 3, 4. 35. 17.

iv. 63. 1, εὐρυθμα = *yarmaravor en patkanavor*. These two words are constantly conjoined in *Philo* to express the idea of harmony, e.g., 4. 23. 17, 1. 103. 19, 1. 96. 25, R.H. 36.

*Ibid.*, ἀφθόνως = *arantz nakhantsu yatchalantz*. So *φθόνος* is rendered *nakhants yatchalman* in 5. 151. 1 and 5. 77. 14.

iv. 63. 2, παραμονή = *yaruthiun en mshlêndschen avoruthiun*. The same phrase is met with in parts of *Philo* lost in Greek. This use of *yaruthiun* as the great *Lexicon* of the Mekhitarists notes is common in the Armenian *Philo*, but rare elsewhere. Its ordinary sense is "uprising" or "resurrection."

This line of argument is too technical to be further pursued in a review notice; but the above examples prove that the version before

us is as old as the year 450; that it was made from Greek and not from Syriac is also certain from the manner in which Greek compounds and idioms are rendered bit by bit and part by part.

The Armenian compares very well for accuracy with the Latin version. Sometimes it supports the Latin against the Greek text where John of Damascus and other excerptors have preserved the latter for us, sometimes the Greek against the Latin; thus in iv. 63. 1 it evidences the words *καὶ ἐγκατάσκειν* which the Latin omits, and of which Hervey in his note remarks that they are Stieren's emendation, but a gloss. Their presence in the Armenian shows that they are nothing of the kind. It is reassuring to find that it almost everywhere agrees with the Latin text word for word, so proving that the latter was a faithful version of the lost Greek text. And as it is so faithful in these two last books of the *Adversus haereses*, we may rely on its fidelity in the first three books where we have not a rival Armenian text by which to control it. Occasionally we get a glimpse of another reading than the Latin text has rendered. Thus in iv. 1. 1 instead of *in erroris procedere profundum* one can conjecture *in err. προσπίπτειν prof.* Here one of the Latin MSS reads *procidere*. Just below instead of *nobis meliores* the Armenian involves *nobis inimiciores*. Then it adds *tibi* with the Claremont MS, and a little farther on it witnesses to *his* which the same MS omits. Toward the end of the same section it confirms Grabe's supposition that the Greek word *ἀνθρώποι* and not *ἐπισκόποι* (as Pearson imagined) underlies the Latin word *speculatores*. A few corruptions are revealed in the Latin. Thus in the passage v. 36: *Dominus docuit mixtionem calicis novam in regno cum discipulis habiturum se pollicitus*, instead of *habiturum* we should read *bibiturum*.

After the words just cited and almost at the end of Irenaeus' work occurs the only addition which the Armenian makes to the text. I translate these additional words:

And again when he says: There shall come days when the dead who are in the tombs shall hear the voice of the Son of Man and shall arise; they that have done good, unto the resurrection of life; and they that have done ill, unto the resurrection of judgment (John 5:28, 29). He declares that the first to rise are the doers of good actions, who shall go to rest. Next those shall rise who are to be judged. As the book of Genesis has it, the sixth day is the close of this age, meaning the six thousand years, and after that ensues the seventh day of rest, about which David says: This is my rest, the just enter into it: meaning the seventh millennium of the kingdom of the just, in which they shall precede (or? advance) in the discipline of incorruption of a renewed world who in this kept watch.

The works of Irenaeus are important for the reconstitution of the New Testament text as it stood in the second half of the second century; but a certain doubt has always hung over the Latin text, because a Latin translator was so likely to substitute for readings which were unfamiliar to him others taken out of his current Latin text. But after a careful comparison (executed for Professor Sanday) of all the New Testament texts as read in the Armenian with those of the Latin version, I can affirm that in the latter we have an extremely accurate and faithful reflection of Irenaeus' citations; for the Armenian rarely differs from the Latin. In the few cases in which it does differ, it usually imparts a more western coloring to the texts cited.

FRED C. CONYBEARE

OXFORD, ENGLAND

Professor Gwynn has furnished an excellent edition of some highly important biblical texts.<sup>1</sup> The book is in two parts, each consisting of an introduction, the Syriac texts, the reconstructed Greek, supplemental notes, and an index.

Part I deals with the New Testament. It consists of a new and thoroughly revised edition of the four shorter Catholic Epistles, II Peter, II and III John, and Jude, in the recension which is commonly printed in editions of the Syriac New Testament. These four epistles, as is well known, were not included in the Peshitta, and the version just mentioned has been of uncertain origin. Gwynn shows that it formed a part of the Philoxenian recension of the year 508 A.D. After this is given the pericope concerning the Woman taken in Adultery, John 7:53—8:12, in two distinct recensions; the one, in a form otherwise unknown, belonging to the sixth century, and the other to the seventh (presumably a part of the work of Paul of Tella). In all cases we are given very full and exact information regarding the manuscripts and the history of the versions.

Part II contains Old Testament texts, namely, extracts from the Syro-Hexaplar version of Genesis, Leviticus, I and II Chronicles, and Nehemiah. The passage from Genesis (26:26-31) comes from a single leaf of vellum preserved in the British Museum, and partially fills the hitherto existing gap in the version of Genesis made by Paul of Tella.

<sup>1</sup>*Remnants of the Later Syriac Versions of the Bible.* Edited, with Introductions, Notes, and Reconstructed Greek Text, by John Gwynn, D.D., D.C.L., Regius Professor of Divinity in the University of Dublin. London: Williams & Norgate, 1909. lxxii+161; xxiii+78 pages. 21 shillings.

The Leviticus passage (26:42-46), derived from a lectionary manuscript, is the only known portion of the Syro-Hexaplar version of this biblical book. The extracts from Chronicles and Nehemiah are edited from the very important catena, Brit. Mus. Add. 12,168. In I Chron. we have 1:1-4, 17, 24-28, 34; 2:1-17; 3:1-20; 6:1-49; 23:14-17. In II Chron., 26:16-21; 29:30-36; 30:1-5, 13-20; 32:2-4, 33; 33:1-16; 35:20-25. In Neh., 1:1-4; 2:1-8; 4:7-9, 16-22; 6:15, 16; 8:1-18; 9:1-3. In this part also, the introduction and notes contain much valuable material. The whole publication is one which students of the biblical versions cannot afford to neglect.

On the first page of the General Preface, the editor says in regard to the passages from Chronicles and Nehemiah: "None of these extracts—in fact, no portion of the Syro-Hexaplar text of these Books—has hitherto been published." The same thing is said on the general title-page, and also on pp. ii, ix, xv, and elsewhere. But the whole of the catena from Nehemiah was published, with an introduction, in the *American Journal of Semitic Languages* for October, 1906; not, indeed with the valuable apparatus which Gwynn gives us, and yet in a form which certainly deserved recognition. It is a pity, though perhaps not surprising, that American publications should so often be overlooked on the other side of the Atlantic. Thus, Cheikho has recently published "for the first time" Abu Zaid's *Kitāb al-Maṭar*, and Hilgenfeld the Brit. Mus. *Letters of Simeon the Stylite*, also "for the first time," although both appeared in the *Journal of the American Oriental Society* more than a decade ago.

CHARLES C. TORREY

YALE UNIVERSITY  
NEW HAVEN, CONN.

## RECENT INTERPRETATIONS OF EARLY CHURCH HISTORY

In two good-sized volumes Professor H. M. Gwatkin, of the University of Cambridge, follows his earlier work, *Selections from Early Writers Illustrative of Church History to the Time of Constantine*, 1893, with a well-informed narrative of early church history covering the same period.<sup>1</sup> The scope of these volumes is much the same as that of the volume by Duchesne (*The Early History of the Christian Church from Its Foundation to the End of the Third Century*), which appeared in an English translation at almost the same time, though Professor Gwatkin's book is less

<sup>1</sup> *Early Church History to A.D. 313*. By Henry Melville Gwatkin. London: Macmillan, 1909. 2 vols.: Vol. I, xii+310; Vol. II, vi+376 pages. \$5.25.

formal and more topical in arrangement. Like Duchesne's work, too, it is, apparently, the product of a course of lectures given many times—in this case to students of theology. The material accumulated and organized for this audience seems to have been reworked with a view to making the volumes attractive and instructive to the "general reader" as well. The book, then, would appear to aim, not so much at making any noteworthy contribution to the subject, as at constituting an introduction to the main features of church history viewed in connection with the development of the Empire as a whole.

In the pursuit of these aims it can well be said that Professor Gwatkin has produced a readable and learned introduction to early church history, wherein, indeed, if one detects in many places a theological flavor, he yet ought to give the author only the warmest support in his effort to treat church history as a phase of history in general, and to make that view of the subject prevail, not only in the theological schools, but in the cultured world at large. To this effort no doubt is due the amount of space given to the development of Roman society as a whole. The characteristics, main aims, and chief acts of all the Europeans are rather fully treated; and the social, religious, and intellectual changes, going on apart from Christianity, are more than merely suggested. Altogether one comes away from reading Professor Gwatkin's volumes with a good deal of the feeling that Christianity and the church were a part and parcel of the whole development during the first three centuries of the Christian era. This is decidedly as it should be and makes one regret the more that, having given us a glimpse of so much that is good, Professor Gwatkin could not have given us more.

If, for example, with Cumont (*Les religions orientales dans le paganisme romaine*, 1906, pp. 1-13) he could have viewed the Roman Empire as the last stage in the formation of a Mediterranean state and civilization, the first stages of which are to be seen in the East, and with him could have viewed Rome and the West as pioneer country toward which all things Eastern as of necessity flowed, he would have rearranged his values, changed his emphasis and proportion, and given us a picture infinitely more suggestive and true.

Again, while Professor Gwatkin is in certain lines something of a pioneer, in others his position cannot be termed advanced. Very noticeably is this the case in his conception of religion, in which subject he has brought himself only to a partial acceptance of the evolutionary point of view. The result is that, in his treatment of the theme which forms the core of his work, his presentation is ineffective and out of proportion.

How firmly the author holds to this unfruitful conception may be seen from the following quotation: "Given the revelation of God, comparative religion may help to show us how the forces of human nature clothe it with religions of men; but the application of comparative religion to the revelation of itself is a fundamental error" (I, 3). For the writer of such a sentence, one can see that it is absolutely impossible correctly to present either in whole or in part the religious evolution of humanity during the period of the Roman Empire, a task which the historian of the church of that period cannot hope to escape. Indeed it is the essence of his subject. Evidently the oriental religions and gnosticism cannot be assigned their proper place in the evolution, nor for that matter can the full significance even of Christianity itself be brought out. Thus, for the author, neo-Platonism is only "the vastest system of religion ever devised by human thought" in which "the current of the time set back to monotheism" (II, 137, 138). He is far from seeing in it the logical resultant of the interplay of the oriental religions (Christianity included) and Graeco-Roman religions and philosophical beliefs; far from seeing that here in the whole of Roman society (or a great portion of it), aside from the part of it that was admittedly Christian, has been wrought a great transformation whereby people come to regard knowledge as a revelation, so that henceforth philosophy and learning were subordinated to religion, and that, hence, much of the work of transforming the intellectual and religious horizon of the Roman world was done by the oriental religions independently of Christianity. Thus he is unable to bring out the fact that along many lines they fought for the same things, and that Christianity, in carrying through to recognition the theory of strict monotheism along with the other characteristic Christian beliefs and practices, had but to build, in large measure, on foundations laid by others.

In this treatment of neo-Platonism, too, one misses another point of view: the author's language here and throughout the book is not consciously that of the reactions of Christianity on its environment. In this passage Christianity and the oriental religions are not associated as factors in a great work of transformation; the two are merely contrasted as being one, a purely human product, the other, a gift of God. That the two together were active agents working on Roman society is a fact not emphasized. There is, indeed, in the two volumes much material susceptible of being interpreted in the light of the reaction of Christianity on its environment, notably in the chapter on "Christ, Our Life" which is by all odds the best and most instructive in the



whole work, but the interpretation is never made. On the contrary, the author's thoughts are centered constantly inward on Christianity. He asks himself, How did it grow? How was it affected by its environment? Never, How were the groups of Christians scattered through the Empire affecting the custom of the various localities in which they lived? What new group ideas did they represent? As they grew in numbers how did their ideas tend to become the ideas of the separate communities and the Empire at large? No more does he ask what it meant for community life that, in the Christian meetings and meeting-places, new and powerful social centers were forming; or, how was it that Christianity, under Constantine, was able to influence so powerfully, if not dominantly, the policy of the government. That the author should not have looked at his subject from this point of view is, however, not strange, since in the past the training of the church historian has not been, even in Germany, conducive to assuming such an attitude. Significant of a change in this respect is the work of the late Professor Bigg, who in the preface to his study, *The Church's Task in the Roman Empire*, sounds a new note. But, for the most part, at present, one must search elsewhere than in the works of professed historians of the church for a treatment of it in relation to the society in which it has grown up. (Compare especially the interesting, if not altogether trustworthy, attempt of Seeck, *Geschichte des Untergangs der antiken Welt*, Band III, 1909.)

In turning to points of detail, the treatment of the growth of the organization of the church calls for comment as one of the least satisfactory parts of the book. In this connection, the author seeks not so much to know what the character of the organization of the early church was and under what influences its primitive conceptions and forms took their later, well-known shape, as to ascertain where and when may be found something that can be called a "bishop" in the later sense of the term. This point of view leads him to such misleading, if not absolutely false, statements as: "Upon the whole we meet with elders quite early in the apostolic age, and deacons rather later, but we find *no trace* of bishops in the New Testament" (I, 72; the italics are not in the original). And again, when discussing the evidence in Clement's letter to the Corinthians: "Now it is as certain as any historical fact can well be that there was no bishop in the important church of Corinth at the time of Clement's writing" (I, 291). Nothing in the whole book argues so strongly for an inability on the author's part to make careful intensive

studies of documents as these truly astounding statements. In making them, furthermore, the author appears indifferent to the stimulating discussions of Sohm both as given in his *Kirchenrecht*, which book indeed he includes in the bibliography appended to chap. iv, "The Apostolic Age," and as ably interpreted and expanded by Lowrie, *The Church and Its Organization, the Primitive Age*, 1904.<sup>2</sup> A similar failure to avail himself of the results of German scholarship and to give them consideration equal to that accorded to the results of English scholarship is apparent in the author's treatment of the Eucharist. In speaking of the evolution in form and interpretation which this feature of Christian practice and worship underwent, the author finds no traces in Christian writers before Cyprian of the notion that the elements in the Lord's Supper were regarded as a sacrifice in the non-Christian sense; in other words, no trace of assimilation to the conceptions and usages of the surrounding society. This conclusion, presented in a characteristically somewhat static and non-evolutionary form, is not in harmony with the weight of recent scholarship as given in Rauschen's able summary of recent discussion of this subject (Gerhard Rauschen, *Eucharistie und Bussakrament in den ersten sechs Jahrhunderten der Kirche*, 1908, pp. 46-49; a second edition is now out). Harnack implies that previous development comes to expression in Cyprian (*Lehrb. d. Dogmengesch.*, I, 428, cf. Rauschen, p. 60). Loofs finds the beginnings of change shadowed forth in Justin (*Realenzykl.*, I, 44, in *ibid.*, p. 65), while the Catholic scholar Wieland, whose book *Mensa und Confessio*, given by the author in his bibliographical lists, is the most striking recent contribution to the subject, finds the beginnings first clearly marked in Irenaeus (*Mensa und Confessio*, 1906, pp. 52 f., in Rauschen, p. 62). Of these changes in opinion on the subject, however, the author gives no hint either in text or notes.

In conclusion, then, while one cannot characterize these volumes by Professor Gwatkin as being either suggestive, rigorously scientific, or fully abreast of modern scholarship, yet one gladly recognizes in them merits of form and style, extensive knowledge of the sources, and a consistent attempt to treat the history of the church as one would treat the history of any other institution. The book ought to do a good work in the popularization, in a good sense, of the history of the church.

<sup>2</sup> Lowries' remark that English and American scholarship, for the most part, appears unconscious of the significance of Sohm is well substantiated by the work under discussion.

Of wider scope but of less intensive character than the work of Professor Gwatkin is Professor Flick's volume<sup>1</sup> covering the history of the church from its beginnings through Innocent III. The book is the result, not of an effort along the line of original research, nor of an effort to give a new interpretation to the facts, but of an effort to present the subject in the manner best adapted to appeal to the ordinary undergraduate student in American universities: to give an account of the evolution of the church "minus all theological and dogmatic discussions." It is, indeed, by virtue of this aim that Professor Flick's work gains most of its interest and significance. For while one does not find in it much else of especial note, the volume does possess interest as showing the rapidly increasing tendency among "profane" historians to encroach on the preserves of the church historian in the theological schools. Professor Flick's book is a testimony both to the fact that the history of the church demands a different treatment, a different perspective, than that usually given it in theological institutions, and that the consciousness of this demand is steadily becoming more widespread and stronger. Perhaps even more significant in this connection than his book is Professor Flick's work as instructor in church history which he has taught for some years with success at Syracuse University where the subject is on a par with the other courses in history.

Brought to light under these circumstances, it would be strange if the book bore any theological traces. Nor does it. The work has a thoroughly normal point of view. The church is treated as any other institution would be treated in the main. Those features of its development are emphasized that one would wish to see emphasized; and those are minimized that one would wish to see minimized. Yet here one ought to note that the author scarcely fulfils the promise of his sub-title to show the church's "influence on the civilization of western Europe": its formative influence, indeed, is often affirmed, but the subject is never satisfactorily developed. In this respect, however, he is no better and no worse than his forerunners none of whom, with the exception of an occasional monograph writer, have been able to get much beyond considering the growth of the church organization and society's reaction on the church. No one has yet consistently worked out the history of the church, viewed from the standpoint of its reaction, from the moment of its birth, upon the society constituting its environment; and, properly

<sup>1</sup> *The Rise of the Mediaeval Church, and Its Influence on the Civilization of Western Europe, from the First to the Thirteenth Century.* By Alexander Clarence Flick. New York and London: Putnam, 1909. 623 pages.

speaking, this should be the dominant point of view of any work professing to treat, as a whole, any section of church history. Be this as it may, in the present instance, in his attempt to present his subject in a form that would appeal to the general reader, one must admit that Professor Flick has been far more successful than was Professor Gwatkin, in spite of the latter's greater first-hand knowledge of his field.

Aside from what may, in a glance, be termed the historiographical interest attaching to Professor Flick's book, there is not much in it that need long detain the reviewer. Originality of treatment it does not pretend to have, and has not. While on the whole the material is well presented and includes some interesting facts not so conveniently accessible elsewhere, yet the work is not only marked by looseness of expression but also by such undue respect for secondary authors that some parts come to bear almost the character of a compilation. Nowhere is this respect for secondary authorities more strongly in evidence than in the bibliographies which would have been far more serviceable had much of the older literature been pruned away, and some indication of the relative value of each book been given.

In conclusion, it should be said that Professor Flick's book will undoubtedly be of service in the field for which it was more particularly designed, namely, either as a textbook, or as a book used for outside reading by college classes working in the mediaeval field. This is the more certain to be the case, as there is no other book which covers the field in this way.

CURTIS H. WALKER

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

---

### THE MEDIAEVAL MIND

Since the death of the late Henry Charles Lea, the author of the two stately volumes<sup>1</sup> here reviewed, is probably recognized by most as the *doyen* of mediaeval studies in this country. To years of ripened scholarship Mr. Taylor unites indefatigable research—I think it may be truly said of him that he has read every volume in the Latin half of Migne's *Patrologia*—possesses proved historical method, and sympathy and imagination for his subject. The field of study is peculiarly his own—"to follow through the Middle Ages the development of intellectual energy and the

<sup>1</sup> *The Mediaeval Mind. A History of the Development of Thought and Emotion in the Middle Ages.* By Henry Osborn Taylor. London: Macmillan, 1911. 2 vols. x+613; 589 pages.

growth of emotion." He is interested in the history of the mind of the Middle Ages—not theologically speaking, for that theme is almost thread-bare—but in

The lookings-inward of the race  
 Before it had a past to make it look behind;  
 Its reverent wonders and its doubtings sore,  
 Its adorations blind;  
 The theme of its war-songs, and the glow  
 Of chants to freedom by the old-world sung;  
 The sweet love cadences that long ago  
 Dropt from the old-world tongue.

Mr. Taylor doubtless would subscribe to the famous dictum of Sir William Hamilton: In the world there is nothing great but man; in man there is nothing great but mind. The history of mediaeval civilization—"daily life, habits and dress, wars and raiding, crimes and brutalities, or trade and craft and agriculture"—does not interest him. There is something that recalls Carlyle's intense emphasis on moral values in the author's emphasis upon the things of the intellect. So true is this that there are paragraphs in the preface that remind one of *Past and Present* in no mean degree.

No student of things mediaeval will be so ignorant as not to know that for the writing of this *magnum opus* Mr. Taylor has made profound preparation. His *Ancient Ideals* and the *Classical Heritage of the Middle Ages* may be regarded as preliminary apprenticeship to this *chef d'œuvre*. The plan and method by which he has endeavored to realize his purpose may be gathered from a survey of the table of contents of the first chapter, which is introductory. There are in all seven books. Book I, "The Groundwork," traces the fusion of the fundamental elements of mediaeval civilization—Roman, German, Christian—into a composite whole in the period roughly comprised between the fourth and the eighth centuries. The average reader will probably read these 206 pages with greater appreciation than any of the rest, for it is not too technical to be hard reading, and from the point of view of literary art is a masterly synthetic piece of work. Book II, "The Early Middle Ages," covers the ninth, tenth, and eleventh centuries in Latin Europe, chiefly the mental and emotional aspects of Monasticism as typified in such characters as Peter, Damiani, Anselm, Gerbert, Hildebrand, and the Cluniacs. Book III, "The Ideal and the Actual: the Saints," might be regarded as the high-water mark of the work, in dealing with such wondrous spirits as St. Bernard and St. Francis and the mystic visions of ascetic women like Hildegard of Bingen and others.

So far the author has centered the consideration of his subject largely around personalities. In Book IV, "The Ideal and the Actual Society," the themes become more impersonal—feudalism, knighthood, romantic chivalry, and courtly love; though even here the personal element is strong, for the exemplars of their ideas are Godfrey of Bouillon, St. Louis, Roland, Tristan, Lancelot, Parzival, "the brave man slowly wise," Héloïse, and Walther von der Vogelweide. Book V, "Symbolism," is especially interesting to the student of mediaeval art, ritual, liturgy, etc. Book VI, "Latinity and Law," is a study of the classical heritage of the Middle Ages and the influence of the Roman mind upon the West. No mediaevalist and no deep student of either ancient classicism or of the Renaissance can afford to neglect this pregnant portion. Book VII, "Ultimate Intellectual Interests of the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries," is the conclusion of the whole matter. The culmination of mediaeval thought is reached in scholasticism, the universities, and those giant intellects of that masterful thirteenth century, Albertus Magnus, Aquinas, Roger Bacon, Occam—and Dante.

This analysis merely gives the skeleton of the work. It would require more pages than a review adequately to set forth the perfect treatment of even a single part. But it is safe to say that in the future no student of culture history, whatever his particular interest, can afford to ignore these pages. What Lecky has done for the history of European morals Mr. Taylor has done for the intellectual and emotional history of the Middle Ages.

In conclusion, a word of appreciation should be said in regard to the author's copious, and often brilliant, translations of his illustrative extracts. A veritable anthology of mediaeval thought might be culled from them—thoughts grave, gay, religious, satirical, poetic. The copious notes constitute a careful bibliography and the index is excellent.

JAMES WESTFALL THOMPSON

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

## PRESERVED SMITH'S LIFE OF LUTHER

With this biography<sup>1</sup> Dr. Smith has met a long-existing need in English historical literature. He has written the first adequate life of Martin Luther in the English language. It is an impressive piece of evidence concerning the astonishing backwardness of historical scholar-

<sup>1</sup> *The Life and Letters of Martin Luther*. By Preserved Smith, Ph.D. Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1911. x+490 pages. \$3.50 net.

ship in the United States that not until the year 1911 did an American scholar produce a satisfactory biography of one of humanity's greatest leaders. And it is only within a few years that the English-speaking world has had from the pen of one of its own members a scholarly history of the great transformation of society in which this leader was the chief agent.

The author of *The Life and Letters of Martin Luther* has done well. Though his pages are not loaded with many references to sources, the reader feels confidence in his scholarship. He obviously has made a detailed and thorough study of the sources which he intended chiefly to use for this work, Luther's Letters and Table Talk. His study of documents was not confined to these by any means, for he has had access to and used the best collections of Lutherana, both public and private, in America and Europe, and has printed, either wholly or in part, a few documents hitherto unpublished or little known.

Aside from the documentary sources of information, the use of which gives so much vitality to some parts of his work, Dr. Smith has drawn on the recent German monographs concerning Luther. That a great number of studies on the single phases and events of Luther's life have appeared during the past fifteen years is known to every student of the Reformation, but these results of the latest researches have been so scattered and inaccessible that many American students have remained ignorant of their contents. This new information, most of it based on documents unknown or unedited fifteen years ago, is here presented for the first time to English readers.

The spirit in which this biography is written is truly scientific. Luther's work and character are of a nature which stirs partisanship, and everybody knows how he has been misrepresented by friends and foes alike. This presentation of his life is without bias and its fairness is all the more attractive, because seemingly unconscious; there is no straining after impartiality, or effort to impress the reader with the author's scientific spirit. There is no concealment of Luther's weaknesses and errors; along with his virtues and elements of strength and greatness they are presented as a matter of course. The best German biographers, though thorough scholars, are affected, perhaps unconsciously, by their patriotism, and sometimes are at pains to explain away Luther's mistakes or so to present those events where he was in error as to palliate, if not partly excuse, his guilt.

One of the most attractive and valuable features of the book is that the author so often allows Luther to speak for himself. Sometimes it

is through the Table Talk, often through the letters, occasionally through some tractate or other writing. All of these documents are excellently translated and add much to the interest and vividness of the narrative. One of the many chapters which gains so much from a judicious use of the letters is that on the debate at Leipzig. One letter to Spalatin in February while Luther was preparing for the disputation by a study of church history has particular value and interest, because it presents his historical argument against the supremacy and divine right of the papacy. In another letter to Spalatin in July Luther gives the substance of his argument against Eck and his own narrative of the events at Leipzig. This chapter on the disputation at Leipzig is a good one, for the unenlightening, accessory details of the event are omitted and most of the essentials given in three well-translated letters.

The chapter on the "Diet of Worms" also presents some letters of unusual interest and shows more clearly than do other histories of the period the decisive part which Erasmus played in securing the hearing for Luther. In the explanation of Charles's opposition to Luther no mention is made of political considerations and the emperor's relation to the pope, the sole factor being Charles's personal qualities and antipathies.

The chapter on the religious radicals, Carlstadt and Munzer, and Luther's return from the Wartburg gives a clear and orderly narrative, with full extracts from the letters, of the rather confused events in Wittenberg during 1521-22. The account of Luther's private life from 1522-31 contains a brief but excellent statement of his ideas on education. The story of his marriage with Catharine von Bora is an interesting one, but might be shorter, and the space given to the relations of Luther with Henry VIII could have been used with greater benefit to the reader for a brief presentation of Luther's more important theological views. For although the author states (p. ix) that he has "endeavored to reveal Luther as a great character rather than as a great theologian," he could have fulfilled this purpose without omitting a subject concerning which many inquiring readers would enjoy a brief clear discussion.

The chapter on "The Monk" is not entirely satisfying. Luther's spiritual experience in the monastery and its place in his development is of such immeasurable importance for his life and the entire Protestant revolt that it ought to have full and careful treatment and be made as clear as the sources of information permit. The author states correctly his problem for this period of Luther's life (p. 12), but the solution is not so clear and impressive as the paramount importance of this great



spiritual conflict demands. Whether the reader will perceive the change in Luther's views which occurred in the monastery and grasp its significance is a question.

The chapter on "The Professor" is helpful and interesting. It gives much information concerning Luther's habits of study, the books he used, and his methods of preparing lectures. His warfare on Aristotelian philosophy, the influence of German mysticism on him, his preaching and growth into a reformer are some of the subjects here discussed.

Another subject which has been successfully treated is Luther's relation to Erasmus. This matter is sometimes elaborated too much in detail, sometimes too abstrusely, but here is a simple, entertaining account which gives the essential facts. In fact, Dr. Smith usually does well when he is dealing with the personality of Luther and his direct relations to the events and persons of his day. This means that the chief purpose with which the biography was written has been fulfilled. In the preface (p. viii), referring to Luther, the author says: "The present work aims to explain that personality, to show him in the setting of his age. . . ." And there is no doubt that he has given a clear and vivid presentation of Luther's personality and has shown his relation to many important events in the Reformation period.

But he has nowhere given an adequate idea of Luther's great services for the progress of western civilization. That he was one of the great leaders of humanity and why he was such are not made clear. He is called the founder of a new culture (p. 407), but there is no explanation of what this means, of what the new was, how it differed from the old, or what contributions Luther made to it. A reader wants to be told what part Luther had in forming modern thought, life, and points of view. What were his contributions to the life of the western nations? It seems as if a biography of Luther should include at least a few pages showing that the revolt which he began has affected every phase of human society, has become a profound and far-reaching revolution. In a word, Luther's great significance is not shown. This deficiency does not mean that the biography is anything but excellent as far as it goes. But the author has not performed a task for which he must have unusual qualifications, namely, to make his readers understand why Martin Luther is such a tremendous figure in the history of western Europe. A scholarly and well-proportioned discussion of particular events in his life and of his personality does not meet this need.

E. E. SPERRY

## SCHLEIERMACHER'S THEOLOGY IN ENGLISH

Professor Cross's condensed presentation of Schleiermacher's chief work,<sup>1</sup> *The Christian Faith*, is divided into four parts: a sketch of Schleiermacher's life; his relation to earlier Protestantism; a presentation of *The Christian Faith*, and an estimate of Schleiermacher's contribution to theological science.

The story of his life, drawn for the most part from published correspondence, lays bare the characteristic feature of his doctrine—its basis in experience. Here is indicated the profound spiritual influence of the Moravian faith in a conscious communion with the living Christ which held him in his alternation of moods between the current orthodoxy and rationalistic skepticism. More than any theologian of his time he succeeded in solving the problem of "union without compromise of free science and Christian piety." He cast off at length the trammels of Moravianism, yet still retained the fervor of its devotion to his personal Lord. He steeped himself in the Greek philosophers—he translated Plato's works—neo-Platonism, Origen, Augustine, Luther, and Calvin, and modern philosophers, Descartes, Spinoza, Locke, Lessing, Kant, Christian Wolff, and Herder. He was deeply affected by the influence of his sister, by close friendships with cultivated women and the leading literary men of the time, and by Romanticism. His *Reden* was published in 1799. He became professor and preacher at Halle in 1804. From 1806 he had a large share in the religious and patriotic awakening of the German people. In 1807, transferred to the newly founded university at Berlin, he became head of the theological faculty and pastor of the *Dreieinigkeit* church. The first edition of his *Glaubenslehre* was published in 1821-22.

The tracing of Schleiermacher's relation to earlier Protestantism is particularly well done. It would be hard to find in forty-seven pages a more adequate presentation of the intellectual and religious forces which came to a head in Schleiermacher. Here is described, first, the compromise of established Protestantism between Catholicism and Christian radicalism; secondly, the intellectual revolt in England under Bacon and Locke, the Deists and David Hume, with the failure of the orthodox apologists; thirdly, rationalism on the continent derived from Spinoza, Leibnitz, Wolff, Lessing, and especially Kant, and, finally,

<sup>1</sup> *The Theology of Schleiermacher*. By George Cross, Ph.D., Professor of Christian Theology in the Newton Theological Institution. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1911. ix+344 pages. \$1.65.

the revival kindled by the Pietists, Moravians, and the Wesleys which brought back religion from dogma and organization and forms of worship to the indefeasible right of individual emotional experience of the gospel. To all these influences Schleiermacher reacted, and thus he found his task: to exhibit the inner nature of the Christian religion, to relate it to other historical religions, to indicate the place and right of the religious consciousness, to restate the essential and permanent content of the Christian religion, to justify the correlation of doctrine and experience, and to furnish to aggressive Christianity an instrument suitable for its propagation.

The central interest of the book naturally focuses on the presentation of *The Christian Faith*—a condensation and setting forth of the *Glaubenslehre*. For several reasons this is a most welcome offering. Schleiermacher is undoubtedly the most significant theologian since Luther and Calvin, and his influence is increasing with every decade. To the English student who does not read German, and even to one who is familiar with it, the complexity of Schleiermacher's discussions and the length of his sentences are difficulties from which one would be delivered. Moreover, the multitudinous references to Schleiermacher in almost every subject of present-day theological inquiry and especially Ritschlian thought, together with the import and fruitfulness of his suggestions, has kindled a deep interest in very many minds to find these for themselves in his system of doctrine and read them in their context and wider bearings, and also catch something of the impulse and sweep of his presentations. It was no ordinary task which Professor Cross set himself, to condense the 1,200 pages of the original work into 177 pages, and at the same time to provide not a bare outline but the full scope and movement of Schleiermacher's thought. In this attempt he has been more than successful. He has given us a model of condensation, of self-effacement, save so far as his profound sympathy with his author finds rich expression, of interpretative insight, of simple and lucid exposition, and he has preserved the proportion of emphasis. If we are not to have a translation of Schleiermacher's great work in English, this condensation together with Oman's translation of the *Reden* (*Discourses on Religion to the Educated among Its Despisers*) will go far to put us in possession of the secret of Schleiermacher's powerful impulse to Christian thinking in the past one hundred years. Yet this ought to stimulate still further the desire for a translation of the complete work, which no one is better qualified to undertake than is Professor Cross. The attention of the reader will especially be drawn

to the part which Christian experience plays in Christian doctrine and the exclusion of all material which does not spring out of that experience, to the setting forth of the antithesis in the religious self-consciousness on the one hand, of sin and of grace, on the other, to the intense vitality of his doctrine of the person and work of Christ, to his doctrine of election, of the Holy Spirit, and of the divine Trinity. Reference to the German text is facilitated by paragraph references to corresponding sections of the original work, published in four volumes, Gotha, 1889.

In his estimate of Schleiermacher's theological system Professor Cross suggests lines of criticism and the direction which constructive theology must take in answer to current needs. Here he shows Schleiermacher's influence in the philosophy of religion in the analysis and comparison of the religious process, in apologetics in the contention that religion is an integral necessity of personality and that Christian faith is based on the person of Christ, in dogmatics as leading theology back to conscious relation to Jesus Christ wherein authority is not external but dynamic, the subjective is balanced by the community aspect of faith and all doctrinal formulation goes back to the inner life and is tested by its ministry there. The author subjects Schleiermacher's idea of religion, knowledge, and revelation as well as his conception of Christianity and Christ to a searching criticism and closes his presentation with the following significant words:

It remains the imperishable honor of Schleiermacher that he grasped the whole problem of theology in a new way and compelled theologians of all schools to follow him. He vindicated for the religious life the claim to utter supremacy in any theory of the relations of God, man, and the world. He has gradually forced modern theology to attempt the radical reconsideration of every traditional doctrine. . . . Moreover, his whole treatment of the problems of theology is so rich in suggestion that every theologian of the present day is his debtor and many of his most stimulating ideas are still awaiting development.

Two additional features of the book deserve notice. Works of reference are added for those who may wish independently to pursue the study of Schleiermacher and his place in Protestant theology, and a full and valuable index is provided.

The date of Schleiermacher's birth is 1768 and not, as given on p. 3, 1763.

CLARENCE AUGUSTINE BECKWITH

CHICAGO THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

## CUSHMAN'S HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

Histories of philosophy are numerous, but few have the difficulties of beginners in view. A work by Professor Cushman<sup>1</sup> meets a real need. It covers the entire field of philosophy in the western world, and, written as it is with practically no philosophical bias, it is likely to appeal to students, and to general readers as well, who are interested in any phase of the human spirit's activity when presented in a scientifically historical manner.

In the first volume, both ancient and mediaeval philosophy are treated, the latter extending until about 1453. The author's sense of proportion is well displayed by the space allotted to the different periods, and the cultural background is developed with not a little skill. The handling of the various ethical schools just after Aristotle's death is especially worthy of note, but the treatment of the succeeding religious period, while good, is not quite so satisfactory. Not infrequently one feels that, if the analysis had been a little deeper and if the differences had been placed in sharper antithesis, there would have been a gain. This, however, may have been contrary to the author's purpose. The few maps and the cuts illustrating the different phases of the Ptolemaic theory of the heavens are a distinct advantage. Especially valuable, too, is the list of Platonic readings from the master hand of Professor Jowett.

In the second volume, which deals with modern philosophy, the division into periods is rather novel and suggestive. The philosophy of the Renaissance extends from about 1453 to 1690, and is followed by the Enlightenment, 1690 to 1781. In each period there are several subdivisions according to the character of the thought. Kant stands by himself, and then come the German idealists, the philosophy of the thing-in-itself, and the philosophy of the nineteenth century. The treatment of the subject-matter throughout is apparently impartial and with a due sense of proportion. The maps add interest and the grouping of the writers of the Enlightenment and the comparative tables of dates are serviceable.

There are, however, several inaccuracies and rather misleading statements in this volume which, though they do not materially mar the work as a whole, call for brief mention. The customary date for the beginning of the Protestant Reformation is not 1518, Leibnitz' mother was not a

<sup>1</sup> *A Beginner's History of Philosophy*. By H. E. Cushman. 2 vols. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co. Vol. I, 1910, xx+406 pages, \$1.60; Vol. II, 1911, xvii+377 pages, \$1.60.

Pietist, since Pietism, technically so called, began in 1666 and she died in 1664. Newton did not die in 1722. One can hardly say that "from his [Locke's] theory of religion came Deism," since Deism antedated Locke, as the author indicates later, and Hume was probably not throwing bricks at Spinoza, as one might infer from the statement on p. 88. On the other hand it was Hume himself who used the expression "hideous hypothesis," meaning Spinoza's. Berkeley's work was the *Principles of Human Knowledge* and not as stated on pp. 172 and 177. It is but a half-truth to call Samuel Johnson "an Episcopal missionary," and Jonathan Edwards probably did not get the Berkeleian idealism from Johnson. (Cf. I. Woodbridge Riley, *American Philosophy*, 1907, p. 146.) Such a moot question demanded a footnote. The references to Hegel's *Logic* and *Encyclopaedia* on pp. 318 and 338 should have been consistent, and the statement in the concluding paragraph that "at the beginning of the twentieth century there seems to be a reaction from the scientific positivism" should have been expanded to avoid misinterpretation.

One further word of criticism might be added. The handling of the scientific development would have been improved, if the Democritan influence had been pointed out more at length. The basis for this was laid in Vol. I, p. 116, but this early promise was not fulfilled.

In spite of these flaws, however, the work as a whole is admirable and deserves wide adoption for classroom purposes.

GREGORY D. WALCOTT

HAMLIN UNIVERSITY  
ST. PAUL, MINN.

---

## BRIEF MENTION

### OLD TESTAMENT

BEER, GEORG. *Pascha oder das jüdische Osterfest*. [Sammlung gemeinverständlicher Vorträge und Schriften aus dem Gebiet der Theologie und Religionsgeschichte. No. 64.] Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1911. vii+44 pages. M. 1. 20.

Beer declares the Passover to have been originally a pastoral feast and like the Sabbath held in honor of the moon-god, thus having no relation to Yahweh-worship. This feast upon the soil of Canaan was consolidated with the feast of Unleavened Bread and incorporated into the religion of Yahweh, where it is given historical significance. This pamphlet is the forerunner of a larger discussion of the same subject which will present the facts in full upon which these opinions are based.

GLAUE, P., UND RAHLFS, A. *Fragmente einer griechischen Uebersetzung des samaritanischen Pentateuchs*. [Mitteilungen des Septuaginta-Unternehmens der königlichen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen. Heft 2.] Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1911. 38 pages. M. 1.50.

The Royal Academy at Göttingen has undertaken the great task of attempting to recover the original text of the Septuagint. This involves a thorough scrutiny of a host of MSS, comparison with daughter-versions, etc. Meantime various prolegomena to the task are being disposed of. The interest of the present piece of work lies in the fact that it deals with some fragments of a previously unknown Greek rendering of the Samaritan version of Deut., chaps 24-29. A photographic facsimile of the fragments is offered and a critical edition of the text with a running commentary on the points of agreement and difference between it and (1) the Hebrew text of the Jews; (2) the Hebrew text of the Samaritans; (3) the Samaritan Targum, and (4) the previously known Greek translations. From these comparisons it appears that (a) this is a translation of the Samaritan text; (b) that it very closely resembles the Samaritan Targum; (c) that while influenced by the already existing Septuagint it nevertheless displays marked independence of it; (d) that it is faithful to its original but by no means in slavish subjection to it, like Aquila; (e) that it is later than the Septuagint but earlier than Origen.

HÄNEL, J. *Die aussermassoretischen Uebereinstimmungen zwischen der Septuaginta und der Peschitta in der Genesis*. [Beihefte zur Zeitschrift für die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft, XX.] Giessen: A. Töpelmann, 1911. 87 pages. M. 3.60.

The purpose of this study is to see what light is thrown by the Greek and Syriac translations of Genesis upon the question as to the relation between these two translations as a whole. The point of attack is furnished by the cases in which Greek and Syriac agree as over against the Massoretic text. The specific problem raised by such cases is this: do Greek and Syriac go back to a common Hebrew source different from the Massoretic text, or did the Syriac rendering make use of the Greek, or are the agreements due to later editorial efforts which sought to bring Syriac into harmony with Greek? In the attempt to answer this question, Hänel first collates all the variant readings of Syriac and decides upon the original form of Syriac. The second chapter lists all the cases of agreement between Syriac and Greek as over against the Massoretic text, and also those between Syriac and various groups of Greek MSS. The third and last chapter, on the basis of the facts thus far collected, proceeds to consider the origin of these agreements. The important conclusions are: (1) Lucian did not use Syriac in his recension of Greek; (2) the Hebrew originals of Syriac and Greek stand nearer to each other than either of them does to the Massoretic text; (3) Syriac is strongly influenced by Greek directly, though it may not be said exactly in what way the influence was exerted. This is a piece of work revealing great industry and excellent judgment and is deserving of high praise.

JASTROW, MORRIS, JR. *Die Religion Babyloniens und Assyriens*. 17. Lieferung. Giessen: A. Töpelmann, 1911. 80 pages. M. 1.50.

This part brings the conclusion of the twentieth chapter on "Vorzeichen und Deutungslehre," to which 537 pages have been given. No more convincing evidence

of the fact that the German edition is in reality a new book can be cited than the statement that in the English original the space devoted to oracles and omens amounted all told to only 80 pages, whereas in this book the same subject has already been given 647 pages, and the end is not yet. The completion of the book is promised for the spring of 1912. This last section of the twentieth chapter takes up the omens afforded by the state of the weather, storms, etc. These were worked out to a most elaborate degree. In summary, Jastrow calls attention to the undoubted influence of Babylonian astrology and omenology upon the Etruscan civilization and that of the Greeks. Of even greater interest is the evidence offered to show that the Chinese too were indebted to Babylonia in the same way. The suggestion that Turkestan was the meeting place of the Chinese and Babylonian cultures is attractive. The beginning of chap. xxi deals with divination by means of oil, water, and serpents. One of the many things that render this work of great value is the fact that a large amount of source-material is given in translation, much of it being here translated for the first time.

CHEYNE, T. K. *The Two Religions of Israel, with a Re-examination of the Prophetic Narratives and Utterances.* London: A. & C. Black, 1911. xv+428 pages. 12s. 6d.

This title means just what it says. All scholars have recognized a cleavage in the religious life of Israel, the great spiritual prophets like Amos, Hosea, *et al.*, being separated from the superstitious and idolatrous masses by a great gulf. But Cheyne means more than this; the great prophets as representatives of Yahweh were the spokesmen of the one and the higher religion. The so-called false "prophets" for the most part and the mass of the people were the representatives of another and totally different religion, viz., Jerahmeelism. This latter and lower religion is identical with Baalism. Both religions originated in North Arabia: "to Amos, as to his people in general, N. Arabia must have been a holy land, full of precious memories of the past." It will thus be seen that this is but another attempt to commend the Jerahmeelite hypothesis to the scholarly public. In the midst of the many vagaries growing out of this hypothesis, the careful reader will discover an occasional suggestion that recalls the earlier work of this brilliant scholar. The first eighteen pages of the Introduction which concern themselves with the origin and character of Israelitish prophecy are especially well worth reading.

GRESSMANN, H., *et al.* *Die Schriften des Alten Testaments in Auswahl neu übersetzt und für die Gegenwart erklärt.* 11. u. 12. (Doppel-) Lieferungen: *Die Urgeschichte und die Patriarchen nebst Einleitung in die fünf Bücher Moses und in die Sagen des 1. Buches Moses* (Bogen 11-20), von H. Gunkel. 13. Lieferung: *Weisheit* (Das Buch Hiob, Spruchweisheit, Betrachtungen des Kohelet), von Paul Volz (Bogen 1-5). 14. Lieferung: *Die Lyrik des Alten Testaments*, von W. Stärk (Bogen 12-16). Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1911. x+310 pages. M. 3.20.

The parts of this popular commentary succeed each other with commendable rapidity and regularity. The parts here listed present the completion of Gunkel's work on the traditions and patriarchal legends which constitutes the conclusion of the first volume of the work as a whole. Volz's portion covers the introduction to the



Book of Job with the translation and interpretation of the first thirty-nine chapters of Job. Stärk carries on his work upon the Psalms, completing the presentation of his second section of the Psalter, viz., the prayers, and making a good start upon the third section, to wit, the songs. The point of view and method of Gunkel's work are familiar to all students by reason of this work being but a popular presentation of the materials already published in his great commentary on Genesis, now in its third edition. Volz treats the Book of Job as composed of four different main strata: (1) the prologue and epilogue, which furnished the old traditional basis for the later expansions; (2) the debate between Job and the three friends (chaps. 3-31); (3) the speeches of Elihu added still later; (4) the Yahweh speeches (chaps. 38-41). Volz's translation is in blank verse and constitutes the most valuable part of his contribution. Stärk's treatment of the psalter offers a translation and strophical reconstruction of the individual psalms, together with brief introductory notes and footnotes devoted chiefly to the emendation of the text. Those who contemplate the purchase of this series should send in their orders at once, since the publishers announce an increase of price with the completion of the second volume which is near at hand.

---

#### NEW TESTAMENT AND PATRISTICS

ROBERTSON, A. T. *Kurzfassste Grammatik des neutestamentlichen Griechisch mit Berücksichtigung der Ergebnisse der vergleichenden Sprachwissenschaft und der κοινή-Forschung*. Deutsche Ausgabe von Hermann Stocks. Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1911. xvi+312 pages. M. 5.

The German edition of Robertson's *Short Grammar of the Greek New Testament* is a revision rather than a translation. The various suggestions for improvement offered by reviewers (see, e.g., *Biblical World*, XXXIV, 1909, 138; *Theologischer Jahresbericht*, I, 1909, 183) of the American edition need not be repeated. Suffice it to say that Debrunner (*Theologische Literaturzeitung*, 1909, col. 228) and others had regarded the author's employment of the comparative method as hardly a success. Profiting by this criticism, the German editor made a thorough study of comparative philology. The result of this independent labor is a vastly improved grammar. The chapter divisions have been retained, but the enumeration of sections has been made more scholarly by being made continuous. Paragraphs have been rearranged, reduced, revised, and rejected. The text has become more homogeneous through the copious use of footnotes, conspicuous by their complete absence in the American edition. Quotations from the LXX, the apocrypha, the κοινή, Josephus, etc., have been added. The bibliographic jungle has been transformed into a carefully and systematically arranged as well as greatly increased reference list that should encourage the student to continue his reading along lines suggested by his perusal of this brief grammar.

HUTTON, EDWARD ARDRON. *An Atlas of Textual Criticism*. Being an Attempt to Show the Mutual Relationship of the Authorities for the Text of the New Testament up to about 1000 A.D. Cambridge: University Press; New York: Putnam, 1911. 125 pages and 9 charts. \$1. 50.

Reluctant to follow Dr. Hort in his distinguishing of neutral readings from Alexandria, Mr. Hutton classifies readings as Alexandrian, Western, and Syrian.

He perceives that these textual types may best be compared by exhibiting their readings in passages where all three differ, i.e., by confronting the Syrian reading with its Western and Alexandrian rivals. An interesting table of such triple readings is accordingly given, to enable the student to satisfy himself as to the relative excellence of the three types of text in all parts of the New Testament. This is followed by a table of the witnesses—manuscripts, versions, and Fathers—supporting the reading given, ingeniously designed to show the textual complexion of each witness. This part of Mr. Hutton's work is suggestive and helpful, and it is his feeling that a fuller carrying out of it would yield valuable results for textual study. Aside from this the book makes no important contribution to textual criticism.

BLUNT, A. W. F. *The Apologies of Justin Martyr*. (Cambridge Patristic Texts.) Cambridge: University Press; New York: Putnam, 1911. lviii+154 pages. \$2.25.

After a comprehensive, well-proportioned introduction, dealing with the life and thought of Justin and the date, text, and course of thought of the Apologies, follows the Greek text of the Apologies, with good historical and exegetical notes. The spurious "epistle of Antoninus" and the rescript of Hadrian are treated in two appendices. Mr. Blunt's Greek text of Justin differs very little from that of Krüger; he specifies twenty-eight readings in which he has thus departed from Krüger's excellent edition. Krüger's convenient versification is also retained. Blunt departs most notably from Krüger in placing the eighth chapter of the "Second Apology" after the second, following the Paris manuscript in preference to Eusebius.

Blunt is very doubtful as to Justin's acquaintance with the Fourth Gospel, and attaches little importance to Harnack's view that he knew the Gospel of Peter. He recognizes that our so-called Apologies are really one, or rather an apology and a supplement, as Harnack has shown. The work is rightly assigned to circa A.D. 153. Mr. Blunt says something of the theology of Justin, and of his picture of early Christian worship and ritual. In his list of chief editions he fails to mention Professor Gildersleeve's useful edition of 1877, as compared with which Mr. Blunt's is perhaps inferior on the philological, and superior on the historical, side. He has produced a very attractive edition of the leading documents of the pre-Catholic Christianity of the second century.

HOLL, D. KARL. *Die handschriftliche Überlieferung des Epiphanius (Anacortus und Panarion)*. *Texte und Untersuchungen*, herausgeg. von Harnack und Schmidt, XXXVI, 2. Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1910. M. 3.

With the conscientious accuracy and the expert facility to which we have become accustomed in the *Texte und Untersuchungen*, Karl Holl discusses in this pamphlet the textual tradition of Epiphanius. He adds four manuscripts to those which had been used for the best previous editions (Öhler, 1859-61, and Dindorf, 1859-62) and, as a result of his painstaking examination, he is able to elucidate the textual history of Epiphanius' writings to a degree undreamed of by his predecessors. He finds, in brief, that the best of the nine manuscripts extant is Vaticanus 503, beside which only Marcianus 125 has some independent value, all the others being either directly or indirectly derived from Vaticanus 503. We await with pleasure Dr. Holl's critical edition, which will put on a sound basis the text of this mine of information on the history of the early church and its literature.

HEIKEL, IVAR A. *Kritische Beiträge zu den Constantin-Schriften des Eusebius. Texte und Untersuchungen*, herausgeg. von Harnack und Schmidt, XXXVI, 4. Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1911. M. 3. 50.

A valuable addition to the literature concerning Eusebius is here presented to us. The slender, modest volume is packed with valuable information. Heikel explains its origin and publication by a remark in Stahlin's *Editionstechnik*, to the effect that, a few years after the publication of a text-critical edition, the editor should bring before the public such corrections, emendations, or additions as he or his reviewers have been able to make in the meantime. Heikel gives us here a variegated collection indeed. First, he brings much new material to bear in support of his contention against Wendland, Harnack, Schwartz, *et al.*, that the so-called "Oration of Constantine to the Holy Assembly" is not authentic, and probably nothing more than a mere school exercise based upon a statement of Eusebius in Book IV of the *Vita Constantini*, to which this oration is added as Book V. Secondly, he adds much new text-critical, material recollations, evaluations of manuscripts, etc., etc. Then follows a new statement of his conception of the composition of the *Laus Constantini*, as against that of Schwartz, *et al.*, to which is added the text-critical material from the new edition of the *Theophania* by Gressmann. Finally new proofs are set forth for the non-Eusebian origin of the chapter-indices of the manuscripts for these books. It is too bad that a work, upon which so much diligence has been expended, should be marred here and there by some very faulty German. In spite of this no one who makes use of the new Berlin edition of Eusebius for scientific purposes can afford to overlook this book.

GRIST, WILLIAM ALEXANDER. *The Historic Christ in the Faith of Today*. New York: Revell, 1911. 517 pages. \$2.50.

This extensive study in the Gospels appears to aim at being critical, and does indeed make some use of the methods and results of modern criticism. But properly speaking the book is not critical and makes no contribution to the subject. One fails to find any reference to either Holtzmann, to J. Weiss, to Schweitzer, or to the "Hat Jesus gelebt?" controversy and its leaders. We should expect to find more of consequence in a book of such proportions, of so serious a tone, and with such a theme. It is difficult to conceive of any worthy purpose it can serve, at all commensurate with its pretensions.

Greek words are frequently quoted, but often inaccurately. Quite a list of such errors could be given, but it is not necessary. Sometimes English words are used in a very peculiar manner, such as "anthropomorphism" for subjectivity on p. 11, and "theosophy" (theology?) on p. 13. That the book contains some good thoughts goes without saying.

---

#### CHURCH HISTORY

SCHMIDT, P. ULRICH. *P. Stephan Fridolin*. München: Leutner, 1911. xii+166 pages. M. 3. 80.

This biography of a Franciscan preacher dwelling at Nürnberg in the latter half of the fifteenth century is the work of an affectionate and admiring brother of the twentieth century. Though primarily a biography, it is at the same time a contribution to the history of preaching in the later Middle Ages. The author appears

not only as historian but also as apologist and defender of this phase of the church's work.

Preaching was much more general, he finds, than former Protestant prejudice supposed. The dominant influence in its development was the example of the Mendicant Orders and their works on homiletics. It was the Mendicants who roused the secular clergy from their lethargy and spurred them to emulation.

One of the greatest of the mediaeval pulpit orators, one who "united all the qualities of an excellent preacher," was "our Franciscan," whose sermons "are in part true gems of mediaeval German prose and genuine pearls of moving eloquence." The high praise of Stephan Fridolin involves the admission that, in spite of its many excellencies, mediaeval preaching had some defects; for we read that "he was one of the few preachers of the closing Middle Ages who was not guilty of the numerous evils characteristic of the preaching of that day." The only fault which he had in common with his contemporaries was bitterness in denunciation of the Jews. As humanist, historian, and memismatist he was a man of solid learning and achievement.

Owing to meager sources, the biography gives only limited information concerning the events of Fridolin's life. But there is ample compensation for this unavoidable lack in the many glimpses into the customs, life, and ideals of the time.

VOGT, ALBERT (Editor). *L'Exposition de la doctrine de l'église catholique*. Paris: Bloud et Cie, 1911. 214 pages. Fr. 3.

This famous little treatise on Roman Catholic doctrine was the most successful of all Bossuet's works and has been translated into all the languages of Europe. It is one of the fruits of the intense effort made by the Catholic clergy of France prior to the revocation of the Edict of Nantes to controvert Protestant doctrine. From 1652 Bossuet had been engaged in this work intermittently and about 1665 began to write down notes and memoranda for those who came to him for religious instruction. These notes he soon arranged in systematic form, though not with the intent that they should be published. But manuscript copies multiplied rapidly and to prevent errors in copying the Exposition was published in 1671.

The purpose of the Exposition was to remove the erroneous opinions and prejudices concerning Catholic doctrine which had been accumulating during a century and a half of religious controversy. Bossuet hoped that a simple and correct presentation of Catholic doctrine might win back the allegiance of the rebels and thus re-unite the Catholic and Protestant churches.

The text of this edition is based on two of the early manuscript copies of the Exposition; on an exemplar of the first printed edition; and on a copy of the edition of 1857 containing notes added to an exemplar of the first edition by Bossuet himself. This copy of the first edition was destroyed when the library of the Louvre was burned in 1871. The editor has provided copious footnotes which contain commentary, historical material, and variant readings. He aims to refute the Protestant charge that Bossuet's doctrines varied from time to time and that a secret edition published before 1671 was condemned by the church.

ALLISON, WILLIAM HENRY. *Inventory of Unpublished Material for American Religious History in Protestant Church Archives and Other Repositories*. Washington: The Carnegie Institution, 1910. 254 pages. \$2.50.

At the suggestion of Professor Jameson, the head of the Department of Historical Research of the Carnegie Institution, Dr. Allison has undertaken and completed this

inventory of American church history materials lying unpublished in libraries and offices throughout the country. No effort is made to systematize or organize the material. The task Professor Allison has set himself has been the pioneer one of listing the whole mass as far as it has been accessible. To do this he has traveled widely through the country and labored with painstaking care over many obscure and scattered collections. The result is a list, of surprising extent, of documents relating to the history of the various Protestant denominations from Puritan and colonial times to the present.

The historians of the American churches will find Dr. Allison's book indispensable in their future work, and the detailed index of 50 pages, which closes his work, will greatly facilitate their labors. In the case of much early material Dr. Allison has itemized the letters and documents that he has examined. Such matters as the early relation of Christian churches to the Indians, the work of the Moravians in this country, the activities of the Friends, and many others, are illuminated by these lists. Their chief value, however, is obviously as guides for the future church historians of American Christianity.

FRANÇAIS, J. *L'église et la sorcellerie*. Paris: Nourry, 1910. 272 pages. Fr. 3. 50.

This little book is one of a series, the *Bibliothèque de critique religieuse*, which includes the exiled Jesuit, Father Tyrrell's much abused letter to a professor of anthropology, and the French translation of Professor William James's *Pragmatism*. The point of view of the author is suggested on the inside title-page in a quotation from James's *Varieties of Religious Experience* and from Herbert Spencer. His thesis is that the history of witchcraft is "one of the most significant episodes in the anti-scientific conflict of the Roman church." No man living could possibly compass the complete bibliography of witchcraft, but M. Français is abreast of the best literature upon the subject, as the excellent notes show. England, Scotland, and Salem are not neglected in the survey. The malign supremacy of the "wickedest book in the world"—the *Malleus malificorum*—is amply demonstrated. As a history of witchcraft at once popular and scientific this work will fill the wants of many readers and is worth translating into English. There is an appendix of texts and documents.

PISANI, P. *L'église de Paris et la Révolution*. Tome II (1792-1796); tome III (1796-1799). Paris: Alphonse Picard et Fils, 1909. 424 and 434 pages. Fr. 2.50 and Fr. 3.

The canon of Notre-Dame de Paris, who is also a professor in the Catholic Institute in Paris, continues his study of the history of the church of Paris and the Revolution in a second and third volume which deals with the period of the Legislative Assembly and the Convention, i.e., with the history of the church during the Reign of Terror and the early years of reaction, 1794-96. In the main, the rigorousness of the author's historical method has tempered his feelings as a churchman. He recognizes the complexity of the issues, but he does not always perceive the distinction to be made between what the government actually did, and what was done by popular fanaticism or individual officials, who exceeded their powers, like Fouché at Nevers. It is a singular witness to the thoroughness of modern French scholarship to find a French priest writing more temperately of this burning question than the lay author of *The French Revolution and Religious Reform*.

*The New Schaff-Herzog Encyclopedia of Religious Knowledge.* Edited by SAMUEL MACAULEY JACKSON (editor in chief), GEORGE W. GILMORE (associate editor), and others. Vol. X. New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1910. \$5.00.

This new volume of this compendious work covers a wide range of subjects treated by one hundred and sixty-four writers. Like the preceding volumes it is not altogether new but many of the articles in former editions have been revised and brought down to date. The general degree of excellence is fully maintained. Among the articles that have especially interested the reviewer is the one on "Sacred Music" covering the entire history from the time of the Hebrews down to the latest Christian developments in the nineteenth century. The article on "Anglican Ritualism" by Canon Scott Holland in a very illuminating way treats the origin and rise and struggles of ritualism in the Church of England. "Revivals" covers the entire history of the subject. It discusses these manifestations sympathetically from biblical times down to the latest developments, including the Welsh revival and the work of Mills, Torrey, and Chapman. Many readers will be interested in the three articles given to "Christian Science," as follows: The Official Statement, Judicial Estimate, and Critical View of the Doctrines. Here, as in other portions of the *Encyclopedia*, one cannot help raising the question: Would it not be better in a work that claims to be scientific to publish the official statement, and leave the reader to draw his own conclusions.

This tenth volume still further encourages us to believe that when the great work is finished it will be a most valuable compendium of religious knowledge.

## BOOKS RECEIVED

The more important books in this list will be reviewed at length

### OLD TESTAMENT AND ALLIED SUBJECTS

- Brown, John. *The History of the English Bible*. Cambridge: The University Press; New York: Putnam, 1911. 136 pages. \$0.40.
- King, E. G. *Early Religious Poetry of the Hebrews*. Cambridge: The University Press; New York: Putnam, 1911. 153 pages. \$0.40.
- Thompson, Sir Herbert. *A Coptic Palimpsest, Containing Joshua, Judges, Ruth, Judith, and Esther, in the Sahidic Dialect*. London: Frowde, 1911. 386 pages. 21s.
- von Soden. *Palästina und seine Geschichte*. Leipzig: Teubner, 1911. 111 pages. M. 1.25.

### NEW TESTAMENT

- Beer, Georg. *Pascha oder das jüdische Osterfest*. Tübingen: Mohr, 1911. 44 pages. M. 1.20.
- Clarke, William Newton. *The Ideal of Jesus*. New York: Scribner, 1911. 329 pages. \$1.50.
- Deissmann, Adolf. *Paulus. Eine kultur- und religionsgeschichtliche Skizze. Mit je einer Tafel in Lichtdruck und Autotypie sowie einer Karte: Die Welt des Apostels Paulus*. Tübingen: Mohr, 1911. 202 pages. M. 6.
- Dibelius, Martin. *Die urchristliche Überlieferung von Johannes dem Täufer. Forschungen zur Religion und Litteratur des Alten und Neuen Testaments*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck u. Ruprecht, 1911. 150 pages. M. 4.80.
- Feine, Paul. *Theologie des Neuen Testaments. Zweite, stark umgearbeitete Auflage*. Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1911. 731 pages. M. 4.50.
- Frankenberg, Wilhelm. *Das Verständnis der Oden Salomos*. Giessen: Töpelmann, 1911. 103 pages. M. 5.
- Harris, J. Rendal. *The Odes and Psalms of Solomon. Published from the Syriac Version*. Cambridge: The University Press. 272 pages. \$5.00.
- Holtzmann, Heinrich. *Lehrbuch der neutestamentlichen Theologie. In Zwei Bänden*. Tübingen: Mohr, 1911. 320 pages. M. 7.
- Macphail, S. R. *The Epistle of Paul to the Colossians*. Edinburgh: Clark; New York: Scribner, 1911. 130 pages.
- Piepenbring. *Jesus et les Apôtres*. Paris: Nourry, 1911. 329 pages. Fr. 5.
- Robertson, Archibald, and Plummer, Alfred. *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the First Epistle of St. Paul to the Corinthians*. New York: Scribner, 1911. 424 pages. \$2.50.
- Rücker, Adolf. *Die Lukas-Homilien des hl. Cyrill von Alexandrien: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Exegese*. Breslau: Goerlich u. Coch, 1911. 101 pages. M. 3.20.
- Schmidtke, Alfred. *Neue Fragmente und Untersuchungen zu den jüdenchristlichen Evangelien: Ein Beitrag zur Litteratur und Geschichte der Judenchristen*. Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1911. 302 pages. M. 10.
- Simons, Eduard. *Heinrich Holtzmanns Praktische Erklärung des I. Thessalonischer Briefes. Neu herausgegeben*. Tübingen: Mohr, 1911. 163 pages. M. 2.50.
- Smith, William Benjamin. *Ecce Deus: Die urchristliche Lehre des rein-göttlichen Jesu. Verlegt bei Eugen Diederichs in Jena*, 1911. 316 pages.
- Wendt, Hans Heinrich. *Die Schichten im vierten Evangelium*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck u. Ruprecht, 1911. 158 pages. M. 4.40.
- Zorrell, Francisco. *Novi testamenti lexicon Graecum. (Cursus scripturae sacrae, auctoribus R. Cornely, I. Knabenbauer, Fr. de Hummelauer aliisque soc. Jesu presbyteris.)* 3 vols., 960 cols. Paris: Lethielleux, 1911. Fr. 5.00.

### CHURCH HISTORY

- Arpee, Leon. *The Armenian Awakening. A History of the Armenian Church*.

- 1820-60. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press; London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1909. \$1.25.
- Cornish, F. Ware. The English Church in the Nineteenth Century. In two parts. London: Macmillan, 1911. x+373; 453 pages. \$4.00.
- Gairdner, James. Lollardy and the Reformation in England. Vols. II and III. An Historical Survey. London: Macmillan, 1908. 506 pages. \$6.50.
- Jones, Rufus M., et al. The Quakers in the American Colonies. London: Macmillan, 1911. 603 pages. \$3.50.
- Lamberton, Clark. Themes from St. John's Gospel in Early Roman Catacomb Painting. Princeton: The University Press. 146 pages.
- Scheel, Otto. Dokumente zu Luthers Entwicklung. (Sammlung ausgewählter kirchen- und dogmengeschichtlicher Quellschriften als Grundlage für Seminarübungen.) Herausgegeben unter Leitung von Professor D. G. Krüger. II. Reihe, 2. Heft. Tübingen: Mohr, 1911. 146 pages. M. 3.
- Sippell, Theodor. Wilhelm Dells Programm einer "lutherischen" Gemeinschaftsbewegung. Tübingen: Mohr, 1911. 120 pages. M. 2.80.
- Westerburg, Hans. Schleiermacher als Mann der Wissenschaft, als Christ und Patriot. Eine Einführung in das Verständnis seiner Persönlichkeit. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck u. Ruprecht, 1911. 162 pages. M. 2.50.
- Wilbur, Henry W. The Life and Labors of Elias Hicks. Philadelphia: Friends' General Conference Advancement Committee, 1910. 242 pages.

## DOCTRINAL

- Butler, James Glentworth. Present-Day Conservatism and Liberalism. Boston: Sherman, French & Co., 1911. 122 pages. \$1.00.
- Dau, W. H. T. Justification. New ed. St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1911. 60 pages. \$0.10.
- Murray, David A. Christian Faith and the New Psychology, Evolution, and Recent Science as Aids to Faith. New York: Revell, 1911. 384 pages. \$1.50.
- Nitzsch, Friedrich. Lehrbuch der Evangelischen Dogmatik. Dritte Auflage. Bearbeitet von Professor Lic. Horst Stephan, Privatdozent in Marburg. Tübingen: Mohr, 1911. 291 pages. M. 7.
- Troeltsch, Ernst. Die Bedeutung der Geschichtlichkeit Jesu für den Glauben. Tübingen: Mohr, 1911. 51 pages. M. 1.
- Wallace, J. Sherman. What of the Church? Philadelphia: The Griffith & Rowland Press, 1911. 123 pages.
- Workman, George Coulson. At-One-ment, or Reconciliation with God. New York: Revell, 1911. 237 pages. \$1.25.

## PRACTICAL THEOLOGY

- Buckley, James M. Theory and Practice of Foreign Missions. New York: Eaton and Mains, 1911. 151 pages. \$0.75.
- Dean, J. T. Visions and Revelations. Discourses on the Apocalypse. Edinburgh: Clark; New York: Scribner, 1911. 265 pages.
- Eells, Edward. The Gospel for Both Worlds. Boston: Sherman, French & Co., 1911. 133 pages. \$0.60.
- Fiebig, Paul. Luthers Schrift von der Freiheit eines Christenmenschen für die Gebildeten der Gegenwart und für reiferen Schüler und Schülerinnen höherer Lehranstalten. Tübingen: Mohr, 1911. 41 pages. M. 0.80.
- Rothstein, G. Leitfaden zum Unterricht im Neuen Testament für reifere Schüler und Schülerinnen höherer Lehranstalten. Halle: Waisenhaus, 1911. 100 pages. M. 1.

## COMPARATIVE RELIGION

- Jevons, F. B. The Idea of God in Early Religions. Cambridge: The University Press; New York: Putnam, 1910. 170 pages. \$0.40.
- von Orelli, Conrad. Allgemeine Religionsgeschichte. Bonn: Marcus u. Weber, 1911. xcvi+288 pages. M. 2.
- Warren, William Fairfield. The Religions of the World and the World-Religion. New York: Eaton & Mains; Cincinnati: Jennings & Graham, 1911. 103 pages. \$1.00.

## PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION

- Reichel, Gerhard. Zinzendorfs Frömmigkeit im Licht der Psychoanalyse. Tübingen: Mohr, 1911. 192 pages. M. 4.
- Sanday, William. Personality in Christ and Ourselves. New York: Oxford University Press, American Branch. 75 pages. \$0.50.



## MISCELLANEOUS

- Alexander, G. Glover. *The Administration of Justice in Criminal Matters (in England and Wales)*. Cambridge: The University Press; New York: Putnam, 1911. 158 pages. \$0.40.
- Anderson, John Benjamin. *New Thought, Its Lights and Shadows*. Boston: Sherman, French & Co., 1911. 149 pages. \$1.00.
- Barker, D. A. *Cash and Credit*. Cambridge: The University Press; New York: Putnam, 1910. 143 pages. \$0.40.
- Goucher, John F. *Growth of the Missionary Concept*. New York: Eaton and Mains. 202 pages. \$0.75.
- Green, Max. *Die Judenfrage und der Schlüssel zu ihrer Lösung*. Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1911. 119 pages. M. 1.75.
- Sherman, John Carleton. *The Stunted Saplings*. Boston: Sherman, French & Co., 1911. 50 pages. \$0.60.
- Simmel, Georg, *et al.* *Verhandlungen des ersten deutschen Soziologentages (Schriften der deutschen Gesellschaft für Soziologie. I. Serie. I. Band)*. Tübingen: Mohr, 1911. 334 pages. M. 8.
- Smyth, Mary W. *XLI Biblical Quotations in Middle English Literature before 1350*. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1911. 303 pages.
- Spiller, G. *Papers on Inter-Racial Problems Communicated to the First Universal Races Congress at the University of London, July 26-29, 1911. Edited, for the Congress Executive, by G. Spiller*. London: King and Son; Boston: Ginn & Co., 1911. 485 pages.
- Summerhayes, Martha. *Vanished Arizona. Recollections of My Army Life*. Salem: Salem Press, 1911. 319 pages. \$1.50.

## INDEX



# INDEX

## I. AUTHORS AND SUBJECTS

	PAGE
AMES, E. S., Review of King, The Development of Religion . . . . .	152
BACON, BENJAMIN WISNER, Matthew and the Virgin Birth . . . . .	83
The Resurrection in Primitive Tradition and Observance . . . . .	373
Bardesanes and the Odes of Solomon . . . . .	459
BATTEN, L. W., Review of Violet, Die Esra-Apokalypse (IV Esra). Erster Teil . . . . .	280
BECKWITH, CLARENCE AUGUSTINE, The Influence of Psychology upon Theology . . . . .	194
Review of Cross, The Theology of Schleiermacher . . . . .	647
BROWN, WILLIAM ADAMS, Review of Kohler, Grundriss einer systematischen Theologie des Judentums auf geschichtlicher Grundlage . . . . .	128
BURKITT, F. CRAWFORD, The Historical Character of the Gospel of Mark . . . . .	169
CASE, SHIRLEY JACKSON, Jesus' Historicity: A Statement of the Problem . . . . .	265
Is Jesus a Historical Character: Evidence for an Affirmative Opinion . . . . .	205
The Historicity of Jesus: An Estimate of the Negative Argument . . . . .	20
Review of: Alexander, The Ethics of St. Paul . . . . .	291
Bultmann, Der Stil der Paulinischen Predigt und die kynisch-stoische Dialektik . . . . .	286
Clemen, Der geschichtliche Jesus: Eine allgemeinverständliche Untersuchung der Frage: hat Jesus gelebt, und was wollte er? . . . . .	626
Drews, The Christ Myth . . . . .	626
Durand, The Childhood of Jesus according to the Canonical Gospels. With an Historical Essay on the Brethren of the Lord . . . . .	118
Goguel, Les sources du récit johannique de la passion. L'eucharistie, des origines à Justin Martyr . . . . .	118
Huck, Synopse der drei ersten Evangelien . . . . .	286
Le dogme et l'évangile. Essai comparatif entre les dogmes de l'église catholique et les doctrines du Nouveau Testament . . . . .	118
Mangenot, La résurrection de Jésus, suivie de deux appendices sur la crucifixion et l'ascension . . . . .	118
Milligan, Selections from the Greek Papyri . . . . .	286
Montefiore, The Synoptic Gospels . . . . .	116
Souter, Novum Testamentum Graece . . . . .	286
Smith, Ecce Deus: Die urchristliche Lehre des reingöttlichen Jesu . . . . .	626
Troeltsch, Die Bedeutung der Geschichtlichkeit Jesu für den Glauben . . . . .	626
Weiss, Die Aufgaben der neutestamentlichen Wissenschaft in der Gegenwart . . . . .	286
CASTOR, GEORGE D., Review of Meyer-Weiss, Kritisch-exegetischer Kommentar über das Neue Testament, Der erste Korintherbrief . . . . .	628
Christology of the New Testament Writings, a Critique on Professor Warfield's Article . . . . .	609
Christology of a Modern Rationalist, The . . . . .	584
Classification and Evolution of Miracle, The . . . . .	569
COE, GEORGE ALBERT, Review of Ames, The Psychology of Religious Experience . . . . .	301
CONYBEARE, FRED C., Review of Ter-Minassiantz, Irenaeus gegen die Häretiker . . . . .	631
CREELMAN, HARLAN, Review of Skinner, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on Genesis . . . . .	272
CROSS, GEORGE, Review of McGiffert, Protestant Thought before Kant . . . . .	479
Crisis in Doctrinal Christianity, The . . . . .	228
DE ZWAAN, J., Ignatius and the Odist . . . . .	617
Dositheus, the Samaritan Heresiarch, and His Relations to Jewish and Christian Doctrines and Sects . . . . .	404

	PAGE
Early Christians, The Most Important Motives for Behavior in the Life of . . .	505
Evolution of Religion, The . . . . .	57
FAULKNER, JOHN ALFRED, A Word of Protest: Must Christians Abandon Their Historic Faith? . . . . .	436
First Cause, Thoughts on the Idea of . . . . .	238
FOSTER, FRANK HUGH, The Christology of a Modern Rationalist . . . . .	584
Theological Obscurantism . . . . .	96
GALLOWAY, GEORGE, Religious Experience and Theological Development . . .	599
GATES, ERRETT, Pragmatic Elements in Modernism . . . . .	43
GILBERT, GEORGE HOLLEY, A Critique on Professor Warfield's Article "The Christology of the New Testament Writings" in the July Number of This Journal . . . . .	609
GOODSPEED, EDGAR J., The Toronto Gospels . . . . .	268
The Text of the Toronto Gospels . . . . .	445
Review of: Tucker, Life in the Roman World of Nero and St. Paul . . . . .	472
von Dobschütz, Die Thessalonicher Briefe . . . . .	293
Gospel of Mark, The Historical Character of . . . . .	169
Hebrew View of Sin, The . . . . .	525
Historical Character of the Gospel of Mark, The . . . . .	169
Historicity of Jesus, The: An Estimate of the Negative Argument . . . . .	20
Historicity of Jesus, Is Belief in Indispensable to Christian Faith . . . . .	362
Ignatius and the Odist . . . . .	617
Influence of Psychology upon Theology, The . . . . .	194
Is Belief in the Historicity of Jesus Indispensable to Christian Faith? . . . . .	362, 614
Is Jesus a Historical Character? Evidence for an Affirmative Opinion . . . . .	205
Jesus' Historicity: A Statement of the Problem . . . . .	265
Jesus, Is He a Historical Character? Evidence for an Affirmative Opinion . . . . .	205
Jesus, The Historicity of: An Estimate of the Negative Argument . . . . .	20
Jesus, The Pre-Christian . . . . .	259
Jesus, Is Belief in His Historicity Indispensable to Christian Faith? . . . . .	362, 614
KÖNIG, EDUARD, Concerning Paton's Review of König's Dictionary . . . . .	461
KOHLER, KAUFMANN, Dositheus, the Samaritan Heresiarch, and His Relations to Jewish and Christian Doctrines and Sects (A Study of Professor Schechter's Recent Publication) . . . . .	404
LE BOSQUET, The Classification and Evolution of Miracle . . . . .	569
Logical Aspect of Religious Unity, The . . . . .	250
MACINTOSH, DOUGLAS C., Is Belief in the Historicity of Jesus Indispensable to Christian Faith? . . . . .	362
Review of: Dewey, The Influence of Darwin upon Philosophy, and Other Essays in Contemporary Thought . . . . .	142
Inge, Faith and Its Psychology . . . . .	142
MARTIN, JOHN J., Review of Downer, The Mission and Ministration of the Holy Spirit . . . . .	141
MASTERMAN, E. W. G., Review of Viaud, Nazareth et ses deux églises de l'annon- ciation et de Saint Joseph . . . . .	289
MATHEWS, SHAILER, Is Belief in the Historicity of Jesus Indispensable to Chris- tian Faith? . . . . .	614
The Evolution of Religion . . . . .	57
Review of Sanday: Christologies Ancient and Modern . . . . .	134
Matthew and the Virgin Birth . . . . .	83
McGIFFERT, ARTHUR CUSHMAN, Theological Education . . . . .	1
Miracle, The Classification and Evolution of the . . . . .	569
Modernism, Pragmatic Elements in . . . . .	43

# INDEX

667

	PAGE
MONCRIEF, J. W., Review of: Barry, Ideals and Principles of Church Reform . . . . .	127
Emerton, Unitarian Thought . . . . .	299
McGlothlin, Baptist Confessions of Faith . . . . .	478
Thompson, The Historic Episcopate . . . . .	125
MONTET, EDOUARD, Thoughts on the Idea of a First Cause . . . . .	238
MONTGOMERY, JAMES A., Review of Cowley, The Samaritan Liturgy . . . . .	277
Motives for Behavior in the Lives of the Early Christians, The Most Important . . . . .	505
NEWMAN, ALBERT HENRY, Review of Schaff, History of the Christian Church, Vol. V, Part II . . . . .	123
PARKER, A. K., Review of: The World Missionary Conference, 1910 . . . . .	309
Mott, The Decisive Hour of Christian Missions . . . . .	311
Speer, The Duff Lectures for 1910: Christianity and the Nations . . . . .	311
Students and the Present Missionary Crisis . . . . .	312
PARSONS, ERNEST W., Review of Viteau, Les Psaumes de Salomon, Introduction, Texte Grec, et Traduction . . . . .	471
PATON, LEWIS BAYLES, Review of: König, Hebräisches und aramäisches Wörterbuch zum Alten Testament . . . . .	107
Pragmatic Elements in Modernism . . . . .	43
Pre-Christian Jesus, The . . . . .	259
Psychology, The Influence of upon Theology . . . . .	194
RAUSCHENBUSCH, WALTER, Review of Hall, Social Solutions in the Light of Christian Ethics . . . . .	146
READ, CONYERS, Review of Thomas, Le Concordat de 1516, ses origines, son histoire au XVI <sup>e</sup> siècle . . . . .	475
Religious Experience and Theological Development . . . . .	599
Religion, The Evolution of . . . . .	57
Religious Unity, The Logical Aspect of . . . . .	250
Resurrection in Primitive Tradition and Observance, The . . . . .	373
ROCKWELL, WILLIAM WALKER, Review of Tschackert, Die Entstehung der lutherischen und der reformierten Kirchenlehre samt ihren innerprotestantischen Gegensätzen . . . . .	476
RUSSELL, JOHN E., The Crisis in Doctrinal Christianity . . . . .	228
SCOTT, E. F., Review of: Granbery, Outline of New Testament Christology . . . . .	294
Staudt, The Idea of the Resurrection in the Ante-Nicene Period . . . . .	296
Sin, The Hebrew View of . . . . .	525
SMITH, GERALD BIRNEY, Review of: Lyman, Theology and Human Problems . . . . .	139
Wendland, Der Wunderglaube im Christentum . . . . .	297
Monod, Le problème de Dieu et la théologie chrétienne depuis la réforme . . . . .	298
SMITH, HENRY PRESERVED, The Hebrew View of Sin . . . . .	525
Review of: Essays in Modern Theology and Related Subjects, Gathered and Published as a Testimonial to Charles Augustus Briggs, D.D., Litt.D., on the Completion of His Seventieth Year . . . . .	463
Macdonald, Aspects of Islam . . . . .	482
SMITH, JOHN M. P., Review of Lehmann-Haupt, Israel: Seine Entwicklung im Rahmen der Weltgeschichte . . . . .	466
Stonehouse, The Book of Habbakuk . . . . .	469
SMITH, WILLIAM BENJAMIN, The Pre-Christian Jesus . . . . .	259
SPERRY, E. E., Review of: Smith, The Life and Letters of Martin Luther . . . . .	643
Stoeckius, Forschungen zur Lebensordnung der Gesellschaft Jesu im 16. Jahrhundert . . . . .	474
SPRENGLING, MARTIN, Bardesanes and the Odes of Solomon . . . . .	459
Review of: Koch, Cyprian und der Römische Primat . . . . .	122
Sanders, Facsimile of the Washington Manuscript . . . . .	112
Sanders, The Old Testament Manuscripts in the Freer Collection. Part I . . . . .	113

	PAGE
Text of the Toronto Gospels, The	445
Theological Education	I
Theological Obscurantism	96
THOMPSON, JAMES WESTFALL, Review of Taylor, <i>The Mediaeval Mind</i>	641
Thoughts on the Idea of a First Cause	238
Toronto Gospels, The	268
Toronto Gospels, The Text of	445
TORREY, CHARLES C., Review of Gwynn, <i>Remnants of the Later Syriac Versions of the Bible</i>	634
TUFTS, J. H., Review of: Cunningham, <i>Christianity and Social Questions</i>	481
Hall, <i>History of Ethics within Organized Christianity</i>	146
"Two Natures" and Recent Christological Speculation, The. I, <i>The Christology of the New Testament Writings</i>	337
"Two Natures" and Recent Christological Speculation, The. II, <i>The New Testament Jesus the Only Real Jesus</i>	546
VON DOBSCHÜTZ, E., <i>The Most Important Motives for Behavior in the Life of the Early Christians</i>	505
VOTAW, C. W., Review of: King, <i>The Ethics of Jesus</i>	282
Stalker, <i>The Ethic of Jesus according to the Synoptic Gospels</i>	282
The Logical Aspect of Religious Unity	250
WALCOTT, GREGORY D., Review of: Cushman, <i>A Beginner's History of Philosophy</i>	650
Katzer, <i>Luther und Kant</i>	138
Lindsay, <i>The Fundamental Problems of Metaphysics</i>	137
WALKER, CURTIS H., Review of: Flick, <i>The Rise of the Mediaeval Church, and Its Influence on the Civilization of Western Europe, from the First to the Thirteenth Century</i>	640
Gwatkin, <i>Early Church History to A.D. 313</i>	635
Rauschen, <i>L'euchariste et la pénitence durant les six premiers siècles de l'église</i>	121
WARFIELD, BENJAMIN B., <i>The "Two Natures" and Recent Christological Speculation. I, The Christology of the New Testament Writings</i>	337
The "Two Natures" and Recent Christological Speculation. II, <i>The New Testament Jesus the Only Real Jesus</i>	546
Word of Protest, A: Must Christians Abandon Their Historic Faith?	436

## II. RECENT THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE

Adams, <i>Israel's Ideal, or Studies in Old Testament Theology</i>	156
Abbott, <i>The Message of the Son of Man</i>	160
Alexander, <i>The Ethics of St. Paul</i>	291
Allison, <i>Inventory of Unpublished Material for American Religious History in Protestant Church Archives</i>	657
Ames, <i>The Psychology of Religious Experience</i>	301
Author of " <i>Resurrectio Christi</i> ," <i>The Vision of the Young Man Menelaus</i>	323
Bardy, <i>Didyme l'aveugle</i>	324
Barge, <i>Frühprotestantisches Gemeindechristentum in Wittenberg und Orlamünde</i>	328
Barry, <i>Ideals and Principles of Church Reform</i>	127
Bauer, <i>Das palästinische Arabisch, die Dialekte des Städters und des Fellachen</i>	319
Beer, <i>Pascha oder das jüdische Osterfest</i>	651
Berry, <i>The Old Testament among the Semitic Religions</i>	157
Benser, <i>Das moderne Gemeinschaftschristentum</i>	325
Bishop, <i>Jesus the Worker</i>	331
Blunt, <i>The Apologies of Justin Martyr</i>	655
Bornhausen, <i>Der religiöse Wahrheitsbegriff in der Philosophie Rudolf Euckens</i>	494
Brandt, <i>Jüdische Reinheitslehre und ihre Beschreibung in den Evangelien</i>	490
Brown, <i>The English Puritans</i>	325
Brückner, <i>Das fünfte Evangelium (Das heilige Land)</i>	319

	PAGE
<i>Bruston</i> , Fragments d'anciens évangiles récemment retrouvés . . . . .	489
<i>Buchanan</i> , The Four Gospels from the Codex Veronensis (b) . . . . .	491
<i>Bullmann</i> , Der Stil der Paulinischen Predigt und die kynisch-stoische Diatribe . . . . .	286
<i>Bumpus</i> , A Dictionary of Ecclesiastical Terms . . . . .	500
<i>Burkitt</i> , The Earliest Sources for the Life of Jesus . . . . .	160
<i>Burrage</i> , New Facts concerning John Robinson, Pastor of the Pilgrim Fathers . . . . .	324
<i>Caspari</i> , Vorstellung und Wort "Friede" im Alten Testament . . . . .	486
<i>Champion</i> , The Living Atonement . . . . .	496
<i>Cheyne</i> , The Two Religions of Israel, with a Re-examination of the Prophetic Narratives and Utterances . . . . .	653
<i>Clemen</i> , Der geschichtliche Jesus: Eine allgemeinverständliche Untersuchung der Frage: hat Jesus gelebt, und was wollte er? . . . . .	626
<i>Cockshott</i> , The Pilgrim Fathers, Their Church and Colony . . . . .	161
<i>Cope</i> , The Efficient Layman . . . . .	332
<i>Cornely</i> , Commentarius in Librum Sapientiae . . . . .	317
<i>Cornely</i> , Historicae et criticae introductionis in libros sacros compendium . . . . .	317
<i>Cowley</i> , The Samaritan Liturgy . . . . .	277
<i>Cross</i> , The Theology of Schleiermacher . . . . .	647
<i>Cunningham</i> , Christianity and Social Questions . . . . .	481
<i>Cushman</i> , A Beginner's History of Philosophy . . . . .	650
<i>Dewey</i> , The Influence of Darwin upon Philosophy, and Other Essays in Contemporary Thought . . . . .	142
<i>d'Alma</i> , Philon d'Alexandrie et le quatrième évangile . . . . .	489
<i>De Groot</i> , The Religion of the Chinese . . . . .	497
<i>De la Roi</i> , Neu-jüdische Stimmen über Jesum Christum . . . . .	490
<i>Downer</i> , The Mission and Ministration of the Holy Spirit . . . . .	141
<i>Dreus</i> , The Christ Myth . . . . .	626
<i>Durand</i> , The Childhood of Jesus according to the Canonical Gospels . . . . .	118
<i>Durrell</i> , The Self-Revelation of Our Lord . . . . .	322
<i>Eerdmans</i> , Alttestamentliche Studien. III, Das Buch Exodus . . . . .	318
<i>Egli, Emil, and Finsler</i> (editors), Huldreich Zwingli's sämtliche Werke . . . . .	327
<i>Emerton</i> , Unitarian Thought . . . . .	299
Essays in Modern Theology and Related Subjects, Gathered and Published as a Testimonial to Charles Augustus Briggs, D.D., Litt.D., on the completion of His Seventieth Year . . . . .	463
Evangelies Apocryphes, Tome I . . . . .	490
Evangelie de Thomas . . . . .	490
<i>Feret</i> , La faculté de théologie de Paris et ses docteurs les plus célèbres, Tome VII . . . . .	329
<i>Flick</i> , The Rise of the Mediaeval Church, and Its Influence on the Civilization of Western Europe, from the First to the Thirteenth Century . . . . .	640
<i>Français</i> , L'église et la sorcellerie . . . . .	658
Fünfter Weltkongress für freies Christentum und religiösen Fortschritt . . . . .	498
<i>Gardeil</i> , Le donné révélé et la théologie . . . . .	164
<i>Giram</i> , Le christianisme progressif: Essai sur le christianisme et la conscience moderne . . . . .	323
<i>Giss</i> , Die menschliche Geistestätigkeit in der Weltentwicklung . . . . .	495
<i>Glaue und Rahlfs</i> , Fragmente einer griechischen Uebersetzung des samaritanischen Pentateuchs . . . . .	652
<i>Glazebrook</i> , Studies in the Book of Isaiah . . . . .	488
<i>Goguel</i> , L'eucharistie, des origines à Justin Martyr . . . . .	118
Les sources du récit johannique de la passion . . . . .	118
<i>Granbery</i> , Outline of New Testament Christology . . . . .	294
<i>Grappin</i> , Eusèbe: Histoire ecclésiastique, Livres v-viii . . . . .	491
<i>Gregory</i> , Wellhausen und Johannes . . . . .	322
<i>Gressmann, et al.</i> , Die Schriften des Alten Testaments in Auswahl neu übersetzt und für die Gegenwart erklärt . . . . .	315, 488, 653
<i>Grimley</i> , Saint Bernard, Abbot of Clairveaux: Selections from His Letters, Sermons, Meditations, and Other Writings, Rendered into English . . . . .	326
<i>Grist</i> , The Historic Christ in the Faith of Today . . . . .	656



	PAGE
<i>Gunkel</i> , Genesis übersetzt und erklärt . . . . .	313
<i>Gwatkin</i> , Early Church History to A.D. 313 . . . . .	635
<i>Gwynn</i> , Remnants of the Later Syriac Versions of the Bible . . . . .	634
<i>Habert</i> , La religion de la Grèce antique . . . . .	330
<i>Hagen</i> , Lexicon Biblicum . . . . .	485
<i>Hall, T. C.</i> , History of Ethics within Organized Christianity . . . . .	148
<i>Hall, J. A.</i> , The Nature of God . . . . .	146
Social Solutions in the Light of Christian Ethics . . . . .	163
<i>Hänel</i> , Die aussermasoretischen Uebereinstimmungen zwischen der Septuaginta und der Peschittha in der Genesis . . . . .	652
<i>Harnack</i> , Monasticism: Its Ideals and History, and "The Confessions of St. Augustine" . . . . .	162
<i>Haase</i> , Zur Bardesanischen Gnosis . . . . .	324
<i>Haupt</i> , Staat und Kirche in den Vereinigten Staaten von Nord America . . . . .	331
<i>Hauser</i> , Etudes sur la réforme française . . . . .	327
<i>Hautsch</i> , Die Evangelienzitate des Origenes . . . . .	158
<i>Heikel</i> , Kritische Beiträge zu den Constantin-Schriften des Eusebius . . . . .	656
<i>Holl</i> , Die handschriftliche Ueberlieferung des Epiphanius (Anacortus und Panarion) . . . . .	655
<i>Hill</i> , The Earliest Life of Christ Ever Compiled from the Four Gospels . . . . .	492
<i>Hollman</i> , Welche Religion hatten die Juden, als Jesus auftrat? . . . . .	490
<i>Hölscher</i> , Sanhedrin und Makkot. Die Mischnatractate "Sanhedrin" und "Makkot" ins Deutsche übersetzt und unter besondere Berücksichtigung des Verhältnisses zum Neuen Testament mit Anmerkungen versehen . . . . .	316
<i>Huck</i> , Synopse der drei ersten Evangelien . . . . .	286
<i>Humbert</i> , Les origines de la théologie moderne . . . . .	492
<i>Hutton</i> , An Atlas of Textual Criticism . . . . .	654
<i>Inge</i> , Faith and Its Psychology . . . . .	142
<i>Jastrow</i> , Die Religion Babyloniens und Assyriens, 15. Lieferung . . . . .	314, 652
<i>Jeremias</i> , Das Alter der babylonischen Astronomie . . . . .	159
<i>Jordan</i> , Comparative Religion: A Survey of Its Recent Literature . . . . .	497
Modernism in Italy, Its Origin, Its Incentive, Its Leaders, and Its Aims . . . . .	162
<i>Joyce</i> , The Inspiration of Prophecy . . . . .	158
<i>Katzer</i> , Luther and Kant . . . . .	138
<i>Kautsch</i> , Die heilige Schrift des Alten Testaments in Verbindung mit Professor Budde, et al., übersetzt und herausgegeben . . . . .	314, 315
<i>Kent</i> , Biblical Geography and History . . . . .	484
The Great Teachers of Judaism and Christianity . . . . .	486
<i>Kern</i> , A Study of Christianity as Organized; Its Ideas and Forms . . . . .	499
<i>King, Irving</i> , The Development of Religion . . . . .	152
<i>King, H. C.</i> , The Ethics of Jesus . . . . .	282
<i>Knabenbauer</i> , Commentarius in Proverbia . . . . .	317
<i>Knodi</i> , Die Bedeutung Calvins und des Calvinismus für die protestantische Welt im Lichte der neueren und neuesten Forschung . . . . .	324
<i>Koch</i> , Cyprian und der Römische Primat . . . . .	122
<i>Koeniger</i> , Voraussetzungen und Voraussetzungslosigkeit in Geschichte und Kirchengeschichte . . . . .	329
<i>Kohler</i> , Grundriss einer systematischen Theologie des Judentums auf geschichtlicher Grundlage . . . . .	128
<i>König</i> , Babylonien und die Deutung des Alten Testaments . . . . .	487
Hebräisches und aramäisches Wörterbuch zum Alten Testament . . . . .	107
<i>Kreyher</i> , Zur Philosophie der Offenbarung . . . . .	495
<i>Lake</i> , The Early Days of Monasticism on Mount Athos . . . . .	161
<i>Lebreton</i> , Les origines du dogme de la Trinité . . . . .	326
Le dogme et l'évangile. Essai comparatif entre les dogmes de l'église catholique et les doctrines du Nouveau Testament . . . . .	118
<i>Lehmann-Haupt</i> , Die Geschichte Judas und Israels im Rahmen der Weltgeschichte . . . . .	487
Israel: Seine Entwicklung im Rahmen der Weltgeschichte . . . . .	466
<i>Lindsay</i> , The Fundamental Problems of Metaphysics . . . . .	137

	PAGE
<i>Lobstein</i> , An Introduction to Protestant Dogmatics . . . . .	495
<i>Lyman</i> , Theology and Human Problems: A Comparative Study of Absolute Idealism and Pragmatism as Interpreters of Religion . . . . .	139
<i>Macdonald</i> , Aspects of Islam . . . . .	482
<i>Mains</i> , Modern Thought and Traditional Faith . . . . .	496
<i>Mangenot</i> , La résurrection de Jésus, suivie de deux appendices sur la crucifixion et l'ascension . . . . .	118
<i>Meyer</i> , Die Thessalonicher Briefe . . . . .	293
<i>Meyer-Weiss</i> , Kritisch-exegetischer Kommentar über das Neue Testament . . . . .	628
<i>McConnell</i> , Religious Certainty . . . . .	164
<i>McDowell</i> , In the School of Christ . . . . .	331
<i>McGiffert</i> , Protestant Thought before Kant . . . . .	479
<i>McGlothlin</i> , Baptist Confessions of Faith . . . . .	478
<i>Milligan</i> , Selections from the Greek Papyri . . . . .	286
<i>Mirbt</i> , Mission und Kolonialpolitik in den deutschen Schutzgebieten . . . . .	330
<i>Monod</i> , Le problème de Dieu et la théologie chrétienne depuis la réforme . . . . .	298
<i>Monod</i> , De titulo Epistolae vulgo ad Hebraeos inscriptae . . . . .	320
<i>Montefiore</i> , The Synoptic Gospels . . . . .	116
<i>Montgomery</i> , The Unexplored Self . . . . .	496
<i>Moore</i> , Pragmatism and Its Critics . . . . .	499
<i>Mott</i> , The Decisive Hour of Christian Missions . . . . .	311
<i>Muller</i> , Studien zum Text der Psalmen . . . . .	486
<i>Nau</i> , Nestorius: Le livre d'Héraclide de Damas . . . . .	321
<i>Odhnen</i> , Michael Servetus—His Life and Teachings . . . . .	493
<i>Ormanian</i> , L'église Arménienne, son histoire . . . . .	325
<i>Paton</i> , The Early Religion of Israel . . . . .	159
<i>Pisani</i> , L'église de Paris et la Révolution. Tomes II et III . . . . .	658
<i>Pollard</i> , Records of the English Bible . . . . .	484
<i>Rand</i> , The Classical Moralists . . . . .	331
<i>Rauschen</i> , L'euchariste et la pénitence durant les six premiers siècles de l'église . . . . .	121
<i>Regnault</i> , Une province procuratorienne au début de l'empire romain . . . . .	321
<i>Reichert</i> , Martin Luther's Deutsche Bibel . . . . .	316
<i>Resch</i> , Das Galiläa bei Jerusalem. Eine biblische Studie . . . . .	321
<i>Robertson</i> , Kurzgefasste Grammatik des neutestamentlichen Griechisch mit Berücksichtigung der Ergebnisse der vergleichenden Sprachwissenschaft und der <i>κοινή</i> -Forschung . . . . .	654
<i>Sanday</i> , Christologies Ancient and Modern . . . . .	134
<i>Sanders</i> , Facsimile of the Washington Manuscript of Deuteronomy and Joshua in the Freer Collection . . . . .	112
The Old Testament Manuscripts in the Freer Collection. Part I, "The Washington Manuscript of Deuteronomy and Joshua" . . . . .	113
<i>Schaff</i> , History of the Christian Church, Vol. V, Part II . . . . .	123
<i>Schermann</i> , Der liturgische Papyrus von Dér Balyzeh . . . . .	319
<i>Schmidt, D.</i> , Der Kampf um die Seele . . . . .	163
<i>Schmidt, P. Ulrich</i> , Stephan Fridolin . . . . .	656
<i>Schmidt, N.</i> , The Messages of the Poets: The Books of Job and Canticles and Some Minor Poems in the Old Testament, with Introductions, Metrical Translations, and Paraphrases . . . . .	317
<i>Schmoll</i> , Die Busslehre der Frühscholastik: Eine dogmengeschichtliche Untersuchung . . . . .	327
<i>Sell</i> , Christentum und Weltgeschichte bis zur Reformation . . . . .	325
<i>Sheldon</i> , New Testament Theology . . . . .	489
<i>Shumaker</i> , God and Man. Philosophy of the Higher Life . . . . .	164
<i>Skinner</i> , A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on Genesis . . . . .	272
<i>Smith, P.</i> , The Life and Letters of Martin Luther . . . . .	643
<i>Smith, S.</i> , Religion in the Making . . . . .	160
<i>Smith, W. B.</i> , Ecce Deus: Die urchristliche Lehre des reingöttlichen Jesu . . . . .	626
<i>Snowden</i> , The Basal Beliefs of Christianity . . . . .	496
The World a Spiritual System: An Outline of Metaphysics . . . . .	332

	PAGE
<i>Souter</i> , Novum Testamentum Graece . . . . .	286
<i>Speer</i> , The Duff Lectures for 1910: Christianity and the Nations . . . . .	311
<i>Siddhies</i> , Clemens Alexandrinus: Dritter Band, Stromata Buch VII and VIII— Excerpta ex Theodoto—Eclogae Propheticae—Quis Dives Salvetur— Fragmente . . . . .	159
<i>Stalker</i> , The Ethic of Jesus according to the Synoptic Gospels . . . . .	282
<i>Staudt</i> , The Idea of the Resurrection in the Ante-Nicene Period . . . . .	296
<i>Steinmann</i> , Die Sklavenfrage in der alten Kirche . . . . .	489
<i>Stoeckius</i> , Forschungen zur Lebensordnung der Gesellschaft Jesu im 16. Jahr- hundert . . . . .	474
<i>Stonehouse</i> , The Book of Habakkuk . . . . .	469
<i>Stosch</i> , Die apostolischen Sendschreiben nach ihren Gedankengängen dargestellt . . . . .	322
<i>Strack</i> , Grammatik des biblisch-aramäischen, mit den nach Handschriften berich- tigten Texten und einem Wörterbuch . . . . .	487
Hebräische Grammatik mit Übungsbuch . . . . .	487
Jesus, die Häretiker, und die Christen nach der ältesten Jüdischen Aufgaben Sanhedrin-Makkoth. Die Misnatraktate über Strafrecht und Gerichts- verfahren, nach Handschriften und alten Drucken herausgegeben, über- setzt und erläutert . . . . .	316
<i>Students and the Present Missionary Crisis</i> . . . . .	312
<i>Swele</i> , The Ascended Christ: A Study in the Earliest Christian Teaching . . . . .	491
<i>Taylor</i> , The Mediaeval Mind. A History of the Development of Thought and Emotion in the Middle Ages . . . . .	641
<i>Ter-Minassiantz</i> , Irenaeus gegen die Häretiker . . . . .	631
The New Schaff-Herzog Encyclopedia of Religious Knowledge, Vol. VI and Vol. VII . . . . .	165
The New Schaff-Herzog Encyclopedia of Religious Knowledge, Vol. X . . . . .	659
The World Missionary Conference, 1910 . . . . .	309
<i>Thomas</i> , Le Concordat de 1516, ses origines, son histoire au XVI <sup>e</sup> siècle . . . . .	475
<i>Thompson</i> , J. H., The Synoptic Gospels Arranged in Parallel Columns . . . . .	323
<i>Thompson</i> , R. E., The Historic Episcopate . . . . .	125
<i>Thomsen</i> , Palästina und seine Kultur in fünf Jahrtausenden . . . . .	157
<i>Torrey</i> , Notes on the Aramaic Part of Daniel . . . . .	157
<i>Troeltsch</i> , Die Bedeutung der Geschichtlichkeit Jesu für den Glauben . . . . .	626
<i>Tschackert</i> , Die Entstehung der lutherischen und der reformierten Kirchenlehre samt ihren innerprotestantischen Gegensätzen . . . . .	476
<i>Tucker</i> , Life in the Roman World of Nero and St. Paul . . . . .	472
<i>Ungnad</i> , Die Oden Salomos aus dem syrischen übersetzt, mit Anmerkungen . . . . .	322
<i>Vacandard</i> , Etudes de critique et d'histoire religieuse . . . . .	162
<i>Viaud</i> , Nazareth et ses églises de l'annonciation et de Saint Joseph . . . . .	289
<i>Violet</i> , Die Esra-Apokalypse (IV Esra). Erster Teil . . . . .	280
<i>Viteau</i> , Les Psaumes de Solomon, Introduction, Texte Grec, et Traduction . . . . .	471
<i>Vogt</i> , L'exposition de la doctrine de l'église catholique . . . . .	657
<i>Von Schubert</i> , Reich und Reformation . . . . .	493
<i>Von Soden</i> , Das lateinische Neue Testament in Afrika zur Zeit Cyprians, nach Bibelhandschriften und Väterzeugnissen . . . . .	161
<i>Ward</i> , Social Ministry. An Introduction to the Study and Practice of Social Service . . . . .	498
<i>Waring</i> , The Political Theories of Martin Luther . . . . .	493
<i>Weiss</i> , B., Der Hebräerbrief in zeitgeschichtlicher Beleuchtung . . . . .	320
<i>Weiss</i> , J., Die Aufgaben der Neutestamentlichen Wissenschaft in der Gegenwart . . . . .	286
<i>Wendland</i> , Der Wunderglaube in Christentum . . . . .	297
<i>Wiener</i> , The Origin of the Pentateuch . . . . .	317
<i>Wright</i> (editor), The Authorized Version of the English Bible, 1611 . . . . .	485
<i>Zegariski</i> , Polen und das Basler Konzil . . . . .	492

PAGE  
28  
311

159  
282  
200  
486

474  
400  
322

487  
487  
153


10  
12  
91


41  
31

15  
9  
9  
5  
1













3 0000 116 361 589